LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
January 25/09


Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 6,39-42. And he told them a parable, "Can a blind person guide a blind person? Will not both fall into a pit? No disciple is superior to the teacher; but when fully trained, every disciple will be like his teacher. Why do you notice the splinter in your brother's eye, but do not perceive the wooden beam in your own? How can you say to your brother, 'Brother, let me remove that splinter in your eye,' when you do not even notice the wooden beam in your own eye? You hypocrite! Remove the wooden beam from your eye first; then you will see clearly to remove the splinter in your brother's eye.

Saint Cyril of Alexandria (380-444), Bishop, Doctor of the Church
Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, 6; PG 72, 601 (©Friends of Henry Ashworth)
The well trained disciple will be like his master

The blessed disciples were to be the spiritual guides and teachers of the whole world. It had therefore to be dearly seen by all that they held fast to the true faith. It was essential for them to be familiar with the gospel way of life, skilled in every good work, and to give teaching that was precise, salutary, and scrupulously faithful to the truth they themselves had long pondered, enlightened by the divine radiance. Otherwise they would be blind leaders of the blind. Those imprisoned in the darkness of ignorance can never lead others in the same sorry state to knowledge of the truth. Should they try, both would fall headlong into the ditch of the passions. To destroy the ostentatious passion of boastfulness and stop people from trying to win greater honor than their teachers, Christ declared: «The disciple is not above his teacher.» Even if some should advance so far as to equal their teachers in holiness, they ought to remain within the limits set by them, and follow their example. Paul also taught this when he said: «Be imitators of me as I am of Christ,» (1Cor 11,1). So then, if the Master does not judge, why are you judging? He came not to judge the world (Jn 12,47), but to take pity on it. What he is saying, then, is this: "If I do not pass judgment, neither must you, my disciple. You may be even more guilty of the faults of which you accuse another... «Why do you look for the speck in your brother's eye?»


Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Syria will be first rogue state to get Barack Obama charm offensive-By Tim Shipman/Telegraph.co.uk  24/01/09
Gaza versus Lebanon: What a difference for Harper. By: NORMAN SPECTOR/Globe and Mail 24/01/09
A Second Chance for Syria-By: Hassan Haidar/Dar Al-Hayat 24/01/09
Islamic Terrorists Forming Cells In America-Evening Bulletin 24/01/09
Iran bolstered by survival of Hamas allies in Gaza-Reuters 24/01/09

The IDF model that failed in Lebanon succeeded in Gaza.By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff/ Ha'aretz  24/01/09
Obama's New Middle East Envoy.By: David Bedein Front Page com 24/01/09
The Countdown Has Begun.By: Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed/24/01/09

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for January 24/09
Sfeir: Centrist Bloc Not Directed against Aoun-Naharnet
Syria Congratulates Hamas On Gaza "Victory"-CBS News
Saniora Urges Lebanese to Support Gazans in 'Any Way Possible'-Naharnet
Nahr al-Bared Allegedly Rejects Military Bases-Naharnet
Gaza schools open but young minds closed to peace-International Herald Tribune
Jumblat-Nasrallah Meeting Ruled Out-Naharnet
Hariri: Consolidating Arab Ranks Prevents Iranian Intervention-Naharnet
Nahr al-Bared Allegedly Rejects Military Bases-Naharnet
Franjieh Accuses Saudi, Egypt of seeking to Finish Off Lebanon's Christians-Naharnet
International Tribunal to be Launched March 1, No Specific Charges Made Yet-Naharnet
Gen. Qahwaji: Army Ready to Confront Israeli Aggression-Naharnet
Cabinet Authorizes Murr to discuss Border Control with Syria-Naharnet
Sources: US searched suspected arms-smuggling ship-The Associated Press
How Obama can use narcotics enforcement to fight terrorism-New Republic

Sfeir: Centrist Bloc Not Directed against Aoun
Naharnet/Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir said Saturday that a centrist parliamentary bloc is "not directed against Gen. Michel Aoun."
He said the centrist bloc is not limited to Christian sects. "It exists in all sects."
Sfeir hoped upon his return from Cairo on Saturday that Lebanese political leaders at the national dialogue "would agree in order to get the country out this cycle."
He also hoped that peace and stability would prevail.
The patriarch headed to Egypt on Thursday to represent Pope Benedict XVI at the burial of former head of the Coptic Catholic Church in Egypt, Cardinal Stephanos II Ghattas.Sfeir had said that a centrist parliamentary bloc tips the balance between right and left. Beirut, 24 Jan 09, 19:33

Naharnet/Saniora Urges Lebanese to Support Gazans in 'Any Way Possible'
Naharnet/Prime Minsiter Fouad Saniora on Saturday urged Lebanese citizens to support the people of Gaza in "any way possible.""I call on the Lebanese to support the Palestinian brethren in Gaza in any way possible and according to the individual's capability," Saniora said during a Day of Solidarity with Gaza. He also pleged to exert efforts to ensure the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland. On the 22-day war on Gaza, Saniora said: "The question that presents itself: Was the problem in Gaza solved? Was the will of the Palestinian people eradicated? Was there any progress toward a settlement?""The Israeli enemy did not learn lessons from the past that violence brings violence," Saniora said, adding that the biggest favor that could be done to Israel is a Palestinian split. Beirut, 24 Jan 09, 16:30

