LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 05/09

Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Mark 12:28-34. One of the scribes, when he came forward and heard them disputing and saw how well he had answered them, asked him, "Which is the first of all the commandments?" Jesus replied, "The first is this: 'Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God is Lord alone!  You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength.' The second is this: 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.' There is no other commandment greater than these." The scribe said to him, "Well said, teacher. You are right in saying, 'He is One and there is no other than he.' And 'to love him with all your heart, with all your understanding, with all your strength, and to love your neighbor as yourself' is worth more than all burnt offerings and sacrifices." And when Jesus saw that (he) answered with understanding, he said to him, "You are not far from the kingdom of God." And no one dared to ask him any more questions.

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Jihad goes intercontinental.By Walid Phares 04/06/09
Casting Lebanon’s destiny in ballot boxes/Future News 04/06/09
US steadfast against Hezbollah.By Kaveh L Afrasiabi/Asia Times 04/06/09
Lebanon's opposition faces a hard climb-By Michael Young 04/06/09
The Crisis of the Christians Is the Crisis of Lebanon.By:Abdullah Iskandar, 04/06/09
Israel Prefers Hezbollah.By: Randa Takieddine 04/06/09
Analysis: Smoke, mirrors and fire in Lebanon-Jerusalem Post 04/06/09
Obama vs. bin Laden: A battle for Muslim hearts-Christian Science Monitor 04/06/09
Corruption remains one of the most important challenges in Lebanon-The Daily Star 04/06/09
Talking To: Economist Sami Nader/The Economy after the elections. By: Maysam Ali, NOW Staff  04/06/09
A message of friendship from America to the Middle East. Michael Tomasky, 04/06/09

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June 04/09
Mouawad: If Iran and Hezbollah win, the next victim would be Aoun-iloubnan.info
Obama calls for new beginning between U.S., Muslims.Reuters
Martyr Hanna’s mother responds to Aoun-Future News
Edde: Aoun wants to weaken Bekerke/Future News
Today’s scene: forgery, more violence and a “Fatwa”-Future News
Qassem Threatens Hizbullah will Continue to Rearm, Advises U.N. to Go to Sleep-Future News
Lieberman: Israel to Boycott Conference With Hamas or Hizbullah-Future News
Williams: U.N. Closely Following Issue of Israeli Spy Networks-Future News
Massive Forgery of Identity Cards Uncovered ahead of Elections-Future News
Iran, France Agree to Spare Lebanon Any Shock-Future News
Child Trafficking Gang Arrested in the Bekaa-Future News
Allouch told almustaqbal.org: Fraudulence stems from a criminal approach-Future News
Nadim Gemayel: Sassine can't turn into a weapons cache for Hezbollah-iloubnan.info
Hezbollah concerns misplaced-United Press International
Hezbollah says not seeking Iran-style state in Lebanon-WashingtonTV
What should Israel do about Iran?guardian.co.uk
WILLIAMS: Abandonment of Israel-Washington Times
Ready For War-The Jewish Week -
Petraeus questions Hezbollah's existence-Middle East Times
Mudslinging going full swing ahead of Lebanon vote-AFP
Looking at Hezbollah With Hamas in Mind-Forward
Syria to allow visit of American military leaders: US report-Xinhua
Maronite Bishops urge Lebanese to accept poll results-Daily Star
Arab monitors being poll-monitoring mission-Daily Star
NDI election observers arrive ahead of vote-Daily Star
Qassem: Hizbullah wants unity government-Daily Star
Race in Baabda could prove tight and pivotal-Daily Star
True sovereignty and independence-Daily Star
Public debt will limit economic policy options of next Lebanese cabinet-Daily Star
Family of Air France passenger await news about crash-Daily Star
Political parties seen as most corrupt groups in country-Daily Star
AUB to award four honorary doctorates this year-Daily Star
Climate change poses threat to Mideast security, report warns-Daily Star

Obama calls for new beginning between U.S., Muslims
Module body
By Ross Colvin and David Alexander
CAIRO (Reuters) - President Barack Obama sought a "new beginning" between the United States and the Muslim world on Thursday but offered no new initiative to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an omission likely to disappoint many. "We meet at a time of tension between the United States and Muslims around the world -- tension rooted in historical forces that go beyond any current policy debate," the U.S. president said in a major speech at Cairo University."I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect," he said. "America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition."
Obama's speech was an effort to restore the tarnished U.S. image among many of the more than 1 billion Muslims around the world, damaged by former President George W. Bush's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the treatment of U.S. military detainees. The choice of Cairo for the speech underscored Obama's focus on the Middle East, where he faces huge foreign policy challenges, from trying to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process to curbing Iran's nuclear program. Obama, who is hoping to build a coalition of Muslim government to back his diplomatic moves, offered no new proposals to advance the Middle East peace process, saying Palestinians "must abandon violence" and urging them acknowledge Israel's right to exist. "The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements," he said. "This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop." Before the speech, the U.S. president met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. "We discussed how to move forward in a constructive way to bring peace and prosperity to people in the region," Obama told reporters after the talks with Mubarak, who has ruled Egypt since 1981 and kept a tight lid on opposition. (Additional reporting by Cynthia Johnston in Cairo and Zahra Hosseinian in Tehran; Writing by Edmund Blair)

Obama in Cairo
A message of friendship from America to the Middle East
Michael Tomasky, Special to NOW , June 4, 2009
As Barack Obama prepares to deliver his big Cairo speech, I think back to the campaign and his election victory last November. To millions of us in America, the sun shone that day for the first time in eight years. Finally, we were going to have a president we could send out into the world feeling pride rather than embarrassment. He had intellectual curiosity about other cultures, and his very election (because of his race) signaled to other nations that the United States could overcome some of its own historical malice. Because of those two facts, we hoped, he just might be able to establish the United States’ moral authority again.
Now here we are, seven months later. It’s been a mostly successful seven months for Obama, but you would never call it an easy seven months by any means. It seems like practically every day here in Washington, Obama is on TV, dealing with some new calamity. He’s already become so familiar that it can sometimes feel that he’s been president for about two years.
So the initial euphoria may have ebbed a bit. But most Americans feel we’re in good hands with this guy. And one of the things we most want him to do is to repair America’s relationship to the world. From your vantage point, you may not realize it, but we’re not a bunch of Dick Cheneys over here. Millions and millions of Americans want our country to lead by moral example and to work with the world instead of against it. And yes, lots of us understand that Muslims aren’t all religious extremists, and that their aspirations are not very different from ours.
And that, in a nutshell, is what I want Obama to say. He must emphasize the values and touchstones that America and the Muslim world have in common and describe a future in which we come closer together. As the American journalist Robert Dreyfuss put it a few days ago, Obama should riff on the infamous title of a 1990s book by a conservative American academic and insist: “There is no Clash of Civilizations. There never was. Instead, I suggest that, working together, we can create a Partnership of Civilizations.”
Remember, too, that while his audience for this speech will be chiefly Muslim, it will not be only Muslim. Americans will be listening closely to the president’s words as well. So whatever he says to the Muslim world, he should say also to his own countrymen. He should use this opportunity to praise the great and benevolent aspects of Islamic religious and cultural traditions. I said earlier that all Americans aren’t reactionaries. However, I will confess that most Americans probably don’t know the most basic facts about the Muslim world. Obama can use this speech as a pedagogical moment for his own country.
Naturally, I hope he gives a special little shout-out to Lebanon on the eve of your important elections. As you know from Hillary Clinton’s and Joe Biden’s cautious words on their visits, Obama can’t tilt too obviously in one direction or the other. But we all know which result the United States wants, and he should find the words that might encourage that result without inciting too much of an anti-US backlash.
So that’s the happy talk. And, yes, he has to deliver some medicine. Obama has to embrace his own form of democracy promotion, promising that we won’t try to force it on people at gunpoint, but nevertheless insisting on values – women’s equality, freedom for ethnic and religious minorities, a free press, the settlement of disputes through peaceful means – that must be universal.
He should rebuke Hosni Mubarak about Egypt’s awful human rights record and demand improvement. He should affirm Israel’s right to exist within the 1967 borders and explain why Arab nations and peoples have to do the same (he’s been giving Israel medicine too, and if you don’t believe me just read the conservative Israeli – and American – commentary on the Obama administration’s position on the settlements).
He must urge a renunciation of violence. Here, of course, one doesn’t expect that Hassan Nasrallah will listen to the speech and say, “Hmm, by golly, he’s right.” But Obama has to direct these words toward regular people in the region and try to pull them away from leaders who advocate and sponsor violence.
No one expects that one speech will transform everything. The Obama administration has to follow the speech with deeds that match the words. Life isn’t a movie. The world changes slowly and clumsily. But I still think of the optimism so many of us here felt last election night. We also hope that eight years from now, as President Obama is winding down his second and final term in office, the world, and your portion of it, will look pretty different from the way they do today. This speech begins that process.
**Michael Tomasky is editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas and US editor-at-large for The Guardian. You can read his blog here.

Martyr Hanna’s mother responds to Aoun
Date: June 4th, 2009 Source: NNA
The mother of a Lebanese Army Captain whose helicopter was downed by Hizbullah militants in south Lebanon last year, responded to renegade General Michel Aoun comments that the pro-Iranian party had not killed or kidnapped any of the people of Batroun, the government-run National News Agency reported Thursday. “It seems that you have a weak memory that mixes things up which made you forget that Samer Hanna was from Batroun,” Yvette Hanna, mother of Samer Hanna said. Hanna, was flying a Lebanese army helicopter in a routine reconnaissance flight when his aircraft was shot down over the southern village of Sojod, a Hizbullah-dominated area. “Those who received you in Tannourine were definitely from Haret Hreik (Beirut’s southern suburbs) and not from Batroun (the hometown of Samer Hanna),” she added. “You have not lost a person of your flesh and blood to know the value of the martyrdom of Samer Hanna who loved his country and died while on duty,” Hanna added. “I regret that a former army commander defends the killers of a captain in the Lebanese army instead of paying tribute to his soul,” she added. “I remained silent to block the way for those who might exploit what I say to politicize the case because I respect the military institution and the memory of my son.” “I respond to General Aoun in my name and not in the name of the military institution because the judicial authority is looking into the case,” she concluded.

Edde: Aoun wants to weaken Bekerke
Date: June 3rd, 2009 Source: NNA
National Bloc leader, Carlos Edde, asserted in a statement Wednesday that March 8’s MP Michel Aoun wants Bekerke weakened so that he becomes the supreme Christian leader in Lebanon. Edde hailed the Bekerke statement issued today following the Maronite Bishop Council meeting which called on compatriots for support for the national charter, stressing the need to perform the June 7 parliamentary elections in a calm and democratic atmosphere. He said “the Bekerke statement was very logical because Patriarch Sfeir and the Church don’t take sides. They think of the nation’s best interest.” Edde, who is running for one of the five Maronite seats in Kessrouan, assured that Aoun and Hizbullah politics don’t fulfill the ambitions of Kessrouan citizens, “this is why many will vote for the March 14 list, especially after the words of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who stressed that resistance will grow stronger in both Lebanon and the region if March 8 wins elections.”He expressed apprehension from the probability of a March 8 win. “If Hizbullah is to control command centers, the state’s institutes will answer to the party which, in turn, answers to Iran,” pointed Edde. Edde, whose main opponent in Kessrouan is Free Patriotic Movement leader, predominant MP Michel Aoun, affirmed that “the other camp will resort to means of intimidation, threatening of a new civil war in case March 14 wins, by obstructing the government and using violence.”He concluded with saying “we mustn’t forget Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who asked the Lebanese not to forget May 7.”May 7 marks a bloody day in Lebanon’s history, when armed opposition supporters attacked innocent citizens of Beirut.

Al-Jouzu condemns accusations of treason
Date: June 4th, 2009 Source: NNA
Mohammad Ali al-Jouzu, Mufti of Mount Lebanon region, condemned Thursday the accusations of treason launched by the opposition against figures from the majority.
Al-Jouzu told the National News Agency, he said: “The resistance is trying to give itself artificial sanctity, and fake artificial victories to make the people believe that it is above the law, the constitution and the state and that anyone who opposes it is a traitor and a Zionist enemy. “The Israelis infiltrated the ranks of the resistance; there is no more confidence in its social milieu since it lacks the national immunity and honest loyalty. The security apparatus exposed several Israeli spies since then; the resistance has been accusing figures from the majority with espionage. He added: “There is a campaign of lies spreading from the Beirut northern suburb to the Bekaa and Tripoli, they are trying to make people believe that some honest and recognized personalities well known for their loyalty are undercover agents.”

Casting Lebanon’s destiny in ballot boxes
Date: June 4th, 2009 Future News
Describing the June 7 parliamentary elections as “a decisive phase in Lebanon’s history” is not exaggerated. Each vote casted in the ballot boxes will contribute in determining the direction of the country and its destiny for years to come. These votes will determine the preference of the ‘Cedars Revolution’ and will support the projects of sovereignty, independence, state, stability, and prosperity, declining the figure of tutelage and connection to the outside and the model of chaos, economic obstruction and the mini-state concept. Winning the decisive battle is up to few seats, thus we will not cross out any candidate from the electoral tickets of ‘March 14’ coalition because losing any seat means we might lose the battle of preserving Lebanon’s identity. This is why we will not let anyone cross out our Lebanon! Lebanon’s destiny is in our hands for two simple reasons: the first is that the majority will block out any foreign interference in elections, and the second is because in our hands we can cross the suspicious projects which aim at changing the nature of our democratic political system and toppling the Taef agreement. In our hands we will cross out all those who crossed out their previous stances, and in our hands we will change those who have changed their standpoints and those who sought to change the identity of the country and engage it with regional axes. In our hands we will cross out those who claimed reform and became the defenders of illegitimate weapons and corrupters, and those who promised change and ended up changing their stances. In our hands we will vote to determine our fate and assert that we will not allow Syria’s Bashar el Assad or Iran’s Mahmud Ahmed Nejad to determine our political, strategic, or national choices.

Today’s scene: forgery, more violence and a “Fatwa”
Date: June 4th, 2009 Source: Future News
“D Day” is coming up in 3 days. The electoral battle is heating up and the stands of the two opposing camps are becoming more and more lucid.
March 14 expresses, as always, concerns for the state and calls for the preservation of the national charter and the republic. This was voiced by Bkerke and the Maronite Bishops statement. Meanwhile, March 8 guys are still hinting a coup over the state and its institutions, chanting slogans that when decoded, can only mean an “open war”.
Regarding elections preparations, although the Interior Ministry is making intense efforts to render the June 7 parliamentary elections “transparent and calm”, some imposters, AKA opposition candidates, are making the ministry’s task more difficult by forging IDs.
This sham is being pulled in districts were some claim to have the support of 70% of the voters.
Citizens slammed the act and dubbed it “shameful”. “Taking things into deep consideration, pointed a source to almustaqbal.org, “which of the political factions has appropriate technical and logistic equipment to forge IDs?”
National charter…Lebanon’s constitution
Separately, Maronite Bishops asked the Lebanese to support the national charter and vote using logic and ethics, “vying in a sheer civil atmosphere that lives up to Lebanon’s reputation.” They also asked compatriots to resort to the mind and not the arms, and to accept election results with “high spirits”.
March 14 general secretary voiced support for the Bishops call and asked the Lebanese to choose between an open war zone of constitutional infringement, eventually leading to the termination of the Lebanese independence and the national charter, the constitution, the Taëf Agreement and Arabism. It cautioned from March 8 exaggerations in launching rumors and fabrications that particularly hit candidate Nayla Tueni.
Tueni, running for the Maronite seat in Beirut’s first district, asked Interior Minister Ziad Baroud, and Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar to start an investigation to probe the ID forgery question laid in Baabda and other regions.
Islamic Jamaa and Future Movement: one voice
Future Movement leader, MP Saad Hariri visited Islamic Jamaa Secretary General, Sheikh Faisal Mawlawi to confirm their alliance.
After urging people to vote for the complete March 14 electoral lists, MP Hariri released a statement asking the movement’s supporters in Iklim al-Kharroub district to “consider all candidates not on the list as opponents to the movement and its leader’s approach.”
Geagea’s recollection of the Great Ones
During the March 14-independents festival in Beirut’s first district, Lebanese Forces leader, Samir Geagea, assured that “Achrafieh, Rmeil and Saifi citizens support democracy, embodied by Charles Malek’s green book, and not Hizbullah yellow one.”
Geagea indicated that “Achrafieh means Fouad Boutros, St Joseph, the Patriarch, Camille Chamoun and Bashir Gemayel. To vote for their philosophies and thoughts, vote for March 14.”
He also asserted that George Hawi, Gebran Tueni and Samir Kassir, are “the genuine Orthodox representatives of Achrafieh, not Assaad Hardan.”
Religion, at the disposal of politics
The best example of Hizbullah’s enshrinement of religion for electoral purposes is the party’s “Fatwa” it issued instructing Shiites of Zahleh not to vote for March 14’s Okab Sakr.
Consequently, Baabda Shiite candidate and March 14 supporter, Bassem al-Sabeh asked voters not to “go by this religious extortion”.
More violence!
Free Patriotic Movement, hallmarked with arrogance and violence, introduces Catholic supporter, candidate in Metn, Edgard Maalouf, whom bodyguards and himself barged into Byblos Bank in Dora, bearing weapons pointed towards employees and citizens. If you could only imagine the reason! It seems that Maalouf was a bit upset that his bank transaction was a bit delayed! It should be noted that the FPM’s Ibrahim Kanaan, who runs for the Maronite seat in Metn started a fight in Mansourieh last month. His bodyguards opened fire, and injured innocent by passers. A Metn source told almustaqbal.org of its surprise towards these inexplicable behaviors and asked “is this the type of parliamentarians we want as representatives of the Lebanese?”
Hizbullah confesses getting armed
Surprisingly enough, Hizbullah deputy secretary general, Sheikh Naim Kassem said “we are getting armed. We will show the world that our arms will free our land.” Kassem asked “will we defend Lebanon by saying that it has the right to sovereignty as a constitutional demand? Will we defend Lebanon through a couple of papers titled Defense Strategy that do Lebanon no good? Is defending Lebanon achieved through allowing Israeli jets flying over our heads every day? No, it isn’t. We have tried your defense. Lebanon is only defended through rockets, cannons and lion hearts.”

