LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
November 27/09

Bible Reading of the day
Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians/6/9 Or don’t you know that the unrighteous will not inherit the Kingdom of God? Don’t be deceived. Neither the sexually immoral, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor male prostitutes, nor homosexuals, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor slanderers, nor extortioners, will inherit the Kingdom of God.

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Investment scandal damages Hezbollah/ By Alia Ibrahim/Washington Post/26.11.09
Syria's Path to Islamist Terror/By Michael Rubin/Middle East Quarterly/26.11.09
Iran and Hizballah Get Hillarycare: Two Mistakes That America's Enemies Notice and Act On/By Barry Rubin/25.11.09
Lebanon: A National Unity Government that Fragments the State/Abdullah Iskandar/Al Hayat/November 26/09 
Spare the kids, clean the judiciary today/The Daily Star/November 26/09 

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for November 26/09 
Geagea: Hizbullah's Current Form of Existence Subjects Lebanon to Dangers/Naharnet
Ministerial Committee Holds Final Session to Document Policy Statement/Naharnet
The Constitutional Council: No Registration of IDs in Zahle, No Bribery in Metn and Jezzine MP Had Candidacy Rights/Naharnet
Eddeh: Who Gave Doha Accord Guarantees to Stop Assassinations?/Naharnet
Report: U.N. Official Says Israel to Withdraw from Ghajar within Hours/Naharnet
Samir Frangieh: ‘March 8’ will be divided into an Iranian group and a Syrian one/anb
Khalil: Geagea is annoyed by recent reconciliation meetings/Now Lebanon
Jumblat and Aoun Agree to Form Committee to Follow up Discussions on the Displaced/Naharnet
Human Rights Watch Rejects Saudi Witchcraft Charges against Lebanese Psychic/Naharnet
Aoun Asks Berri to Withdraw 'Abolishing Political Sectarianism' from Public Discussion/Naharnet
Qassem: Hizbullah Arms Not for Discussion by Government or National Dialogue Table/Naharnet
Suleiman: Forming 'National Commission for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism' Requires Comprehensive Lebanese Consensus/Naharnet
Gemayel: Any Pact between Lebanese State and Hizbullah Contradicts International Resolutions/Naharnet
March 14: Berri's Suggestion Timing Raises Logical Queries/Naharnet
Geagea: Abolishing Political Sectarianism Topic Raised to Avoid Discussing Resistance/Naharnet
Berri: Resistance to Remain Armed Until Liberation, Policy Statement Not before Eid al-Adha/Naharnet
Lebanon agrees Hezbollah right to use arms against Israel/AFP
Report: Israel prepared to leave Ghajar within hours/Ynetnews
Special to The Washington Post/Washington Post
Constitutional Council rejects poll challenges/Daily Star
'Historic' meeting takes steps toward healing Chouf rift/Daily Star
Policy statement retains previous clause on Hizbullah's arms/Daily Star
US jury indicts 4 for alleged plot to support Hizbullah/Daily Star
Berri's call to end political sectarianism may be posturing/Daily Star
Rights group appeals psychic's 'witchcraft' death sentence/Daily Star
Hizbullah 'incapable' of handlling crime in suburbs/Daily Star
Judge charges three more suspected spies/Daily Star
People from all walks of life hug it out at environment symposium/Daily Star
Amnesty Int'l urges action on Civil War missing/Daily Star
Arab world most vulnerable to effects of climate change/Daily Star
Activists press Cabinet to work toward granting women nationality rights/Daily Star
Al-Qaida tied to Iraqi Baathists in Syria?/United Press International

Geagea: Hizbullah's Current Form of Existence Subjects Lebanon to Dangers
Naharnet/Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea on Thursday said that "the Taef Accord did not mention the resistance or Hizbullah", and considered that "Hizbullah's presence, as it is now, subjects Lebanon to dangers." After meeting with MP Ekab Sakr in Maarab, Geagea urged not to mention the resistance article in the ministerial Policy Statement "because it hasn't been agreed on yet." Geagea considered that abolishing political sectarianism means abolishing "sectarianism" itself. He added: "This topic was raised in the aim of covering up another topic. On the other hand, Geagea saluted the ongoing wave of reconciliations under the auspices of President Michel Suleiman. Answering a question about Wednesday's Baabda reconciliation between MPs Michel Aoun and Walid Jumblat, Geagea said: "If only that meeting between Aoun and Jumblat had happened before some time, we would have spared a lot of tense attitudes toward us over our political relation with Jumblat." "General Aoun made this reconciliation only after MP Jumblat changed his political stance regarding Syria," added Geagea in a regretful tone.
However, Geagea said that there was no personal dispute with Aoun to hold a reconciliation meeting, but rather a major political dispute. Answering a question on whether he would meet with Marada Movement leader MP Suleiman Franjieh, Geagea answered by saying he was ready to meet any Lebanese political party and expressed admiration toward "the positive role played by MP Franjieh." Geagea applauded the reforms that took place inside the Justice Ministry. Beirut, 26 Nov 09, 15:33

'Historic' meeting takes steps toward healing Chouf rift
/Daily Star staff/Thursday, November 26, 2009
BEIRUT: President Michel Sleiman hosted on Wednesday reconciliation talks between Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) leader MP Walid Jumblatt and Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader MP Michel Aoun at the Baabda Palace. Aoun described the meeting, which mainly focused on the issue of displaced from the 1975-90 Civil War in the Chouf region, as an “openness rather than reconciliation meeting.” The two leaders tasked Environment Minister Akram Chehayeb from the PSP and MP Alain Aoun from the FPM to follow up discussions on the file of the displaced. Sleiman hoped that a “specific mechanism” will be adopted for the return of the displaced to the Chouf region. Jumblatt considered that all political forces have to gather up “to close the wound still present in the Chouf areas of Shahar, Abbey, and Brih.” Sectarian clashes between Druze and Christian militias during Lebanon’s bloody almost 15-year Civil War forced scores of Christians to flee their homes in the Chouf.
Twenty years after the end of armed conflicts, thousands of Christians are either still reluctant to visit their properties or unable to access them because Druze families currently reside there.
“General Aoun has a great political significance in Mount Lebanon,” Jumblatt told reporters following the meeting. Jumblatt also promised to visit Aoun’s residence in Rabieh and said he will invite the FPM leader to Mukhtara. Aoun, meanwhile, said there were no “core divergences with Jumblatt but rather disagreement on political stances.”
Aoun and Jumblatt have held a single meeting in April 2005 following the assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
“Today marks the end of a historical period and the start of another,” Aoun told reporters. He described sectarian clashes in the Chouf during the Civil War as a “historical mistake,” adding that life in the Chouf “should be back to normal.” The reconciliation between the two politicians was the second incidence initiated by Sleiman, who hosted Jumblatt and Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh for a meeting last week. Well-informed sources said a similar meeting between Franjieh and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea is expected to take place soon in Baabda. FPM sources told the Central News Agency Wednesday that the Aoun-Jumblatt meeting was aimed at facilitating dialogue between the FPM and the PSP over several topics, including the issue of the displaced. The meeting will also lay the foundations for coexistence in the Chouf region in the coming period, the sources added. PSP’s Minister of State Wael Abu Faour said Wednesday that the meeting between the two leaders comes as part of the “prevailing atmosphere of reconciliation and openness.” – The Daily Star

Policy statement retains previous clause on Hizbullah's arms
Platform to note reservations of parliamentary majority christians
By Nafez Qawas /Daily Star correspondent
Thursday, November 26, 2009
BEIRUT: In efforts to hasten the finalization of the policy statement for Premier Saad Hariri’s newly formed government, the committee tasked with drafting the platform agreed to adopt the same clause approved by the previous Cabinet over the resistance’s arms, while noting reservations expressed by the parliamentary majority Christians. The Phalange Party, the Lebanese Forces and Labor Minister Butros Harb argue that Hizbullah’s arsenal undermines state authority and runs counter to UN resolutions. Hizbullah has made it clear its arms are not up for debate. The party fought a devastating war with Israel in 2006 and argues its arms are necessary to protect the country against any future aggression by Israel, which quit south Lebanon in 2000 after a 22-year occupation
The committee, which met for the ninth time Wednesday to finalize the political section of the ministerial statement, concluded the platform and is expected to document the statement Thursday at 1 p.m. Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri ruled out Wednesday the possibility that the statement would be finalized and approved before Eid al-Adha.
Berri criticized the debate over Hizbullah’s arms but nevertheless, described as “good” the atmosphere regarding the policy statement.
He stressed that Hizbullah’s arms belong to all Lebanese “and their existence is linked to Israel’s withdrawal from all Lebanese territory.”
Minutes before entering the meeting of the ministerial statement’s committee Wednesday, State Minister for Administrative Reform Mohammad Fneish said “amendments have been made to the political section of the statement, some of which are related to the resistance’s arms.” State Minister Wael Abu Faour also mentioned that amendments have been made, adding that “the talks concerning a national defense strategy will take place during national dialogue sessions.” Social Affairs Minister Salim Sayegh of the Phalange said he refused to readopt the previous ministerial statement’s clause concerning the resistance’s arms which stipulates that “it is the right of the Leba­nese people, army and resistance to liberate the Shebaa Farms, the Kfar Shuba Hills and the northern part of the village of Ghajar as well as to defend Lebanon and its territorial waters in the face of any enemy by all available and legal means.”
Phalange head Amin Gemayel also rejected negotiations with Hizbullah over its arms. “Negotiating with Hizbullah on its arms in the ministerial statement is like making a treaty with it and suggests the government is compromising its sovereignty for the benefit of Hizbullah.” He said the Lebanese “ought to be united around Cabinet to make it their only representative, and let it negotiate with the international community and ensure the country’s protection.”

