LCCC
ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
February 13/09
Bible Reading of the day.
Bible Reading
of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to
Saint Luke 17,1-6. He said to his disciples, "Things that cause sin will
inevitably occur, but woe to the person through whom they occur. It would be
better for him if a millstone were put around his neck and he be thrown into the
sea than for him to cause one of these little ones to sin. Be on your guard! If
your brother sins, rebuke him; and if he repents, forgive him. And if he wrongs
you seven times in one day and returns to you seven times saying, 'I am sorry,'
you should forgive him." And the apostles said to the Lord, "Increase our
faith." The Lord replied, "If you have faith the size of a mustard seed, you
would say to (this) mulberry tree, 'Be uprooted and planted in the sea,' and it
would obey you.
Saint Cyprian (c.200-258), Bishop of Carthage and martyr
The good of patience (copyright Fathers of the Church, Inc.)"You should forgive
him."
"Love bears all things, believes
all things, hopes all things, endures all things" (1Cor 13,7).By this the
apostle Paul showed that love can persevere steadfastly because it has learned
to endure all things. And in another place he says: "Bear with one another
through love, striving to preserve the unity of the spirit through the bond of
peace" (Eph 4,2-3).Neither unity nor peace can be preserved unless brothers
cherish one another with mutual forbearance and preserve the bond of unity with
patience as intermediary. How then will you be able to endure these things: not
to swear or curse; not to seek again what has been taken away from you; on
receiving a blow to offer the other cheek also to your assailant; to forgive
your brother who offends you not only seventy times seven times, but all his
offences without exception; to love your enemies; to pray for your adversaries
and persecutors, if you do not have the steadfastness of patience and
forbearance?We see what happened in the case of Stephen. When he was being
killed by the violence and stones of the Jews, he did not ask for vengeance but
forgiveness for his murderers, saying: "Lord, do not hold this sin against them"
(Acts 7,60).
Free Opinions, Releases, letters &
Special Reports
Lebanon NOT for sale/Future News
12/02/09
An
election that raises Syria's appetite.By:
Michael Young 12/02/09
Don't
expect Israel's parties to be very unlike.Barnett
R. Rubin 12/02/09
How serious is the EU about
supporting democracy and human rights in Lebanon?. Daily Star 12/02/09
Latest News Reports From
Miscellaneous Sources for February 12/09
Obama Supports U.N. Moves to Punish
Hariri Killers-Naharnet
Baroud Suspends Sect
Registration at Population Registry-Naharnet
Jumblatt:
The success of the right in Israel announces new wars in the region-Future
News
IDF on high
alert for fear of “Hezbollah” revenge attack
-Future News
Seaid:
International Tribunal achieved by public participation in Martyr Hariri’s
commemoration-Future
News
Sfeir
Renews Support for Centrist Bloc, Says He is Neither With March 8 Nor March 14-Naharnet
Students Clash at Lebanese
University Law School-Naharnet
Baroud
Suspends Sect Registration at Population Registry-Naharnet
Israeli
Troops on High Alert for Anniversary of Mughniyeh's Assassination-Naharnet
Families of Buhsas Victims
Legally Seek Bassil's Testimony-Naharnet
Shatah: Proposing
Projects, Not Amounts Key to Solving South Council Crisis-Naharnet
Four Speakers to Address
Feb. 14 Crowd-Naharnet
March 14, Bassil Preparing
for New Round of Confrontation in Parliament-Naharnet
Hand Grenade Goes Off in
Beirut, No Casualties-Naharnet
March 14 Rejects Foreign
Influence, Calls Partisans to Chant for Lebanon on Saturday-Naharnet
Moawad Won't Run in 2009-Naharnet
Berri and Aoun Follow the
Same Path-Naharnet
Jumblat in Baabda Soon to
Clarify Stance on Army-Naharnet
Hariri: I Won't Take Part
in New Government if March 8 Wins Elections-Naharnet
Sarkozy Determined to
Bring Hariri Killers to Justice-Naharnet
Yakan to Nominate
Candidates All Over Lebanon-Naharnet
Nazik Hariri Remembers
Slain Husband-Naharnet
Lebanon's state prosecutor in
intensive care at Beirut hospital-Daily
Star
When will Hizbullah avenge
Mughniyeh assassination?-Daily
Star
Khatami says Hariri 'was killed
by terrorism'-Daily
Star
Fear of assassinations haunts Lebanon on Hariri
anniversary (Feature)Monsters and
Critics.com
Mideast reacts to israel elections-Xinhua
Are we helping Syria to fly the terrorist skies?Foreign
Policy
Democrats Reach Out to Syria-Wall
Street Journal
Veteran US lawmaker to meet with top Syrian leader-Xinhua
Gemayel to discuss poll pact
with Murr - and even Tashnak-Daily
Star
Are we helping Syria to fly the terrorist skies?
Tue, 02/10/2009 - 12:19pm
By
Michael Singh
There have been
news reports over the last day or
two suggesting that, according to the Syrian government, the United States has
granted approval for the export of spare parts to rehabilitate Boeing 747s owned
by Damascus. By way of background, any such export would require a license from
the U.S. Department of Commerce (for the relevant regulations on this issue, see
here).
To the casual observer, the approval of spare parts for civilian aircraft might
seem unremarkable. Except, of course, for the fact that Syria serves as the
conduit for Iranian weapons bound for Hizballah in Lebanon, which is among the
reasons
cited by the Commerce Department
for restricting U.S. exports to Damascus. These arms shipments provide Hizballah
the capability to intimidate Lebanese citizens and potentially destabilize the
entire region.
Troublingly, there is a history of allegations that Iran and Syria have used
civilian transport for illicit arms shipments. Recall, for example, the
2007 case of a train in Turkey
which, having been bombed by Kurdish guerillas, was found to be carrying arms
bound for Syria from Iran hidden among construction materials. Or more recently,
the case of the ship, also bound
for Syria from Iran, that was detained by Cypriot authorities and reportedly
found to be carrying cargo in violation of UN Security Council resolution 1747.
Until the Syrian government ends its provision of arms to terrorist groups like
Hizballah, it makes little sense for the United States to help Damascus maintain
its aircraft fleet.