Nahr al-Bared Allegedly Rejects Military Bases
Naharnet/A Letter allegedly signed by "citizens of Nahr al-Bared camp" on Saturday rejected government plans to construct military bases for the Lebanese army in the northern refugee shanty town. The letter, published by the as-Safir and al-Akhbar dailies, did not include any signatures, however.
It also said security for the refugee camp "cannot be achieved by building naval and military bases." The alleged letter also criticized fencing in the camp, because it "isolates us from our environs and affects trading with our neighbors." Beirut, 24 Jan 09, 14:39

Hariri: Consolidating Arab Ranks Prevents Iranian Intervention
Naharnet/Mustaqbal Movement leader Saad Hariri said consolidating Arab ranks would prevent Iran from interfering in Pan-Arab affairs with the aim of splitting the Arabs. "We are involved in several confrontations and Lebanon is the first line of Defense," Hariri told representatives of partisans living overseas.
"The forthcoming elections in Lebanon also are the first line in defense of Lebanon, the Arabs, Arab belonging, the Palestine cause, Cedar revolution martyrs, martyrs of the 2006 aggression and Gaza martyrs," Hariri noted. The forthcoming general elections, scheduled for June, 8 are of "crucial" nature, Hariri stressed.
Iran, he added, is behind the split of Arabs, but Saudi Monarch King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz "thwarted" such an attempt at the Kuwait summit, Hariri added.
The Syrians withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005 because of the pressure exerted by Lebanese patriots after the Feb. 14 assassination of ex-Premier Rafik
Hariri, The Mustaqbal Movement leader Recalled. "They wouldn't return. I stress, They wouldn't return," he concluded. Beirut, 24 Jan 09, 13:32

Nahr al-Bared Allegedly Rejects Military Bases

Naharnet/A Letter allegedly signed by "citizens of Nahr al-Bared camp" on Saturday rejected government plans to construct military bases for the Lebanese army in the northern refugee shanty town. The letter, published by the as-Safir and al-Akhbar dailies, did not include any signatures, however. It also said security for the refugee camp "cannot be achieved by building naval and military bases." The alleged letter also criticized fencing in the camp, because it "isolates us from our environs and affects trading with our neighbors." Beirut, 24 Jan 09, 14:39

Franjieh Accuses Saudi, Egypt of seeking to Finish Off Lebanon's Christians
Marada Movement leader Suleiman Franjieh accused the Hariri Clan of implementing a Saudi-Egyptian agenda in Lebanon to "finish off the role of Christians in Lebanon." Franjieh, in an interview with Hizbullah's al-Manar TV, also said the address by Saudi Monarch King Abdul Aziz at the Kuwait summit was "positive, but (Syrian) President Bashar Assad would not change his convictions." "Syria's convictions certainly include supporting the resistance and working for a thorough, just and honorable peace," he added. Franjieh also launched a vehement attack on neutral candidates, saying those who support them are "collaborators."
He claimed that all neutral candidates "belong to March 14."Franjieh also said the March 8 coalition is considering nominating one of the jailed generals in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, but did not disclose further details. Beirut, 23 Jan 09, 22:28

Cabinet Authorizes Murr to discuss Border Control with Syria
Naharnet/The Lebanese Government on Friday authorized Defense Minister Elias Murr to visit Damascus for talks with his Syrian counterpart on border control and combating smuggling. Interior Minister Ziad Baroud also informed the cabinet, which convened at the Baabda Palace under President Michel Suleiman, that he has received a message informing him that the Syrian cabinet has approved the forming of a joint follow-up committee with Lebanon as agreed during his latest visit to Damascus. President Suleiman informed the cabinet that he intends to visit Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates on Feb. 9-10 and Premier Fouad Saniora expressed his intention to visit Morocco on Feb. 15 for talks on bilateral relations. The cabinet also decided to maintain the present fees for power services as well as its Gasoline Tax, set at 9,600 pounds per 20 liters. Beirut, 24 Jan 09, 12:42

Jumblat-Nasrallah Meeting Ruled Out
Naharnet/Minister without portfolio Wael Abu Faour ruled out the possibility of a meeting between progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat and Hizbullah chief Hassan Nasrallah. Abu Faour told al-Sharq al-Awsat pan-Arab daily "such a meeting has not been proposed, either by the PSP or Hizbullah." He said the recent meeting between Jumblat and the head of Hizbulah's parliamentary Bloc Mohammed Raad "focused mainly on security topics." The talks also covered political developments and "controversial issues, such as relations with Syria," Abu Faour added. Jumblat, according to Abu Faour, recalled during the talks with Raad "that Americans and Britons landed in France and helped the French resistance in liberating their country during World War II." "What has Syria done to help the resistance?" Abu Faour quoted Jumblat as asking. Beirut, 24 Jan 09, 11:59