Berri's call to end political sectarianism may be posturing
Lebanon remains entrenched in confessional system with no real movement for change
By Michael Bluhm /Daily Star staff
Thursday, November 26, 2009
BEIRUT: Speaker Nabih Berri’s latest call to abolish political sectarianism is largely a political tactic with almost no hope for meaningful action, as confessional political divides remain perhaps the deepest in the country’s modern history, a number of analysts told The Daily Star on Wednesday. Berri last week voiced his desire to form a parliamentary committee to pursue the elimination of political sectarianism, as stipulated in the 1989 Taif Accord, which ended the 1975-90 Civil War. Berri’s political foes in the March 14 coalition immediately raised objections and placed conditions on Berri’s initiative, while Berri warned on Tuesday against obstructing the formation of the committee Despite Berri’s history of support for the issue, his latest push should be viewed as his political parry to the twin thrusts of President Michel Sleiman to reopen the Taif Accord and March 14 to convene a national-dialogue session solely to discuss the arms of Berri’s ally Hizbullah, said Raghid al-Solh, adviser to the Issam Fares Center, a non-partisan think tank.
“One of the interpretations is that it’s … a preemption of what could take place at the national dialogue,” Solh said. “We end with a kind of tit-for-tat: ‘You forget about the arms of the resistance, and we forget about the abolition of sectarianism.’” At the same time, abolishing political sectarianism has long been a rallying cry for Berri, one he regularly renews every time another political figure proposes revisiting the Taif Accord, said Habib Malik, who teaches history at Lebanese American University and is the son of Charles Malik, one of Lebanon’s founders and co-author of the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights. “This has been a pet issue for Berri for a long time,” he said.
The issue is also more than a rote political response or personal project, however – Berri’s support embodies a longstanding Shiite “political mantra” that abolishing political sectarianism would lead to increased power for the Shiite community, which many believe has not received political representation proportionate to its demographic weight, Malik said. However, many Shiites – including Hizbullah – have followed the rejection of this approach in favor of political consensus espoused by the late Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddine in his influential book, “The Commandments,” Malik added. The negative reaction from Christian politicians in the March 14 camp to Berri’s proposal also reflects their standard response to the call to end political sectarianism, Malik said. Many Christians fear that the initiative aims to reduce their political influence, ensconced in constitutional guarantees of the presidency and half of Parliament’s seats, said Solh. “They treat this intention … as if it directed against the Maronite community especially,” he added.
In any case, Berri’s move will likely not lead to any substantial progress on the issue, with the country’s political factions so polarized that they needed five months to form a government, said Paul Salem, head of the Carnegie Middle East Center. “The situation realistically is not ripe for movement on this,” he said. “None of this is going to go anywhere.”
The move to eradicate political sectarianism also lacks committed activists spreading the idea on a grass-roots level, and it will require more political support than from just Berri, Solh said.
“Non-sectarian forces are marginalized,” he said. “If you are really talking about eliminating confessionalism … you need political and social harbingers, actors. So far you don’t have these. We still need to wait until new forces that are committed to the national idea – and not the sectarian idea – come to the fore. You cannot see anything of this sort in Lebanon now.”
Even though Berri’s drive is unlikely to produce results, the problem of political sectarianism needs urgent attention, as differences have become worse than during the Civil War, Solh said.
“I haven’t seen such rampant political confessionalism in the country,” he said, adding that the formation of the national-unity Cabinet had reduced tensions.
“During the Civil War, confessionalism was almost forced on the parties. It took some political actors and military actors to turn it from social, political or ideological confrontation to purely sectarian.” The flurry of recent rhetoric advocating reopening Taif, convening the national dialogue and abolishing political sectarianism also serve to illustrate that Lebanon’s political leadership is becoming aware that the political system, hamstrung by sectarianism, is failing the country, Salem said. Since the 2005 exit of Syrian troops, Lebanon has witnessed a shutdown of Parliament for almost a year, a presidential vacuum for six months and the recent five months of agony during government-formation talks, he added.
“The status quo is also becoming increasingly and more clearly inoperable and dysfunctional,” Salem said. “There’s something dysfunctional that everybody is increasingly recognizing.We’re entering a phase over the next few years … where discussing these things is going to become much more imperative. For us to move forward is going to take a great disruption or a great leap forward.” In the end, the country’s near-paralysis in a political system based on sectarianism only gives Berri “all the more reason to bring it up now,” Salem said.
“If confessionalism by itself were going away, there’d be no need,” he said. “Right now we’re stuck, but the problem is getting bigger. The state of sectarianism is very heightened … and it’s gotten worse, not better. It doesn’t show natural signs of getting better by itself. Left to our own devices, we’re not going in the right direction.”

Geagea questions ‘right to resistance’ in taif
BEIRUT: Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea raised doubts about the opposition’s motives behind their calls for eliminating political sectarianism and questioned the timing of the initiative. Speaking to students from Notre Dame University, Geagea accused the opposition of seeking to dodge discussions on the national defense strategy and the clause related to the resistance in the ministerial statement. He claimed that the term resistance is not even mentioned in the Taif Accord, “contrary to the opposition’s claims.”  He cited the introduction of the Constitution, which stipulates that there is no legitimacy to any authority that contradicts the National Pact. Geagea said: “The same logic applies to weapons outside the state’s jurisdiction.” – The Daily Star

Ministerial Committee Holds Final Session to Document Policy Statement
Naharnet/The ministerial committee finalized the political section of the ministerial statement on Wednesday amid reservations by Ministers Boutros Harb and Salim al-Sayegh on the resistance article. The committee concluded the platform after more than seven hours of discussions under PM Saad Hariri and is expected to document the statement Thursday at 1:30 pm in its 10th and final session. The committee agreed to adopt the same clause approved by the previous cabinet over the resistance's arms. The Phalange Party and Lebanese Forces argue that Hizbullah's arsenal undermines state authority and runs counter to U.N. resolutions. "We cannot accept that there be another authority that has the power or competence to use coercion in Lebanon other than the state," Social Affairs Minister al-Sayegh, a member of the Phalange Party, told Agence France Presse. "Any country cannot afford to have two authorities with two commands," he added. "There should be a monopoly of the state on all issues related to security and weapons." An Nahar daily said Thursday that both Harb and al-Sayegh expressed reservations on article 6 which deals with the resistance. The newspaper reported that the article on the state was accepted by all committee members. The conferees introduced a new section on the government's priorities under the headline of "The priorities of the People … The Priorities of the Cabinet." An Nahar quoted ministerial sources as saying that for the first time, the committee discussed 13-14 priorities, a sign that the cabinet "will put all conflicting issues aside and focus on the people's concerns such as electricity and water."
Beirut, 26 Nov 09, 09:52

Eddeh: Who Gave Doha Accord Guarantees to Stop Assassinations?
Naharnet/National Bloc leader Carlos Eddeh wondered who was behind the assassinations in Lebanon between 2004 and 2008 and who gave March 14 leaders guarantees to live in peace following the Doha Accord. In an interview published Thursday by the daily An-Nahar, Eddeh said assassinations stopped following what he described as the "Doha miracle.""Only those defending the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon were targets of assassination or assassination attempts and were forced to live under tight security measures, while March 8 politicians were not subject to any intimidation," he added. Citing lack of evidence regarding who was behind those assassinations, Eddeh said "we are forced to undertake logical analysis."
"People close to Hizbullah accused Israel of carrying out the assassinations, and the Aounists automatically followed the same path. "Without any doubt, the Israeli intelligence is very strong and has a history of abolishing its enemies. "But those who accuse the Israelis also accused those murdered and those who survived assassinations of being Israeli agents.
"Either they are contradicting themselves or they are supporting the hypothesis that says 'the Israelis kill their allies in Lebanon and not their enemies'. "Moreover, the Israelis were not in Doha and did not benefit from this agreement. So why did they (assassinations) stop? "According to a second hypothesis and to Opposition circles, the terrorist attacks were the work of al-Qaida. "If correct … this indicates that some sort of an alliance has developed between March 8 forces and al-Qaida, or at least convergence of interests. Eddeh called, in the absence of any other credible hypothesis, "to remember the threats against Lebanese politicians who were defending Lebanon's sovereignty and demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops and non-interference by the Syrian regime in Lebanon's internal affairs." "These views were put forth by some of those (political leaders) who attended the Doha meetings," he went on to say. "This explains why everything changed after the return of Lebanese delegations from Qatar as they assured me that I was no longer in danger."Beirut, 26 Nov 09, 12:02