Qassem Threatens Hizbullah will Continue to Rearm, Advises U.N. to Go to Sleep
Naharnet/Hizbullah's deputy leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, has threatened that his party will continue to rearm itself and advised the United Nations to back off.
"We will buy weapons. We will be an armed resistance and we will liberate the land with arms. Let the (U.N.) Security Council take a rest and sleep," Qassem said during a ceremony marking the 20th anniversary of the death of Imam Ayatollah Khomeini on Wednesday. The U.N., he added, will not dictate to Hizbullah. "We don't want anything from it. Let them shout but their shouts will go unheard." "Lebanon can only be defended by the canon, the rocket and mighty hearts," he stressed. Lauding Iran's support for Lebanon and the Arab cause, the top Hizbullah official vowed to prevent the country from becoming an American or Israeli battlefield. "We have reached adulthood. Lebanon will not be a battlefield either for the U.S. or for Israel," Qassem told the crowd during the ceremony at UNESCO palace. On the elections, the Hizbullah deputy chief said: "We believe the results of the elections will be in the favor of resistant Lebanon." Beirut, 04 Jun 09, 08:47

Qassem Rejects Accusations Hizbullah Will Transform Lebanon into an Islamic State
Naharnet/Hizbullah's deputy secretary general has rejected accusations that a Hizbullah-led government would try to implement an Iranian-style Islamic state.
Confident of victory in Lebanese weekend elections, Sheikh Naim Qassem said Tuesday the party would invite its opponents to join a national unity government if it wins.
In an interview with The Associated Press, he shrugged off warnings about boycotts and insisted Western nations are willing to talk to the new government irrespective of who wins.
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, on a visit to Lebanon last month, warned Washington would reassess aid to Lebanon depending on the next government's makeup and policies. The U.S., which considers Hizbullah a terrorist organization, has provided about $1 billion in aid since 2006.
"After June 7, there will be a new scene," said Qassem, who leads Hizbullah's election campaign. He said Hizbullah and its allies "will work to form a national unity government. How much we will succeed is up to the other side."
He spoke Tuesday at a secret location in the Hizbullah stronghold of south Beirut. Out of security concerns, AP reporters were driven in a minivan with black-draped windows to an apartment building basement. There, they were transferred to another minivan with black-draped windows to block the view and driven to another building, where Qassem later showed up for the interview.
The vote for parliament pits Western-backed factions that have dominated the government for the last four years against a coalition led by Hizbullah and its ally, Christian leader Michel Aoun. Hizbullah has had veto power over government decisions for the past year as part of a national unity government formed after its gunmen overran Beirut Muslim neighborhoods in May 2008, bringing Lebanon to the verge of another civil war. So far, the election has been considered too close to call and the pro-Western coalition has also predicted victory. But if Qassem's predictions materialize, it would be the first time Hizbullah is positioned to play a major role in the formation of Lebanon's government.
Qassem predicted his alliance would pick up between three and six seats over the 64-seat margin to have an absolute majority in the 128-member legislature and some factions from the pro-Western coalition would opt to join the new government. But one major faction has already said it won't.
He accused the U.S. of last-minute attempts to influence the vote, but said they would not work. President Barack Obama is addressing Muslims in a speech from Cairo Thursday, days before the Lebanese elections, in his latest overture to improve relations with the Islamic world.(AP-Naharnet) Beirut, 03 Jun 09, 07:01

Lieberman: Israel to Boycott Conference With Hamas or Hizbullah
Naharnet/Israel will not take part in any Middle East peace conference, including one Russia hopes to hold in Moscow, that involves Hamas or Hizbullah, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said on Wednesday. Lieberman also said that Israel does not intend to bomb Iran, in the most explicit comments on the matter by a top minister of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government to date. Speaking at the end of a three-day visit to Russia, Lieberman said that other countries in the Middle East and around the world should be concerned about Iran's nuclear program. But he said those countries should not expect Israel to solve the problem for them.
"We do not intend to bomb Iran, and nobody will solve their problems with our hands," he told reporters. "We don't need that. Israel is a strong country, we can protect ourselves.
"But the world should understand that the Iran's entrance into the nuclear club would prompt a whole arms race, a crazy race of unconventional weaponry across the Mideast that is a threat to the entire world order, a challenge to the whole international community," he said. "So we do not want a global problem to be solved with our hands."
The comments appeared to be a slight softening from recent statements made by Netanyahu's government that have suggested Israel might be forced to take military action against Iran.
Netanyahu has repeatedly said Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, and has refused to rule out the use of force.
After his recent meeting in Washington with President Barack Obama, Netanyahu said he and the U.S. president agreed Iran must not obtain nuclear weapons, and attempts to solve the problem through negotiations could not be unlimited in time. Iran, whose president has expressed hatred of Israel, maintains its nuclear programs are only designed to provide electricity. But Israel, the United States and other nations fear the effort is aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons. While in Moscow, Lieberman met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and others.(AP-AFP) Beirut, 03 Jun 09, 14:10

Massive Forgery of Identity Cards Uncovered ahead of Elections
Naharnet/Between 4,000 and 10,000 forged identity cards in the Zahle, Baabda, Western Bekaa and south Lebanon districts remain prime concern for judicial police only three days ahead of decisive parliamentary elections. Media reports said Interior Minister Ziad Baroud was sparing no effort to find a mechanism to combat fraud. Pan-Arab daily Asharq al Awsat on Thursday said the forged IDs were now in the hands of security authorities which already undertook measures to arrest the perpetrators. It said security forces were able to find a printer used in the forgery. Well-informed sources told An Nahar daily, however, that the government has the potential to hand out devices to detect fraud at all polling stations. Pan-Arab Al Hayat newspaper, for its part, spoke of two kinds of forgery -- Counterfeit IDs which can be detected by sophisticated technical equipment and "legitimate" IDs which carry the name of a person other than the bearer's name or his/her photo. The second type of forgery means that they carry the names of people overseas who have not obtained Lebanese identity cards or those working outside the country and are not expected to participate in the election so IDs would be given to people to vote. This is usually done by agreement between the mayor and the party that wishes to gain votes of illegal voters in its favor. A well-informed source told al Liwaa daily, meanwhile, that about 3,700 forged identity cards had been found in the possession of a very prominent political party ready to be used in voting. He said the fingerprint of each citizen is in itself a guarantee that fraud will not take place. The report on evidence of fake identity cards was uncovered by Prime Minister Fouad Saniora during an ordinary cabinet session on Tuesday. Baroud said the ministry had "put its hand on the issue." "We have taken strict measures and we will take even stringiest measures to bring the situation under control," Baroud was quoted as telling Cabinet ministers. Beirut, 04 Jun 09, 08:28

Iran, France Agree to Spare Lebanon Any Shock
Naharnet/France and Iran have reportedly stressed the need to ensure continuation of inter-Lebanese dialogue and safeguard the progress made in the Doha agreement.
The daily As Safir on Thursday said the "Lebanese dossier" was tackled during talks in Elysee between Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and French officials, particularly French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Elysee sources said Sarkozy met Mottaki upon an Iranian request to deliver a letter from the Iranian leadership that could form the starting point for the re-launch of dialogue with Tehran over the frozen nuclear enrichment during presidential elections. Beirut, 04 Jun 09, 09:36

Child Trafficking Gang Arrested in the Bekaa
Naharnet/Police in the eastern Bekaa valley have arrested members of a gang that sold newly-born children, the first such arrests linked to child trafficking in Lebanon, An Nahar daily reported Thursday. Police in a northern Bekaa town arrested a mayor, his wife, a midwife and a doctor at a hospital in the region, the newspaper said.
The operation was uncovered after police received information that the doctor and the midwife were claiming that the alleged foundling babies were being sent abroad with the help of a non-governmental organization. Police then put the gang under watch. The mayor, who is the head of the network, was arrested when he arrived along with his wife and a pregnant woman at the hospital where she delivered the child and handed it to the man. An Nahar said the woman who delivered the child received $500. Investigation is ongoing with the arrested individuals to uncover more details about the child trafficking operation. Beirut, 04 Jun 09, 10:00

Q&A: Lebanese elections
BBC/Lebanese elections are keenly fought in a country of many minorities
Lebanon is voting for a new parliament on Sunday, in elections that many believe could prove decisive for the country's future and the regional balance of power.
The pro-Western and Saudi-backed 14 March governing coalition, which won a slim parliamentary majority in the last election in 2005, is expected to face a strong challenge from the Hezbollah-led opposition backed by Syria and Iran.
What is the background?
The 2005 coalition came to power on a wave of anger at Syria's longstanding influence over Lebanon provoked by the killing of former PM Rafik Hariri. His supporters blamed the murder on Syria, although Damascus denied any involvement.
But subsequently, a long political stand-off between the new 14 March ruling coalition and the pro-Syrian opposition over the election of a new president culminated in violent clashes across the country in May 2008.
After a long series of unsuccessful talks and outbreaks of violence, the rival parties held reconciliation talks in the Qatari capital, Doha, which resulted in the formation of a national unity government, with the opposition getting 11 out of 27 ministerial posts.
What is the electoral system?
Lebanon's MPs are elected through a confessional system - that is one which allows 11 of the country's religious minorities a guaranteed fixed representation in parliament.
The 128-seat chamber is divided equally between Muslim and Christian communities, giving each side 64 seats (even though the proportion of Christians in the overall population has declined since the system was put in place, and is now at an estimated 35-40%).
The system gives Sunni Muslims 27 seats and Shias Muslims the same number. The Druze get eight seats and Alawites two. On the Christian side, 34 seats are reserved for Maronites, 14 for Greek Orthodox, eight for Catholics, six for Armenians and two for other Christian minorities.
MPs are elected for four-year terms in 26 multi-seat constituencies. Lebanese men and women above 21 years of age have the right to vote, whether they are resident in Lebanon or not.
Although candidates compete against their co-religionists for a fixed numbers of seats in each constituency, electors from other confessional groups can vote for them too - a system designed to prevent candidates representing the interests only of their own group.
For example, the Baabda constituency has six seats, three for Maronite Christians, two for Shia Muslims and one for a Druze deputy - broadly reflecting the confessional make-up of the constituency. All voters can vote for six candidates and the winners will be the ones who pick up the most votes among their confessional group.
Critics of the system say in the past it has encouraged gerrymandering of votes. The boundaries of voting districts were altered by a parliamentary vote in September 2008.
What are the electoral alliances?
The backbone of the current parliamentary majority, the 14 March coalition, is the mainly-Sunni Future movement (Mustaqbal in Arabic) headed by Saad Hariri, son of the assassinated former PM Rafik Hariri.
The two main blocs are led by Hassan Nasrallah and Sa'ad Hariri
The alliance also includes the Progressive Socialist Party, a Druze group headed by Walid Jumblatt, the Christian Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, the Christian Phalangist party, as well as numerous smaller groups.
The Opposition coalition - known in the press as the 8 March coalition - is built around the Iranian-backed Shia Hezbollah (Party of God in Arabic), which has a strong military wing, and the pro-Syrian Shia Amal movement headed by the current parliamentary speaker, Nabih Birri.
Other important players in the opposition bloc are the mainly Christian Free Patriotic Movement led by former army chief Michel Aoun, and two pro-Syrian and mainly Christian parties, al-Marada and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party.
What are the main battlegrounds?
The election is thought likely to be decided in a small number of highly competitive districts.
The most fiercely-contested seats are expected to be in Christian-populated regions, such as the Beirut-1 district in the capital, Zahleh in the Bekaa valley, Batrun in the north, and Metn in the central Mount Lebanon province, as well as confessionally mixed areas like West Bekaa district.
In many districts, on the other hand, few surprises are expected. The overwhelmingly Shia areas of South Lebanon and the northern Bekaa are expected to be easy wins for the Hezbollah-Amal coalition, while some Sunni areas in the north and Beirut are seen as safe for the Future movement.
A poll published by al-Akhbar newspaper suggested that 48 seats should be relatively safe for the opposition, and 40 for the 14 March coalition.
Will the election be fair?
Even though the voting process itself is expected to be generally fair, some believe unfair tactics are being applied ahead of the election, with newspapers reporting that the major parties are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to buy votes and fly Lebanese home to vote.
International observers are being sent by the European Union, the Arab League, the Carter Foundation, the Turkish government and the US National Democratic Institute.
BBC Monitoring selects and translates news from radio, television, press, news agencies and the internet from 150 countries in more than 70 languages. It is based in Caversham, UK, and has several bureaux abroad.

Lebanon's opposition faces a hard climb
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, June 04, 2009
With three days left until Lebanon's parliamentary elections, it's difficult not to get caught up in the predictions game, even though the dangers of that were apparent in 2005, when Michel Aoun turned most forecasts to mush. This time, however, things appear to be different.
It is almost certain that Aoun will emerge with the largest single Christian bloc in Parliament, whether alone or with allies such as Sleiman Franjieh and maybe Elie Skaff. However, the general's aspiration to have the largest parliamentary bloc ever, as he recently stated, seems a very difficult wager to win. Even if Aoun does well, he will not do well enough to hand the opposition a majority, bearing in mind that a great deal can and will happen on Sunday that will shape the final outcome, given that this is the first time the Lebanese vote in a single day.
Here's a simplistic view of the electoral situation. The opposition starts off with 33 guaranteed seats, between what it is bound to gain in the South (minus Sidon), Beirut II, and Baalbek-Hermel. That means that in predominantly Christian areas, Aoun and his allies would need to gain at least 32 seats in order for the opposition to earn a parliamentary majority. If we take each district from Zghorta down to Baabda and east to Zahleh, even excessively optimistic assessments of electoral results in favor of the opposition indicate that those 32 seats remain elusive.
For example, let's assume the following results. If Franjieh and his allies win all three seats in Zghorta, Salim Saadeh wins a seat in Koura, Aoun sweeps the three seats in Jbeil and the five seats in Keserwan, wins five seats in the Metn, four seats in Baabda, one seat in Beirut I, and, through Skaff, three seats in Zahleh, the opposition would still need seven seats to win a slight legislative majority. Aounist projections are for sweeps everywhere, but that is highly improbable for several reasons.
First, the mood in the Christian community has changed in the past four years, so that the likelihood of the electorate voting complete lists is less than it was in 2005. Aoun retains a solid and mobilized core of voters, however it is not they alone who won him his victory four years ago; rather, it was nonaligned Christian voters angry with the quadripartite agreement between Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri, Nabih Berri, and Hizbullah, and sustained in their anger by the Maronite church.
A second reason is that Aoun may have committed a fatal blunder in earning the enmity of Michel Murr, as well as that of President Michel Sleiman and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. Sleiman can play a key role in tilting the vote in some districts through the army, and this in the most legal ways possible; meanwhile the church has subtle forms of sway over the electorate, much legitimacy, and a pulpit to get its ideas across.
However, it is Murr who perhaps poses the most direct threat to Aoun. Lebanese elections are only partly about ideas at this late stage. Ideas matter, but interests and hardnosed calculations will play a more critical role in determining what happens this year. When it comes to services, Murr is among the strongest players on the scene. Both in the Metn and Baabda, the economic lungs of Mount Lebanon, where business and industrial enterprises are concentrated, his clout comes through his ability to facilitate a multitude of essential administrative and legal procedures for his electorate. Murr has spent years placing people in the bureaucracy, local administrations, and the judiciary, and will call in his chips in the Metn as well as in Baabda and Beirut I, where his son in law, Edmond Gharios, and granddaughter, Nayla Tueni, are candidates.
It would also be a mistake to dismiss the prospect that, even at the last moment, Murr will be unable conclude an under-the-table deal that takes a bite out of Aoun's alliance with the Armenians, the backbone of the general's victory strategy in the Metn and Beirut I. Ultimately, Murr realizes, the Armenians see little interest in finding themselves out on a limb alone with Aoun, fighting against Murr and the Phalange Party in the Metn, and by extension on adversarial terms with Sleiman.
A third reason is that Aoun's alliance with Hizbullah continues to worry a great majority of Christians. Aoun made a colossal gaffe this weekend in Batroun when he said that if an opposition-led government could not get money from the West, then it could always go to China. The statement got laughs, and Aoun did not say it with very much seriousness. But a politician cannot be flippant about such things. His remark alarmed many people because it seemed an admission that a government over which Hizbullah has influence will spell trouble for Lebanon in its relations with traditional economic partners and funders in Europe, the Gulf countries, and the United States. Most Lebanese would regard any form of financial or cultural isolation from these places as catastrophic.
Add that to the recent statement of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in which he said that an opposition triumph in Lebanon would mean the opening of a new front against Israel, and you have several ingredients that might fuel Christian panic. Aoun has shown a notable ability to drive the community against its own history, profiting from its sense of decline, but there are hard limits to that game.
What all these factors may lead to, however, is not so much a devastating loss for Aoun, than a fragmenting of the Christian vote. Aoun did well in 2005 because his electorate voted complete lists; today, voters are much more likely to mix their lists, choosing candidates from both sides based on both loyalty and welfare. This means that Aoun will bleed support, and while he will probably not suffer a major setback (even if we cannot rule that out) since his electorate is motivated, he should come up short on an opposition victory. We'll see Sunday who has egg on his or her face.
In last week's commentary on the Der Spiegel article, I mistakenly wrote that in August 2006 "the investigation of [telephone] intercepts was headed by ISF Captain Wissam Eid." In fact, the head of the investigation at the time was Samir Shehadeh, who escaped an assassination attempt in September. Eid was his deputy, and took over the investigation afterward.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR

The Economy after the elections:
Maysam Ali, NOW Staff , June 3, 2009
The outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections will define Lebanon’s political identity as well as its standing within the region and the world. But equally important is the election’s impact on the Lebanese economy. Despite the relative stability of Lebanon’s financial sphere during the global economic crisis, experts warn that the economy’s performance might vary according to who will govern the country over the next four years.
According to Sami Nader, economist and professor at the Université St. Joseph, a Hezbollah-led government would have a detrimental effect on the Lebanese economy and would divert international aid and investment away from the country.
This may sound strange coming from a man who is Michel Aoun's former son-in-law and who played a major role in drafting the Free Patriotic Movement’s economic strategy in 2005, but the changes in the party’s politics since then, Nader says, including the FPM’s controversial 2006 Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah, made him reconsider his allegiance.
NOW Lebanon sits down with Nader to discuss how the elections and a possible change in the balance of power in the country might affect the economy and Lebanon’s status in the eyes of the international community.
What do you think will happen to the economy after the elections?
Nader: We have to stress the fact that in the eyes of the international community, the question is very simple: It’s whether Hezbollah will win the elections; the opposition-aligned FPM and [Nabih Berri’s] Amal Movement are insignificant when it comes to the international community and institutions...
This is why the international community, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is very concerned. The IMF initiated a series of sessions with Hezbollah to assess their economic program in case they won.
This concern emanates from the fact that Hezbollah is still blacklisted by major international countries in the West, such as the United States. There were even talks within the European Union to include Hezbollah on the terrorists list. This will damage confidence in this country, it will block any possibility of recovery, and it will put to question the possibility of the continuation of the donors’ commitment to Lebanon.
What is the future of aid promised during the Paris III international donor conference?
Nader: Paris III was convened on the basis of an economic recovery plan that Hezbollah has questioned. Unlike Paris II, aid given to Lebanon through Paris III was conditional on a plan that was put in place by [Prime Minister Fouad] Siniora’s government. Hezbollah stated that it does not endorse this plan. No one has a clear answer on what will happen to Paris III. And this grey area is very damaging for the economy. Our economy was still in good shape since 2006 because of the climate of confidence that Siniora and the Central Bank were reinforcing. It was capable of absorbing political instability and the economic consequences of the July War. All of that is now put into question because of uncertainty.
How do you assess the current economy of Lebanon?
Nader: Lebanon today can withstand the economic upheavals. This is because it relies on a solid monetary policy, the Central Bank’s role and a government with an economic plan and that is backed directly by the West, the United States, the European Union and Arab countries, as was the case in the Paris III conference. Those are the main donors and the political back-up of the Lebanese economy. They saw in this government one they can trust.
What would be the alternative if Hezbollah and its allies were to govern?
Nader: … It would lead to the isolation of Lebanon politically and subsequently economically… This is an area of concern because Hezbollah doesn’t have an economic plan. The party has a military plan; they call it “the Islamic Resistance”. Resisting Israel, however, should be part of a comprehensive Arab plan. Lebanon cannot bear alone the burden of fighting Israel and reclaiming Arab rights. I believe that it is in the best interest of Lebanon and the Arabs to stick to the peace initiative as proposed by [Saudi] King Abdullah’s peace plan in 2002.
What is the Free Patriotic Movement’s role in this? Would they be able to present a comprehensive economic plan that’s lacking in Hezbollah’s platform?
Nader: It’s irrelevant because their economic plan doesn’t rely on any political principles. All the political items that were present in [FPM leader Michel Aoun’s] plan in 2005 were totally retrieved from the platform they had proposed. This means that what they proposed today in terms of social and economic reform is insignificant given the lack of a comprehensive political vision. No economic plan is possible without a strategic political vision. Today their political program is that of Hezbollah. And it is rejected by the international community…
What FPM proposed in the Third Republic is a series of small reforms that focus on procedures and the enforcement of new procedural laws. It lacks a vision and a strategy necessary for economic recovery.
In addition, for the rest of the world it’s whether Hezbollah will make it. Other allies don’t matter. They are right because it’s Hezbollah who commands 40,000 soldiers, a force bigger than the Lebanese army. Hezbollah has its own development fund, educational institutions, a separate budget and infrastructure which make it a state within a state.
What’s in an FPM-Hezbollah alliance for Michel Aoun?
Nader: At first, he thought that through Hezbollah he can win the election. Doubts were raised on whether the election of President Michel Sleiman was constitutional. When Sleiman was elected, members of the opposition refuted the constitutionality of his election. This casts doubts on the real intention of the opposition. Furthermore, the May 7 events showed that they can resort to violence to attempt a coup and enforce a political setup that’s in their favor.
And what if the March 14 alliance reclaims a majority in the elections?
Nader: International aid would increase. There was a concern whether March 14 will remain in power and withstand Hezbollah’s military pressure, such as the May 7 events, and the political pressure, such as the obstructing third, the protests in the downtown area, the obstruction of parliament for two years, and impeding the election of the president. They froze all the political institutions and yet, despite all that, the March 14 forces withstood all the pressures.
If March 14 makes it this election, it means that it is legitimate, credible, backed by a majority of the Lebanese. It reinforces investors’ trust in Lebanon and the Lebanese banking system. This would benefit the Lebanese economy because investment and international support would continue. Furthermore, the Lebanese president was the recipient of a large welcome by the international community. This is unprecedented in Lebanese history. It has substantial economic value. We have to protect it and build on it.
Can the current minority, if it wins, attract donors outside the US and EU?
Nader: One has to take into consideration what [Israeli Defense Minister] Ehud Barak said on the Lebanese elections, namely that a Hezbollah victory will give Israel freedom of action. The prospects of war would increase. This will worsen political instability, which will in turn reflect on interest rates, monetary stability and on the confidence level that investors have in Lebanon. It will negatively affect the investments that poured into Lebanon despite the economic crisis. Iran could not finance all-out activities because even if it wants to, it does not have the means.
What will become of Arab investment in the country? Will they decrease?
Nader: Of course, what kinds of investment do you see today in Gaza? We would be heading to a model similar [to that of] Gaza because we would be governed by the same ideology and system. The Lebanese economy has been supported by the tourism sector for the past four years; what would happen to this sector? With a victory for Hezbollah and its allies, the resulting political instability and the prospect of a looming war, Arabs and other tourists would not head to Lebanon. In fact, this is what made them flee the country in 2006.
What would you say is the biggest enemy of the Lebanese economy?
Nader: Uncertainty. The prospect of war and political instability. It has monetary and financial – not only economic – consequences. There is no economic stability in times of war.
What do you make of the plans to fight corruption that were raised by the Free Patriotic Movement and its allies?
Nader: It’s more of a slogan than an actual strategy to fight corruption. Even the laconic plan proposed by the Lebanese Forces to address corruption is more efficient in terms of the mechanism to be implemented. The real challenge of the economy today is not corruption but rather fostering confidence in the Lebanese economy. This is not to say that corruption is not a problem; it is a major issue, but it tends to focus on the past. The FPM stress the importance of auditing accounts, which if carried out would backfire on their allies; but at any rate, this strategy is backward and not forward-looking. We need a vision for the future, a plan to increase the size of the economy. We need a Lebanese dream of peace and stability.
Would the opposition be able to manage the Lebanese economy?
Nader: I have not come across an economic plan by Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s plans are based on social aid, inspired by a leftist-leaning model demanding a bigger role for the government. But one wonders whether a bigger government is the solution as it is the second major reason for public debt. The size of the public administration in the country is huge and is a real burden for the Lebanese economy. In addition, the way that the social security apparatus is run does not give a good example of Hezbollah and Amal’s efficiency in public administration.
Another example of management is invoice collection at the Electricité du Liban (EDL). Mount Lebanon alone makes more than double in bill collection than what is made in the Bekaa and the southern suburb of Beirut… [Hezbollah and Amal] did not give an example of good citizenship and good public management there.
Might an opposition takeover push Lebanese people to travel abroad?
Nader: Yes, those who are desperate would travel. Those who think about their children; immigration will be fierce, serious and long-term. During the civil war, immigration was short-term, and people returned to Lebanon in the 1990s.
The majority of expats are very attached to Lebanese sovereignty. This is especially true of the Lebanese Christian community. A great number of the expat groups previously supporting Aoun have now shifted.
What do you expect of the elections this year?
Nader: I expect the same balance of power. Lebanon has been able to find a delicate equilibrium and has devised a way to survive through instability. We should find a solution for Hezbollah’s arms.

The Crisis of the Christians Is the Crisis of Lebanon
Thu, 04 June 2009
Abdullah Iskandar/Al Hayat
Lebanon’s modern history could be summed up by the inter-Christian division, particularly following independence. The leaders of other confessions concurred with this division, with it being the only pathway to power, as custom and the Taef Agreement handed in the presidency to the Christians. Then, the political life revolved, with its administrative and developmental ramifications, around this division which reflected the controversy over Lebanon’s position and its Arab commitments.
Until the civil war in the mid 1970s, this division remained disciplined by the Constitution and the laws. Political life was renewed through parliamentary and presidential elections, even though violent acts emerged at some junctures, publicly driven by the presidency as in 1952 and 1958. In the first instance, the president wanted to extend his term, while in the second, he sided with foreign alliances against the region.

This division revealed the objection of non-Christian parties in general to the president’s policy. This objection turned - thanks to the demographic and economic changes - to a pressuring tool to redraw the internal equation among the sects, as expressed in the Taef Agreement. But ever since this accord was put into effect, the domestic arena has changed, with the Shiite rise represented by the alliance between Amal and Hezbollah and the transformation of the Sunni’s rhetoric from loose Arabism to a Lebanon-inspired rhetoric that addresses the same issues the Christians had previously defended.
If, during the turmoil in Lebanon, the Sunnis avoided infighting thanks to many factors, the Shiite and Christian communities fell prey to internal strife and intestine fighting. While the Shiites managed – and so did the Sunnis to a large extent – to achieve reconciliation, the Christian divisions persisted and all attempts for internal reconciliation failed.
Now, reconciliation attempts within the sects are underway, at least to avoid translating the verbal violence to the street. But the Christian divisions are deepening. A few days before the elections, this division will determine the picture of the coming parliament and maybe that of Lebanon, although the Christians’ role and size have dramatically shrunk in Lebanon’s public and political life, due to the Taef Agreement or internal self impotency.
This contradiction between the increasingly weakening Christians and their role in determining Lebanon’s future expresses for sure their crisis. But at the same time, this contradiction reveals the crisis of the sects in developing the new formula that should govern peaceful coexistence between the people of the same country. This crisis is best expressed by the fierce electoral battle in the Christian stronghold districts, while the results of the elections are settled in advance in the districts where other sects are dominant.
In this sense, the inter-Christian crisis expresses the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, which is associated with the image of the homeland, the meaning of its institutions, and joint citizenship that secures equal rights and duties, as provided for in the Constitution.
The experience of the previous parliamentary term reveals that this crisis did not only paralyze the parliament for half of its term, equally obstructing government action, but also mixed up the institutions and entities. All sectarian leaders sought to monopolize the institutions, namely the executive ones. As such, the institutions became a sort of a mini-parliament which sums up the work of the legislative institution. Noticeably, the agenda of the national dialogue session – that was arranged under exceptional circumstances to look into issues pertaining to national strategies – is now restricted to items that fall within the jurisdiction of the executive power.

Israel Prefers Hezbollah
Thu, 04 June 2009
Randa Takieddine/Al Hayat
The visit by President Barack Obama to Saudi Arabia today, followed by Cairo tomorrow, to put forward his ideas on solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is tantamount to support for Arab political moderation.
On the eve of decisive elections in Lebanon, a week before the important elections in Iran, Obama wants, by solving the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, to boost the forces of political moderation in the Muslim and Arab worlds, which have been weakened by Israel’s unresponsiveness to any Arab peace initiative put forward by Arab political moderates.
Obama is aware that the Israeli-Palestinian struggle is the region’s central problem. He asked his leading strategic ally in the region, the Israeli prime minister, to halt and remove settlements and accept a Palestinian state. The Israeli response, up to now, has been as expected; a refusal to halt settlements, a refusal to lift the siege on Gaza, and the rejection of the principle of a Palestinian state. This is nothing new; it is the reality of Israeli policy since the founding of the state.
Israel has turned Gaza into “Hamas-stan,” where ordinary Gazans suffer from its siege and its policies. Only Hamas benefits from this, strengthening its position on the ground. This has been noticed by western officials who have visited Gaza – the siege is boosting Hamas’ position.
In the same context, Israel hopes for a victory by Hezbollah in the Lebanese parliamentary elections. Israel despises the Lebanese state and respects Hezbollah, which defeated it in the July War of 2006.
The war showed how Israel destroyed all features of the Lebanese state, laying siege to Lebanon and isolating it (as it did in Gaza), to punish the Lebanese state. It left one safe exit route for Lebanon, to Damascus – what a coincidence!
Today, Israel is hoping for a Hezbollah win in the elections in Lebanon, because it knows the party is stronger than the Lebanese state. Israel also knows that war and peace decisions are in Hezbollah’s hands. But Israel does not want peace in the region, because it is frightened about seeing a Palestinian state on its borders, no matter how demilitarized it is. The Jewish state is afraid of disappearing under the demographic weight of Arabs on its borders. Through its policies, it is strengthening radical Islamic forces and working to empty Jerusalem and the occupied territories of Christians, who have left the country.
In the same context, Israel sees no objection to political decisions being in Hezbollah’s hands in Lebanon, provided that the Christian role is marginalized, even if they are in power in Lebanon.
Israel wants to retain a state of war throughout the region, because it is the only deterrent to the removal of its settlements, its policies of occupation and hegemony, and the establishment of a Palestinian state, which the entire world wants.
Seeing Hezbollah in power in Lebanon, with a majority that can let it direct the country, is the best option for the Jewish state. Strengthening hard-line politics and extremism will serve its policy of rejecting a Palestinian state and the Palestinian people. Arab political moderation that is open to the world does not suit it either. This is because it would be forced to take unpalatable steps; Israel is anxious about what President Obama will say in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, because it is aware that it is being asked to make fundamental concessions. On Friday, Obama will visit France for talks with President Nicholas Sarkozy on his ideas on a solution to the conflict in the Middle East, especially since Sarkozy wishes to launch a peace conference on all tracks by the end of the year. It is certain that the topic of Lebanon’s elections will be raised, even if in passing, since each man has a different policy orientation. Paris has decided to recognize the results and deal with the government, whoever is in power, while Washington is more cautious; it will wait and see what the results will bring about.
It is clear that the evaluation of the two states involves a difference when it comes to the results of Lebanon’s upcoming elections. It is clear that Paris believes that the opposition will win, and that nothing will change as far as it is concerned, because in the view of Paris, no side can eliminate the other in Lebanon. Washington is more cautious, but Paris is now comfortable with its good relationship with Damascus, and this is a priority for it. France under Jacques Chirac closed Europe’s doors to Damascus; today, Sarkozy has opened them wide. In the view of Paris, the elections in Lebanon will not change anything, irrespective of the result.