International Tribunal to be Launched March 1, No Specific Charges Made Yet
The Registrar of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Robin Vincent has said no one has been charged yet in the assassination of ex-Premier Rafik Hariri, stressing that the court would start operating on March 1. "No specific charges against any person have been made yet," Vincent told a gathering at the (Beit al Muhami) Attorney's Home in Beirut on Thursday evening via a live close circuit televised address. The meeting was attended by Interior Minister Ziad Baroud, Head of the State Consultative Council Judge Shukri Sader, former minister Elias Hanna, British Ambassador Frances Guy, Head of the Beirut Bar Association Ramzi Jreij and others.
"Court logistics preparations at the Hague are still ongoing," Vincent said. He added that investigations into the Hariri crime would continue throughout 2009.
He explained that an agreement was signed with the Dutch government for the court to have its headquarters in The Hague. The tribunal will start operations on Sunday March 1, he said. "On that date, Special Commissioner Daniel Bellemare becomes an international prosecutor. He and his team would gradually move from Lebanon to the Hague," Vincent said. He added that once Bellemare is in the Hague, a special meeting would be held to establish the rules, governing procedures and proof, adding that this would be completed at the appropriate time, while respecting the specified time schedule for placing information systems.
Vincent assured his audience "the tribunal will be clear and transparent, meaning every citizen has the right to learn about the tribunal's progress."
From 2002 to 2005, Vincent served as Registrar of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Since then, his work has included temporary service as Deputy Registrar of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and advising on the establishment of other international tribunals, including the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Judge Sader said the tribunal's mission is to uncover all international terror cases in Lebanon and not just that of Hariri.
"This means uncovering all assassination crimes from the attempt on Marwan Hamadeh to that of Gebran Tueni," Sader said, adding that all victims are equal in the eyes of the international community. "The tribunal also has the power to look for possible future terror attacks that could take place following the court's establishment," Sader said. He explained that the Security Council adopted the tribunal under Article 7 of the U.N. Charter to avoid going through the Lebanese parliament "out of respect for Lebanon." U.N. Secretary-General at the time Kofi Annan and his legal assistant Nicolas Michel both failed to obtain the approval of the Lebanese parliament, he said. He pointed to one issue that will need to be cleared under article seven, that the court does not have the right to force a third party to cooperate in the case. Beirut, 23 Jan 09, 10:15

Gen. Qahwaji: Army Ready to Confront Israeli Aggression
Naharnet/Army Commander Gen. Jean Qahwaji on Friday said the regular force is "fully prepared to confront Israeli aggression on Lebanon."
Qahwaji told foreign military attaches accredited to Lebanon the army also is ready to provide security for the forthcoming parliamentary elections "so that all citizens would be able to freely express their opinions." He also called for commitment to UNSCR 1701 and the need to prevent attempts to destabilize the southern border region. Beirut, 23 Jan 09, 19:30

MTV Makes a Comeback
MTV network would appear on the screen after more than seven years of interruption by a court order issued during Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.
Veteran TV journalist Walid Abboud would head MTV's news department. Abboud, who has resigned his current post with LBC, told Naharnet MTV would appear on the air soon, making a comeback after it was closed by a court order on Sept.4, 2002. The verdict that ordered MTV closure was described by opponents of Syria's dominance as "politically motivated."Abboud said he would also have his own talk show on MTV screen in addition to managing the news department.
MTV managers would hold a press conference next week to declare the network's comeback plans, according to Abboud. Beirut, 23 Jan 09, 19:05

Middle East Conflicts Cost 12 Trillion Dollars
Naharnet/Countries hit by conflicts in the Middle East have lost 12 trillion dollars over two decades through squandered development and livelihoods, said a new study launched Friday. Presented as the first dispassionate attempt to quantify the impact of conflicts in the region, it was immediately endorsed by several countries that have acted as peace brokers in the region, including Norway and Switzerland.
The report, by the India-based Strategic Foresight Group, revealed a massive price tag for all sides since 1991 due to the destruction wrought by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, strife in Lebanon and the US invasion of Iraq. But it also underlined the equally huge potential of a comprehensive peace for countries and territories in the region and their inhabitants, predicting that it would unleash growth from the Mediterranean deep into the Gulf.
Sundeep Waslekar, who headed the study with experts from the regions concerned, said individual incomes for Israelis and Palestinians were half what they would be if peace had been accomplished at the Madrid conference in 1991. For Iraqis, per capita incomes had been cut to one third over the same period, he added.
In the event of peace, an average Israeli family would increase its income by 4,429 dollars per year in 2010 even if Israel paid compensation to Palestinian refugees and moved more than 150,000 settlers out of the West Bank, according to the report.
The income of Palestinian territories would more than double even if they remained in their current shape and the study suggested roughly equal gains to be had on both sides of the fence. Unveiling the report at the United Nations offices here, Waslekar said the choice was fundamentally down to one between continued "devastation" and a peace accord. "If they don't make the choice the cost will continue to mount," he underlined.
Even countries on the periphery could gain, said the study, positing a rise in household incomes in Jordan, which houses hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees, of 1,250 dollars. But the study also highlighted the massive cost of the US invasion in Iraq and its aftermath.
Without the conflict and sanctions, Iraq's national income would have been more than 38 times larger, at 2.2 trillion dollars, it estimated.
The study has already received official backing from Norway, Qatar, Switzerland and Turkey. Swiss foreign ministry official Thomas Greminger said they hoped it would encourage the public and leaders in the Middle East to reflect on "how much they have lost" and on "how much more they could lose."
"The report gives further ground for international actors on why they should intensify their actions for peace in the Middle East," he added.
British politician John Alderdice, one of the backers of the study, described the findings as "truly eye watering."
Alderdice, who was active in the peace process in Northern Ireland, stressed that it sought to address one half of the peace incentive: warring parties sought a settlement when each realised they couldn't win and the costs were too great. However, Waslekar underlined that the exercise also had limitations.
"There are costs you can't measure - like the cost in human dignity," he pointed out.(AFP) Beirut, 23 Jan 09, 22:12