Sfeir Renews Support for Centrist Bloc, Says He is Neither With March 8 Nor
March 14
Naharnet/Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir on Thursday renewed his support for a
centrist parliamentary bloc and declared he was neither with March 8 nor March
14 Forces.
"I am with a centrist bloc that would facilitate resolving domestic issues,"
Sfeir told reporters following a meeting with members of the Youth Shadow
Government. He said he was surprised as to why some interpreted his statements
as being supportive of the ruling March 14 coalition and against the Hizbullah-led
March 8 Forces.
Addressing the delegation, Sfeir said: "Learn from others' mistakes so you won't
make them yourself." He called on all Lebanese to serve their country,
particularly those in power "should use their power to serve the best interest
of all citizens and not their own interest." Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 13:32
Students Clash at Lebanese University Law School
Naharnet/Fist fights broke out between students belonging to different political parties
at the Lebanese University's Law School in Hadath. The Voice of Lebanon radio
station said students set some offices ablaze. It said fighting erupted among
student groups within the March 8 coalition when one side used loudspeakers to
blare political chants. Other local reports said the clash pitted supporters of
Speaker Nabih Berri's AMAL Movement against Hizbullah partisans. Security forces
stepped in to try to contain the fighting. Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 14:41
Baroud Suspends Sect Registration at Population Registry
Naharnet/Interior Minister Ziad Baroud issued a general instruction allowing Lebanese not
to declare their sect at population registries.
"Requests made by citizens not to declare their religious sect or to remove it
from their personal identity registration should be respected," Baroud's general
instruct read. The minister added that this right was guaranteed by the
constitution and by the international declaration for human rights, and other
international agreements that Lebanon is party to. He sited article 9 of the
Lebanese constitution that guarantees freedom of religious belief. Various
Lebanese civil societies and political parties have been fighting for a civil
law regarding citizenship status, in particular the recognition of civil
marriage. Baroud was an active member of civil society prior to becoming
Interior minister. Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 15:13
Four Speakers to Address Feb. 14 Crowd
Naharnet/March 14 forces are mobilizing masses for a rally that will be held on Saturday
on the occasion of ex-Premier Rafik Hariri's fourth assassination anniversary.
According to the daily An-Nahar on Thursday, al-Mustaqbal Movement leader Saad
Hariri, Phalange leader Amin Gemayel, Democratic Gathering MP Walid Jumblat and
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea are scheduled to address the mass rally that
would start at 10:30am in Beirut's Martyrs Square.
The celebration is expected to end at 12:50pm, the time of the car bomb
explosion that killed Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005. A source from the organizing
committee told An-Nahar that the committee was expecting large masses that could
exceed hundreds of thousands. The organizing committee has placed 100,000 chairs
and the event would include cultural programs. Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 09:22
Shatah: Proposing Projects, Not Amounts Key to Solving South Council Crisis
Naharnet/Finance Minister Mohammed Shatah said the key to resolving the Council for the
South crisis is when projects become our target and not amount of funds needed
for projects. "Then, numbers – whether 40, 50 or 60 billion – would not be the
main issue – but rather the projects proposed to the Cabinet" for approval,
Shatah said in an interview with the daily An Nahar published on Thursday.
Shatah said that a solution is seen in the offing based on projects proposed by
the Council.
Meanwhile, Speaker Nabih Berri stressed he would not retract a request for LL 60
billion for the Council unless a Ministry of Planning was established to replace
councils, foundations and funds. The Council for the South crisis was aggravated
when Lebanese leaders failed to agree over funding, particularly after Berri
submitted a budget request of LL 150 billion for the Council, a demand totally
rejected by Prime Minister Fouad Saniora and the majority of Cabinet. A 10-day
deadline for resolving the standoff has also passed without an agreement.
Ministerial sources had earlier said that a possible solution was being
discussed that would "put the issue within its institutional framework." The
proposal calls for adopting a mechanism used by the finance ministry with the
various funds, councils and public institutions such as they submit their budget
requests and funds needed for 2009 for approval. Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 10:37
Families of Buhsas Victims Legally Seek Bassil's
Testimony
Naharnet/Attorney Mohammed al-Murad, acting on behalf of the families of the Buhsas
victims, legally requested the testimony of Telecommunications Minister Jebran
Bassil, as a main witness in the case. Bassil has allegedly refrained from
providing investigating authorities, particularly the military intelligence unit
with details concerning the crime. Murad also called on Bassil's Bureau Manager
Gilbert Najjar as well as officials from Alfa and MTC Touch cell phone
companies, to testify and provide all the necessary and available data showing
that Bassil is refraining from helping the investigation. First Sergeant Anwar
Jassem al-Khatib and Corporal Ali Mohammed Ali died from an explosion in the
Buhsas area at the southern entrance of the city of Tripoli during the morning
rush hour of Sep. 29, 2008. The main suspect in the case is Abdul Ghani Jawhar,
a Lebanese citizen who remains at large. Jawhar heads the terrorist group Fatah
al-Islam. Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 10:22
March 14, Bassil Preparing for New Round of Confrontation in Parliament
Naharnet/The ruling March 14 coalition is reportedly preparing for a new round of
confrontation with Telecommunications Minister Jebran Bassil over the
wiretapping issue.
News reports said a meeting of the Media and Communications Committee scheduled
for Thursday is likely to be a hot one just like the previous session with MPs
from the ruling majority eyeing Bassil. Mustaqbal Movement MP Ghazi Youssef said
March 14 lawmakers will listen to what Bassil has to say regarding questions
raised on the wiretapping issue. "The most important thing is to listen to the
minister's (Bassil's) response because up till now he has not replied to
anything," Youssef told the daily An Nahar. "We will hold him accountable for
his response … If he tried to avoid a reply or if his responses should not be
transparent," Youssef warned, adding that March 14 MPs would otherwise seek a
no-confidence vote against Bassil. Bassil, meanwhile, told the daily As Safir
that he would attend Thursday's meeting carrying with him a dossier full of
"satisfactory answers to questions posed to him at the previous session.""On the
contrary, I will be the one who will request to hold all those who have violated
implementation of the wiretapping law," Bassil warned."I have many questions to
ask in this regard," he added.
Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 10:08
Israeli Troops on High Alert for Anniversary of Mughniyeh's Assassination
Naharnet/Israeli troops on Thursday were put on high alert on the northern border for the
anniversary of top Hizbullah commander Imad Mughniyeh's assassination.
Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raised the level of alertness, particularly on the
northern border, in a bid to thwart any attempt by Hizbullah to launch a
retaliatory attack against Israel in response to Mughniyeh's murder, Ynet news
said on its website. Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has vowed to avenge
the killing of Mughniyeh, exactly one year ago in a car bombing in Damascus.