US steadfast against Hezbollah
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi /Asia Times
Middle East/Jun 5, 2009
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF05Ak03.html
On the eve of critical national elections in fragile Lebanon on Sunday, United States President Barack Obama has opened a new chapter in his quest for "dialogue with the Muslim world". This, inevitably, dictates the US's respect for the results of the elections, even if that means the victory of Hezbollah, a mass-based guerrilla organization that continues to remain on the US government's terrorist list.
In that event, short of fine-tuning its policy and making the necessary adjustments with respect to the terrorist label for Hezbollah, the Obama administration may have no choice but to cut US aid to Lebanon, particularly military aid - since 2005, the US has given US$250 million to the Lebanese armed forces.
United States Vice President Joseph Biden, in his recent Beirut
visit, explicitly linked the future of US assistance to the outcome of the parliamentary elections, where the Hezbollah-led bloc that includes Christian Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), is expected to win by a narrow margin.
And in an interview with the Arabic paper al-Huryat, US Central Command chief General David Petraeus stated categorically that the Obama administration considered Hezbollah a "terrorist organization" and added that "Hezbollah's justification for existence will become void if the Palestinian cause is resolved".
The US is likely, then, to commit the same error it made with respect to the Palestinian elections in January 2006 that were dominated by Hamas, another group with which the US is loathe to deal.
The majority of Lebanon's Shi'ites, who comprise roughly 35% of the population, may disagree with Petraeus' description, in light of Hezbollah's net contribution to their political empowerment. There is also its role as "a major provider of social services, operating schools, hospitals and agricultural services for thousands of Lebanese Shi'ites", to quote a recent report on Hezbollah by the US Council on Foreign Relations.
Petraeus' error is precisely in overlooking the internal dynamics in Lebanon that have historically been conducive to Hezbollah's rising star.
For its part, Israel is doing all it can to influence the outcome of elections, by staging a major military drill near Lebanon's borders. This has as a result put Lebanon's army on the highest alert. Israel has also issued dire warnings that should Hezbollah win, "Lebanon will expose itself to the might of the Israeli army more than any time in the past", to quote Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barack.
Similarly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that "if Hezbollah wins, that would be a troubling development, and our deployment will be in kind".
Hezbollah is up against the anti-Syrian coalition led by Sunni Muslim Saad al-Hariri, which gained a majority in parliament in 2005 elections. The alliance, named March 14, includes Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Christian leaders Samir Geagea and Amin Gemayel. The current majority coalition has 70 seats in parliament and the minority, including Hezbollah, has 58.
Israel, it appears, is not wasting any time in cultivating the seeds of a future conflict with Lebanon, where a military defeat for a Hezbollah-controlled government would be devastating to Hezbollah's political fortunes. It has recently been revealed by former Israeli chief of staff General Dan Halutz that Israel failed to assassinate Hezbollah's political leader, Hassan Nasrallah, during the 2006 Lebanon war.
This, together with the Lebanese government's arrest of nine Lebanese who were spying for Israel's Mossad, reflects the basic tenor of Israel's one-dimensional security approach toward the evolving political developments in Lebanon.
Conspicuously absent in the US and Israeli calculations about the political and geostrategic implications of a Hezbollah victory is any appreciation of how this may actually deepen Hezbollah's moderation.
Transformed over time from a "non-state" actor into a formidable political party with direct representation in the Lebanese government, Hezbollah is less a "state-within-state" in Lebanon's complex political system and more an integral part of it. The sooner the US, the European Union and above all Israel come to terms with this important evolving reality and adopt the necessary changes, the better, for the sake of regional peace.
Unfortunately, a number of Western pundits paint a Hezbollah victory as a "defeat for the US" as well as Saudi Arabia, and a solid "victory" for Iran and Syria.
However, there are several problems with such analyses.
First, electoral victory is one thing, actual changes in the balance of forces in Lebanon's sectarian politics is quite another. What is more, it is far from given that a governmental victory for Hezbollah will not have negative side-effects on its political and military prowess as a movement.
Indeed, an Hezbollah victory may well translate into new fetters for its paramilitary wing that has so far successfully resisted both the calls for its disarmament as well as its integration into the national army. A minor "security trap" opened by the elections results favoring Hezbollah exists. That explains some rudimentary ambivalence on the part of its leadership over being at the helm of government until 2013.
Second, a Hezbollah victory could further complicate the delicate relationship between its military forces and the upgraded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, as well as its relations with some European powers. These include Germany, which has contributed to the multinational Maritime Task Force supporting the Lebanese navy's control of the seaways. The mandate for this task force runs out in December and its extension now hinges on the post-election political makeup in Lebanon.
Third, assuming that a winning Hezbollah fails to form a government of national unity, in light of the torpedo effect of an incendiary report by the German weekly Der Spiegel that blames Hezbollah for the 2005 assassination of the former prime minister Rafik Hariri, the resulting sectarian nature of the government would definitely exacerbate the country's political rifts. This would render more difficult a resumption of "all-party talks" favored by Hezbollah, particularly if the US and its Western allies impose a policy of embargo and isolation.
In that case, Iran would incur additional financial costs as it would need to increase its foreign aid to a Tehran-friendly regime - not a pleasant prospect for a country that is experiencing economic troubles at home.
For now, Iran's hope is that Hezbollah's public assurances about forming a government of national unity, or Hezbollah politicians' current dialogue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for future assistance to Lebanon, will bear fruit. And relatedly, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states will not cease their financial support of the Lebanese government after the elections; at stake are a US$11 million IMF loan and $84 million in yearly assistance by the European Union.
To consolidate their gains, Hezbollah leaders must make extra efforts in assuring the international community that, contrary to current talk of a "US defeat" caused by a Hezbollah victory, Hezbollah itself does not interpret it this way. Hezbollah believes it can be a factor for regional stability. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Salom has said that Hezbollah victory would "constitute a danger to regional and international stability".
Hezbollah has also complained that the US ambassador to Lebanon, Michele Sisson, has "meddled" in Lebanon's affairs by "leading all efforts to finalize the electoral tickets for the March 14 bloc", to quote an article on Hezbollah's al-Manar network.
The US is clearly playing a zero-sum game with regard to Hezbollah. This raises the question of how the US can possibly engage with Iran, a major regional power, short of engaging with the powerful pro-Iran Hezbollah that is now poised to control the government in Beirut. (Even short of victory, Hezbollah, which presently has veto power over cabinet ministers per a 2008 agreement, will continue to wield tremendous influence in Lebanon's sectarian-based politics.)
The annual US Department of State terrorism reports scold Iran as a "terror-sponsoring state", citing its support for "terrorist organizations" such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
A future removal of Hezbollah from the US terror list would go a long way in removing "rogue state" Iran from the same list, a sine qua non for diplomatic normalization between Washington and Tehran.
Unfortunately, despite its innovation of a "Muslim dialogue", the Obama administration is ill-prepared to deal with the consequences of Lebanon's parliamentary elections as these are painted in black and white "geo-strategic" semantics that distort rather than illuminate a complex reality.
**Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry, click here. His latest book, Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing , October 23, 2008) is now available.

Jihad goes intercontinental
By Walid Phares
Since the deadly attacks in Mumbai last November, counter-terrorism experts worldwide, particularly those based in democracies in the crosshairs, have been drawing long-term conclusions as to the forthcoming type of operations which may hit cities and interests on more than one continent.
Today, we are in the post-Mumbai era where the expectation of recidivism and copycats is eerily high. Indeed, the jihadis who seized a few buildings in India's financial center, wreaked havoc at several locations in the city and killed nearly 220 people have brought to the attention of national security analysts a concept for the future: Urban jihad.
I had predicted these scenarios of mayhem perpetrated by
determined terrorists in chapter 13 of my first post-September 11, 2001 book, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West, published in 2005.
My projection of al-Qaeda and other jihadi tactics was based on a patient and thorough observation of their literature and actions for decades. By now, the public realizes that such scenarios are not just possible but highly likely in the future. In all countries where jihadi cells and forces have left bloody traces over the past eight years, at least counter-terrorism agencies have been put on notice: it can happen there as well.
But the Mumbai ghazwa (raid) reveals a more sinister shadow hovering over the entire sub-continent, if not also Central Asia. Although a press release was issued by the so-called "Indian Mujahideen", many traces were left - almost on purpose - to show Pakistani involvement, or to be more precise, a link to forces operating within Pakistan, one of them at least being Lashkar-e-Toiba.
Other suppositions left investigators in the region with the suspicion that elements within the intelligence service in Pakistan were involved, even if the cabinet wasn't aware of it. This strong probability, if anything, gave rise to much wider speculation since this attack took place in the midst of dramatic regional and international developments.
In the United States, the Barack Obama administration is gearing up to redeploy from Iraq and send additional divisions to Afghanistan where the Taliban forces have been escalating their terror campaign. In a counter move, the jihadi web inside Pakistan has been waging both terror and political offensives. In Waziristan and the Swat Valley, just prior to the latest attempts to strike deals with local warlords, Pakistani units were compelled to retreat.
A few weeks later, Islamabad authorized the provincial administrators to sign the so-called Malakand agreement with the "Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law", headed by Sufi Mohammad, in which local Taliban would enact religious laws instead of the national secular code.
Across Afghanistan, Pakistan and India it has become clear that the jihadis are acting as an overarching regional force. In short, while Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi are consumed with domestic challenges such as ethnic and territorial crises, the nebulous beginning with al-Qaeda and stretching to the local jihadi groups across the land is acting ironically as one, though with many faces, tongues and scenarios.
The jihadis have become continental, while the region's governments were forced into tensions among each other and with their own societies. Hence, exploring the regional strategies of the jihadis is now a must.
Pre-9/11 strategies
In the post-Cold War era, a web of jihadi organizations came together throughout the Indian sub-continent from Kandahar to the Bay of Bengal. The nebulous was as vast as the spread of Islamist movements that took root in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.
The cobweb is extremely diverse and not entirely coordinated. In many cases, striking competitions and splinters characterize its intra-Islamist politics. But from political parties to student unions to jihadi guerrillas, the main cement of the plethora has been a solidly grounded ideology, inspired by local Deobandism and West Asian-generated Wahhabism and Salafism.
The "jihadi causes" reflect a variety of claims, from political and sharia to ethnic territorial. However, all these platforms end in the necessity of establishing local "emirates", which eventually are building blocks towards the creation of the caliphate-to-come.
Inside Pakistan, the Islamists fight secularism, impose religious laws and crave an all-out "Islamist" - not just "Islamic" - nation. From this country, a number of jihadi groups have been waging a war on India for the secession of Kashmir, but in order to establish a Taliban-like state. The Pakistan-based "Kashmiri jihadis" have connected with their India-based counterparts who in turn have bridges with jihadis operating across India through various networks, including the Islamic Student Union and later the "Indian Mujahideen". The "web" stretches east to Dhaka and south all the way to Malaysia and Indonesia.
Unfortunately, Western and non-Western scholarship in the field didn't recognize the regional dimension of the jihadi threat on the sub-continent before the 2001 strikes in America and the subsequent attacks in Europe and beyond. Jihadism in South Asia has always been conventionally linked to local claims and foreign policies, while in reality the movement has developed a regional war room; even before the US intervention in Afghanistan, the jihadis had been seeking transnational achievements.
The post-Soviet grand design of al-Qaeda was to incite the "national" jihadi entities to act in concert with one another, even if their propaganda machines would intoxicate their foes with different narratives. Based in Kabul since the takeover by the Taliban in 1996, the initial plan was to grow stronger inside Afghanistan, make it a "perfect emirate" model to follow and from there expand in all directions. Evidently, the first space to penetrate was Pakistan, starting with the northwestern regions.
In the book Future Jihad, I have argued that one of the long-range goals of the 9/11 attacks was to provoke massive jihadi uprisings in many Muslim countries, especially in Pakistan, with help from insiders and the armed forces.
The pre-9/11 plan was to infiltrate Islamabad from Kabul and thereafter to penetrate Kashmir and back a massive jihadi campaign inside India. The enormity of developments was supposed to enflame Bangladesh as well. In short, the plan was to "Talibanize" the region from Kabul to the Gulf, slicing many enclaves in northern India with it. Obviously, plan A collapsed as US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces crumbled the Taliban regime and dispersed al-Qaeda.
Post-Tora Bora
As Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar crossed into Waziristan at the end of 2001, the jihadi strategy for the region shifted to Plan B. However, the basic goal didn't change - to establish a series of emirates in the sub-continent.
What changed were the launching pads and the priorities. Now that the epicenter shifted to these valleys inside northwestern Pakistan, the strategic hierarchy imposed a new agenda: First, the tribal areas had to become a no-go zone for Pakistan's armed forces and a new Afghanistan-in-exile was to be established: al-Qaeda's remnants in the centre, surrounded by a belt of Taliban, themselves surrounded by an outer belt of fundamentalist tribes and movements. Former Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf understood that sending the bulk of his forces there meant an all-out civil war, hence he kept a status quo amid Western frustration.
But the jihadi forces moved on the offensive inside Pakistan via bombings and assassinations, including failed attempts against the former president and the murder of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Not only the border areas were falling to the insurgency, but segments of many cities fell under the expansion of urban jihadization. The Red Mosque bloodshed was only an example of the generalized push to seize more power. The minimal goal set by the cohorts of the Islamist and jihadi forces was to immunize Waziristan and the surrounding valleys from any incoming attacks while launching blitzkriegs from these areas in two directions: a comeback of the Taliban inside Afghanistan and strikes inside India.
To the west of Waziristan, the equation was reversed. Instead of a Taliban regime in Kabul spilling over into Islamabad, the post-Tora Bora situation witnessed the emergence of a quasi-Taliban regime inside Pakistan spilling back to Afghanistan, hence the recrudescence of operations in the latter's provinces. Eastbound from Waziristan, the nebulous tasted the Pakistan-based jihadis to serve as strategic decoys.
Indeed, the best way to confuse the Pakistani military is to draw New Delhi into a renewed conflict with its western neighbor. Shrewdly - via Lashar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Kashmiri jihadis and in association with India-based jihadis - many terror attacks were launched inside Indian territories as of 2002, including strikes against the parliament, trains and other targets. The inflaming of the India-Pakistan theatre was and remains a key strategic design in the hands of the regional jihadis. This is why the recent strikes in Mumbai were ordered.
Post-Mumbai
Inside the jihadi war room for the subcontinent, preparations are underway to meet two forthcoming challenges. One is the decision by the Obama Administration to send two additional divisions to Afghanistan. General David Petraeus, chief of Central Command, and his fellow military strategists have recommended a surge-type campaign to eradicate al-Qaeda and its allies from inside most of the country and, with the help of other NATO forces, push the Taliban hordes all the way back to the borders. The second jihadi worry is possible military pressure on Waziristan from the Asif Ali Zardari government.
Logically, the Taliban/al-Qaeda Plan "C" will be to try to crumble both offensives before they happen. Therefore, in war game scenarios, if you are the jihadi, you would put all efforts possible to delay and weaken the forthcoming NATO-led surge. How they
will go about accomplishing this is a good question. The terror network has more than one tool at its disposal: rapid deterioration inside Afghanistan, striking at NATO allies, disrupting NATO supply lines originating in Pakistan, assassinations and even possible strikes on the American homeland, if they can.
But one other tool may also be considered: luring Washington into negotiations with the Taliban. Already the propaganda machine of the jihadis from different corners of the planet, including via its tentacles inside the Western media, is pushing the idea that discussions with the "good Taliban" is a viable and pragmatic option. Recently, a particular push for considering radical Islamism as a "fact of life" to be recognized has materialized in a publicized Newsweek article.
Painting the jihadis as credible partners in a peacemaking equation is, in fact, part of a smart maneuver to gain time and delay US-led efforts to defeat the network in Afghanistan. Ironically, similar moves were undertaken in Pakistan. In order to delay Islamabad's new secular government in its preparedness to confront the Taliban once and for all, good cop-bad cop tactics are employed: suicide bombings target officials and civilians alike, while offers for ceasefire from local Islamists shower the authorities.
The recent agreement of Malakand signed between Sufi Islam and Pakistani authorities allowed the implantation of sharia in the province. The agreement could have been used to the advantage of the Taliban to indoctrinate the youth, recruit fighters and suicide bombers, repress civil society movements and eradicate government presence. Just look at the Waziristan accord (2006) as an example.
Another trap we should not allow ourselves to fall into is calling those who are reconcilable the "good" Taliban or the "little" Taliban. We should avoid assigning the label to armed opposition groups or other groups that may associate with the Taliban on a small level. Just as it would have been a strategic mistake to label the members of the Sahwa (Awakening Councils) in Iraq little "q" al-Qaeda or "good" al-Qaeda - it would be quite the blunder to consider as Taliban those who cooperate with the Taliban out of fear or those that seek cooperation as a way to feed their family.
And as the stalling tactics are employed in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, reverse moves will be executed in India. Unfortunately, the regional war room more than likely will order terror activities on Indian soil to diminish the will of the Pakistani government to go to Waziristan. If violence erupts on its eastern border with India, Pakistan cannot be sending troops to battle the Taliban on its western frontiers. Inflaming tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad causes the latter to redeploy forces from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North-West Frontier Province to the border with India, thereby relieving military pressure the Taliban faces in northwest Pakistan. Thus Plan "C" seems to announce waves of happenings in the sub-continent. What can and should be done about it, remains the most important question.
Counter strategies
Any counter strategy design must being with the following affirmations:
That the threat is strategic and regional, not just local and legitimate.
That the counter strategies must put the confrontation of the regional threat above all local considerations and issues.
That the United States and its allies operating out of Afghanistan are determined to engage that threat with all the tools at their disposal and with the largest alliance it can muster.
That Pakistan and India should realize that they are both targeted by the jihadis regardless of their quarrels over ethno-territorial issues.
With these principles accepted, a global set of counter strategies can be set to deal with al-Qaeda/Taliban and their jihadi nebulous in the sub-continent.
Afghanistan
The US-led NATO coalition should proceed with the reinforcement of the expeditionary force to levels capable of insuring a full control of the country's national soil; and at the same time a gigantic effort must be mustered in three directions: training and equipping the Afghan Army and Police, supporting a vast network of civil society non-governmental organizations (NGOs) countrywide and reaching out to countries that haven't yet participated in the post-9/11 counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan, such as Russia, India, China, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria, and invite them to join the consortium in sectors of their choice. The further the campaign is internationalized, the more jihadis will be isolated.
Engagement strategies
The US and NATO should not be dragged to the path of the so-called partnership with jihadis to defeat other jihadis. In this game, the more ideological and sophisticated factions always win. Instead, the international coalition must engage the democratic forces and sustain them to win the intellectual and political battle.
Pakistan
The present government must undertake a full reassessment of its past strategies and reform its own forces so that it can ready itself to wage a national mobilization, part of which will be on the military level, but the most significant part must be on the popular and political levels. The campaign to counter the terror forces can only be successful if large segments of the population are engaged in the struggle against fundamentalism.
India
New Delhi, too, will have to reshape its plan to counter the jihadi strategies in the region and on its soil. While the military and security engagement against local terror groups will continue, Indian resources in the war of ideas will have to be tapped. As a major economic and technological power in the region, and now worldwide, India has the ability to open a new front against radical ideologies with the help of linguistic, cultural and intellectual skills, crucial to the battle. The establishment of a vast network of television and radio broadcasts, NGOs and intelligence capability based on Indian soil can weaken Islamist radicalism.
Last but not least, the vital cement of all the above strategies is their integration and eventually fusion under one platform. If the United States, NATO and other international partners can bring together the three democratically-elected governments of the subcontinent - Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (and perhaps Bangladesh) - under a unified and coordinated global strategy, the jihadi forces will be isolated and gradually rolled back.
*Dr Walid Phares is the director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad. Dr Phares teaches global strategies at National Defense University.
(Copyright 2009 Dr Walid Phares.)
 

LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 05/09

Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Mark 12:28-34. One of the scribes, when he came forward and heard them disputing and saw how well he had answered them, asked him, "Which is the first of all the commandments?" Jesus replied, "The first is this: 'Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God is Lord alone!  You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength.' The second is this: 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.' There is no other commandment greater than these." The scribe said to him, "Well said, teacher. You are right in saying, 'He is One and there is no other than he.' And 'to love him with all your heart, with all your understanding, with all your strength, and to love your neighbor as yourself' is worth more than all burnt offerings and sacrifices." And when Jesus saw that (he) answered with understanding, he said to him, "You are not far from the kingdom of God." And no one dared to ask him any more questions.

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Jihad goes intercontinental.By Walid Phares 04/06/09
Casting Lebanon’s destiny in ballot boxes/Future News 04/06/09
US steadfast against Hezbollah.By Kaveh L Afrasiabi/Asia Times 04/06/09
Lebanon's opposition faces a hard climb-By Michael Young 04/06/09
The Crisis of the Christians Is the Crisis of Lebanon.By:Abdullah Iskandar, 04/06/09
Israel Prefers Hezbollah.By: Randa Takieddine 04/06/09
Analysis: Smoke, mirrors and fire in Lebanon-Jerusalem Post 04/06/09
Obama vs. bin Laden: A battle for Muslim hearts-Christian Science Monitor 04/06/09
Corruption remains one of the most important challenges in Lebanon-The Daily Star 04/06/09
Talking To: Economist Sami Nader/The Economy after the elections. By: Maysam Ali, NOW Staff  04/06/09
A message of friendship from America to the Middle East. Michael Tomasky, 04/06/09

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June 04/09
Mouawad: If Iran and Hezbollah win, the next victim would be Aoun-iloubnan.info
Obama calls for new beginning between U.S., Muslims.Reuters
Martyr Hanna’s mother responds to Aoun-Future News
Edde: Aoun wants to weaken Bekerke/Future News
Today’s scene: forgery, more violence and a “Fatwa”-Future News
Qassem Threatens Hizbullah will Continue to Rearm, Advises U.N. to Go to Sleep-Future News
Lieberman: Israel to Boycott Conference With Hamas or Hizbullah-Future News
Williams: U.N. Closely Following Issue of Israeli Spy Networks-Future News
Massive Forgery of Identity Cards Uncovered ahead of Elections-Future News
Iran, France Agree to Spare Lebanon Any Shock-Future News
Child Trafficking Gang Arrested in the Bekaa-Future News
Allouch told almustaqbal.org: Fraudulence stems from a criminal approach-Future News
Nadim Gemayel: Sassine can't turn into a weapons cache for Hezbollah-iloubnan.info
Hezbollah concerns misplaced-United Press International
Hezbollah says not seeking Iran-style state in Lebanon-WashingtonTV
What should Israel do about Iran?guardian.co.uk
WILLIAMS: Abandonment of Israel-Washington Times
Ready For War-The Jewish Week -
Petraeus questions Hezbollah's existence-Middle East Times
Mudslinging going full swing ahead of Lebanon vote-AFP
Looking at Hezbollah With Hamas in Mind-Forward
Syria to allow visit of American military leaders: US report-Xinhua
Maronite Bishops urge Lebanese to accept poll results-Daily Star
Arab monitors being poll-monitoring mission-Daily Star
NDI election observers arrive ahead of vote-Daily Star
Qassem: Hizbullah wants unity government-Daily Star
Race in Baabda could prove tight and pivotal-Daily Star
True sovereignty and independence-Daily Star
Public debt will limit economic policy options of next Lebanese cabinet-Daily Star
Family of Air France passenger await news about crash-Daily Star
Political parties seen as most corrupt groups in country-Daily Star
AUB to award four honorary doctorates this year-Daily Star
Climate change poses threat to Mideast security, report warns-Daily Star

Obama calls for new beginning between U.S., Muslims
Module body
By Ross Colvin and David Alexander
CAIRO (Reuters) - President Barack Obama sought a "new beginning" between the United States and the Muslim world on Thursday but offered no new initiative to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an omission likely to disappoint many. "We meet at a time of tension between the United States and Muslims around the world -- tension rooted in historical forces that go beyond any current policy debate," the U.S. president said in a major speech at Cairo University."I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect," he said. "America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition."
Obama's speech was an effort to restore the tarnished U.S. image among many of the more than 1 billion Muslims around the world, damaged by former President George W. Bush's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the treatment of U.S. military detainees. The choice of Cairo for the speech underscored Obama's focus on the Middle East, where he faces huge foreign policy challenges, from trying to restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process to curbing Iran's nuclear program. Obama, who is hoping to build a coalition of Muslim government to back his diplomatic moves, offered no new proposals to advance the Middle East peace process, saying Palestinians "must abandon violence" and urging them acknowledge Israel's right to exist. "The United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements," he said. "This construction violates previous agreements and undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop." Before the speech, the U.S. president met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. "We discussed how to move forward in a constructive way to bring peace and prosperity to people in the region," Obama told reporters after the talks with Mubarak, who has ruled Egypt since 1981 and kept a tight lid on opposition. (Additional reporting by Cynthia Johnston in Cairo and Zahra Hosseinian in Tehran; Writing by Edmund Blair)

Obama in Cairo
A message of friendship from America to the Middle East
Michael Tomasky, Special to NOW , June 4, 2009
As Barack Obama prepares to deliver his big Cairo speech, I think back to the campaign and his election victory last November. To millions of us in America, the sun shone that day for the first time in eight years. Finally, we were going to have a president we could send out into the world feeling pride rather than embarrassment. He had intellectual curiosity about other cultures, and his very election (because of his race) signaled to other nations that the United States could overcome some of its own historical malice. Because of those two facts, we hoped, he just might be able to establish the United States’ moral authority again.
Now here we are, seven months later. It’s been a mostly successful seven months for Obama, but you would never call it an easy seven months by any means. It seems like practically every day here in Washington, Obama is on TV, dealing with some new calamity. He’s already become so familiar that it can sometimes feel that he’s been president for about two years.
So the initial euphoria may have ebbed a bit. But most Americans feel we’re in good hands with this guy. And one of the things we most want him to do is to repair America’s relationship to the world. From your vantage point, you may not realize it, but we’re not a bunch of Dick Cheneys over here. Millions and millions of Americans want our country to lead by moral example and to work with the world instead of against it. And yes, lots of us understand that Muslims aren’t all religious extremists, and that their aspirations are not very different from ours.
And that, in a nutshell, is what I want Obama to say. He must emphasize the values and touchstones that America and the Muslim world have in common and describe a future in which we come closer together. As the American journalist Robert Dreyfuss put it a few days ago, Obama should riff on the infamous title of a 1990s book by a conservative American academic and insist: “There is no Clash of Civilizations. There never was. Instead, I suggest that, working together, we can create a Partnership of Civilizations.”
Remember, too, that while his audience for this speech will be chiefly Muslim, it will not be only Muslim. Americans will be listening closely to the president’s words as well. So whatever he says to the Muslim world, he should say also to his own countrymen. He should use this opportunity to praise the great and benevolent aspects of Islamic religious and cultural traditions. I said earlier that all Americans aren’t reactionaries. However, I will confess that most Americans probably don’t know the most basic facts about the Muslim world. Obama can use this speech as a pedagogical moment for his own country.
Naturally, I hope he gives a special little shout-out to Lebanon on the eve of your important elections. As you know from Hillary Clinton’s and Joe Biden’s cautious words on their visits, Obama can’t tilt too obviously in one direction or the other. But we all know which result the United States wants, and he should find the words that might encourage that result without inciting too much of an anti-US backlash.
So that’s the happy talk. And, yes, he has to deliver some medicine. Obama has to embrace his own form of democracy promotion, promising that we won’t try to force it on people at gunpoint, but nevertheless insisting on values – women’s equality, freedom for ethnic and religious minorities, a free press, the settlement of disputes through peaceful means – that must be universal.
He should rebuke Hosni Mubarak about Egypt’s awful human rights record and demand improvement. He should affirm Israel’s right to exist within the 1967 borders and explain why Arab nations and peoples have to do the same (he’s been giving Israel medicine too, and if you don’t believe me just read the conservative Israeli – and American – commentary on the Obama administration’s position on the settlements).
He must urge a renunciation of violence. Here, of course, one doesn’t expect that Hassan Nasrallah will listen to the speech and say, “Hmm, by golly, he’s right.” But Obama has to direct these words toward regular people in the region and try to pull them away from leaders who advocate and sponsor violence.
No one expects that one speech will transform everything. The Obama administration has to follow the speech with deeds that match the words. Life isn’t a movie. The world changes slowly and clumsily. But I still think of the optimism so many of us here felt last election night. We also hope that eight years from now, as President Obama is winding down his second and final term in office, the world, and your portion of it, will look pretty different from the way they do today. This speech begins that process.
**Michael Tomasky is editor of Democracy: A Journal of Ideas and US editor-at-large for The Guardian. You can read his blog here.

Martyr Hanna’s mother responds to Aoun
Date: June 4th, 2009 Source: NNA
The mother of a Lebanese Army Captain whose helicopter was downed by Hizbullah militants in south Lebanon last year, responded to renegade General Michel Aoun comments that the pro-Iranian party had not killed or kidnapped any of the people of Batroun, the government-run National News Agency reported Thursday. “It seems that you have a weak memory that mixes things up which made you forget that Samer Hanna was from Batroun,” Yvette Hanna, mother of Samer Hanna said. Hanna, was flying a Lebanese army helicopter in a routine reconnaissance flight when his aircraft was shot down over the southern village of Sojod, a Hizbullah-dominated area. “Those who received you in Tannourine were definitely from Haret Hreik (Beirut’s southern suburbs) and not from Batroun (the hometown of Samer Hanna),” she added. “You have not lost a person of your flesh and blood to know the value of the martyrdom of Samer Hanna who loved his country and died while on duty,” Hanna added. “I regret that a former army commander defends the killers of a captain in the Lebanese army instead of paying tribute to his soul,” she added. “I remained silent to block the way for those who might exploit what I say to politicize the case because I respect the military institution and the memory of my son.” “I respond to General Aoun in my name and not in the name of the military institution because the judicial authority is looking into the case,” she concluded.

Edde: Aoun wants to weaken Bekerke
Date: June 3rd, 2009 Source: NNA
National Bloc leader, Carlos Edde, asserted in a statement Wednesday that March 8’s MP Michel Aoun wants Bekerke weakened so that he becomes the supreme Christian leader in Lebanon. Edde hailed the Bekerke statement issued today following the Maronite Bishop Council meeting which called on compatriots for support for the national charter, stressing the need to perform the June 7 parliamentary elections in a calm and democratic atmosphere. He said “the Bekerke statement was very logical because Patriarch Sfeir and the Church don’t take sides. They think of the nation’s best interest.” Edde, who is running for one of the five Maronite seats in Kessrouan, assured that Aoun and Hizbullah politics don’t fulfill the ambitions of Kessrouan citizens, “this is why many will vote for the March 14 list, especially after the words of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who stressed that resistance will grow stronger in both Lebanon and the region if March 8 wins elections.”He expressed apprehension from the probability of a March 8 win. “If Hizbullah is to control command centers, the state’s institutes will answer to the party which, in turn, answers to Iran,” pointed Edde. Edde, whose main opponent in Kessrouan is Free Patriotic Movement leader, predominant MP Michel Aoun, affirmed that “the other camp will resort to means of intimidation, threatening of a new civil war in case March 14 wins, by obstructing the government and using violence.”He concluded with saying “we mustn’t forget Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who asked the Lebanese not to forget May 7.”May 7 marks a bloody day in Lebanon’s history, when armed opposition supporters attacked innocent citizens of Beirut.

Al-Jouzu condemns accusations of treason
Date: June 4th, 2009 Source: NNA
Mohammad Ali al-Jouzu, Mufti of Mount Lebanon region, condemned Thursday the accusations of treason launched by the opposition against figures from the majority.
Al-Jouzu told the National News Agency, he said: “The resistance is trying to give itself artificial sanctity, and fake artificial victories to make the people believe that it is above the law, the constitution and the state and that anyone who opposes it is a traitor and a Zionist enemy. “The Israelis infiltrated the ranks of the resistance; there is no more confidence in its social milieu since it lacks the national immunity and honest loyalty. The security apparatus exposed several Israeli spies since then; the resistance has been accusing figures from the majority with espionage. He added: “There is a campaign of lies spreading from the Beirut northern suburb to the Bekaa and Tripoli, they are trying to make people believe that some honest and recognized personalities well known for their loyalty are undercover agents.”

Casting Lebanon’s destiny in ballot boxes
Date: June 4th, 2009 Future News
Describing the June 7 parliamentary elections as “a decisive phase in Lebanon’s history” is not exaggerated. Each vote casted in the ballot boxes will contribute in determining the direction of the country and its destiny for years to come. These votes will determine the preference of the ‘Cedars Revolution’ and will support the projects of sovereignty, independence, state, stability, and prosperity, declining the figure of tutelage and connection to the outside and the model of chaos, economic obstruction and the mini-state concept. Winning the decisive battle is up to few seats, thus we will not cross out any candidate from the electoral tickets of ‘March 14’ coalition because losing any seat means we might lose the battle of preserving Lebanon’s identity. This is why we will not let anyone cross out our Lebanon! Lebanon’s destiny is in our hands for two simple reasons: the first is that the majority will block out any foreign interference in elections, and the second is because in our hands we can cross the suspicious projects which aim at changing the nature of our democratic political system and toppling the Taef agreement. In our hands we will cross out all those who crossed out their previous stances, and in our hands we will change those who have changed their standpoints and those who sought to change the identity of the country and engage it with regional axes. In our hands we will cross out those who claimed reform and became the defenders of illegitimate weapons and corrupters, and those who promised change and ended up changing their stances. In our hands we will vote to determine our fate and assert that we will not allow Syria’s Bashar el Assad or Iran’s Mahmud Ahmed Nejad to determine our political, strategic, or national choices.

Today’s scene: forgery, more violence and a “Fatwa”
Date: June 4th, 2009 Source: Future News
“D Day” is coming up in 3 days. The electoral battle is heating up and the stands of the two opposing camps are becoming more and more lucid.
March 14 expresses, as always, concerns for the state and calls for the preservation of the national charter and the republic. This was voiced by Bkerke and the Maronite Bishops statement. Meanwhile, March 8 guys are still hinting a coup over the state and its institutions, chanting slogans that when decoded, can only mean an “open war”.
Regarding elections preparations, although the Interior Ministry is making intense efforts to render the June 7 parliamentary elections “transparent and calm”, some imposters, AKA opposition candidates, are making the ministry’s task more difficult by forging IDs.
This sham is being pulled in districts were some claim to have the support of 70% of the voters.
Citizens slammed the act and dubbed it “shameful”. “Taking things into deep consideration, pointed a source to almustaqbal.org, “which of the political factions has appropriate technical and logistic equipment to forge IDs?”
National charter…Lebanon’s constitution
Separately, Maronite Bishops asked the Lebanese to support the national charter and vote using logic and ethics, “vying in a sheer civil atmosphere that lives up to Lebanon’s reputation.” They also asked compatriots to resort to the mind and not the arms, and to accept election results with “high spirits”.
March 14 general secretary voiced support for the Bishops call and asked the Lebanese to choose between an open war zone of constitutional infringement, eventually leading to the termination of the Lebanese independence and the national charter, the constitution, the Taëf Agreement and Arabism. It cautioned from March 8 exaggerations in launching rumors and fabrications that particularly hit candidate Nayla Tueni.
Tueni, running for the Maronite seat in Beirut’s first district, asked Interior Minister Ziad Baroud, and Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar to start an investigation to probe the ID forgery question laid in Baabda and other regions.
Islamic Jamaa and Future Movement: one voice
Future Movement leader, MP Saad Hariri visited Islamic Jamaa Secretary General, Sheikh Faisal Mawlawi to confirm their alliance.
After urging people to vote for the complete March 14 electoral lists, MP Hariri released a statement asking the movement’s supporters in Iklim al-Kharroub district to “consider all candidates not on the list as opponents to the movement and its leader’s approach.”
Geagea’s recollection of the Great Ones
During the March 14-independents festival in Beirut’s first district, Lebanese Forces leader, Samir Geagea, assured that “Achrafieh, Rmeil and Saifi citizens support democracy, embodied by Charles Malek’s green book, and not Hizbullah yellow one.”
Geagea indicated that “Achrafieh means Fouad Boutros, St Joseph, the Patriarch, Camille Chamoun and Bashir Gemayel. To vote for their philosophies and thoughts, vote for March 14.”
He also asserted that George Hawi, Gebran Tueni and Samir Kassir, are “the genuine Orthodox representatives of Achrafieh, not Assaad Hardan.”
Religion, at the disposal of politics
The best example of Hizbullah’s enshrinement of religion for electoral purposes is the party’s “Fatwa” it issued instructing Shiites of Zahleh not to vote for March 14’s Okab Sakr.
Consequently, Baabda Shiite candidate and March 14 supporter, Bassem al-Sabeh asked voters not to “go by this religious extortion”.
More violence!
Free Patriotic Movement, hallmarked with arrogance and violence, introduces Catholic supporter, candidate in Metn, Edgard Maalouf, whom bodyguards and himself barged into Byblos Bank in Dora, bearing weapons pointed towards employees and citizens. If you could only imagine the reason! It seems that Maalouf was a bit upset that his bank transaction was a bit delayed! It should be noted that the FPM’s Ibrahim Kanaan, who runs for the Maronite seat in Metn started a fight in Mansourieh last month. His bodyguards opened fire, and injured innocent by passers. A Metn source told almustaqbal.org of its surprise towards these inexplicable behaviors and asked “is this the type of parliamentarians we want as representatives of the Lebanese?”
Hizbullah confesses getting armed
Surprisingly enough, Hizbullah deputy secretary general, Sheikh Naim Kassem said “we are getting armed. We will show the world that our arms will free our land.” Kassem asked “will we defend Lebanon by saying that it has the right to sovereignty as a constitutional demand? Will we defend Lebanon through a couple of papers titled Defense Strategy that do Lebanon no good? Is defending Lebanon achieved through allowing Israeli jets flying over our heads every day? No, it isn’t. We have tried your defense. Lebanon is only defended through rockets, cannons and lion hearts.”