A Second Chance for Syria
Hassan Haidar/ Al-Hayat - 23/01/09//
The reconciliation initiative put forth by Saudi Arabia at the Kuwait summit was not merely prompted by the horrific events of Gaza, but also by a clear political conviction that priority should be given to the most important, rather than the important. The Kingdom became aware that the Israeli military monopoly on the Gaza inhabitants would not have been so brutal if Arabs hadn't been divided. It considered that a minimum level of Arab consensus is necessary in order to reflect on Palestinians and restore a minimum level of unity between them - especially with the coming of a new US administration and the potential revival of the peace process in the region. Hence, there were no more reservations about dealing with Syria, so that it would not monopolize either - after having lost on more than one "front" - or make a hasty response.
Damascus, which constitutes almost on its own the Arab "opposition axis", and shares with Tehran the cards of Hamas and Hezbollah, seemed to be, during and after the Gaza war, weaker than before and prone to more isolation - particularly since it decided to freeze its indirect negotiations with Israel, which constituted at a certain time a reason for breaking Europe's (especially France's) boycott.
Syria's alliance with Iran did not allow it to successfully play Hamas' card, and the two allies' stances were clearly divergent. Whereas Syrians wanted to open the Lebanese front, even if on a limited basis, in order to relieve the Palestinian Islamic movement, Iranians considered that the "Lebanese internal scene" is more important. Indeed, for them, priority must be given to the electoral battle that will be waged and maybe won, by the Lebanese Hezbollah-led opposition in a few months. Iranian envoy to Damascus and Beirut Ali Larijani declared that the opening of a front in South Lebanon would assuredly reflect negatively on Hezbollah's penetration of the Christian ranks and distance Michel Aoun's supporters. This was further explained by the declaration of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about Hamas not needing military support, when he forbade Iranian enthusiasts from going to fight in Gaza, saying that "nothing can be done in this regard."
The second Syrian weak point appeared in the failure to provide quorum for the emergency Doha summit and its replacement with the "Gaza meeting", then in Lebanon's stance during this meeting. Despite the fact that President Michel Sleiman was among the first who approved the summit, he linked his participation to meeting the quorum, or else negotiations would be sufficient. This was not to the liking of Damascus, and its allies protested against him in their demonstrations to support Gaza. Their media also criticized this stance, but it did not affect the Lebanese President's determination to take a completely opposing stance to that of Damascus, when he expressed reservations about the clause of rejecting the Arab initiative and preventing the slipping of his country into one of the two Arab axes.
The Lebanese stance has also another dimension, with the impending start of the works of the international tribunal on Hariri's assassination, and the assurance of UN Secretary General, during his visit to Beirut a few days ago, that this mechanism has been launched and cannot be stopped. This is also supposed to be a source of concern for Syria.
As for the war on Gaza itself, and despite the fact that the Israeli aggression was premeditated, planned and merely waiting for a pretext, it is clear that Hamas, then Damascus were guilty of miscalculation. This was revealed by the movement's politburo head Khaled Meshal, when he declared that he had been expecting a "swift victory" on Israel within a few days. Damascus, on the other hand, was expecting a "swift victory" on Egypt, which it did not obtain, despite Hezbollah's calls to the Egyptian people and army to "rebel". On the contrary, Egypt grew stronger after the campaign against it and was able to gather, in Sharm el Sheikh, the leaders of Europe, who had already changed their stance towards Syria. Sakozy himself told his politicians that when he contacted Damascus for pushing it to pressure Hamas into accepting the ceasefire, he concluded that its main concern was to "weaken Egypt".
Hence, Syria came to the Kuwait summit "weakened", and Saudi Arabia gave it a second chance to return to the rank of Arab unity, despite some Egyptian reservations. Will it take advantage of this or go back to moving cards and allies? Perhaps, what took place at the meeting of foreign ministers in Kuwait after the reconciliation is not very promising