"Israelis are living in fear of our revenge. Don't expect me to say when we will
strike," Nasrallah has said. Nasrallah accused Israel of Mughniyeh's
assassination, but the Jewish State denied the charge. Nasrallah also accuses
Israel of holding on to remains of 350 Lebanese and Palestinian fighters. A
prevailing assessment in the defense establishment, Ynet said, is that Hizbullah
may also act on a later date. It quoted security sources as saying that the
heightened state of alert continues across the globe for fear of an attempt to
attack Israeli targets abroad. "Hizbullah views Israel as responsible for
Mughniyeh's assassination and has vowed to avenge his death," a security source
told Ynet. "All the relevant elements have been prepared accordingly for a long
time now. This alertness will continue in the future as well according to
evaluations of the situation." Nasrallah is to deliver a speech on the occasion
of Mughniyeh's assassination on Monday. Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 13:26
Hand Grenade Goes Off in Beirut, No Casualties
Naharnet/A hand grenade went off early Thursday in Beirut's Nuwairi neighborhood, causing
no casualties.
The state-run National News Agency said the blast took place at 6:30 am in an
abandoned two-story building. It said Lebanese army troops and police swiftly
cordoned off the area and opened an investigation into the incident. The Voice
of Lebanon radio station, however, said an assailant riding a motorcycle tossed
the grenade on the building in Nuwairi's Nahhal neighborhood. Beirut, 12 Feb 09,
08:25
Jumblat in Baabda Soon to Clarify Stance on Army
Naharnet/Democratic Gathering Leader Walid Jumblat will "soon" meet President Michel
Suleiman to clarify his stance which took a hard hit at the Lebanese army
command, the daily Ad Diyar said Thursday. Jumblat placed doubts on military
appointments during a recent television interview.
Ad Diyar said Suleiman's response to Jumblat led to a tense situation, prompting
the Druze leader to boycott a committee of experts tasked with studying the
various proposals for a defense strategy. Jumblat said the reason he withdrew
his representative, retired Col. Sharif Fayyad, from the defense strategy
committee, was because he did not want to take part in what he called
"counterfeit party." Meanwhile, Jumblat called for Arab-Iranian coordination to
confront what he called the Israeli "tripartite Livni-Netanyahu-Lieberman
victory." Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and hawkish ex-premier Benjamin
Netanyahu were locked in a battle for power on Wednesday after a photo-finish
election that could send peace talks into limbo. An overall lurch to the right
has made it more likely that Netanyahu will return to the nation's most powerful
post, but Livni immediately started coalition talks, meeting on Wednesday with
ultra-nationalist Avigdor Lieberman. "The victory of the tripartite Livni-Netanyahu-Lieberman
gang warns of more wars," Jumblat said in remarks published by the daily As
Safir on Thursday. "And unless a serious Arab stance is established in order to
exert real pressure on the new U.S. Administration in line with the Arab peace
initiative, I am afraid that the schemes of both nations (Israel and Palestine)
would fall apart," Jumblat warned. He stressed on the need to establish a
"united Arab stance as well as coordination between the Arab League and Iran to
confront the challenges imposed by the victory of the Israeli tripartite gang."
Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 08:08
March 14 Rejects Foreign Influence, Calls Partisans to Chant for Lebanon on
Saturday
Naharnet/The March 14 majority alliance on Wednesday said it would not permit "external
infiltration into our national-political life" and said the Lebanese people
would reaffirm allegiance to the nation and support for justice on the fourth
anniversary of ex-Premier Rafik Hariri's killing. The alliance, in a statement
released after a meeting by its leaders, said "they" wanted Feb. 14, 2005, the
day Hariri was assassinated, to be "a day marking state death." "But you wanted
it a day for the nation's renaissance," said the statement recited by MP Butros
Harb. "It was followed by the unprecedented civil independence movement in the
Middle East, the March 14 movement," the statement added. It said the
international tribunal that would start operating on March 1st would be "an
historic event that would safeguard justice and move criminals closer to
justice." "The 14th of February is a day to renew allegiance to Lebanon and
loyalty to the martyrs' blood; a day to declare support for the truth, justice
and the international tribunal," it said. "We call you to stream to Martyrs
Square to commemorate the event. Together we will be at … Freedom Square to
chant for Lebanon, wave the flag, declare commitment to our national independent
decision and reject all forms of external infiltration into our
national-political life," the statement concluded. Beirut, 11 Feb 09, 21:10
Berri and Aoun Follow the Same Path
Naharnet/Parliament Speaker Berri has said he was in agreement with Free Patriotic
Movement leader Gen. Michel Aoun and warned that internal divisions are more
dangerous than election results. "Send my regards to the General, and I don't
mind that you announce after the meeting that the Development and Liberation
bloc is an essential part of the opposition's structure," Berri told Health
Minister Mohammad Khalife ahead of his visit to Aoun on Wednesday.
"We and Aoun are on the same line," the speaker told Khalife, according to An-Nahar
daily. He said the elections "are not the end of the world in Lebanon."
"Election results do not pose a threat to Lebanon. Internal divide is the danger
because if it expands, national unity" will be negatively affected, Berri told
An-Nahar. Berri also talked about the Higher Relief Council which Premier Fouad
Saniora describes as "the successful experience" and said "its activities were
not only limited to Lebanon but also reached abroad."He added that the Council
has turned into a "fiscal shadow government."On the other hand, Berri hoped the
results of the Lebanese elections set for June 7 will come out as fast as those
of the Israeli elections. Beirut, 12 Feb 09, 13:35
Lebanon NOT for sale
Date: February 12th, 2009 Source: Future News
Lebanese in the past four years have endured lots of hardships and great
responsibilities. Their lives were threatened as followers of the Syrian regime
were putting Lebanon for sale at Israeli, American, Iranian and Syrian auctions.
The “Cedar’s Revolution” four years ago, has been eagerly working on regaining
the components of the government and its sovereign and liberal stance, while the
tribe of “Thank you Syria” has since been dismantling it and auctioning its
decisions to the credit of the Syrian and Iranian regimes at the behest of the
United States of America. For that purpose, February 14, will be a clear message
that Lebanon is Not for sale. It is for all its citizens where no security zones
of sectarian and religious ghettos exist. It will be a referendum that they
champion a strong government and legal armed forces.