Qassem Threatens Hizbullah will Continue to Rearm, Advises U.N. to Go to Sleep
Naharnet/Hizbullah's deputy leader, Sheikh Naim Qassem, has threatened that his party will continue to rearm itself and advised the United Nations to back off.
"We will buy weapons. We will be an armed resistance and we will liberate the land with arms. Let the (U.N.) Security Council take a rest and sleep," Qassem said during a ceremony marking the 20th anniversary of the death of Imam Ayatollah Khomeini on Wednesday. The U.N., he added, will not dictate to Hizbullah. "We don't want anything from it. Let them shout but their shouts will go unheard." "Lebanon can only be defended by the canon, the rocket and mighty hearts," he stressed. Lauding Iran's support for Lebanon and the Arab cause, the top Hizbullah official vowed to prevent the country from becoming an American or Israeli battlefield. "We have reached adulthood. Lebanon will not be a battlefield either for the U.S. or for Israel," Qassem told the crowd during the ceremony at UNESCO palace. On the elections, the Hizbullah deputy chief said: "We believe the results of the elections will be in the favor of resistant Lebanon." Beirut, 04 Jun 09, 08:47

Qassem Rejects Accusations Hizbullah Will Transform Lebanon into an Islamic State
Naharnet/Hizbullah's deputy secretary general has rejected accusations that a Hizbullah-led government would try to implement an Iranian-style Islamic state.
Confident of victory in Lebanese weekend elections, Sheikh Naim Qassem said Tuesday the party would invite its opponents to join a national unity government if it wins.
In an interview with The Associated Press, he shrugged off warnings about boycotts and insisted Western nations are willing to talk to the new government irrespective of who wins.
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, on a visit to Lebanon last month, warned Washington would reassess aid to Lebanon depending on the next government's makeup and policies. The U.S., which considers Hizbullah a terrorist organization, has provided about $1 billion in aid since 2006.
"After June 7, there will be a new scene," said Qassem, who leads Hizbullah's election campaign. He said Hizbullah and its allies "will work to form a national unity government. How much we will succeed is up to the other side."
He spoke Tuesday at a secret location in the Hizbullah stronghold of south Beirut. Out of security concerns, AP reporters were driven in a minivan with black-draped windows to an apartment building basement. There, they were transferred to another minivan with black-draped windows to block the view and driven to another building, where Qassem later showed up for the interview.
The vote for parliament pits Western-backed factions that have dominated the government for the last four years against a coalition led by Hizbullah and its ally, Christian leader Michel Aoun. Hizbullah has had veto power over government decisions for the past year as part of a national unity government formed after its gunmen overran Beirut Muslim neighborhoods in May 2008, bringing Lebanon to the verge of another civil war. So far, the election has been considered too close to call and the pro-Western coalition has also predicted victory. But if Qassem's predictions materialize, it would be the first time Hizbullah is positioned to play a major role in the formation of Lebanon's government.
Qassem predicted his alliance would pick up between three and six seats over the 64-seat margin to have an absolute majority in the 128-member legislature and some factions from the pro-Western coalition would opt to join the new government. But one major faction has already said it won't.
He accused the U.S. of last-minute attempts to influence the vote, but said they would not work. President Barack Obama is addressing Muslims in a speech from Cairo Thursday, days before the Lebanese elections, in his latest overture to improve relations with the Islamic world.(AP-Naharnet) Beirut, 03 Jun 09, 07:01

Lieberman: Israel to Boycott Conference With Hamas or Hizbullah
Naharnet/Israel will not take part in any Middle East peace conference, including one Russia hopes to hold in Moscow, that involves Hamas or Hizbullah, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said on Wednesday. Lieberman also said that Israel does not intend to bomb Iran, in the most explicit comments on the matter by a top minister of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government to date. Speaking at the end of a three-day visit to Russia, Lieberman said that other countries in the Middle East and around the world should be concerned about Iran's nuclear program. But he said those countries should not expect Israel to solve the problem for them.
"We do not intend to bomb Iran, and nobody will solve their problems with our hands," he told reporters. "We don't need that. Israel is a strong country, we can protect ourselves.
"But the world should understand that the Iran's entrance into the nuclear club would prompt a whole arms race, a crazy race of unconventional weaponry across the Mideast that is a threat to the entire world order, a challenge to the whole international community," he said. "So we do not want a global problem to be solved with our hands."
The comments appeared to be a slight softening from recent statements made by Netanyahu's government that have suggested Israel might be forced to take military action against Iran.
Netanyahu has repeatedly said Iran must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons, and has refused to rule out the use of force.
After his recent meeting in Washington with President Barack Obama, Netanyahu said he and the U.S. president agreed Iran must not obtain nuclear weapons, and attempts to solve the problem through negotiations could not be unlimited in time. Iran, whose president has expressed hatred of Israel, maintains its nuclear programs are only designed to provide electricity. But Israel, the United States and other nations fear the effort is aimed at acquiring nuclear weapons. While in Moscow, Lieberman met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and others.(AP-AFP) Beirut, 03 Jun 09, 14:10

Massive Forgery of Identity Cards Uncovered ahead of Elections
Naharnet/Between 4,000 and 10,000 forged identity cards in the Zahle, Baabda, Western Bekaa and south Lebanon districts remain prime concern for judicial police only three days ahead of decisive parliamentary elections. Media reports said Interior Minister Ziad Baroud was sparing no effort to find a mechanism to combat fraud. Pan-Arab daily Asharq al Awsat on Thursday said the forged IDs were now in the hands of security authorities which already undertook measures to arrest the perpetrators. It said security forces were able to find a printer used in the forgery. Well-informed sources told An Nahar daily, however, that the government has the potential to hand out devices to detect fraud at all polling stations. Pan-Arab Al Hayat newspaper, for its part, spoke of two kinds of forgery -- Counterfeit IDs which can be detected by sophisticated technical equipment and "legitimate" IDs which carry the name of a person other than the bearer's name or his/her photo. The second type of forgery means that they carry the names of people overseas who have not obtained Lebanese identity cards or those working outside the country and are not expected to participate in the election so IDs would be given to people to vote. This is usually done by agreement between the mayor and the party that wishes to gain votes of illegal voters in its favor. A well-informed source told al Liwaa daily, meanwhile, that about 3,700 forged identity cards had been found in the possession of a very prominent political party ready to be used in voting. He said the fingerprint of each citizen is in itself a guarantee that fraud will not take place. The report on evidence of fake identity cards was uncovered by Prime Minister Fouad Saniora during an ordinary cabinet session on Tuesday. Baroud said the ministry had "put its hand on the issue." "We have taken strict measures and we will take even stringiest measures to bring the situation under control," Baroud was quoted as telling Cabinet ministers. Beirut, 04 Jun 09, 08:28

Iran, France Agree to Spare Lebanon Any Shock
Naharnet/France and Iran have reportedly stressed the need to ensure continuation of inter-Lebanese dialogue and safeguard the progress made in the Doha agreement.
The daily As Safir on Thursday said the "Lebanese dossier" was tackled during talks in Elysee between Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and French officials, particularly French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Elysee sources said Sarkozy met Mottaki upon an Iranian request to deliver a letter from the Iranian leadership that could form the starting point for the re-launch of dialogue with Tehran over the frozen nuclear enrichment during presidential elections. Beirut, 04 Jun 09, 09:36

Child Trafficking Gang Arrested in the Bekaa
Naharnet/Police in the eastern Bekaa valley have arrested members of a gang that sold newly-born children, the first such arrests linked to child trafficking in Lebanon, An Nahar daily reported Thursday. Police in a northern Bekaa town arrested a mayor, his wife, a midwife and a doctor at a hospital in the region, the newspaper said.
The operation was uncovered after police received information that the doctor and the midwife were claiming that the alleged foundling babies were being sent abroad with the help of a non-governmental organization. Police then put the gang under watch. The mayor, who is the head of the network, was arrested when he arrived along with his wife and a pregnant woman at the hospital where she delivered the child and handed it to the man. An Nahar said the woman who delivered the child received $500. Investigation is ongoing with the arrested individuals to uncover more details about the child trafficking operation. Beirut, 04 Jun 09, 10:00

Q&A: Lebanese elections
BBC/Lebanese elections are keenly fought in a country of many minorities
Lebanon is voting for a new parliament on Sunday, in elections that many believe could prove decisive for the country's future and the regional balance of power.
The pro-Western and Saudi-backed 14 March governing coalition, which won a slim parliamentary majority in the last election in 2005, is expected to face a strong challenge from the Hezbollah-led opposition backed by Syria and Iran.
What is the background?
The 2005 coalition came to power on a wave of anger at Syria's longstanding influence over Lebanon provoked by the killing of former PM Rafik Hariri. His supporters blamed the murder on Syria, although Damascus denied any involvement.
But subsequently, a long political stand-off between the new 14 March ruling coalition and the pro-Syrian opposition over the election of a new president culminated in violent clashes across the country in May 2008.
After a long series of unsuccessful talks and outbreaks of violence, the rival parties held reconciliation talks in the Qatari capital, Doha, which resulted in the formation of a national unity government, with the opposition getting 11 out of 27 ministerial posts.
What is the electoral system?
Lebanon's MPs are elected through a confessional system - that is one which allows 11 of the country's religious minorities a guaranteed fixed representation in parliament.
The 128-seat chamber is divided equally between Muslim and Christian communities, giving each side 64 seats (even though the proportion of Christians in the overall population has declined since the system was put in place, and is now at an estimated 35-40%).
The system gives Sunni Muslims 27 seats and Shias Muslims the same number. The Druze get eight seats and Alawites two. On the Christian side, 34 seats are reserved for Maronites, 14 for Greek Orthodox, eight for Catholics, six for Armenians and two for other Christian minorities.
MPs are elected for four-year terms in 26 multi-seat constituencies. Lebanese men and women above 21 years of age have the right to vote, whether they are resident in Lebanon or not.
Although candidates compete against their co-religionists for a fixed numbers of seats in each constituency, electors from other confessional groups can vote for them too - a system designed to prevent candidates representing the interests only of their own group.
For example, the Baabda constituency has six seats, three for Maronite Christians, two for Shia Muslims and one for a Druze deputy - broadly reflecting the confessional make-up of the constituency. All voters can vote for six candidates and the winners will be the ones who pick up the most votes among their confessional group.
Critics of the system say in the past it has encouraged gerrymandering of votes. The boundaries of voting districts were altered by a parliamentary vote in September 2008.
What are the electoral alliances?
The backbone of the current parliamentary majority, the 14 March coalition, is the mainly-Sunni Future movement (Mustaqbal in Arabic) headed by Saad Hariri, son of the assassinated former PM Rafik Hariri.
The two main blocs are led by Hassan Nasrallah and Sa'ad Hariri
The alliance also includes the Progressive Socialist Party, a Druze group headed by Walid Jumblatt, the Christian Lebanese Forces led by Samir Geagea, the Christian Phalangist party, as well as numerous smaller groups.
The Opposition coalition - known in the press as the 8 March coalition - is built around the Iranian-backed Shia Hezbollah (Party of God in Arabic), which has a strong military wing, and the pro-Syrian Shia Amal movement headed by the current parliamentary speaker, Nabih Birri.
Other important players in the opposition bloc are the mainly Christian Free Patriotic Movement led by former army chief Michel Aoun, and two pro-Syrian and mainly Christian parties, al-Marada and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party.
What are the main battlegrounds?
The election is thought likely to be decided in a small number of highly competitive districts.
The most fiercely-contested seats are expected to be in Christian-populated regions, such as the Beirut-1 district in the capital, Zahleh in the Bekaa valley, Batrun in the north, and Metn in the central Mount Lebanon province, as well as confessionally mixed areas like West Bekaa district.
In many districts, on the other hand, few surprises are expected. The overwhelmingly Shia areas of South Lebanon and the northern Bekaa are expected to be easy wins for the Hezbollah-Amal coalition, while some Sunni areas in the north and Beirut are seen as safe for the Future movement.
A poll published by al-Akhbar newspaper suggested that 48 seats should be relatively safe for the opposition, and 40 for the 14 March coalition.
Will the election be fair?
Even though the voting process itself is expected to be generally fair, some believe unfair tactics are being applied ahead of the election, with newspapers reporting that the major parties are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to buy votes and fly Lebanese home to vote.
International observers are being sent by the European Union, the Arab League, the Carter Foundation, the Turkish government and the US National Democratic Institute.
BBC Monitoring selects and translates news from radio, television, press, news agencies and the internet from 150 countries in more than 70 languages. It is based in Caversham, UK, and has several bureaux abroad.

Lebanon's opposition faces a hard climb
By Michael Young
Daily Star staff
Thursday, June 04, 2009
With three days left until Lebanon's parliamentary elections, it's difficult not to get caught up in the predictions game, even though the dangers of that were apparent in 2005, when Michel Aoun turned most forecasts to mush. This time, however, things appear to be different.
It is almost certain that Aoun will emerge with the largest single Christian bloc in Parliament, whether alone or with allies such as Sleiman Franjieh and maybe Elie Skaff. However, the general's aspiration to have the largest parliamentary bloc ever, as he recently stated, seems a very difficult wager to win. Even if Aoun does well, he will not do well enough to hand the opposition a majority, bearing in mind that a great deal can and will happen on Sunday that will shape the final outcome, given that this is the first time the Lebanese vote in a single day.
Here's a simplistic view of the electoral situation. The opposition starts off with 33 guaranteed seats, between what it is bound to gain in the South (minus Sidon), Beirut II, and Baalbek-Hermel. That means that in predominantly Christian areas, Aoun and his allies would need to gain at least 32 seats in order for the opposition to earn a parliamentary majority. If we take each district from Zghorta down to Baabda and east to Zahleh, even excessively optimistic assessments of electoral results in favor of the opposition indicate that those 32 seats remain elusive.
For example, let's assume the following results. If Franjieh and his allies win all three seats in Zghorta, Salim Saadeh wins a seat in Koura, Aoun sweeps the three seats in Jbeil and the five seats in Keserwan, wins five seats in the Metn, four seats in Baabda, one seat in Beirut I, and, through Skaff, three seats in Zahleh, the opposition would still need seven seats to win a slight legislative majority. Aounist projections are for sweeps everywhere, but that is highly improbable for several reasons.
First, the mood in the Christian community has changed in the past four years, so that the likelihood of the electorate voting complete lists is less than it was in 2005. Aoun retains a solid and mobilized core of voters, however it is not they alone who won him his victory four years ago; rather, it was nonaligned Christian voters angry with the quadripartite agreement between Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri, Nabih Berri, and Hizbullah, and sustained in their anger by the Maronite church.
A second reason is that Aoun may have committed a fatal blunder in earning the enmity of Michel Murr, as well as that of President Michel Sleiman and Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir. Sleiman can play a key role in tilting the vote in some districts through the army, and this in the most legal ways possible; meanwhile the church has subtle forms of sway over the electorate, much legitimacy, and a pulpit to get its ideas across.
However, it is Murr who perhaps poses the most direct threat to Aoun. Lebanese elections are only partly about ideas at this late stage. Ideas matter, but interests and hardnosed calculations will play a more critical role in determining what happens this year. When it comes to services, Murr is among the strongest players on the scene. Both in the Metn and Baabda, the economic lungs of Mount Lebanon, where business and industrial enterprises are concentrated, his clout comes through his ability to facilitate a multitude of essential administrative and legal procedures for his electorate. Murr has spent years placing people in the bureaucracy, local administrations, and the judiciary, and will call in his chips in the Metn as well as in Baabda and Beirut I, where his son in law, Edmond Gharios, and granddaughter, Nayla Tueni, are candidates.
It would also be a mistake to dismiss the prospect that, even at the last moment, Murr will be unable conclude an under-the-table deal that takes a bite out of Aoun's alliance with the Armenians, the backbone of the general's victory strategy in the Metn and Beirut I. Ultimately, Murr realizes, the Armenians see little interest in finding themselves out on a limb alone with Aoun, fighting against Murr and the Phalange Party in the Metn, and by extension on adversarial terms with Sleiman.
A third reason is that Aoun's alliance with Hizbullah continues to worry a great majority of Christians. Aoun made a colossal gaffe this weekend in Batroun when he said that if an opposition-led government could not get money from the West, then it could always go to China. The statement got laughs, and Aoun did not say it with very much seriousness. But a politician cannot be flippant about such things. His remark alarmed many people because it seemed an admission that a government over which Hizbullah has influence will spell trouble for Lebanon in its relations with traditional economic partners and funders in Europe, the Gulf countries, and the United States. Most Lebanese would regard any form of financial or cultural isolation from these places as catastrophic.
Add that to the recent statement of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in which he said that an opposition triumph in Lebanon would mean the opening of a new front against Israel, and you have several ingredients that might fuel Christian panic. Aoun has shown a notable ability to drive the community against its own history, profiting from its sense of decline, but there are hard limits to that game.
What all these factors may lead to, however, is not so much a devastating loss for Aoun, than a fragmenting of the Christian vote. Aoun did well in 2005 because his electorate voted complete lists; today, voters are much more likely to mix their lists, choosing candidates from both sides based on both loyalty and welfare. This means that Aoun will bleed support, and while he will probably not suffer a major setback (even if we cannot rule that out) since his electorate is motivated, he should come up short on an opposition victory. We'll see Sunday who has egg on his or her face.
In last week's commentary on the Der Spiegel article, I mistakenly wrote that in August 2006 "the investigation of [telephone] intercepts was headed by ISF Captain Wissam Eid." In fact, the head of the investigation at the time was Samir Shehadeh, who escaped an assassination attempt in September. Eid was his deputy, and took over the investigation afterward.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR

The Economy after the elections:
Maysam Ali, NOW Staff , June 3, 2009
The outcome of the upcoming parliamentary elections will define Lebanon’s political identity as well as its standing within the region and the world. But equally important is the election’s impact on the Lebanese economy. Despite the relative stability of Lebanon’s financial sphere during the global economic crisis, experts warn that the economy’s performance might vary according to who will govern the country over the next four years.
According to Sami Nader, economist and professor at the Université St. Joseph, a Hezbollah-led government would have a detrimental effect on the Lebanese economy and would divert international aid and investment away from the country.
This may sound strange coming from a man who is Michel Aoun's former son-in-law and who played a major role in drafting the Free Patriotic Movement’s economic strategy in 2005, but the changes in the party’s politics since then, Nader says, including the FPM’s controversial 2006 Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah, made him reconsider his allegiance.
NOW Lebanon sits down with Nader to discuss how the elections and a possible change in the balance of power in the country might affect the economy and Lebanon’s status in the eyes of the international community.
What do you think will happen to the economy after the elections?
Nader: We have to stress the fact that in the eyes of the international community, the question is very simple: It’s whether Hezbollah will win the elections; the opposition-aligned FPM and [Nabih Berri’s] Amal Movement are insignificant when it comes to the international community and institutions...
This is why the international community, namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is very concerned. The IMF initiated a series of sessions with Hezbollah to assess their economic program in case they won.
This concern emanates from the fact that Hezbollah is still blacklisted by major international countries in the West, such as the United States. There were even talks within the European Union to include Hezbollah on the terrorists list. This will damage confidence in this country, it will block any possibility of recovery, and it will put to question the possibility of the continuation of the donors’ commitment to Lebanon.
What is the future of aid promised during the Paris III international donor conference?
Nader: Paris III was convened on the basis of an economic recovery plan that Hezbollah has questioned. Unlike Paris II, aid given to Lebanon through Paris III was conditional on a plan that was put in place by [Prime Minister Fouad] Siniora’s government. Hezbollah stated that it does not endorse this plan. No one has a clear answer on what will happen to Paris III. And this grey area is very damaging for the economy. Our economy was still in good shape since 2006 because of the climate of confidence that Siniora and the Central Bank were reinforcing. It was capable of absorbing political instability and the economic consequences of the July War. All of that is now put into question because of uncertainty.
How do you assess the current economy of Lebanon?
Nader: Lebanon today can withstand the economic upheavals. This is because it relies on a solid monetary policy, the Central Bank’s role and a government with an economic plan and that is backed directly by the West, the United States, the European Union and Arab countries, as was the case in the Paris III conference. Those are the main donors and the political back-up of the Lebanese economy. They saw in this government one they can trust.
What would be the alternative if Hezbollah and its allies were to govern?
Nader: … It would lead to the isolation of Lebanon politically and subsequently economically… This is an area of concern because Hezbollah doesn’t have an economic plan. The party has a military plan; they call it “the Islamic Resistance”. Resisting Israel, however, should be part of a comprehensive Arab plan. Lebanon cannot bear alone the burden of fighting Israel and reclaiming Arab rights. I believe that it is in the best interest of Lebanon and the Arabs to stick to the peace initiative as proposed by [Saudi] King Abdullah’s peace plan in 2002.
What is the Free Patriotic Movement’s role in this? Would they be able to present a comprehensive economic plan that’s lacking in Hezbollah’s platform?
Nader: It’s irrelevant because their economic plan doesn’t rely on any political principles. All the political items that were present in [FPM leader Michel Aoun’s] plan in 2005 were totally retrieved from the platform they had proposed. This means that what they proposed today in terms of social and economic reform is insignificant given the lack of a comprehensive political vision. No economic plan is possible without a strategic political vision. Today their political program is that of Hezbollah. And it is rejected by the international community…
What FPM proposed in the Third Republic is a series of small reforms that focus on procedures and the enforcement of new procedural laws. It lacks a vision and a strategy necessary for economic recovery.
In addition, for the rest of the world it’s whether Hezbollah will make it. Other allies don’t matter. They are right because it’s Hezbollah who commands 40,000 soldiers, a force bigger than the Lebanese army. Hezbollah has its own development fund, educational institutions, a separate budget and infrastructure which make it a state within a state.
What’s in an FPM-Hezbollah alliance for Michel Aoun?
Nader: At first, he thought that through Hezbollah he can win the election. Doubts were raised on whether the election of President Michel Sleiman was constitutional. When Sleiman was elected, members of the opposition refuted the constitutionality of his election. This casts doubts on the real intention of the opposition. Furthermore, the May 7 events showed that they can resort to violence to attempt a coup and enforce a political setup that’s in their favor.
And what if the March 14 alliance reclaims a majority in the elections?
Nader: International aid would increase. There was a concern whether March 14 will remain in power and withstand Hezbollah’s military pressure, such as the May 7 events, and the political pressure, such as the obstructing third, the protests in the downtown area, the obstruction of parliament for two years, and impeding the election of the president. They froze all the political institutions and yet, despite all that, the March 14 forces withstood all the pressures.
If March 14 makes it this election, it means that it is legitimate, credible, backed by a majority of the Lebanese. It reinforces investors’ trust in Lebanon and the Lebanese banking system. This would benefit the Lebanese economy because investment and international support would continue. Furthermore, the Lebanese president was the recipient of a large welcome by the international community. This is unprecedented in Lebanese history. It has substantial economic value. We have to protect it and build on it.
Can the current minority, if it wins, attract donors outside the US and EU?
Nader: One has to take into consideration what [Israeli Defense Minister] Ehud Barak said on the Lebanese elections, namely that a Hezbollah victory will give Israel freedom of action. The prospects of war would increase. This will worsen political instability, which will in turn reflect on interest rates, monetary stability and on the confidence level that investors have in Lebanon. It will negatively affect the investments that poured into Lebanon despite the economic crisis. Iran could not finance all-out activities because even if it wants to, it does not have the means.
What will become of Arab investment in the country? Will they decrease?
Nader: Of course, what kinds of investment do you see today in Gaza? We would be heading to a model similar [to that of] Gaza because we would be governed by the same ideology and system. The Lebanese economy has been supported by the tourism sector for the past four years; what would happen to this sector? With a victory for Hezbollah and its allies, the resulting political instability and the prospect of a looming war, Arabs and other tourists would not head to Lebanon. In fact, this is what made them flee the country in 2006.
What would you say is the biggest enemy of the Lebanese economy?
Nader: Uncertainty. The prospect of war and political instability. It has monetary and financial – not only economic – consequences. There is no economic stability in times of war.
What do you make of the plans to fight corruption that were raised by the Free Patriotic Movement and its allies?
Nader: It’s more of a slogan than an actual strategy to fight corruption. Even the laconic plan proposed by the Lebanese Forces to address corruption is more efficient in terms of the mechanism to be implemented. The real challenge of the economy today is not corruption but rather fostering confidence in the Lebanese economy. This is not to say that corruption is not a problem; it is a major issue, but it tends to focus on the past. The FPM stress the importance of auditing accounts, which if carried out would backfire on their allies; but at any rate, this strategy is backward and not forward-looking. We need a vision for the future, a plan to increase the size of the economy. We need a Lebanese dream of peace and stability.
Would the opposition be able to manage the Lebanese economy?
Nader: I have not come across an economic plan by Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s plans are based on social aid, inspired by a leftist-leaning model demanding a bigger role for the government. But one wonders whether a bigger government is the solution as it is the second major reason for public debt. The size of the public administration in the country is huge and is a real burden for the Lebanese economy. In addition, the way that the social security apparatus is run does not give a good example of Hezbollah and Amal’s efficiency in public administration.
Another example of management is invoice collection at the Electricité du Liban (EDL). Mount Lebanon alone makes more than double in bill collection than what is made in the Bekaa and the southern suburb of Beirut… [Hezbollah and Amal] did not give an example of good citizenship and good public management there.
Might an opposition takeover push Lebanese people to travel abroad?
Nader: Yes, those who are desperate would travel. Those who think about their children; immigration will be fierce, serious and long-term. During the civil war, immigration was short-term, and people returned to Lebanon in the 1990s.
The majority of expats are very attached to Lebanese sovereignty. This is especially true of the Lebanese Christian community. A great number of the expat groups previously supporting Aoun have now shifted.
What do you expect of the elections this year?
Nader: I expect the same balance of power. Lebanon has been able to find a delicate equilibrium and has devised a way to survive through instability. We should find a solution for Hezbollah’s arms.

The Crisis of the Christians Is the Crisis of Lebanon
Thu, 04 June 2009
Abdullah Iskandar/Al Hayat
Lebanon’s modern history could be summed up by the inter-Christian division, particularly following independence. The leaders of other confessions concurred with this division, with it being the only pathway to power, as custom and the Taef Agreement handed in the presidency to the Christians. Then, the political life revolved, with its administrative and developmental ramifications, around this division which reflected the controversy over Lebanon’s position and its Arab commitments.
Until the civil war in the mid 1970s, this division remained disciplined by the Constitution and the laws. Political life was renewed through parliamentary and presidential elections, even though violent acts emerged at some junctures, publicly driven by the presidency as in 1952 and 1958. In the first instance, the president wanted to extend his term, while in the second, he sided with foreign alliances against the region.

This division revealed the objection of non-Christian parties in general to the president’s policy. This objection turned - thanks to the demographic and economic changes - to a pressuring tool to redraw the internal equation among the sects, as expressed in the Taef Agreement. But ever since this accord was put into effect, the domestic arena has changed, with the Shiite rise represented by the alliance between Amal and Hezbollah and the transformation of the Sunni’s rhetoric from loose Arabism to a Lebanon-inspired rhetoric that addresses the same issues the Christians had previously defended.
If, during the turmoil in Lebanon, the Sunnis avoided infighting thanks to many factors, the Shiite and Christian communities fell prey to internal strife and intestine fighting. While the Shiites managed – and so did the Sunnis to a large extent – to achieve reconciliation, the Christian divisions persisted and all attempts for internal reconciliation failed.
Now, reconciliation attempts within the sects are underway, at least to avoid translating the verbal violence to the street. But the Christian divisions are deepening. A few days before the elections, this division will determine the picture of the coming parliament and maybe that of Lebanon, although the Christians’ role and size have dramatically shrunk in Lebanon’s public and political life, due to the Taef Agreement or internal self impotency.
This contradiction between the increasingly weakening Christians and their role in determining Lebanon’s future expresses for sure their crisis. But at the same time, this contradiction reveals the crisis of the sects in developing the new formula that should govern peaceful coexistence between the people of the same country. This crisis is best expressed by the fierce electoral battle in the Christian stronghold districts, while the results of the elections are settled in advance in the districts where other sects are dominant.
In this sense, the inter-Christian crisis expresses the ongoing crisis in Lebanon, which is associated with the image of the homeland, the meaning of its institutions, and joint citizenship that secures equal rights and duties, as provided for in the Constitution.
The experience of the previous parliamentary term reveals that this crisis did not only paralyze the parliament for half of its term, equally obstructing government action, but also mixed up the institutions and entities. All sectarian leaders sought to monopolize the institutions, namely the executive ones. As such, the institutions became a sort of a mini-parliament which sums up the work of the legislative institution. Noticeably, the agenda of the national dialogue session – that was arranged under exceptional circumstances to look into issues pertaining to national strategies – is now restricted to items that fall within the jurisdiction of the executive power.

Israel Prefers Hezbollah
Thu, 04 June 2009
Randa Takieddine/Al Hayat
The visit by President Barack Obama to Saudi Arabia today, followed by Cairo tomorrow, to put forward his ideas on solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is tantamount to support for Arab political moderation.
On the eve of decisive elections in Lebanon, a week before the important elections in Iran, Obama wants, by solving the Palestinian-Israeli struggle, to boost the forces of political moderation in the Muslim and Arab worlds, which have been weakened by Israel’s unresponsiveness to any Arab peace initiative put forward by Arab political moderates.
Obama is aware that the Israeli-Palestinian struggle is the region’s central problem. He asked his leading strategic ally in the region, the Israeli prime minister, to halt and remove settlements and accept a Palestinian state. The Israeli response, up to now, has been as expected; a refusal to halt settlements, a refusal to lift the siege on Gaza, and the rejection of the principle of a Palestinian state. This is nothing new; it is the reality of Israeli policy since the founding of the state.
Israel has turned Gaza into “Hamas-stan,” where ordinary Gazans suffer from its siege and its policies. Only Hamas benefits from this, strengthening its position on the ground. This has been noticed by western officials who have visited Gaza – the siege is boosting Hamas’ position.
In the same context, Israel hopes for a victory by Hezbollah in the Lebanese parliamentary elections. Israel despises the Lebanese state and respects Hezbollah, which defeated it in the July War of 2006.
The war showed how Israel destroyed all features of the Lebanese state, laying siege to Lebanon and isolating it (as it did in Gaza), to punish the Lebanese state. It left one safe exit route for Lebanon, to Damascus – what a coincidence!
Today, Israel is hoping for a Hezbollah win in the elections in Lebanon, because it knows the party is stronger than the Lebanese state. Israel also knows that war and peace decisions are in Hezbollah’s hands. But Israel does not want peace in the region, because it is frightened about seeing a Palestinian state on its borders, no matter how demilitarized it is. The Jewish state is afraid of disappearing under the demographic weight of Arabs on its borders. Through its policies, it is strengthening radical Islamic forces and working to empty Jerusalem and the occupied territories of Christians, who have left the country.
In the same context, Israel sees no objection to political decisions being in Hezbollah’s hands in Lebanon, provided that the Christian role is marginalized, even if they are in power in Lebanon.
Israel wants to retain a state of war throughout the region, because it is the only deterrent to the removal of its settlements, its policies of occupation and hegemony, and the establishment of a Palestinian state, which the entire world wants.
Seeing Hezbollah in power in Lebanon, with a majority that can let it direct the country, is the best option for the Jewish state. Strengthening hard-line politics and extremism will serve its policy of rejecting a Palestinian state and the Palestinian people. Arab political moderation that is open to the world does not suit it either. This is because it would be forced to take unpalatable steps; Israel is anxious about what President Obama will say in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, because it is aware that it is being asked to make fundamental concessions. On Friday, Obama will visit France for talks with President Nicholas Sarkozy on his ideas on a solution to the conflict in the Middle East, especially since Sarkozy wishes to launch a peace conference on all tracks by the end of the year. It is certain that the topic of Lebanon’s elections will be raised, even if in passing, since each man has a different policy orientation. Paris has decided to recognize the results and deal with the government, whoever is in power, while Washington is more cautious; it will wait and see what the results will bring about.
It is clear that the evaluation of the two states involves a difference when it comes to the results of Lebanon’s upcoming elections. It is clear that Paris believes that the opposition will win, and that nothing will change as far as it is concerned, because in the view of Paris, no side can eliminate the other in Lebanon. Washington is more cautious, but Paris is now comfortable with its good relationship with Damascus, and this is a priority for it. France under Jacques Chirac closed Europe’s doors to Damascus; today, Sarkozy has opened them wide. In the view of Paris, the elections in Lebanon will not change anything, irrespective of the result.