Gaza versus Lebanon: What a difference for Harper
NORMAN SPECTOR

From Monday's Globe and Mail
January 24, 2009
From the onset of Israel's attack on Gaza, it was clear that the country's military had drawn important lessons from the disastrous faceoff against Hezbollah in 2006. More remarkably, for most of the three-week campaign against Hamas, Israel's leaders managed the inherent dysfunctions of coalition government, and were even able to subsume the stench of corruption that surrounds a good part of the political class.
In Canada, Prime Minister Stephen Harper, having drawn lessons from his own experience during the Lebanon conflict, also had a better war this time around - certainly better than the mauling he's taken in Parliament and public opinion. In particular, he now seems to understand that, when it comes to the Middle East - a region peripheral to Canadian interests and a domestic political minefield at the best of times - it's best to stay out of the fray.
The summer of 2006 was not the best of times for the Mideast, or for Mr. Harper. His comment that Israel's response to Hezbollah was "measured," though made in the opening hours of the war, became a stick with which protesters, pundits and political foes repeatedly beat him, and still do.
This time, as the Israelis carried out their attacks on Gaza, the Prime Minister managed to keep his lips zipped for nearly two weeks. To fill the vacuum, the Conservatives drafted Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon into action, much as Brian Mulroney made use of Joe Clark in these situations. And even Mr. Cannon got away with low-bridging it - communicating scarcely and mostly through departmental press releases.
Still, to his credit and the credit of his officials, our Foreign Minister was quick out of the starting gate, his messages were clear and they remained consistent. On the first day of the war, Mr. Cannon was already expressing Canada's "deep concern by the escalation of violence in southern Israel and the Gaza Strip and by the loss of life and the suffering sustained by all sides." And he "urged both sides to use all efforts to avoid civilian casualties and to create the conditions to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access to those in need in Gaza."
Most important, and in sharp contrast to Canada's position during the Lebanon war, Mr. Cannon called for "renewed efforts to reach a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel."
Though Israel quickly rejected international calls for a ceasefire, Hamas's refusal to stop firing rockets into civilian areas, universally recognized as a war crime, played into the Harper government's line: "Israel has a clear right to defend itself against the continued rocket attacks by Palestinian militant groups which have deliberately targeted civilians. First and foremost, those rocket attacks must stop." Hamas's intransigence, on the heels of its refusal to renew the previous ceasefire, also eroded the impact of pro-Hamas demonstrations.
In Quebec - in marked contrast to 2006 - no Liberal or Bloc Québécois MPs marched among crowds carrying the banner and chanting the slogans of an organization dedicated to the elimination of Israel. In this regard, Mr. Cannon's decision to communicate some of his messages via Agence France-Presse, from which Quebeckers derive a significant part of their Mideast coverage, was particularly astute.
By the time Mr. Harper broke his silence on Jan. 9, Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff, who also had a bad war in 2006, had brought his party into line with the government's position. Indeed, so decisive was the Conservative victory in the war of words that junior foreign minister Peter Kent, who is responsible for relations with the Americas, got away with playing Mideast politics in his heavily Jewish constituency. How else can one characterize his statement that, while details were sketchy, Hamas was to blame for Israel's strike on a United Nations school because of its "use of civilians and civilian infrastructure as shields for their terrorist activities"?
Later, when Canada alone voted against an unbalanced UN Human Rights Council resolution, most opposition MPs fell into line and editorials across the land were surprisingly supportive. Which was quite an accomplishment for Mr. Harper, considering that Israel was in the process of demonstrating to Palestinians that it could act as crazily as Hamas, and will do so again if sufficiently provoked - a Mideast logic that is very foreign to the mindset of most Canadians.

The IDF model that failed in Lebanon succeeded in Gaza
By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff

Haaretz 24/01/09
It was almost inevitable that most Israelis would be left with a somewhat sour feeling at the end of the war in Gaza. The left was furious about the killing of Palestinian civilians and the widespread destruction wrought across Gaza; the right was angry at the security cabinet for not letting the Israel Defense Forces win. The soldiers in the field were sorry that the operation ended without the return of abducted soldier Gilad Shalit. And the media quickly moved to cover the inauguration of Barack Obama. By midweek, the Gaza campaign had already been relegated to the back pages of the papers.
No few myths that had been cultivated - in these pages, too - were proved false by the operation. The ground operation did not exact large-scale Israeli casualties, the rocket fire was considerably reduced due to the presence of IDF troops in Gaza, and the army withdrew without an organized "exit plan." On the other hand, the prewar assumption that it would be difficult to achieve a clear-cut victory in a confrontation with Hamas was proven correct. Far from raising a white flag, Hamas hurried to mark the IDF's departure with victory processions.
The public's partial disappointment stems from the disparity between the expectations that developed against the backdrop of the relatively smooth entry of the ground forces, and the difficulty of translating the fighting into an arrangement that would vanquish Hamas. Israel's leaders knew from the outset that these were unrealistic expectations, but even several General Staff officers this week maintained that Israel was only four kilometers away from delivering a crushing defeat to Hamas. That was the distance between the forward paratroopers in the north of Gaza City and their buddies from the Givati Brigade in the city's southern part. If the circle had been closed, so this argument goes, we would have seen a different outcome.
Advertisement
For the IDF, the Gaza operation was a corrective experience in the wake of the failure and humiliation it sustained during the Second Lebanon War. The conditions of the confrontation facilitated the army's task: Not only did Hamas turn out to be a weaker foe than Hezbollah, but the performance of the Israeli officers improved, from Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi to GOC Southern Command Yoav Gallant, from the brigade commanders, who raced ahead, to the logistics personnel. But we should also remember the situation in which the IDF's top brass found itself (in part, of course, due to its own fault) at the outbreak of the previous war.
Considering the circumstances, the position paper former GOC Norther Command Udi Adam submitted to the Winograd Committee (which examined the conduct of the 2006 Lebanon war) was surprisingly frank. In it, Adam wrote: "Northern Command did not fulfill its mission - stopping the firing of the Katyushas." Stopping the rocket fire was not officially included in the orders given to the IDF in 2006, but Northern Command nevertheless acknowledged its failure in this regard in retrospect.
In Gaza, the reduction of rocket fire was cited as the operation's only goal, and the IDF adopted a smart media posture that anticipated any operational result with regard to the rocket attacks: IDF spokespersons emphasized time and again that, "it is impossible to get to the last launcher" and anticipated that between 100-300 rockets would be fired at Israel every day. When Hamas did not meet this expectation and fired an average of just 60 rockets (and 20, toward the operation's end) a day, the media focused on Hamas' failure - not on the fact that the attacks continued.
In 2006, when Israel went to war against Hezbollah, Northern Command had nine tanks stationed along the entire border with Lebanon. Half of the string of outposts were manned by a reserve battalion, which the commanding officers considered declaring unfit for action. Southern Command moved into Gaza after two years of meticulous planning, with each brigade and battalion perfectely aware of its sector and mission. In a meeting with Ashkenazi and Gallant at the beginning of this week, the brigade commanders who fought in Gaza said that, in contrast to Lebanon, this time they felt the missions were more firmly defined: The brigades were not rocked by orders that changed each passing day. Intelligence was also accurate: Battalion commanders say that they often knew exactly what to expect around the next bend in the road.
This time, the Israel Air Force's role was completely different. The political echelon authorized Ashkenazi to do what his predecessor, Dan Halutz, was not permitted to do in Lebanon: to launch a widespread attack on governmental targets as a means to pressure the enemy. Not only was the IAF tuned in to the ground forces' requests, it made a special effort to hunt down the rocket launchers. Unlike in 2006, the General Staff did not draw a "yellow line," artificially dividing the operational sector between Northern Command and the IAF.
The model that failed in Lebanon was, for the first time, successfully implemented in Gaza. This time, Southern Command was in charge of the entire combat arena, including aerial actions and "targeted assassinations." True, all available means were placed at its disposal, but it seems as though Gallant learned some lessons from Udi Adam. Gallant had one division commander working under him: Brig. Gen. Eyal Eisenberg (who proved successful in Gaza, after his failure as a division commander in Lebanon). Adam had to cope with four division commanders, some of them hard to get along with.
Ashkenazi and Gallant worked reasonably well together, despite considerable personal tension and a dispute over the operation's continuation. In the "kitchen cabinet," Olmert-Barak-Livni gleaned the impression that Ashkenazi - who favored an end to the operation before expanding the ground offensive ("Phase 3") - insisted on informing the trio about Gallant's opposite stance. In the previous war, knowledgeable sources noted, the only time a different position was presented was when Halutz was sick. An officer who was in contact with the political echelon during the Gaza operation says he now understands what went so horribly wrong in Lebanon: "It was weird, to put it mildly." Another senior figure adds: "It is difficult to conduct a war when an election campaign is under way. Two of the 'kitchen cabinet' members were interested in the operation's implications for the elections. The third [Olmert] was busy with the question of what it would all mean for his legacy."
Moral combat?
At midday Monday, as a senior officer met with journalists for a background briefing to sum up the operation (public interviews with the chief of staff will probably have to wait for his retirement in two years), Prof. Asa Kasher entered the General Staff building in the Kirya, the defense establishment complex in Tel Aviv. About a decade ago, Kasher, a philosopher, helped draw up the IDF's code of ethics. During the second intifada, he and Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin (a combat pilot and now director of Military Intelligence) co-authored a document entitled "Moral Combat Against Terrorism," which defends the use of force against terrorists who hide amid a civilian population. The incident that motivated the document's drafting was the assassination of Salah Shehadeh, a senior Hamas figure, in an attack which also left 15 civilians dead. But that was a proportional attack compared to the firepower the IDF unleashed in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead.
Compared to Hezbollah, Hamas prepared a ramified defensive network to block the IDF's entry. The number of underground mines and booby-trapped buildings in Gaza was unprecedented. Hamas failed because the IDF proceeded with a strategy of pounding, first from the air, then on the ground. A series of conversations with officers this week reinforces the conclusion formed at the outset of the ground operation: The General Staff identified the public's intolerance for soldiers' deaths as an Achilles heel. The IDF used tremendous firepower, knowing this would claim the lives of hundreds of Palestinian civilians, to reduce its own casualties and forestall a situation in which the war would be brought to an end prematurely.
Thomas Friedman, the New York Times columnist, conjectured that Israel wanted to "educate" Hamas and the inhabitants of Gaza by means of brutal collective punishment. Such an interpretation is not entirely wrong, given the scale of the destruction wrought by the Israeli-made Viper mine-clearing machines (which cause an underground explosion that sets off hidden land mines). Officers in command posts describe a different atmosphere that was dictated by the senior command level. Reports from the field mention a directive for bulldozers to raze dozens of buildings - not because they were booby-trapped, but because they were blocking the forces' "line of vision."