February 14 will also be an occasion to announce our refusal of a nation
disintegrated into several mini-states where tongues and hands are chopped off
and necks and dignities are stepped on. On this day we will renew our loyalty to
the “human being” in Lebanon and to the norms of Justice, truth and beauty so
that we regain the country we all dream of with dignity and pride under the
umbrella of a just government and its legal forces.
We will participate February 14 to launch a political workshop whose ultimate
aim is to ban the formation of mini-states and the prevailing of heavier and
stronger weaponry than that of the government in the hands of illegitimate
groups.
This occasion is a necessary path to move forward to the elections to gain the
majority in the parliament in order to work hand in hand to kick off the project
of rebuilding the nation and safeguarding Lebanon from the earthquakes set by
the Syrian and Iranian policies through its followers here.
“Lebanon is not for sale”, this is what we are going to shout out loud February
14. Lebanon is a free, independent and strong state. Lebanon will never be a
playground for others and our blood belongs to us not to the Pasdaran or the
Passij or the Syrian intelligence.
An election that raises Syria's
appetite
By Michael Young /Daily Star staff
Thursday, February 12, 2009
Leave it to the Israelis and Palestinians to extinguish the heavenly light that
accompanied Barack Obama into the White House. The American president, we were
told, would take the sins of the Middle East onto his mortal shoulders and usher
in a new morning of regional concord. Apparently not.
The wittiest comment on Israel's elections Tuesday, which saw a dramatic shift
in the country toward the political right, came from a Hamas official, Moushir
al-Masri, who declared that Israel had chosen "extremists." It would be
difficult to disagree with Masri, but somehow he seemed to miss the irony that
the Palestinians already did that three years ago when they elected a Hamas
majority to the Palestinian Parliament.
What happens next in Israel is a matter of utter confusion. If Tzipi Livni, the
Kadima leader, is asked to form a government, she will have to fish in the
waters of the right to reach some sort of majority, one that will be unstable at
best. If the Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, is handed the task, his
right-wing government will also be rickety, bringing together secular and
religious parties, along with the xenophobic partisans of Avigdor Lieberman - by
some estimates giving the right a short majority of 64 seats in the Knesset. And
all for what? Livni won't have any margin to discontinue settlement building and
evacuate occupied Arab land, assuming she is serious about it; while Netanyahu
is explicitly hostile to it.
On the Hamas side, this is all excellent news. That Israel is obliterating what
remains of the Oslo process suits the movement just fine. The one unmistakable
victim of the Israeli election is the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, who
can now look forward to many more years of deadlock with Israel, as well as an
escalating effort by Hamas to discredit the Palestinian Liberation Organization,
and then eventually either replace it with a more amenable structure or hijack
the PLO itself.
Precisely how George Mitchell, the American envoy for the Middle East peace
process, will untie this knot of vipers is anyone's guess. Perhaps now, all
those who blamed George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice for not doing enough to
promote Palestinian-Israeli peace can understand why they were so lethargic.
Bush and Rice, chastened by their hubris of the years before, were modest about
what the United States could achieve. The domestic dynamics in Israeli and
Palestinian society did not permit a settlement, and Obama's aura, we must
suspect, will not make much difference.
Also delighted with the Israeli election results is Syria. As he surveys the
wasteland of Oslo, the president, Bashar Assad, sees his stock rising. We can
hear echoes of what will be the conventional wisdom in Washington these coming
weeks: "The Palestinian-Israeli track is blocked, so let's move ahead with
negotiations between Syria and Israel." The Syrians are sending out signals that
they would welcome being engaged by the US, but that this can only be effective
if the administration lifts the sanctions imposed under the Syria Accountability
Act (SAA). Syria would also like to be removed from the State Department's list
of terrorism sponsors, and has indicated that Damascus has no intention of
cutting its ties with Iran, Hizbullah or Hamas. These demands are opening
gambits, but Assad will try to milk US impatience when it comes to progress in
the region for all he's worth.
That's why it's urgent for the Obama administration to make public its new
policy toward Syria. The Syrian wish list is not one Assad is likely to soon
get. There even appears to be a continuing debate over whether to send an
American ambassador back to Damascus. The Syrian regime's scribes have valiantly
tried to generate good news by reporting that US-Syrian relations are
normalizing. Some, for example, have written that the State Department is
preparing to name Frederic Hof as the new ambassador to Syria. That appears to
be untrue. The regime is also spinning that the American decision to allow Syria
to buy spare parts for its two Boeing-747s is a sign that the SAA is collapsing.
Again, that is untrue, since the legislation allows the US to sell parts if
necessary to ensure the safety of flying.
But it's Lebanon where Syria's eye wanders most lustily. One writer, Sami
Moubayed, who accurately reflects the Assad regime's thinking, let the cat out
of the bag recently when he wrote that the Syrians "want to show the world -
mainly the US - that just as they can deliver on Palestine, they can deliver in
Iraq and Lebanon." He went on to quote the former US secretary of state, Warren
Christopher, to the effect that Syria "influenced the leaders of Hezbollah to
stop the conflicts with Israel in 1993 and 1996."
It is remarkable how the Syrians will refuse to constrain Hizbullah, while also
peddling themselves as potential adversaries of the party. To believe
Christopher's line, one would need to have been relieved of a memory. In 1993
and 1996 Syria didn't end the conflicts with Israel; it granted Hizbullah great
leeway to use its weapons, as it did later on, then bargained over the rising
number of Lebanese corpses to earn an advantageous deal - not coincidentally
with Warren Christopher himself, living proof that an old fool is someone who
will commend you for robbing him blind.
The Syrian messages on containing Hizbullah are not directed solely at the Obama
administration; they are being beamed toward the next Israeli prime minister as
well. Whether it is Livni or Netanyahu, the Syrians know that regional politics
abhor a vacuum, so that blockage on the Palestinian front or in discussions over
the Golan Heights might create openings between Syria and Israel over Lebanon.
That remains an American worry, and is why there are opponents of Syria in
Washington who nevertheless argue that an American presence at the table is
desirable, if only to prevent the Lebanese from turning into Syria's and
Israel's meal.
Since the region invites gastronomic terminology, in light of the Israeli
election results the Obama administration has its plate full in finding a way
through the inveterate stalemate of the region. Before long, it may conclude
that the pickings are so slim that Arabs and Israelis merit only last suppers.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR.