The Constitutional Council: No Registration of IDs in Zahle, No Bribery in Metn and Jezzine MP Had Candidacy Rights
Naharnet/The Constitutional Council unanimously turned down 19 complaints filed after the June 7 parliamentary elections that claimed the results were fraudulent.
A Council member told As Safir that the decision not to annul any of the votes came away from political consideration despite criticism by those who have made the complaints.
Former Minister Elie Skaff, who had filed a complaint against Nicolas Fattoush, told al-Liwaa that "a political settlement was made at our expense."
Former MP Salim Aoun also criticized the Council's decision saying the body is "political more than constitutional." He had complained against MP Elie Marouni.
The Council member said those who contested the results of the polls had a "weak" proof adding that complaints filed in Zahle and by MP Michel Murr were "the most cohesive" but not to the extent of annulling the results. Al-Liwaa daily also quoted a Council member as saying that the complaints in six electoral constituencies had no legal proof.
He said the process of registering identification papers in other constituencies, in particular Zahle, included all confessions. The complaint was that more than 1,500 people registered in Zahle in order to increase the number of voters. Sources said investigation carried out by the Constitutional Council revealed that only 404 people registered in the district through legal means.
President of the Constitutional Council Issam Suleiman revealed that there was no proof of hefty offers of cash to buy votes.
An Nahar quoted Council sources as saying that a complaint filed against MP Michel Murr for paying $200,000 to Bishop George Saliba was rejected because cash was paid before the start of electoral campaign expenses. As for accusations of misdemeanor against MP Issam Sawaya in the Jezzine district, the Council's investigation revealed that the lawmaker wasn't indicted for any offense prior to the elections. There were 12 complaints filed by opposition members and seven by majority MPs. Beirut, 26 Nov 09, 08:34

Abu Faour Takes Charge of Palestinian Dossier after Makkawi Quits
Naharnet/Chairman of the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee Ambassador Khalil Makkawi has resigned. He told the Voice of Free Lebanon radio station on Thursday that he submitted his resignation after President Michel Suleiman and PM Saad Hariri agreed to put State Minister Wael Abu Faour in charge of the Palestinian dossier. Beirut, 26 Nov 09, 12:45

Report: U.N. Official Says Israel to Withdraw from Ghajar within Hours
Naharnet/A U.N. official told al-Akhbar newspaper the Israeli government informed UNIFIL that it would withdraw from the northern part of Ghajar within hours.
The official said that Ghajar will be under U.N. control. He told al-Akhbar that the pullout aims at limiting international criticism to Israel. The daily said, however, that UNIFIL wasn't informed about any possible pullout from Ghajar. Beirut, 26 Nov 09, 10:15

Jumblat and Aoun Agree to Form Committee to Follow up Discussions on the Displaced
Naharnet/Druze leader Walid Jumblat and Free Patriotic Movement chief Michel Aoun have agreed to form a committee to follow up discussions on several issues, including the file of the displaced. President Michel Suleiman hosted on Wednesday reconciliation talks between Jumblat and Aoun at Baabda Palace. Aoun described the meeting as an "openness rather than reconciliation meeting."  The two leaders tasked Environment Minister Akram Shehayeb from Jumblat's Progressive Socialist Party and MP Alain Aoun from the FPM with forming a committee from which other sub-committees would be formed to follow up several issues, An Nahar said Thursday. Both sides also agreed to make efforts to close the file of the displaced as soon as possible and keep channels of dialogue open, the newspaper reported. It added that Jumblat and Aoun decided to exchange visits and organize meetings between PSP and FPM officials. FPM sources expressed relief at the results of the meeting and told As Safir newspaper that Aoun returned to Rabiyeh with positive impressions after he found readiness by Jumblat to open a new page. "General Aoun has a great political significance in Mount Lebanon," Jumblat told reporters following Wednesday's talks. Beirut, 26 Nov 09, 10:54

Human Rights Watch Rejects Saudi Witchcraft Charges against Lebanese Psychic
Naharnet/Saudi Arabia should overturn a death sentence imposed on a Lebanese national convicted of practicing witchcraft during a visit to the conservative kingdom, an international human rights group said in a report late Tuesday. Human Rights Watch also called on the Saudi government to halt "its increasing use of charges of 'witchcraft,' crimes that are vaguely defined and arbitrarily used." The report highlights the ongoing complaints over the Saudi judicial system, which, while based on Islamic law, leaves a wide leeway to individual judges and can often result in dramatically inconsistent sentences. Ali Sibat, a Lebanese psychic who made predictions on a satellite TV channel from his home in Beirut, was arrested by religious police in the holy city of Medina during a pilgrimage there in May 2008 and then sentenced to death Nov. 9. Sibat is one of scores of people reported arrested every year in the kingdom by local papers for practicing sorcery, witchcraft, black magic and fortune-telling. These practices are considered polytheism by the government of the deeply religious Muslim country.
The Human Rights Watch report presented a series of cases in the country, including that of Saudi woman Fawza Falih, who was sentenced to death by beheading in 2006 for the alleged crimes of "witchcraft, recourse to jinn (supernatural beings)," and animal sacrifice.
On November 2, 2007, Mustafa Ibrahim, an Egyptian pharmacist, was executed for sorcery in Riyadh after he was found guilty of having tried "through sorcery" to separate a married couple, said the rights group. In another case, a criminal court in the western seaport city of Jiddah convicted Eritrean national Muhammad Burhan in October 2006, for being a "charlatan," based on a leather-bound personal phone booklet containing writing in Eritrea's Tigrinya alphabet.
He was sentenced to 20 months in prison and 300 lashes, and then was deported after serving more than double the time in prison.
"Saudi judges have harshly punished confessed 'witches' for what at worst appears to be fraud, but may well be harmless acts," Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, said. "Saudi judges should not have the power to end lives of persons at all, let alone those who have not physically harmed others."
Sibat, 46, was in Saudi Arabia to perform the minor pilgrimage known as omra. He started out in the holy city of Mecca and then traveled to Medina to pray at the Mosque of the Prophet.
At the Medina hotel, members of the religious police who enforce the kingdom's strict Islamic lifestyle spotted Sibat, according to his lawyer, May al-Khansa.
"He was the most popular psychic on the channel," she said. "The number of callers, including from all over the Gulf, spiked in number when he appeared."
"He was told if he confessed to witchcraft, he will be released and allowed to return to Lebanon," she added.
In Lebanon, psychics, fortune-tellers and astrologers operate freely. Many have regular TV and radio shows and some cafes even hire them to attract more customers. Every Dec. 31, they jostle for air time to give their predictions for the new year. Al-Khansa said Sibat was "caught in the act" of performing witchcraft, but no one else has been arrested in the case.
"It's like adultery. If you're caught in the act, you must have an accomplice," said al-Khansa. "Where is the accomplice?"(AP) Beirut, 26 Nov 09, 07:36

Aoun Asks Berri to Withdraw 'Abolishing Political Sectarianism' from Public Discussion
Naharnet/Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun on Wednesday asked Speaker Nabih Berri to withdraw the topic of abolishing political sectarianism from public discussion in order for the parliamentary blocs' leaders "to study it away from the uproar."Aoun was speaking after the weekly meeting of the Change and Reform parliamentary bloc, he answered a question by saying he heard that the president of the Constitutional Council had turned down all parliamentary election challenges but was waiting for the official issuance of verdicts to comment on the subject. Aoun considered the disciplinary measures taken against a judge for bribery as a part of the reform principles.
"There should have been an investigation instead of a dispute over disciplinary measures inside the Internal Security Forces institution," said Aoun, adding that there should be "a serious reconsideration for the hierarchy of ISF."Aoun said that his meeting with MP Walid Jumblat was for finding common grounds in Mount Lebanon and for restoring piece of mind for its residents. On the other hand, the leader of FPM stressed that nothing was scheduled yet regarding reconciliation with each of Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. Aoun denied that the FPM started a war against Maj. Gen. Issam Abu Jamra and said that Abu Jamra was to personally allocate his position inside FPM. Beirut, 25 Nov 09, 19:59