The truth must be said: For years the army has demonstrated insensitivity in regard to killing Palestinian civilians, certainly in times of heavy fighting. In the fall of 2004, during Operation Days of Penitence in the Gaza Strip, one could see the grim faces of officers, after learning about the deaths of two children from Sderot by a Qassam rocket. The result was not long in coming: seven civilians were killed by tank fire at an UNRWA school in Jabalya. Anyone who saw that incident will not be surprised at the 42 civilians who were killed in a similar barrage during Operation Cast Lead. Israel does not implement murderous methods like the Russians in Chechnya, or violence on a par with American actions in Iraq. But it is acting far more harshly than it did in Jenin during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 or in Bint Jbeil, Lebanon, in 2006. The present aggressive policy reminded veteran officers, among them the chief of staff, of the actions of the Israeli forces in Lebanon in 1982. Perhaps we can expect another generational trauma, of the kind that engendered the film "Waltz with Bashir" so late in the day.
Meshal as Nasrallah
The final scene of "Waltz with Bashir" was reenacted in Gaza this week. The film ends with a segment from a TV report filmed by military correspondent Ron Ben-Yishai in the Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps, following the September 1982 massacre. A Palestinian woman, standing amid the ruins, shouts: "Where are the Arabs? Where are the Arabs?" The same complaints were voiced by Gazans, who, this time, too, were shocked at the Arab world's indifference. With the active encouragement of Al Jazeera, large demonstrations were held in Cairo and Amman and even in Jakarta, Indonesia. But the Arab regimes did not rally to Hamas' cause. Even Hezbollah maintained relative quiet along the northern border, apart from the firing of two Katyushas.
The Egyptian daily Al-Ahram reported this week that the head of Hamas' political bureau in Damascus, Khaled Meshal, expressed disappointment at the Arab reaction to the operation during a closed session of the Arab summit in Qatar. Not only did Hamas remain almost alone in the campaign against Israel, it also suffered a painful blow in the military confrontation. The best proof of this was its agreement to an unconditional cease-fire while IDF troops were still in the Gaza Strip. Al-Ahram reports that Meshal admitted that he had not expected the Israeli reaction to be so severe and sustained - the same sentiment that was expressed by Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon two and half years ago.
Outwardly, Hamas broadcast a different message. Military Intelligence tends to give Hamas high grades for the credibility of its announcements in ordinary times. But since the start of the ground operation, Hamas' fabrications have gone off the charts. One of the organization's spokesmen claimed this week that Hamas had expelled the IDF from the Gaza Strip. The spokesman of the Iz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' military wing, admitted to losing only 48 of its men in the fighting. And how many Israeli soldiers were killed? Forty-nine, according to Hamas (in reality, 10 soldiers were killed). Conversations with residents of Ramallah and East Jerusalem indicate that from their point of view, Hamas won. They claim that Hamas withstood Israeli military pressure and that the IDF struck only civilians in the Gaza Strip. Asked why they think Hamas stopped firing rockets, they explain that it was a good-will gesture to Barack Obama on the occasion of his inauguration.

Obama's New Middle East Envoy
By David Bedein

FrontPageMagazine.com | Friday, January 23, 2009
Now that President Obama has appointed former Senator George Mitchell as his Middle East envoy, it appears timely to reflect on George Mitchell’s 2001 Report, entitled The Mitchell Report on the Al-Aqsa Intifadeh.
To refresh the memory of the reader: In late October, 2000, US president Clinton appointed an international investigation commission to investigate the causes of renewed massive violence in Israel, naming an Arab American and former US Senator, George Mitchell, as its chairman, and a Jewish-American, also a former US senator, Warren Rudman, to the panel, together with three prominent European diplomats
Initial reaction in Israel to the publication of the Mitchell Commission report in May, 2001, evoked a sigh of relief when the Mitchell commission did not blame Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for instigating the riots in September, 2000 during his visit to the Temple Mount.
However, even with that Sharon Temple Mount accusation out of the way, the Mitchell Commission report accepted all of the PLO premises for the violence at the time.
The Mitchell commission accepted as a given that the PLO-led riots were based on a movement for "independence and genuine self-determination", without giving credence to the clearly stated PLO goal, stated in all PLO publications, maps and media outlets, even during the current Oslo process, which remains "liberation" of all of Palestine.
For some reason, the Mitchell Commission characterized the rioters armed with molotov cocktails as "unarmed Palestinian demonstrators". a term that they seemed to have borrowed from several PLO information reports that were published at the time..
The Mitchell Commission took the position that Israel's security forces did not face a clear a present danger when faced with a mob trying to kill them with rocks and firebombs
The Mitchell Commission made no mention that the PA has amassed 50,000 more weapons than they are supposed to have, in clear violation of the written Oslo accords,.
The Mitchell Commission surprisingly accepted the notion that the Palestinian Authority security officials are simply not in control of their own tightly controlled security services,
The Mitchell Commission would not consider reliable li intelligence reports which documented that the Palestinian Authority had planned the uprising, and did not relate to documentation which showed that the PA spent past seven years preparing its media, school system and security services for a violent confrontation with Israel.
The Mitchell Commission described as an Israeli "view" that the PA leadership has made no real effort to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism, ignoring the consistent incitement that Arafat has conveyed to his own media for the previous seven years.
The Mitchell Commission also rejected Israel's characterization of the conflict, as "armed conflict short of war"; (How else would you describe an army that fires mortar rounds into Israeli cities?)
The Mitchell Commission also condemned the IDF killing of PLO combat officers during a time of war, without giving an alternative as to what actions the IDF is supposed to take in any such military confrontation.
Instead of issuing a clear call to the PLO to stop sniper attacks on Israel's roads and highways, the Mitchell Commission simply "condemned the positioning of gunmen within or near civilian dwellings", leaving the observer to assume that PLO attacks from empty embankments would be acceptable.
The Mitchell Commission suggested that "the IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before September 28, 2000, …to reduce the number of friction points", ignoring the fact that this would leave entry points to many Israeli cities without appropriate protection during a time of war.
The Mitchell Commission also demanded that Israel should transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs, strangely recommending that Israel once again be in the position of paying the salaries of armed PLO personnel who were at war with Israel.
Meanwhile, the Mitchell Commission took a page out of Arab propaganda when it called on Israeli "security forces and settlers to refrain from the destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in Palestinian areas", and would not relate to the possibility that some of the trees and agricultural land had been razed may have been provided cover to PA security forces during combat.
The Mitchell Commission also accepted the notion that "settlers and settlements in their midst" remains a cause of the Palestinian uprising, because these Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria violate "the spirit of the Oslo process", even though not one word appears in the actual Oslo accords would require the dismemberment of a single Israeli settlement.
In conclusion, the Mitchell Commission drew a strange comparison between "settlement activities" and the Palestinian ability to resume negotiations, so long as "settlement activities" continue, introducing an excuse for the PLO to continue its armed conflict.
In short, the Mitchell Commission Report drove a nail into the coffin of any credibility that George Mitchell can ever have as a Middle East envoy.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
David Bedein, author of the forthcoming book, "Swimming Against the Mainstream", has run the Israel Resource News Agency. www.IsraelBehindTheNews.com, since 1987, at the Beit Agron Press Center in Jerusalem, where he also heads the Center for Near East Policy Research and serves as the Middle East correspondent for the Philadelphia Bulletin, www.thebulletin.us.