Are we helping Syria to fly the terrorist skies?
Tue, 02/10/2009 - 12:19pm
By Michael Singh
There have been news reports over the last day or two suggesting that, according
to the Syrian government, the United States has granted approval for the export
of spare parts to rehabilitate Boeing 747s owned by Damascus. By way of
background, any such export would require a license from the U.S. Department of
Commerce (for the relevant regulations on this issue, see here).
To the casual observer, the approval of spare parts for civilian aircraft might
seem unremarkable. Except, of course, for the fact that Syria serves as the
conduit for Iranian weapons bound for Hizballah in Lebanon, which is among the
reasons cited by the Commerce Department for restricting U.S. exports to
Damascus. These arms shipments provide Hizballah the capability to intimidate
Lebanese citizens and potentially destabilize the entire region.
Troublingly, there is a history of allegations that Iran and Syria have used
civilian transport for illicit arms shipments. Recall, for example, the 2007
case of a train in Turkey which, having been bombed by Kurdish guerillas, was
found to be carrying arms bound for Syria from Iran hidden among construction
materials. Or more recently, the case of the ship, also bound for Syria from
Iran, that was detained by Cypriot authorities and reportedly found to be
carrying cargo in violation of UN Security Council resolution 1747. Until the
Syrian government ends its provision of arms to terrorist groups like Hizballah,
it makes little sense for the United States to help Damascus maintain its
aircraft fleet.
How serious is the EU about supporting democracy and human
rights in Lebanon?
Thursday, February 12, 2009
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Working Papers
Editor's Note: This is the first part of a working paper by scholar Julia
Choucair Vizoso from the FRIDE think tank based in Madrid and published by ECFR.
The document provides a comprehensive overview of EU-Lebanon ties and comes up
with a series of recommendations on the various means by which the EU could
support democracy and human rights in Lebanon. The Daily Star will publish the
rest of the document on Thursday.
Europe is deeply involved in and affected by the situation in Lebanon. From the
European Union's perspective, Lebanon's security is vital for the security of
the entire Mediterranean region, which is judged to be producing increasingly
serious threats to the EU's own stability and strategic security. For Europe,
Lebanon is not only key to the Arab-Israeli conflict but also holds great
symbolic significance as a model of confessional coexistence in a region rife
with sectarian tension.
For almost four years, Lebanon has been in a crisis caused by the upsetting of
the political equilibrium in place since the end of the Lebanese civil war in
the early 1990s. The end of Syrian direct control over Lebanese politics
unleashed a political game of musical chairs in which local and regional players
have struggled to ensure that they hold the upper hand in the new consensus that
will govern Lebanon.
As feared by Lebanese citizens and predicted by many observers, the political
crisis eventually erupted in the worst internal fighting since the civil war.
The outbreak of violence in the second week of May 2008 forced politicians -
through Qatari-sponsored mediation - to return to dialogue to resolve the
18-month political impasse between the governing March 14th coalition and
opposition March 8th parties. The Doha Agreement of 21 May and the formation of
a national unity cabinet on 11 July have ended the immediate risk of further
violence. However, the underlying problems that prompted the crisis remain
unresolved and are likely to resurface in the lead up to the elections for
parliament in the spring of 2009.
The dynamics of this most recent crisis are not new to Lebanon. Due in large
part to the confessional political system, which mandates that political and
institutional Lebanese state. The EU has been unable to develop a coherent and
overarching strategy that addresses the real hurdles to political reform in
Lebanon. The EU's state building approach in Lebanon focuses on traditional
developmental and technical aid that does not address the main problems of state
capacity and state accountability. Also, there is a lack of systematic
coordination on assistance to Lebanon both between individual member states of
the European Union in their bilateral cooperation with Lebanon as well as
between member states and the European Commission.
Furthermore, European states have pursued traditional diplomatic mediation
approaches that do not attempt to coordinate with democracy assistance tools.
The Lebanese confessional system: flawed but entrenched Lebanon's political
system is one of the most complex in the Middle East. Based on the premise that
a careful balance in all aspects of political life must be maintained among the
seventeen recognised religious communities, this confessional system has given
Lebanon a semblance of democratic practice: regular elections, numerous
political parties, and news media that are relatively free and lively compared
with other Arab countries. At the same time, the distribution of power on a
confessional basis has prevented the emergence of a state, let alone a
democratic one.
All political and bureaucratic positions in Lebanon are allocated along
confessional lines. The institutionalisation of long established social,
cultural identities based on confessional and sectarian loyalties has resulted
in a collection of de facto mini-states responsible for all the needs of their
respective constituents rather than in a central authority capable and willing
to deliver basic services to citizens. Lebanon holds regular elections for the
parliament but it cannot be described as an electoral democracy. The sectarian
balancing act prevents the establishment of an electoral law that will guarantee
fair representation.
Electoral districts are blatantly gerrymandered before every election to ensure
the re-election of incumbent deputies and to result in weak coalitions of
independent candidates. The segmented political landscape and the absence of
national institutions render Lebanon ungovernable when there are political
disagreements among the leaders of the major communities. In the absence of a
central authority to arbitrate, political actors are involved in zero sum
negotiations where every compromise is seen as a threat to their existence. As a
result, systemic instability has haunted the country since independence,
surfacing in episodes of violence, the most significant of which was the
1975-1990 civil war. The confessional system also makes Lebanon particularly
vulnerable to the political and strategic battles of its difficult neighbourhood.
The fact that it is impossible for any one domestic force to generate sufficient
power to govern invites the disproportionate influence of outside actors, so
that different Lebanese factions appeal to different external actors for
financial and/or diplomatic assistance that can be translated into greater power
internally. Syria, like many foreign powers before it, was able to exploit the
weaknesses of the confessional system both during and after the Lebanese civil
war, ultimately becoming the main power broker in Lebanon. Many Lebanese
politicians acknowledge the flaws of the existing system and have paid lip
service to 'deconfessionalisation', that is abolishing power-sharing
arrangements that divide executive and legislative power into sectarian
allotments. The corrupt patronage system, however, has created vested interests
in perpetuating the status quo. The confessional system has also prevented the
emergence of powerful grassroots demands to change the system. The debate
surrounding electoral reform is perhaps the most telling example of the fact
that despite a realisation by the political elite that the current system is
inefficient and unrepresentative, the focus is always on short-term benefits or
concessions rather than structural change. The problems of Lebanon's election
law are widely acknowledged and an independent National Commission on Electoral
Law Reform was formed in August 2005 to identify needed revisions. The
commission submitted a draft law to the Council of Ministers on 1 June 2006 that
addressed the major flaws in electoral legislation. Following years of
squabbling over the details, politicians finally reached an agreement in May
2008 that made a passing reference to the draft legislation proposed by the
commission, but in fact ignored its key provisions.