Qassem: Hizbullah Arms Not for Discussion by Government or National Dialogue Table
Naharnet/Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem on Wednesday stressed that "Hizbullah's arms are not a subject of discussion neither by the government nor by the national dialogue table; because what is being discussed is the defensive strategy, and when the strategy is discussed, things related to it follow."
Qassem added: "After the assassination of PM Hariri, the Sunni-Shiite strife emerged as a central headline, and a huge provocation was exerted, but we have always called for a halt of that matter and took a number of steps to stop it. We did many sacrifices and managed to reach a national unity government that comforted everyone and established stability."
"Hizbullah calls for positive relations among Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and the rest of Arab and Muslim nations," added Qassem. Beirut, 25 Nov 09, 21:00

Suleiman: Forming 'National Commission for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism' Requires Comprehensive Lebanese Consensus
Naharnet/President Michel Suleiman on Wednesday stressed that the issue of forming the National Commission for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism "requires a comprehensive Lebanese consensus in a manner that does not contradict with the coexistence charter and the spirit of the Lebanese Constitution."
Suleiman said that the subject is to be achieved through "finding solutions and regulations that remove the motives for sectarian constellations as means to reach political goals and interests."
The president listed the steps to be taken on that path as: political and constitutional reforms, new electoral law, administrative decentralization, educational programs and institutions reform, and balanced developmental policies. Beirut, 25 Nov 09, 20:37

Gemayel: Any Pact between Lebanese State and Hizbullah Contradicts International Resolutions
Naharnet/Phalange Party leader, former president, Amin Gemayel said that "any pact between the Lebanese State and Hizbullah would contradict with some of the international resolutions adopted by the U.N. Security Council lately." "How much does this pact serve Lebanon?" added Gemayel and explained that it would affect the concept of sovereignty and the obligations of the Lebanese State to extend its authority over all national territories. Gemayel considered that what was considered at the present time regarding Hizbullah's arms resembles a pact between the Lebanese government and the party "as if the government was renouncing its authority for its (Hizbullah's) benefit in sovereignty issues."
"Phalange Party's approach regarding the ministerial statement, especially about Hizbullah's arms, is realistic and patriotic," stressed Gemayel. Beirut, 25 Nov 09, 20:22

March 14: Berri's Suggestion Timing Raises Logical Queries
Naharnet/March 14 forces general-secretariat hoped that the ministerial Policy Statement would meet the aspirations of the Lebanese in the stability of the State institutions after a long period of anxiety, obstruction, and stalemate. A statement issued after its weekly meeting on Wednesday said that "at this time, and under the Taef Accord headline, very sensitive issues are being raised, although important, such as the call for forming the National Commission for the Abolition of Political Sectarianism immediately." March 14 forces considered that call, in its form and timing, as a generator of logical queries such as: "1. How can we match between that call, and what we witness today of a defect in national balance due to arms that are making some press on in building their own entity -- politically, geographically, security-wise, financially, and culturally? 2. Can this issue be raised in a manner that reminds of the "intimidation" style adopted by the "security regime" during its days? 3. Wasn't it comprehensible, through the discussions of the Taef convention -- and the statements of national, spiritual, and political leaders -- that approaching the subject is conditioned by reassuring everyone and by providing general stability so that it doesn't contradict its reform goal? 4. Can we rush to discuss the subject while the State is suffering from a terrible defect in its sovereignty and the stability of its institutions?" Beirut, 25 Nov 09, 19:17

Geagea: Abolishing Political Sectarianism Topic Raised to Avoid Discussing Resistance
Naharnet/Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea on Wednesday said that "the other side wants to keep the same formula mentioned in the previous ministerial Policy Statement regarding the presence of arms outside the scope of the State and the defensive strategy."Geagea was addressing a delegation from NDU students after their victory in student election.
He added: "March 14 ministers expressed their opinion regarding the issue of the resistance, like the other party names it, as some of that party raised the issue of abolishing political sectarianism instead of tackling the ongoing discussions on the ministerial statement or the reformations ongoing in Justice Ministry or the economical and social needs of the Lebanese for example."Geagea quoted the Lebanese Constitution introduction that states "no legitimacy for any authority that contradicts the coexistence charter" by deviating it into "no legitimacy for any arms other than the arms of the State because that contradicts the coexistence charter."LF leader added: "The June 7 parliamentary election was a survey on the resistance in Lebanon according to March 8 leaders' statements, however that happened and the result was that the majority of the Lebanese people proved that they do not want the resistance to keep its current status." Beirut, 25 Nov 09, 18:41

Berri: Resistance to Remain Armed Until Liberation, Policy Statement Not before Eid al-Adha
Naharnet/Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri on Wednesday criticized the ongoing debate over the Cabinet policy statement, particularly over the controversial issue of Hizbullah arms and ruled out it will be finalized and approved before Eid al-Adha. Berri, nevertheless, described as "good" the atmosphere regarding the policy statement. "We are putting the final touches on the statement," Berri told reporters from Baabda palace. "Why all the arguing over Hizbullah arms when there is no difference between the previous and the current government?" he asked.
Berri stressed that Hizbullah weapons belong to all Lebanese "and their existence is linked to Israel's withdrawal from all Lebanese territory." Beirut, 25 Nov 09, 12:34

Bassil: Policy statement was okayed in advance
Date: November 26th, 2009/Source: Assafir
Energy Minister Gebran Bassil asserted Thursday that no political party was fooled in the process of drafting the ministerial policy statement, Assafir newspaper published.
“The political part was already agreed upon before discussion, but many insisted on elaborating on it in bid to obtain a moral compensation before their public,” Bassil noted in a brief interview to the daily. Bassil, member of the Free Patriotic Movement, said that everybody recognizes prior to their participation in the cabinet the agreed upon political aspect especially the article related to the resistance

Samir Frangieh: ‘March 8’ will be divided into an Iranian group and a Syrian one
Date: November 26th, 2009/Source: anb
Former MP Samir Frangieh said Wednesday that the current transformations will lead to a split among the ranks of the ‘March 8’ opposition coalition dividing the coalition into an Iranian group and another Syrian one. In an interview to the ANB TV, Frangieh said “the idea of a national unity government was proposed because the government, regardless of its formula, is the guarantee to avoid any crisis in the region, so that Lebanon would not be the origin that would fuel insurrection in the region.”Frangieh noted that Hizbullah has tried after the parliamentary elections to create a new reality, noting that the concessions the party has made for the benefit of the formation of the government were met by more concessions by the majority. The ‘March 14’ group member said the new government should discuss some issues, mentioning “relations with Syria on new basis, and merging the society of the resistance with the rest of the Lebanese community.”Frangieh denied a disagreement among the movements of the ‘March 14’ coalition, “with the exception of MP Walid Jumblatt”, noting that “a government with such a ministerial statement opposed by some Christian groups is better that having no government at all.”“Iran’s situation in terms of the economic and political internal suffering and the difficulty of negotiations eases the Syrian decision, but it does not mean that Syria has broken its alliance with Tehran,” he said. Frangieh added that Iran wants any solution in the region “through instigating sectarian seditions”, noting that “anyone who reads Syrian newspapers would think Syria has returned to what it was during the 1990s and that Walid Jumblatt and Prime Minister Saad Hariri have returned to the Arab line but the fact is that Syria has returned to the Arab barn.”

DLM: Peace and war decision exclusive to the state
Date: November 25th, 2009/Source: NNA
The Democratic Leftist Movement asserted Wednesday that the Lebanese State is exclusively entitled to protect the borders, to preserve the citizens’ rights and to take national decisions like the peace and war decision, the State-run National News Agency reported. In a statement distributed to media outlets after its meeting, the movement’s national council considered that “Hizbullah’s arms that would be discussed on the national dialogue table cannot be solved with verbal fabrications that do not cover any violation to the role of the state.” The DLF urged for a reformist political campaign by implementing all the articles of the 1989 Taëf peace agreement that enables the state to extend its authority throughout the Lebanese territories, drafting a fair electoral law, a senate council and the national committee for the abolition of political sectarianism as well as the implementation of the administrative decentralization.

Azzi: Administrative decentralization is not a Kataeb exclusive demand
Date: November 25th, 2009/Source: Al Nour
President Gemayel political adviser Sejaan Azzi pointed out that his party’s call for administrative decentralization is not a Kataeb excusive demand, but comes as a part of the Taef Agreement, explaining that the administrative decentralization eases traffic pressure off the capital and enhances other districts. In an interview to Al-Nour Radio station Wednesday, Azzi said that the federal political system is a refined, respectable and constitutional system, approved by dozens of countries characterized by unity and sovereignty. Regardless of whether such a system would be convenient to Lebanon, Azzi explained he doesn’t fear when his party calls for federalism since it’s not a crime. He believed that Hizbullah’s arm is an important force to Lebanon if its income stays within the state and becomes an integral part of the Lebanese security system which is overseen by the army. The Kataeb party official demanded a review of the Taef Agreement, adding that a part of it has become outdated and the other part is no longer attainable since many changes have occurred within the Lebanese society.