US steadfast against Hezbollah
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi /Asia Times
Middle East/Jun 5, 2009
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF05Ak03.html
On the eve of critical national elections in fragile Lebanon on Sunday, United States President Barack Obama has opened a new chapter in his quest for "dialogue with the Muslim world". This, inevitably, dictates the US's respect for the results of the elections, even if that means the victory of Hezbollah, a mass-based guerrilla organization that continues to remain on the US government's terrorist list.
In that event, short of fine-tuning its policy and making the necessary adjustments with respect to the terrorist label for Hezbollah, the Obama administration may have no choice but to cut US aid to Lebanon, particularly military aid - since 2005, the US has given US$250 million to the Lebanese armed forces.
United States Vice President Joseph Biden, in his recent Beirut
visit, explicitly linked the future of US assistance to the outcome of the parliamentary elections, where the Hezbollah-led bloc that includes Christian Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), is expected to win by a narrow margin.
And in an interview with the Arabic paper al-Huryat, US Central Command chief General David Petraeus stated categorically that the Obama administration considered Hezbollah a "terrorist organization" and added that "Hezbollah's justification for existence will become void if the Palestinian cause is resolved".
The US is likely, then, to commit the same error it made with respect to the Palestinian elections in January 2006 that were dominated by Hamas, another group with which the US is loathe to deal.
The majority of Lebanon's Shi'ites, who comprise roughly 35% of the population, may disagree with Petraeus' description, in light of Hezbollah's net contribution to their political empowerment. There is also its role as "a major provider of social services, operating schools, hospitals and agricultural services for thousands of Lebanese Shi'ites", to quote a recent report on Hezbollah by the US Council on Foreign Relations.
Petraeus' error is precisely in overlooking the internal dynamics in Lebanon that have historically been conducive to Hezbollah's rising star.
For its part, Israel is doing all it can to influence the outcome of elections, by staging a major military drill near Lebanon's borders. This has as a result put Lebanon's army on the highest alert. Israel has also issued dire warnings that should Hezbollah win, "Lebanon will expose itself to the might of the Israeli army more than any time in the past", to quote Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barack.
Similarly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that "if Hezbollah wins, that would be a troubling development, and our deployment will be in kind".
Hezbollah is up against the anti-Syrian coalition led by Sunni Muslim Saad al-Hariri, which gained a majority in parliament in 2005 elections. The alliance, named March 14, includes Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Christian leaders Samir Geagea and Amin Gemayel. The current majority coalition has 70 seats in parliament and the minority, including Hezbollah, has 58.
Israel, it appears, is not wasting any time in cultivating the seeds of a future conflict with Lebanon, where a military defeat for a Hezbollah-controlled government would be devastating to Hezbollah's political fortunes. It has recently been revealed by former Israeli chief of staff General Dan Halutz that Israel failed to assassinate Hezbollah's political leader, Hassan Nasrallah, during the 2006 Lebanon war.
This, together with the Lebanese government's arrest of nine Lebanese who were spying for Israel's Mossad, reflects the basic tenor of Israel's one-dimensional security approach toward the evolving political developments in Lebanon.
Conspicuously absent in the US and Israeli calculations about the political and geostrategic implications of a Hezbollah victory is any appreciation of how this may actually deepen Hezbollah's moderation.
Transformed over time from a "non-state" actor into a formidable political party with direct representation in the Lebanese government, Hezbollah is less a "state-within-state" in Lebanon's complex political system and more an integral part of it. The sooner the US, the European Union and above all Israel come to terms with this important evolving reality and adopt the necessary changes, the better, for the sake of regional peace.
Unfortunately, a number of Western pundits paint a Hezbollah victory as a "defeat for the US" as well as Saudi Arabia, and a solid "victory" for Iran and Syria.
However, there are several problems with such analyses.
First, electoral victory is one thing, actual changes in the balance of forces in Lebanon's sectarian politics is quite another. What is more, it is far from given that a governmental victory for Hezbollah will not have negative side-effects on its political and military prowess as a movement.
Indeed, an Hezbollah victory may well translate into new fetters for its paramilitary wing that has so far successfully resisted both the calls for its disarmament as well as its integration into the national army. A minor "security trap" opened by the elections results favoring Hezbollah exists. That explains some rudimentary ambivalence on the part of its leadership over being at the helm of government until 2013.
Second, a Hezbollah victory could further complicate the delicate relationship between its military forces and the upgraded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, as well as its relations with some European powers. These include Germany, which has contributed to the multinational Maritime Task Force supporting the Lebanese navy's control of the seaways. The mandate for this task force runs out in December and its extension now hinges on the post-election political makeup in Lebanon.
Third, assuming that a winning Hezbollah fails to form a government of national unity, in light of the torpedo effect of an incendiary report by the German weekly Der Spiegel that blames Hezbollah for the 2005 assassination of the former prime minister Rafik Hariri, the resulting sectarian nature of the government would definitely exacerbate the country's political rifts. This would render more difficult a resumption of "all-party talks" favored by Hezbollah, particularly if the US and its Western allies impose a policy of embargo and isolation.
In that case, Iran would incur additional financial costs as it would need to increase its foreign aid to a Tehran-friendly regime - not a pleasant prospect for a country that is experiencing economic troubles at home.
For now, Iran's hope is that Hezbollah's public assurances about forming a government of national unity, or Hezbollah politicians' current dialogue with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for future assistance to Lebanon, will bear fruit. And relatedly, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states will not cease their financial support of the Lebanese government after the elections; at stake are a US$11 million IMF loan and $84 million in yearly assistance by the European Union.
To consolidate their gains, Hezbollah leaders must make extra efforts in assuring the international community that, contrary to current talk of a "US defeat" caused by a Hezbollah victory, Hezbollah itself does not interpret it this way. Hezbollah believes it can be a factor for regional stability. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Silvan Salom has said that Hezbollah victory would "constitute a danger to regional and international stability".
Hezbollah has also complained that the US ambassador to Lebanon, Michele Sisson, has "meddled" in Lebanon's affairs by "leading all efforts to finalize the electoral tickets for the March 14 bloc", to quote an article on Hezbollah's al-Manar network.
The US is clearly playing a zero-sum game with regard to Hezbollah. This raises the question of how the US can possibly engage with Iran, a major regional power, short of engaging with the powerful pro-Iran Hezbollah that is now poised to control the government in Beirut. (Even short of victory, Hezbollah, which presently has veto power over cabinet ministers per a 2008 agreement, will continue to wield tremendous influence in Lebanon's sectarian-based politics.)
The annual US Department of State terrorism reports scold Iran as a "terror-sponsoring state", citing its support for "terrorist organizations" such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
A future removal of Hezbollah from the US terror list would go a long way in removing "rogue state" Iran from the same list, a sine qua non for diplomatic normalization between Washington and Tehran.
Unfortunately, despite its innovation of a "Muslim dialogue", the Obama administration is ill-prepared to deal with the consequences of Lebanon's parliamentary elections as these are painted in black and white "geo-strategic" semantics that distort rather than illuminate a complex reality.
**Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) . For his Wikipedia entry, click here. His latest book, Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing , October 23, 2008) is now available.

Jihad goes intercontinental
By Walid Phares
Since the deadly attacks in Mumbai last November, counter-terrorism experts worldwide, particularly those based in democracies in the crosshairs, have been drawing long-term conclusions as to the forthcoming type of operations which may hit cities and interests on more than one continent.
Today, we are in the post-Mumbai era where the expectation of recidivism and copycats is eerily high. Indeed, the jihadis who seized a few buildings in India's financial center, wreaked havoc at several locations in the city and killed nearly 220 people have brought to the attention of national security analysts a concept for the future: Urban jihad.
I had predicted these scenarios of mayhem perpetrated by
determined terrorists in chapter 13 of my first post-September 11, 2001 book, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against the West, published in 2005.
My projection of al-Qaeda and other jihadi tactics was based on a patient and thorough observation of their literature and actions for decades. By now, the public realizes that such scenarios are not just possible but highly likely in the future. In all countries where jihadi cells and forces have left bloody traces over the past eight years, at least counter-terrorism agencies have been put on notice: it can happen there as well.
But the Mumbai ghazwa (raid) reveals a more sinister shadow hovering over the entire sub-continent, if not also Central Asia. Although a press release was issued by the so-called "Indian Mujahideen", many traces were left - almost on purpose - to show Pakistani involvement, or to be more precise, a link to forces operating within Pakistan, one of them at least being Lashkar-e-Toiba.
Other suppositions left investigators in the region with the suspicion that elements within the intelligence service in Pakistan were involved, even if the cabinet wasn't aware of it. This strong probability, if anything, gave rise to much wider speculation since this attack took place in the midst of dramatic regional and international developments.
In the United States, the Barack Obama administration is gearing up to redeploy from Iraq and send additional divisions to Afghanistan where the Taliban forces have been escalating their terror campaign. In a counter move, the jihadi web inside Pakistan has been waging both terror and political offensives. In Waziristan and the Swat Valley, just prior to the latest attempts to strike deals with local warlords, Pakistani units were compelled to retreat.
A few weeks later, Islamabad authorized the provincial administrators to sign the so-called Malakand agreement with the "Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad's Sharia Law", headed by Sufi Mohammad, in which local Taliban would enact religious laws instead of the national secular code.
Across Afghanistan, Pakistan and India it has become clear that the jihadis are acting as an overarching regional force. In short, while Kabul, Islamabad and New Delhi are consumed with domestic challenges such as ethnic and territorial crises, the nebulous beginning with al-Qaeda and stretching to the local jihadi groups across the land is acting ironically as one, though with many faces, tongues and scenarios.
The jihadis have become continental, while the region's governments were forced into tensions among each other and with their own societies. Hence, exploring the regional strategies of the jihadis is now a must.
Pre-9/11 strategies
In the post-Cold War era, a web of jihadi organizations came together throughout the Indian sub-continent from Kandahar to the Bay of Bengal. The nebulous was as vast as the spread of Islamist movements that took root in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.
The cobweb is extremely diverse and not entirely coordinated. In many cases, striking competitions and splinters characterize its intra-Islamist politics. But from political parties to student unions to jihadi guerrillas, the main cement of the plethora has been a solidly grounded ideology, inspired by local Deobandism and West Asian-generated Wahhabism and Salafism.
The "jihadi causes" reflect a variety of claims, from political and sharia to ethnic territorial. However, all these platforms end in the necessity of establishing local "emirates", which eventually are building blocks towards the creation of the caliphate-to-come.
Inside Pakistan, the Islamists fight secularism, impose religious laws and crave an all-out "Islamist" - not just "Islamic" - nation. From this country, a number of jihadi groups have been waging a war on India for the secession of Kashmir, but in order to establish a Taliban-like state. The Pakistan-based "Kashmiri jihadis" have connected with their India-based counterparts who in turn have bridges with jihadis operating across India through various networks, including the Islamic Student Union and later the "Indian Mujahideen". The "web" stretches east to Dhaka and south all the way to Malaysia and Indonesia.
Unfortunately, Western and non-Western scholarship in the field didn't recognize the regional dimension of the jihadi threat on the sub-continent before the 2001 strikes in America and the subsequent attacks in Europe and beyond. Jihadism in South Asia has always been conventionally linked to local claims and foreign policies, while in reality the movement has developed a regional war room; even before the US intervention in Afghanistan, the jihadis had been seeking transnational achievements.
The post-Soviet grand design of al-Qaeda was to incite the "national" jihadi entities to act in concert with one another, even if their propaganda machines would intoxicate their foes with different narratives. Based in Kabul since the takeover by the Taliban in 1996, the initial plan was to grow stronger inside Afghanistan, make it a "perfect emirate" model to follow and from there expand in all directions. Evidently, the first space to penetrate was Pakistan, starting with the northwestern regions.
In the book Future Jihad, I have argued that one of the long-range goals of the 9/11 attacks was to provoke massive jihadi uprisings in many Muslim countries, especially in Pakistan, with help from insiders and the armed forces.
The pre-9/11 plan was to infiltrate Islamabad from Kabul and thereafter to penetrate Kashmir and back a massive jihadi campaign inside India. The enormity of developments was supposed to enflame Bangladesh as well. In short, the plan was to "Talibanize" the region from Kabul to the Gulf, slicing many enclaves in northern India with it. Obviously, plan A collapsed as US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces crumbled the Taliban regime and dispersed al-Qaeda.
Post-Tora Bora
As Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar crossed into Waziristan at the end of 2001, the jihadi strategy for the region shifted to Plan B. However, the basic goal didn't change - to establish a series of emirates in the sub-continent.
What changed were the launching pads and the priorities. Now that the epicenter shifted to these valleys inside northwestern Pakistan, the strategic hierarchy imposed a new agenda: First, the tribal areas had to become a no-go zone for Pakistan's armed forces and a new Afghanistan-in-exile was to be established: al-Qaeda's remnants in the centre, surrounded by a belt of Taliban, themselves surrounded by an outer belt of fundamentalist tribes and movements. Former Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf understood that sending the bulk of his forces there meant an all-out civil war, hence he kept a status quo amid Western frustration.
But the jihadi forces moved on the offensive inside Pakistan via bombings and assassinations, including failed attempts against the former president and the murder of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. Not only the border areas were falling to the insurgency, but segments of many cities fell under the expansion of urban jihadization. The Red Mosque bloodshed was only an example of the generalized push to seize more power. The minimal goal set by the cohorts of the Islamist and jihadi forces was to immunize Waziristan and the surrounding valleys from any incoming attacks while launching blitzkriegs from these areas in two directions: a comeback of the Taliban inside Afghanistan and strikes inside India.
To the west of Waziristan, the equation was reversed. Instead of a Taliban regime in Kabul spilling over into Islamabad, the post-Tora Bora situation witnessed the emergence of a quasi-Taliban regime inside Pakistan spilling back to Afghanistan, hence the recrudescence of operations in the latter's provinces. Eastbound from Waziristan, the nebulous tasted the Pakistan-based jihadis to serve as strategic decoys.
Indeed, the best way to confuse the Pakistani military is to draw New Delhi into a renewed conflict with its western neighbor. Shrewdly - via Lashar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Kashmiri jihadis and in association with India-based jihadis - many terror attacks were launched inside Indian territories as of 2002, including strikes against the parliament, trains and other targets. The inflaming of the India-Pakistan theatre was and remains a key strategic design in the hands of the regional jihadis. This is why the recent strikes in Mumbai were ordered.
Post-Mumbai
Inside the jihadi war room for the subcontinent, preparations are underway to meet two forthcoming challenges. One is the decision by the Obama Administration to send two additional divisions to Afghanistan. General David Petraeus, chief of Central Command, and his fellow military strategists have recommended a surge-type campaign to eradicate al-Qaeda and its allies from inside most of the country and, with the help of other NATO forces, push the Taliban hordes all the way back to the borders. The second jihadi worry is possible military pressure on Waziristan from the Asif Ali Zardari government.
Logically, the Taliban/al-Qaeda Plan "C" will be to try to crumble both offensives before they happen. Therefore, in war game scenarios, if you are the jihadi, you would put all efforts possible to delay and weaken the forthcoming NATO-led surge. How they
will go about accomplishing this is a good question. The terror network has more than one tool at its disposal: rapid deterioration inside Afghanistan, striking at NATO allies, disrupting NATO supply lines originating in Pakistan, assassinations and even possible strikes on the American homeland, if they can.
But one other tool may also be considered: luring Washington into negotiations with the Taliban. Already the propaganda machine of the jihadis from different corners of the planet, including via its tentacles inside the Western media, is pushing the idea that discussions with the "good Taliban" is a viable and pragmatic option. Recently, a particular push for considering radical Islamism as a "fact of life" to be recognized has materialized in a publicized Newsweek article.
Painting the jihadis as credible partners in a peacemaking equation is, in fact, part of a smart maneuver to gain time and delay US-led efforts to defeat the network in Afghanistan. Ironically, similar moves were undertaken in Pakistan. In order to delay Islamabad's new secular government in its preparedness to confront the Taliban once and for all, good cop-bad cop tactics are employed: suicide bombings target officials and civilians alike, while offers for ceasefire from local Islamists shower the authorities.
The recent agreement of Malakand signed between Sufi Islam and Pakistani authorities allowed the implantation of sharia in the province. The agreement could have been used to the advantage of the Taliban to indoctrinate the youth, recruit fighters and suicide bombers, repress civil society movements and eradicate government presence. Just look at the Waziristan accord (2006) as an example.
Another trap we should not allow ourselves to fall into is calling those who are reconcilable the "good" Taliban or the "little" Taliban. We should avoid assigning the label to armed opposition groups or other groups that may associate with the Taliban on a small level. Just as it would have been a strategic mistake to label the members of the Sahwa (Awakening Councils) in Iraq little "q" al-Qaeda or "good" al-Qaeda - it would be quite the blunder to consider as Taliban those who cooperate with the Taliban out of fear or those that seek cooperation as a way to feed their family.
And as the stalling tactics are employed in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, reverse moves will be executed in India. Unfortunately, the regional war room more than likely will order terror activities on Indian soil to diminish the will of the Pakistani government to go to Waziristan. If violence erupts on its eastern border with India, Pakistan cannot be sending troops to battle the Taliban on its western frontiers. Inflaming tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad causes the latter to redeploy forces from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North-West Frontier Province to the border with India, thereby relieving military pressure the Taliban faces in northwest Pakistan. Thus Plan "C" seems to announce waves of happenings in the sub-continent. What can and should be done about it, remains the most important question.
Counter strategies
Any counter strategy design must being with the following affirmations:
That the threat is strategic and regional, not just local and legitimate.
That the counter strategies must put the confrontation of the regional threat above all local considerations and issues.
That the United States and its allies operating out of Afghanistan are determined to engage that threat with all the tools at their disposal and with the largest alliance it can muster.
That Pakistan and India should realize that they are both targeted by the jihadis regardless of their quarrels over ethno-territorial issues.
With these principles accepted, a global set of counter strategies can be set to deal with al-Qaeda/Taliban and their jihadi nebulous in the sub-continent.
Afghanistan
The US-led NATO coalition should proceed with the reinforcement of the expeditionary force to levels capable of insuring a full control of the country's national soil; and at the same time a gigantic effort must be mustered in three directions: training and equipping the Afghan Army and Police, supporting a vast network of civil society non-governmental organizations (NGOs) countrywide and reaching out to countries that haven't yet participated in the post-9/11 counterterrorism campaign in Afghanistan, such as Russia, India, China, Indonesia, Brazil and Nigeria, and invite them to join the consortium in sectors of their choice. The further the campaign is internationalized, the more jihadis will be isolated.
Engagement strategies
The US and NATO should not be dragged to the path of the so-called partnership with jihadis to defeat other jihadis. In this game, the more ideological and sophisticated factions always win. Instead, the international coalition must engage the democratic forces and sustain them to win the intellectual and political battle.
Pakistan
The present government must undertake a full reassessment of its past strategies and reform its own forces so that it can ready itself to wage a national mobilization, part of which will be on the military level, but the most significant part must be on the popular and political levels. The campaign to counter the terror forces can only be successful if large segments of the population are engaged in the struggle against fundamentalism.
India
New Delhi, too, will have to reshape its plan to counter the jihadi strategies in the region and on its soil. While the military and security engagement against local terror groups will continue, Indian resources in the war of ideas will have to be tapped. As a major economic and technological power in the region, and now worldwide, India has the ability to open a new front against radical ideologies with the help of linguistic, cultural and intellectual skills, crucial to the battle. The establishment of a vast network of television and radio broadcasts, NGOs and intelligence capability based on Indian soil can weaken Islamist radicalism.
Last but not least, the vital cement of all the above strategies is their integration and eventually fusion under one platform. If the United States, NATO and other international partners can bring together the three democratically-elected governments of the subcontinent - Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (and perhaps Bangladesh) - under a unified and coordinated global strategy, the jihadi forces will be isolated and gradually rolled back.
*Dr Walid Phares is the director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad. Dr Phares teaches global strategies at National Defense University.
(Copyright 2009 Dr Walid Phares.)