Searching for a new modus vivendi: implications for political reform
The assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former prime minister, on 14 February
2005, and the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in April 2005
have shaken the local and regional equilibrium that governed Lebanon since the
end of the civil war. The end of Syrian tutelage over Lebanese politics
unleashed issues that were suppressed since the close of the civil war, ranging
from sectarian relations and the distribution of power to the question of
Hizbullah's arms and the status of armed Palestinian refugees.
The withdrawal of Syrian troops also reflected the end of the wider
international consensus that emerged at the end of the Lebanese civil war based
on the assumption that stability was the first priority in Lebanon and that
Syria could ensure this objective by keeping the fractious sectarian groups and
militant organizations in check. Beginning in 2000 regional developments
gradually eroded this international consensus.
As a result of the collapse of Israeli-Syrian negotiations, the death of the
Syrian president, Hafez al-Asad, Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon, the US
war in Iraq, and the ascendant power of Iran in the region, Lebanon is once
again at the heart of a strategic tug-of-war between the region's main players:
Iran, Syria, Israel, and the United States. The current situation in Lebanon
must therefore be understood against the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and the increasing tension in US-Syrian and US-Iranian relations.
The upsetting of the old local equilibrium coupled with the fierce regional and
international competition has pushed Lebanese politicians to adopt maximalist
positions, which does not bode well for a process of democratic political
reform. Within a year of the Syrian withdrawal, the disparate parties and
confessional groupings had coalesced into two rival camps. The March 14 group
(named after the largest of the protests in 2005 to demand Syrian withdrawal) is
composed primarily of Sunni, Druze, and Christian politicians and controls the
majority of seats in the parliament. It receives diplomatic support from the
United States, France, and key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and
Egypt. Its main goal is to contain Syrian ambitions and, more specifically, to
ensure the implementation of a UN resolution to establish a tribunal to try
suspects in the al-Hariri assassination. The March 8 group (named after the
largest Hizbullah-led protest in 2005) brought together the two Shia parties (Hizbullah
and Amal) with the Maronite Free Patriotic Movement led by Michel Aoun. The
March 8 group denies the legitimacy of the March 14 coalition as the governing
majority, claiming its actions have been unconstitutional.
The March 8 group's international patrons are Iran and Syria, with Damascus
providing political and material assistance and, in Hizbullah's case, military
supplies.
Both groups believe that Lebanon's identity and its future relations with its
neighbours and international actors are at stake in the current tug-of-war:
March 14 strives to prevent further involvement in regional conflict and accuses
Hizbullah of being subservient to Syria and Iran; March 8 accused March 14 of
working for US and Israeli interests.
In a very worrying trend, the conflict has been acquiring greater sectarian
overtones.
The confrontation between the two blocs was exacerbated by a wave of
assassinations of politicians and journalists belonging to the March 14 group
that began in late 2004.
In 2007, a series of car bombs also began targeting civilians and commercial
neighborhoods in and around Beirut. The devastating 34-day war launched by
Israel on Lebanon in summer 2006, after Hizbullah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers
and killed three others, further exacerbated the political divide and renewed
sectarian anxiety. It also ended the attempt by Lebanese politicians to find
through negotiations compromise solutions for the major issues that divided the
two camps. The standoff between the political groups virtually paralysed the
institutions of the Lebanese state.
The outbreak of violence in May 2008 - the worst internal fighting since the end
of the civil war - demonstrated the extent to which the parties perceive the
conflict as an existential one, one that was threatening their very existence as
parties and communities of influence. A government decision on 6 May to reassign
the head of Airport Security at Beirut International Airport and to investigate
and dismantle a separate telecommunications network run and controlled by
Hizbullah triggered violent clashes in which fighting units of Hizbullah and
Amal attacked and overran positions defended by armed supporters of the
government.
The Qatari-mediated Doha agreement of 21 May has averted further violence by
filling the institutional vacuum.
The parties agreed to elect Michel Sleiman, the former commander-in-chief of the
army, as president thus ending the six-month presidential vacuum. They also
formed a unity government on 11 July, in which the governing majority has 16
seats and the opposition got their long-standing demand of 11 cabinet seats -
which guarantees them veto power. The new president nominated the remaining
three ministers.
The situation, however, remains very volatile since the local and regional
triggers discussed above are still firmly in place. Furthermore, Hizbullah's use
of its arms internally has intensified communal animosity and provided fertile
ground for radicalization and rearmament among other factions in Lebanon. The
tension between the two camps in Lebanon continues to threaten domestic
stability and undermine the chances of political reform. Debates about political
and economic reform, which already had a slim chance of leading to significant
change in the first place, have now been completely undermined by shortterm
tactical considerations as the various political forces struggle to obtain and
retain the upper hand in the new balance of power.
The role of European states in the latest crisis has highlighted the centrality
of Lebanon's stability for Europe's interests. From Europe's perspective,
Lebanon's security is vital for the security of the entire Mediterranean region
and therefore preventing the disintegration of the Lebanese political system is
a priority. To achieve this objective, the focus has been primarily on
diplomatic activity aimed at mediating between internal and regional forces.
Europe's diplomatic power: strengths and limitations
The European Union's diplomatic record throughout Lebanon's recent crisis has
highlighted its strengths and weaknesses as a strategic player not just in
Lebanon, but also in the Middle East in general. A discussion of European
diplomatic activity has to begin with the separate foreign policies of the EU
member states most involved in Lebanon.
Despite converging interests and greater coordination between their activities,
European states continue to operate based on their own considerations.
France
France's historic ties with Lebanon (Lebanon was governed by France as a League
of Nations mandate between 1919 and 1943) have placed it at the forefront of
European diplomatic activity. French policy since the end of the Lebanese civil
war has focused primarily on maintaining special relations with Lebanon and
avoiding instability. In light of this objective, France acquiesced to Syrian
military presence in Lebanon based on the assumption that Syria would restore
public order by keeping the fractious sectarian groups and militant
organisations in check. At the same time, France was always keen to maintain its
influence in both countries.