Hizbullah 'incapable' of handlling crime in suburbs
Daily Star staff
Thursday, November 26, 2009
BEIRUT: Head of the Lebanese Option Group Ahmad al-Asaad said Wednesday Hizbullah has shown its incapability to fight against criminals inside the southern suburbs of Beirut. Asaad discussed the suburbs’ security situation during a meeting with religious figure Sayyed Ali al-Amin. He said that Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah showed his party’s weakness to control the region during the speech he gave on November 11. “Hizbullah is no longer capable of controlling drug trafficking in the suburbs and it wants the government to deal with the problem as not to risk the party’s popularity,” Asaad said. He added that Hizbullah wanted to give the impression that it cared for its people’s interests and that its relation with the government was getting stronger. However, he noted that the party’s drug combating campaign will only affect “simple citizens” but will not “target dealers protected by Hizbullah.” – The Daily Star

Judge charges three more suspected spies
Daily Star staff
Thursday, November 26, 2009
BEIRUT: The government commissioner at the military tribunal Judge Saqr Saqr filed a lawsuit Wednesday against three people suspected of collaborating with Israel and demanded the issuing of an indictment against one of them. Saqr filed a lawsuit against arrested suspect Osama Berri, runaway suspect Tony Atmeh and a third suspect who was not completely identified but was referred to as Mahmoud. The three were assumed to have collaborated with Israel, helped it win its battles and entered Israeli territories. Saqr also demanded that an indictment be issued against Berri and that he be referred to the first military investigating magistrate Rashid Mizhir for questioning. Berri was earlier arrested by the Internal Security Forces in the southern town of Tebnin and spy devices were found in his home. – The Daily Star

Investment scandal damages Hezbollah
Even backers question 'Party of God' over ties to indicted financier
By Alia Ibrahim
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/25/AR2009112503756.html
Special to The Washington Post
Thursday, November 26, 2009
YAROUN, LEBANON -- Suleiman's brother was a Hezbollah fighter, killed in the 2006 war with Israel. His house was destroyed by an Israeli shell. And now, his life's fortune is gone, too, lost along with the money of thousands of other Lebanese who put their faith in a billionaire financier with close ties to Hezbollah.
The investment scheme, which is being called the Lebanese version of the Bernie Madoff scandal, threatens to tarnish the Shiite group's carefully cultivated image as a pious defender of the masses that is above the corruption endemic in many of Lebanon's political parties.
As Hezbollah enters the new coalition government and plots its next move in the rough-and-tumble world of Lebanese politics, the "Party of God" is facing unprecedented questions, even among supporters, over its basic integrity.
Suleiman, who would not allow his last name to be published, said he gave $261,000 saved over 22 years of work to Youssef Faour, a partner of financier Salah Ezzedine. Suleiman, 40, said he was "comforted by Ezzedine's ties with Hezbollah," which are well-known, and ignored warning signs that something was wrong.
It is not known yet whether Ezzedine's investments were fraudulent and who, if anyone, profited. Ezzedine and Faour are in custody as their trial slowly progresses.
"These two are just crooks who conned people and stole from them by telling them this was divine money that will bring them 40 percent interest in profit," said Suleiman, a father of five.
Hezbollah has denied any relationship with the financier. During a speech in September, Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah said that the group had never encouraged its members to invest with Ezzedine but that it had launched an investigation. He said "a small number" of party officials had invested $4 million with Ezzedine -- a figure the Lebanese media described as significantly understated.
Observers also scoffed at the notion that Hezbollah had nothing to do with Ezzedine, noting a long track record of ties.
Either way, the damage to Hezbollah's reputation is real.
The group and its top officials have long had access to large sums of money by virtue of generous support from Shiite businessmen and from Iran. But Hezbollah has gone out of its way to avoid flamboyant displays of wealth, instead projecting itself as an organization ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with residents of the Shiite slums of southern Beirut and the villages of southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah's propaganda advertises its membership as a group of dedicated and selfless "martyrs" who liberated the land and whose only agenda is to protect it from Israel. To make up for a lack of government services, the group has built its own network of schools, hospitals and even financial institutions.
That track record has set Hezbollah apart from other parties in Lebanon and from the Palestinian organization Fatah, whose political corruption is legendary. Nasrallah has signaled that he knows how dangerous corruption scandals could be for his party. At a recent meeting with female Hezbollah members, he reportedly spoke out against "Envoy culture" -- referring to the SUV brand that is popular among party members and that has become a symbol of their affluence.
Allegations of involvement in the drug trade have further damaged Hezbollah's reputation. In a recent speech, Nasrallah raised the issue and spoke of an attempt to "destroy the culture of resistance."
Some wonder whether his statements will be enough.
"Hezbollah is not the first revolutionary movement to be corrupted by money, and it won't be the last," wrote columnist Sateh Noureddine in the pro-Hezbollah newspaper As-Safir.
Much of the change in behavior can be traced to the aftermath of Hezbollah's 2006 war with Israel, when government compensation money flooded impoverished Shiite neighborhoods devastated by Israeli attacks.
Some of the money went toward reconstruction, but much of what was left ended up with Ezzedine. Some Hezbollah backers sold their land and their homes so they would have extra money to invest with the businessman, who promised eye-popping returns. He even appealed to his customers' piety by insisting that his investment strategies were compatible with Islamic banking principles, which generally prohibit interest-bearing accounts.
Ezzedine's services sparked a boom -- new cars, restaurants, cafes and fashions.
"All logic and reason suddenly disappeared in one day, as well as the simplicity in life and its requirements," wrote Ibrahim al-Amin, editor in chief of Al-Akhbar, a pro-Hezbollah newspaper.
But now, the morality of Hezbollah's cadres is being questioned for the first time by supporters suffering amid the country's rough economic situation, said Mona Fayyad, a sociology professor at the Lebanese University.
"People have started asking questions. Where is the money coming from? Till now, they avoided speaking about this loudly, because they are terrorized," she said.
In the long run, she said, damage to Hezbollah is unavoidable because its success, to a large extent, depends on an image of superiority that its cadres reflected -- and that is now gone.
"Sayyed Nasrallah used to address his supporters by calling them the most honorable people, placing them above all other humans," she said. "What happened showed they are just as corruptible as everybody else."
Ibrahim is a special correspondent.

Syria's Path to Islamist Terror By Michael Rubin
Middle East Quarterly
http://www.aei.org/article/101340
Monday, November 23, 2009
While the Obama administration and congressional leaders may justify renewed engagement with Syria with their desire to jumpstart the Middle East peace process, they ignore the very issue that lies at the heart of the Syrian threat to U.S. national security: Syrian support for radical Islamist terror. This may seem both illogical and counterfactual given past antagonism between the ‘Alawite-led regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, but there is overwhelming evidence that President Bashir al-Asad has changed Syrian strategic calculations and that underpinning terror is crucial to the foreign policy of the country.
Background
On February 14, 2005, a huge bomb killed former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri as his motorcade drove through Beirut. All eyes fell on Damascus. Syria's leaders had motive: Hariri was a prominent Lebanese nationalist who opposed their attempts to grant Lebanon's pro-Syrian president Émile Lahoud an unconstitutional third term. The Syrians had the means to carry out such an attack: Their army had occupied Lebanon for more than fifteen years. Syrian military intelligence (Shu‘bat al-Mukhabarat al-‘Askariya) operated freely throughout the tiny republic and maintained operational networks there. Asad had actually threatened Hariri: Druze leader Walid Jumblatt reported that at a meeting with Asad and Hariri a few months before the latter's murder, Asad told him, "Lahoud is me … If you and [French president Jacques] Chirac want me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon," a remark Jumblatt interpreted as a death threat to Hariri.
Following the assassination, Syria became an international pariah. U.N. secretary-general Kofi Annan dispatched a fact-finding mission. This mission resulted in the establishment of an international, independent investigating commission headed initially by German judge Detlev Mehlis. U.S. president George W. Bush and French president Jacques Chirac, two leaders whose views of the Middle East seldom coincided, agreed to isolate Syria diplomatically. The State Department withdrew its ambassador, Margaret Scobey, and maintained only a lower-level diplomatic presence in Damascus. Under immense pressure, the Syrian army finally withdrew from Lebanon. But, over subsequent months and years, as Asad detected chinks in the West's diplomatic solidarity--and as U.S. members of Congress began to defy the White House and re-engage with Asad--the Syrian regime began to put cooperation with the U.N. investigators on the back burner. Today, Syrian cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the successor to the more ambitious Investigation Commission, is negligible.
While many in Washington and other capitals continue to perceive Syria as a largely secular state with a leadership fundamentally hostile to radical Islam, today's Syrian leadership encourages both radical Islam and international Al-Qaeda.Obama's Approach to Syria
Barack Obama campaigned on a platform which made engagement central to his foreign policy. "Not talking [to adversaries] doesn't make us look tough--it makes us look arrogant," he declared during his campaign. In his inaugural address, he declared, "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist."
The Syrian regime signaled that it would accept Obama's offer, so long as the White House's hand preceded the unclenching of the Syrian fist. In a congratulatory telegram to Obama, the Syrian leader expressed "hope that dialogue would prevail to overcome the difficulties that have hindered real progress toward peace, stability, and prosperity in the Middle East."
While the Syrian regime had yet to cooperate with the Hariri investigation, cease its sponsorship of and support for terrorism, stop interfering in Lebanon, or stop helping Hezbollah build up its rocket force, the Obama administration wasted little time in easing pressure on Damascus. This rush to dialogue was undertaken in order to create a more conducive atmosphere for engagement. On March 7, 2009, the State Department dispatched Jeffrey D. Feltman, assistant secretary of state and the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Syria in more than four years, to Damascus for talks with Syria's foreign minister. The Obama administration called an abrupt end to the moratorium initiated during the Bush administration forbidding U.S. officials' attendance at Syrian embassy functions in Washington when it sent Feltman and senior National Security Council aides to Syrian National Day festivities. Feltman's participation in the renewed engagement was particularly symbolic given his previous posting as ambassador to Lebanon during the Cedar Revolution of 2005 when he led the diplomatic charge to rid Lebanon of Syrian influence and troops.
On June 24, 2009, the State Department announced that it would once again nominate an ambassador for the U.S. embassy in Damascus. Just over a month later, the Obama administration announced that it would ease sanctions on Syria. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly explained that "Senator [George] Mitchell [the president's Middle East envoy] told President Assad that the U.S. would process all eligible applications for export licenses as quickly as possible."
While the easement did not include those sanctions imposed by Congress in the wake of Hariri's assassination, they, nonetheless, reflect the White House's desire to bring Syria in from the cold. Nor will Congress necessarily act as a check on this enthusiasm to roll back even those sanctions. Less than two years after Hariri's assassination, senators Arlen Specter (Democrat of Pennsylvania), Bill Nelson (Democrat of Florida), John Kerry (Democrat of Massachusetts), and Christopher Dodd (Democrat of Connecticut) traveled to Syria to promote engagement. Four months later, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi also visited Asad for the same purpose, declaring, "The road to Damascus is a road to peace."
Can Syria Be Divorced from Terrorism?
Flipping Syria away from its axis with Iran is a diplomatic priority for the Obama administration as it seeks to revitalize the Middle East peace process. Many Western diplomats and analysts hoped that Syria would reform when the young, Western-educated Bashir al-Asad succeeded his hard-line father Hafiz as president of Syria in 2000. But the Damascus spring proved fleeting. Syria remained a police state at home and an enabler of terrorism abroad with
policies rooted firmly in rejection of Israel's right to exist and opposition to U.S. regional interests. Should Syria be flipped, the theory goes, not only would it mitigate the threat of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, but it could enable Syria to join forces with Lebanon to make peace with Israel. According to Martin Indyk, director of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, "Syria is a strategic linchpin for dealing with Iran and the Palestinian issue. Don't forget, everything in the Middle East is connected."
To seek a resolution to conflict in the Middle East is a noble goal. And yet, to base that deal on Syrian goodwill is not only naïve but requires a perception of Syria and its intentions that is seriously out-of- date. While many in Washington and other capitals continue to perceive Syria as a largely secular state with a leadership fundamentally hostile to radical Islam, today's Syrian leadership encourages both radical Islam and international Al-Qaeda. The traditional assumption that support for extremist Islam is limited to Saudi Arabia and wealthy Persian Gulf financiers is no longer valid. Bashir al-Asad is playing a dangerous game, one that is not only inimical to U.S. interests in the short term but also employs a strategy that could undercut Syrian stability in the long term.
It was not long after the start of military operations against Iraq in March 2003 that the Pentagon grew concerned at Syrian support for the insurgency there. Speaking at a press conference held in Baghdad in 2004, Gen. Richard Myers, then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "There are other foreign fighters. We know for a fact that a lot of them find their way into Iraq through Syria for sure." According to some estimates, perhaps 80 percent of foreign
fighters who infiltrated Iraq crossed the Syrian border. These were disproportionately responsible for the most devastating suicide bombings in Iraq. An Italian investigation of foreign fighter recruitment in Italy found that "Syria has functioned as a hub for an Al-Qaeda network." Syrian president Asad repeatedly denied any involvement in facilitating terrorism in Iraq. In 2007, he told ABC's Diane Sawyer: "If you stoke [terrorism], it will burn you. So if we have this chaos in Iraq, it will spill over to Syria … So saying this [that Syria aids Iraq's insurgency], it's like saying that the Syrian government is working against the Syrian interest."
Two common assumptions handicap an understanding of terrorist networks. The first is that Shi‘i and Sunni groups or governments do not cooperate. Hence, some scholars argue that it is impossible that the Iranian regime could supply arms to the Taliban. In 2007, Juan Cole, a professor at the University of Michigan, wrote, "Among the more fantastic charges that Bush made against Iran was that its government was actively arming and helping the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. In fact, the Taliban are extremist Sunnis who hate and have killed large numbers of Shiites. Shiite Iran is unlikely to support them." The evidence that they have done so, however, is overwhelming as U.S. forces have seized truckloads of Iranian weaponry en route to the Taliban.
Another false argument--and one that applies specifically to Syria--is that secular regimes do not support radical Islamist groups. The Egyptian government, for example, has long turned a blind eye to the supply of Hamas terrorists through tunnels from Egyptian territory. Libya, too, has engaged in the practice, supporting the Islamist terrorist group Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines even as Libyan leader Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi sought to present himself to the West as an ally in the fight against radical Islam. To ensure U.S. national security, U.S. analysis must be based on reality rather than image. Despite Asad's stated animosity toward Islamist terrorism and his regime's trumpeting of its own vulnerability to radical Islamism, the Syrian record shows a willingness not only to tolerate but also to aid Islamist groups and assist Al-Qaeda violence.
The assumption that the Syrian government would not support Islamism is rooted in the regime's troubled history with radical Islam. The originally Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood established a branch in Syria in the late 1950s. The group remained quiet for two decades but, in 1979, it began to engage in terrorism, most famously when members of the group murdered several dozen ‘Alawi military cadets near Aleppo. Three years later, after some 200 Islamists staged an insurrection in Hama, Syria's fifth largest city, the Syrian military razed much of the city, killing between 10,000 and 20,000 civilians, including women and children. In the aftermath of Hama, many analysts note that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood renounced violence although only the most prescient Syria hands have observed that, behind the regime's veneer of secularism, Hafiz al-Asad subsequently sought to co-opt Islamism.
In recent years, however, the Syrian government has blamed domestic terrorism on shadowy and often unnamed Islamist groups. In July 2005, the Syrian government returned alleged Islamist terrorists to Saudi Arabia and Tunisia although, more often, Damascus has refused to extradite terrorists, suggesting that the decision to release is linked more to immediate diplomatic necessity rather than a principled commitment to combat terrorism. Still, the Syrian government has sought to project an image of victimization. In June 2006, Syria's tightly-controlled national television showed the aftermath of a gun battle in Damascus between Islamists and state security forces, suggesting that the government--normally secretive on security matters--wanted to cast itself as a victim of Islamism. The Syrian government cited the September 27, 2008 car bombing in Damascus, which killed seventeen people, as an indication that Islamist terrorists--in this case it named Fatah al-Islam--had targeted the country for its cooperation with U.S. efforts to strengthen security along its border with Iraq. Pointing the finger at Fatah al-Islam may also have been meant to deflect suspicion that the Syrian government had supported the group's activities in Lebanon. A precedent of staged violence, such as the attack on the Danish embassy in Damascus during the Muhammad cartoon crisis, suggests analysts should consider the possibility that other such incidents were also faked. Asad's stated animosity toward radical Islam and Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups is mirrored in Al- Qaeda's traditional hatred of the ‘Alawi regime in Syria. A year before the 9/11 attacks, a leading Al-Qaeda tactician, ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim (better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mus‘ab as-Suri) penned a lengthy polemic against the Syrian regime. Suri described the ‘Alawis as heretics, fanatical Shi‘a descended from Jews and Zoroastrians. About Hama, he related not only how the "lives of more than 45,000 [sic] unarmed Sunni civilians were claimed" but also how the Syrian security forces continued to kill an additional 30,000 Sunni Muslims over the subsequent fourteen years. After a rambling religious discourse on the meaning and necessity of jihad, Suri concluded, "It is not permissible for Muslims to stay under their [‘Alawi] rule for one moment ...They must be pursued and killed to cleanse them from Greater Syria and the face of the earth. They should be killed as individuals and groups, and Sunni Muslims must ambush and kill them all."
Such hatred is real, but in the Middle East alliances shift and enmity can be deferred. Enemies cooperate against those whom they consider a mutual threat. Iran and the Taliban--who hardly like each other and were on the verge of military conflict in 1998--nevertheless found themselves allied only a decade later in efforts to undermine U.S. stability efforts in Afghanistan. For all his diplomatic promises about non-cooperation with terrorists, the evidence that Bashir al-Asad aids and abets Al-Qaeda is damning.
Syrians in the Iraqi Insurgency
In September 2007, U.S. forces in the northern Iraqi town of Sinjar, twelve miles from the Syrian border, discovered computers and a cache of documents that included the records of more than 600 foreign fighters who had infiltrated into Iraq between spring 2006 and summer 2007. The documents show a pattern of Syrian behavior at odds with the regime's public statements and diplomatic posture. While the records listed Syrian as the nationality of only forty-four of the foreign fighters--behind Saudis (237) and Libyans (111)--Syrians coordinated the insertion into Iraq of almost all the fighters listed. The insertion of the Saudi terrorists is especially instructive as Saudi Arabia shares a lengthy and porous border with Iraq. The Saudi jihadists presumably choose to travel to Iraq through Syria because Asad tolerates what the Saudi leadership will not. It is also possible that the total Syrian numbers are underrepresented since Syrians formed a majority of the detainees held at Camp Bucca, the main U.S. detention camp in Iraq.