Former French president Jacques Chirac had particularly close ties to Lebanon
due to his personal relationship with Lebanon's former Prime Minister, Rafik
Hariri. With Bashar al-Asad's succession in Syria in 2000, France also increased
its contacts with Syria and involved itself in the new process of administrative
reform in the country.
By 2004, France had started to lose confidence both in Syria's stabilising role
in Lebanon as well as in the Syrian government's willingness to deliver economic
and administrative reform. Syria's brazen interference with the Lebanese
political system to keep former president Emile Lahoud in office - coupled with
Chirac's growing disenchantment with Bashar al-Asad - exacerbated French
concerns and ultimately led France to join the United States as co-sponsor of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (September 2, 2004) calling for
the withdrawal of "all remaining foreign forces," understood to mean Syria, from
Lebanon. The resolution also called for the "disbanding and disarmament of all
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias," a clear allusion to Hizbullah. According to
French officials, this clause went against French preferences of not alienating
the movement but was included upon US insistence.
Following Hariri's assassination, France suspended relations with Syria and
strongly backed the establishment of an international tribunal to investigate
the murder. As the Lebanese political scene grew increasingly polarised, France
also provided strong diplomatic support to the March 14 coalition.
The ElysŽe was also very active in pushing for a cease- fire agreement between
Israel and Hizbullah following the summer 2006 war and France helped draft the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 which was unanimously adopted on
11 August 2006. France committed 2,000 troops to the reinforced UN Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission.
French policy toward Lebanon under President Nicolas Sarkozy has experienced
some changes in its style.
Firstly, in marked contrast to Chirac's mandate, Sarkozy has made an effort to
depersonalise relations between French and Lebanese politicians. For example, in
his first visit to Lebanon, Sarkozy led a delegation of French ministers and the
leaders of France's major political parties to Lebanon, becoming the first
Western head of state to 10 Chirac invited Bashar al-Asad to make a state visit
to France in June 2001, dispatched trusted advisers to help steer administrative
modernisation, and sent a close aide (Jean-FranŤois Girault, a former
presidential adviser) as ambassador to Syria.
According to Sarkozy, the decision to bring such a large and diverse delegation
for the occasion was intended to show that "France's solidarity with the
Lebanese people and our country's commitment to Lebanon's independence and
sovereignty have nothing to do with parties, or individuals."
Secondly, French policy under Sarkozy has adopted a more conciliatory position
towards the "March 8" group than under Chirac in the hope of creating an
environment more conducive to the resolution of the gridlock. This has been
accompanied by a much more vigorous shuttle diplomacy approach. Soon after his
election, Sarkozy sent a high-level envoy to Lebanon to restart the frozen
dialogue between the parties and invited all the Lebanese factions involved in
the national dialogue to an inter-Lebanese meeting at Celle Saint-Cloud in
France in July 2007.
Thirdly, France has made considerable diplomatic investment in restoring
high-level ties with Syria since Sarkozy's accession in May 2007. After a highly
publicised initial attempt by France's foreign minister Bernard Kouchner to
enlist Syrian support failed to push forward a resolution to the Lebanese
crisis, Sarkozy announced he would freeze relations with Syria and would only
renew them if Damascus collaborated in diffusing the Lebanese crisis. Soon after
the election of a new president in Lebanon, France moved to restore high-level
contacts with Syria, sending two senior envoys - Jean-David Levitte and Claude
GuŽant - to meet with Bashar al-Asad in Damascus on 15 June 2008. These efforts
culminated in a very public and symbolic trip by al-Asad to Paris to attend the
summit for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean and join in
Bastille Day celebrations on 12-14 July 2008.
At the summit, Sarkozy announced that Syria and Lebanon would open embassies in
both countries, a very significant development given Syria's resistance to fully
normalising relations with Lebanon. Such a normalisation would entail exchanging
embassies, but more importantly, demarcating the border between Syria and
Lebanon. Sarkozy also called for reviving efforts to negotiate the EU-Syria
association agreement.
Despite the changes in style from Chirac to Sarkozy, French policy guidelines in
Lebanon remain the same: promoting internal dialogue to avoid instability in
Lebanon, and ensuring that Syria's grip on Lebanon does not derail French
influence in the country. It can be said that Sarkozy has tried to send the
message to Syria that his approach is different from that of Chirac, but that he
still has firm conditions for engagement. France has also continued to
collaborate with the United States on Lebanon policy and both countries have
strived to portray an image of harmonised policy decisions.
Other European member states have historically been less involved than France in
the internal politics of Lebanon and view the country primarily through the lens
of broader regional interests. Efforts in this context have focused on an
attempt to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process.
Germany
Germany is vested in maintaining stability in Lebanon due to a concern that
conflicts in the region could have an impact on European security and due to its
sense of historical responsibility for Israel's existence and security.
Under the leadership of Angela Merkel, German chancellor since November 2005,
the German government declared the Middle East conflict to be one of its top
priorities.
The German presidency of the EU (from January to June 2007) had three main goals
for its Middle East policy: to revive the Middle East Quartet, to stabilize
Lebanon, and to achieve progress towards a comprehensive peace settlement.
Following the 2006 war, Lebanon became one of four large-scale missions with a
long-term orientation for the German government. German sensitivities to the
potential danger of German troops clashing with Israeli soldiers limited
Germany's involvement in UNIFIL (which began on 15 October 2006) to commanding
the Maritime Task Force (MTF) along the coast of Lebanon, whose task, in
conjunction with the Lebanese navy, is to prevent arms smuggling at the
country's maritime borders.
On 29 February 2008 Germany handed over the command of the MTF to the European
Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) that is currently led by Italy. Germany has also
taken the lead in assisting the Lebanese government in controlling the land
border with Syria to curb cross-border smuggling and illegal arms trade.
The project focuses on providing technical support and training to Lebanese
security forces and is managed by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior
and the Federal Foreign Office in collaboration with Denmark, the United
Kingdom, and the United States with funds from the European Commission.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Germany has also been carrying out a key role
in the realization of indirect talks on the exchange of prisoners and remains
between Israel and Hizbullah. Most recently, Germany helped mediate a deal on 16
July in which Hizbullah exchanged the bodies of two Israeli soldiers captured in
July 2006 in return for five Lebanese prisoners and the remains of 200 Lebanese
and Palestinian fighters.