The Syrian jihadists themselves come from across Syria although most originate in the inland Dayr az-Zawr region, which abuts Iraq. Still others come from Latakia, the home province of the Asad family, and from Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. At just thirty-four individuals, the sample size of Syrians whose hometown is listed in the Sinjar records is too small to draw definitive conclusions about the roots of all Syrian jihadists, but it is clear that the radicals come from all across the country.
The Sinjar records also detail recruitment methods. Those recruiting most jihadists were "ikhwan (brothers)," not necessarily Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimun) members, but rather those whom the recruits considered devout or to be members of radical groups. Friends and relatives also recruited young Syrians for terrorist missions in Iraq. Most damning for Syrian government denial of culpability for facilitating terror was the Sinjar record's notation that recruiters reached several Syrians through the Internet. Given strict Syrian monitoring of electronic communication, Syrian statements that they did not know of such recruiting activities on their soil are not credible.
Underlining the extent and intensity of these recruitment efforts was the fact that almost two-thirds of the Syrian nationals who volunteered for jihad in Iraq--and all those who reported initial recruitment by the Internet--became suicide bombers. The recruitment of suicide terrorists is complex. It requires psychological screening and indoctrination. If the Syrian government claims to be unaware of such activities in its own towns, cities, and mosques, then Syria's future stability cannot be assumed. It is far more likely that the Syrian regime chose to turn a blind eye to terrorist recruitment on its soil. Again, however, this Syrian blind eye should raise concerns about the country's future stability as it suggests a vulnerability to blowback should these same Islamist terrorists decide to return to Syria to take on the Asad regime.
The Syrian government's denials of facilitation for Islamist terror are less credible given the country's role as a transit point for radical fighters and arms. Almost all Saudis, Libyans, Egyptians, Algerians, Kuwaitis, Yemenis, and Moroccans transited Syria to reach Iraq. Syria is a police state. It is implausible that its government is unaware of the transit of large numbers of foreign nationals, some through Damascus International Airport, others across the border from Jordan and Turkey. Nor can the Syrian government simply blame spontaneous outrage at U.S. occupation of Iraq: Many of the foreign fighters who traversed Syria--and more than one-fifth of the Syrians represented in the Sinjar records--made cash contributions to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, often more than $1,000 and, in some cases, more than $10,000. For an outraged jihadist to take a weapon and try to cross the border is one thing; to acquire information necessary to donate to Al-Qaeda and actually transfer the money takes more direction.
The underground railroad through Syria is lucrative not only to Al-Qaeda but also to many Syrians. Trafficking people across Syria's border with Iraq is a complex and lucrative business. Smugglers will bribe border guards and, depending upon the size of the operation, officials in Damascus. Taking individuals across the border requires false papers, and acquiring these depends on corruption in Syrian government offices. In order to smuggle sensitive cargo through border checkpoints, smugglers often require intelligence about shifts and rotations of personnel at the border. This, in turn, suggests the complicity of higher levels within the Syrian regime. Indeed, many Syrian intelligence officials accept money to turn the other way. While the Syrian government sought credit for the prevention of terrorist infiltration following the U.S. siege of Fallujah in the summer of 2004, jihadists and fixers established an elaborate network of safe houses on the Syrian side of the border to enable the flow of fighters into Iraq to continue. After the capture of Fallujah, U.S. troops found photographs of the leader of the Jaysh Muhammad insurgent group meeting with a senior Syrian official. While officials refused to name the Syrian official, the Iraqi ambassador to Syria said that he had protested to the Syrian government.
The Sinjar documents describe a network of Syrian coordinators who facilitate travel through Syria, receiving between $19 and $34,584 for their services, the differential apparently dependent both upon the nationality of the jihadis as well as the demands of specific Syrian fixers. Saudis paid, on average, $2,500. However, the different pricing schemes offered by various fixers suggest the parallel operation of multiple networks rather than a single, coordinated system. While cross-border tribal links aided infiltration, so too apparently have security forces expelled from Lebanon. These latter augmented smuggling networks into Iraq in order to make up for income lost when Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon. Because the Syrian security forces are the domain of the ‘Alawis, the involvement of the security forces in smuggling and in the "taxation" of smuggling suggests the direct complicity of the regime. Indeed on December 6, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated seven individuals based in Syria as suppliers of financial support for the Iraqi insurgency. Six were members of the Syrian Baath Party.
Matthew Levitt, a former FBI terrorist analyst and now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, highlighted the case of an individual known as Fawzi al-Rawi. "The extent of the Syrian role in al-Rawi's activities is noteworthy," Levitt explained. "Al-Rawi was appointed to his position in the Syrian Ba'ath Party by Syrian president Bashir al-Asad in 2003." Levitt also noted that the Treasury Department found that Rawi "is supported financially by the Syrian Government, and has close ties to Syrian intelligence."
Syrians in the International Jihad
The Asad regime's support for Al-Qaeda extends far beyond the Iraqi theater of operations. Ryan Mauro, assistant director of intelligence at The Counter Terrorism Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Centre, has observed: "Many international Al-Qaeda plots have Syrian links." He has also recounted Syrian links to Al-Qaeda attacks in Jordan and Morocco. For example, the cell of Abu Mus'ab az-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, was based in Syria. Zarqawi's group was responsible for the October 28, 2002 assassination of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan, as well as numerous killings of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
It has been reported that at least one alleged bomber from the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (a Moroccan Al-Qaeda affiliate that claimed responsibility for the May 2003 suicide attacks on restaurants, hotels, and the Belgian consulate in Casablanca) trained in Syria. In 2004, foreign students enrolled in Islamic schools in Syria participated in terrorist bombings in Israel and Turkey. Analysts might dismiss the attack on Israel as motivated by long-standing Syrian policies, but the attacks in Turkey occurred at a time when a sympathetic Turkish government was helping the regime in Damascus ease its international isolation. U.S. defense officials allege that Mustafa al-'Uzayti (Abu Faraj al-Libi), a senior Al-Qaeda official captured by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence on May 2, 2005, met several terrorists in Syria to plan attacks not only on the United States but also in Europe and Australia. Jordanian authorities narrowly averted a massive chemical terrorist attack in downtown Amman, which the Jordanian authorities estimate might have killed 80,000 people.
Following its 2005 expulsion from Lebanon, the Syrian regime used its connections to jihadists to attempt to destabilize the Lebanese government, sponsoring the Al-Qaeda affiliate Fatah al-Islam, which established itself in Nahr al-Barid, a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon. According to Lebanese government interrogation reports, captured jihadists reported links with Syrian intelligence. Jihadist cells in Iraq also spoke casually of Syrian veterans of the Jund ash-Sham (Soldiers of Syria) in Lebanon. Until an October 26, 2008 U.S. raid from Iraq killed him, Zarqawi's deputy, Sulayman Khaled Darwish (Abu ‘l-Ghadiya), continued to receive safe haven in Syria. Following Darwish's death, Sa'd al-Shammari took over his foreign fighter facilitation network and continued to operate it from inside Syria. The list is long enough to suggest that a Syrian link to Al-Qaeda is more the rule than the exception. By providing a safe haven, the Syrian government is as complicit in assisting the terrorist group as was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
The Duplicity of the Regime
There is a growing discrepancy between the image the Syrian regime seeks to convey--that it cooperates in the war on terrorism by cracking down on radical Islamists--and the reality, which is that senior Syrian officials coddle and protect radical Islamists and Al-Qaeda operatives. Ironically, reports from international organizations such as Amnesty International have provided the Syrian regime with unwitting international legitimacy by endorsing its claim to intolerance for radical Islamists. Amnesty criticized the regime for the arrest of twelve and for the incommunicado detention of ten alleged Islamists in Dayr az-Zawr and also complained about the imprisonment of an Islamist returned to Syria in a "suspected unlawful rendition to Syria by the U.S. authorities." Such criticisms may be true, but without a proper context, they suggest that the regime exhibits complete hostility to Islamism.
In reality, Asad's position is more nuanced. The media plays its part in endorsing this carefully constructed image of the regime, which is accepted blindly by many journalists. The Economist, for example, cast doubt on the October 26, 2008 U.S. commando raid on a compound in Syria in which U.S. officials claim to have killed a senior Al-Qaeda figure. "What makes the raid odder still is that the Syrian authorities have themselves embarked on a nationwide confrontation with Al-Qaeda types in Syria," the magazine noted, apparently assuming the Syrian crackdown was more substance than show.
Lee Smith, a leading Syria analyst and scholar at the Hudson Institute, has speculated that any Syrian crackdown on foreign jihadists might be mere Machiavellian calculation. "Damascus has an important card to play against the Saudis, who fear that Syria is holding several hundred Saudi fighters in prison," he writes, adding, "Damascus could embarrass the Saudis by publicly announcing the existence of these extremists--or even worse, allow those jihadis to return home to fight the House of Saud."
Asad's motivation may be multifaceted. Abdel Halim Khaddam, vice president under both Hafiz and Bashir al-Asad and now a leading opposition figure in exile, speculated that Bashir gambled that the popularity of enabling resistance outweighed the dangers of antagonizing the United States. "Fighting the Americans in Iraq is very dangerous … But it also makes Bashir popular. Under the banner of resistance, anything is popular."
Conclusion
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran suggested that religious rule might be the wave of the future and not an ideal of the past. Three years later, Hafiz al-Asad's "Hama rules" (as columnist Thomas Friedman anointed the bloody crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood) were a wakeup call for Islamists. The fall of secular, nationalist governments rose to the top of their agenda, but the task would neither be preordained nor easy.
After Hafiz al-Asad reasserted his authority, the Syrian government quietly began to use religion to co-opt those who might otherwise be attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood and its message. The Syrian regime financed mosques, subsidized clerics, and broadcast more religious programming on the tightly-controlled state television. Just as Saddam Hussein--once embraced in Western capitals for his staunch secularism and hostility to political Islam--found religion after his 1991 defeat in Operation Desert Storm, so, too, has the Asad regime cynically turned toward religion even as, like Saddam's regime, it seeks to maintain its image of hostility to radical Islam.
Speaking at a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference's Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Damascus on May 23, 2009, Bashir al-Asad endorsed the group's theme of "Promoting Islamic Solidarity," condemned the "ferocious campaign against Islam with the objective of tarnishing its image as a frame of reference in terms of the civilization and religion of our peoples," and beseeched the gathered Arab leaders to become more religiously conservative, declaring, "How can we defend a religion whose obligations we fail to carry out: these obligations of unifying our ranks and positions, stating the word of truth against the arrogant, and defending our honor and dignity against those who usurp them?" Although Asad paid lip service to curtailing terrorism (albeit with rhetoric infused with moral relativism), his depiction of the threat posed to Islam by the West brought to mind the belligerent anti-Westernism of ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, Osama bin Laden's intellectual mentor, more than it did the Arab nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser or Baath Party founder Michel ‘Aflaq.
Syria is now behaving like Saudi Arabia did in the 1990s and early 2000s when it chose to export Islamist radicalism while denying its own culpability and its vulnerability to attacks from the same quarter. Asad should heed history, however. Just as an Al-Qaeda blowback struck Saudi Arabia in the end, so, too, could Damascus's coddling and support for jihad abroad come back to haunt Syria.
Indeed, this appears to be a possibility to which Al-Qaeda theoreticians are not blind. Among the documents found in the Sinjar cache was a lengthy and detailed tract examining the lessons learned from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's violent campaign in Syria. It found that the brotherhood lacked a comprehensive plan, was fractured into too many groups, failed to indoctrinate sufficiently, had weak public relations, and was too dependent on outsiders for resources. Al-Qaeda blamed the failure of jihad in Syria up to Hama on failed Muslim Brotherhood leadership but found that "most of the base members, some of the mid level leaders, and maybe a few high level leaders are innocent and decent people . . . Those faithful were driven to the jihad with true resolve; they willed their leaders to act. Unfortunately all their efforts went in vain despite . . . the abundance of possibilities, and they set an example for ‘Jihad Quality' by working diligently, persistently and silently, and by avoiding in-house and partisan bickering." Al-Qaeda's analysts found the ground in Syria still fertile for jihad should Al-Qaeda spark a movement that had learned the lessons of the past.
The Obama administration may hope to cultivate Bashir al-Asad as a partner for peace, but diplomatic ambition should not trump reality. As Asad plays with fire, far more than Syria could get burned.
**Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at AEI.

Lebanon: A National Unity Government that Fragments the State
Wed, 25 November 2009
Abdullah Iskandar/Al Hayat
It seems that all the consultations, contacts and meetings that preceded the accord reached over the formation of a national unity in Lebanon did not contribute in bringing the concept of this unity closer. It also seems that the discussions that accompanied the drafting of the new government’s policy statement did not consolidate this unity. The crisis of the General Directorate of the Internal Security Forces – which accompanied the discussions over the policy statement – revealed a major flaw in the function of the state apparatuses and institutions, which threatens their entity, and not merely deepening the differences within the national unity government.
The seriousness of this reality from which Lebanon has long suffered lies in the great contradiction between the flaw that is further deepening in the state and the appropriate conditions that help resolve it (Locally: A consensual president and elections that brought about a balance of powers which was reflected on the government and apparent intentions to turn the page of the civil strife and revive institutions. Regionally and internationally: Unanimity over supporting the national unity government and willingness to help it in all its steps).
This means that the local parties are still dealing with the state's institutions as partisan and factional trophies, not as institutions that should be independent from the domestic political rivalries, when it comes to their work mechanisms. For instance, the civil servant – regardless of his grade – is affiliated administratively to a domestic leader and gains his power and influence from him, not from the laws that regulate the work of the institutions.
The crisis of the Internal Security Forces Directorate revealed this great flaw in the affiliation of the state employees, especially with it being a security institution that has a great role in preserving the civil peace and implementing laws. But similar crises, some of which are hidden and others are overt, plague other security and civil institutions. For instance, the sect or party leader is the reference of the employees who belong to his same sect or party. Besides, any violation of the law that regulates the institutions' work or a wrong implementation of it requires political negotiations instead of referring to the law and implementing it, as the case should be in any state that seeks to maintain the unity of its institutions.
Taking into consideration such intentional erroneous implementation of the law, the cabinet does not only lack the character of national unity, but the mere description of its members as ministers implies exaggeration. The minister, who is supposed to persistently implement the policy of the government and run the affairs of his ministry's employees, is no longer in control of this administration which is monopolized by leaders. He thus turns into a false witness of the decisions made by these leaders regarding the affairs of the employees who are administratively under his control. He is neither able to choose his staff and aides, nor to hold anyone in his ministry accountable or even to implement the law in his work.
In other words, these practices damage the role of the minister and his position as he is primarily responsible for the proper functioning of the state administrations and institutions.
According to the Lebanese Constitution, the role of the President of the Republic is to ensure the proper implementation of constitutional and procedural laws. While the Taef Accord linked the cabinet as a whole with the executive authority, the President remains the person tasked with implementing the constitution. But the current reality changed this role which turned into one concern that pertains to maintaining the current cabinet formula.
Despite the intentions expressed by the President every now and then to end this flaw, he remains governed by a certain balance of powers and the lineup of the same government that is threatened by a blocking third (despite the electoral choice), when any attachment to implementing the laws surfaces, aside from the accord among politicians.
Hence, behaviors are consecrated and precedents are reinforced, ones that strip the state from its custody over its institutions and further fragment it, in favor of the expansion of sects and parties that still defend contradicting interests and goals.