Italy
Italy's involvement in Lebanon has reflected the shifts in its policy toward the
southern Mediterranean in general, which has been characterised by a trend
whereby centre-left governments have favoured relations with the EU whereas
centre-right governments have favoured developing closer ties with the United
States. In this context, Italy's increased involvement following the 2006 war
reflected the eagerness of Romano Prodi's centre-left government (elected in
April 2006) to cooperate with other EU members to reinforce a European foreign
policy and depart from the "Atlanticism" of the Berlusconi era. Engagement in
Lebanon presented Italy with a window of opportunity to take the lead in
bolstering European efforts to revive the Middle East peace process and more
broadly to inject momentum into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Italy
was very active in trying to end the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon and
hosted a conference in Rome on 26 July 2006 to discuss how to bring an end to
the conflict and to pledge future support for Lebanon's reconstruction. Italy
also pushed to enlarge the UNIFIL presence in South Lebanon and contributed the
largest contingent with 2,450 troops.
Since Silvio Berlusconi's re-election in April 2008, statements both by
Berlusconi and the Italian foreign minister, Franco Frattini, have reflected a
harder stance on the issue of Hizbullah's disarmament. Berlusconi pledged to
maintain Italian troops as part of UNIFIL, but alluded to the need to revise the
rules of engagement for UNIFIL soldiers. Frattini formulated these demands
initially, but in mid-June 2008 stated that for the moment, it was not possible
to rework UNIFIL's rules of engagement given the situation in the country but
that the rules of engagement in their current form, if fully applied, would
suffice. In an 8 July visit to Israel, Frattini also expressed Italy's
willingness to mediate in direct peace negotiations between Israel and Lebanon.
Spain
Spanish policy toward Lebanon has been framed within its policy toward the
Arab-Israeli conflict and by its leading role in the Barcelona Process: Union
for the Mediterranean.
In this context, involvement in Lebanon gives Spain the opportunity to be more
involved both in the Middle East as well as within Europe. As in the case of
Italy, the change in leadership in Spain has also increased Spanish activity in
Lebanon. Spanish foreign minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos (who assumed his post
in March 2004), has a history of involvement in the Middle East peace process
and a personal conviction that Spain should be more involved in the region. The
numerous visits by Moratinos to Lebanon and Syria during the summer 2006 war and
subsequent visits aimed at getting the Lebanese parties to agree on a new
president, indicate a clear decision by the Spanish government to be involved in
the crucial political moments in Lebanon. The Spanish contribution to UNIFIL
(1,100 troops) has also raised the stakes for Spanish policy in the country.
Strengths and limits of European
diplomacy in Lebanon
European states' diplomatic record in Lebanon shows that Europe can play an
important and constructive role in mitigating conflict, primarily by convincing
domestic actors to step back from the brink and therefore avoid the
disintegration of order. Unlike other foreign powers with interests in Lebanon,
Europe has exhibited a conciliatory approach based on a consensus around the
notion that Lebanon cannot be governed without the agreement of its principal
political coalitions and, therefore, that Europe must actively pursue the role
of mediator. This common approach was expressed most clearly through the
coordinated visits to Lebanon of the foreign ministers of France, Spain, and
Italy (Bernard Kouchner, Miguel Angel Moratinos, and Massimo D'Alema) in October
and November 2007. Joint European involvement in UNIFIL has also increased the
leverage of the EU in preventing a new violent conflict on Lebanon's southern
border.
EU member states have also adopted a nuanced approach to the question of
Hizbullah's arms. While acknowledging that the existence of an armed militia
independent of the government is an obstacle to democratic reform in any
country, European states have for the most part demonstrated acceptance of the
fact that the debate over Hizbullah's status is very complex because it is not
limited to the Lebanese context. Most European governments perceive that since
its establishment in 1982, Hizbullah has become a multifaceted organization that
is a political party, a vast social welfare network, and a regional movement and
militia allied with Syria and Iran to deter US and Israel's ambitions in the
region. Given this reality, European states accept the fact that barring a
breakthrough in the Arab- Israeli conflict, the prospects of the group's
disarmament remain very distant. This is accompanied by a belief that the
disarmament of Hizbullah can only be done in a cooperative and gradual manner,
in full consultation with Hizbullah itself. As such, European states have
preferred to engage the group and make efforts to reduce or contain the
likelihood of Hizbullah using its large military potential - an approach that
has given Europe a fair degree of diplomatic leverage.
For example, Germany is interested in maintaining its rather unique role as a
successful mediator in prisoner swaps between Hizbullah and Israel.
In light of these considerations, most European governments have resisted
including Hizbullah on the list of terrorist organisations despite the fact that
in March 2005 the European parliament branded Hizbullah as a terrorist
organisation and urged EU governments to place the group on their terrorist
blacklists. France, Spain, and Italy have been particularly opposed to this
designation.
The Netherlands, on the other hand, included Hizbullah in its terrorism list in
2004. The British government added the military wing of Hizbullah to a list of
terrorist groups banned in the United Kingdom on 2 July 2008. While these
positions have helped European efforts at mediation, the recent crisis has
highlighted the extent to which Europe is limited in its ability to bring about
a sustainable solution. Europe has limited influence on the likelihood of a
comprehensive regional, political, and diplomatic agreement between the United
States, Iran, and Syria that would address all issues of regional concerns. Such
an agreement would allow efforts at stabilization to occur in a less explosive
environment.
Despite the convergence of some member states' policies in Lebanon, deep
disagreements among European states continue to impede a unified European
policy. This was demonstrated most visibly in European states' response to the
summer 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon.
While the large majority of the EU's 25 states called for an immediate
cease-fire, the United Kingdom mirrored US policy, insisting that it would be
futile to demand an end to the fighting until the "necessary conditions for a
durable, sustainable ceasefire that would prevent a return to the status quo
ante" were present.20 The EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy Javier Solana visited Lebanon at the height of the conflict but
he was not given a mandate by the Finnish EU presidency to speak on behalf of
the 25 member states, as recommended by Jacques Chirac. At the end of the
crisis, Chirac explicitly expressed his concern that the European Union was
insufficiently active in the crisis and that its slow reaction to stop the
destruction of Lebanon highlighted the weaknesses of the EU's foreign policy. In
addition to vigorous diplomatic activity, the European Union's policy for
stabilising Lebanon has relied on significant financial aid, allocated both at
the multilateral level (mainly through EU institutions) as well as bilaterally
through the individual member states.