The Countdown Has Begun
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=15482

Asharq Al- Awsat,
The countdown has begun. It is a tradition within political analysis to judge any new president after the first 100 days of their presidency, and not immediately after he has assumed office. Let’s be generous, unlike tradition, and show patience towards the new American President Barack Obama for an entire year to tackle our regional issues and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular.
However, we cannot wait another day to discuss our thoughts on what might happen. In my opinion, not much will take place despite that Obama selected the best politicians who know our region well, from envoys, advisers, officials to senior state officials such as Vice President Joseph Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who are aware of the smallest details of our region and know it better than most of its own residents. They are different to the Bush team that emerged from the ranch.
How can I worry despite all the available success factors; Obama enjoys widespread popularity in America and around the world and he is supported by battalion of ministers and experts. Moreover, Obama has pledged not to commit the same mistakes as Bush and that he will learn from such mistakes.
In my opinion, the problem lies in the [Middle East] region itself, not across the ocean. History has witnessed a number of opportunities that have been lost and there are no indications that the Arab mindset is changing. Since the 1960s, the ideology of the Arab regime itself has not changed. It is haunted by uncertainty, fear, regional conflicts and the inability to take decisive decisions. What has changed since the defeat of 1967? The answer is nothing practically, with the exception of the era of late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat who engaged in peace and war and changed history in the interest of his nation. Had it not been for Sadat, Egypt today would be like Palestine, Syria and Lebanon; its territories would be occupied by Israel and its movement suspended.
Obama will spend a year sending his envoys to wander around the Arab capitals and he will not discover the truth until his second year in power; there will be many promises but a lack of political seriousness and Obama will get bored and devote himself to another part of the world. This is what happened to the Russians during the era of Kennedy, then Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush Senior, Clinton and Bush Junior. It began in the days of US President Eisenhower in the fifties when he presented a political project to deal with the issue of [Palestinian] refugees, water and territories, until Bush Junior who announced his recognition of an independent Palestinian state.
As for Israel, it has been the permanent beneficiary of the Arab situation without having to make much effort. Through their states, quarrels and lies, the Arabs are working in Israel’s favor and Israel knows this. The Arabs today are preoccupied with Iran which is a more of a source of concern for the Europeans than it is for the Americans. The Arabs are overburdened with terrorism which has caused them to lose all the sympathy that they once had and they are overburdened with internal conflict at its worst.
However, we stand before a new American president; from his demeanor, language and early action, Obama seems to be a good president, who is ready to carry out great work in our region. But he will fail as long as we, as Arabs, do not work hard. Obama deserves to be given a chance because this is our chance also.

Syria will be first rogue state to get Barack Obama charm offensive
By Tim Shipman in Washington
Telegraph.co.uk
 
Barack Obama will seek to befriend Syria and enlist the rogue state's help in fighting terrorism, in what US officials see as the first test of his plans to talk to America's enemies.
24 Jan 2009
Diplomats and Democrats in Washington have confirmed that Mr Obama wants to persuade the Syrian leader, Bashar Assad, to cooperate with the West, in the hope that he will loosen his country's close ties to Iran, forcing Tehran to the negotiating table as well.
During his presidential campaign, Mr Obama pledged to speak to states like Iran and Cuba without imposing preconditions as the Bush administration did on any contacts.
But in conversations with allies since his election, Mr Obama has made clear that he believes the key to improving the political situation in the Middle East is to peel Syria away from its longstanding alliance with Iran, rather than to immediately start negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear weapons programme.
US officials believe it will be more palatable for American voters for Mr Obama to launch his rogue nation outreach effort with Damascus rather than Iran and that dealing with the mullahs in Tehran would be much easier if they could no longer rely on knee-jerk support from Syria.
Both countries are accused of arming and sponsoring the terrorists groups Hamas and Hezbollah, funneling extremists and weapons into Iraq and attempting to purchase and develop nuclear technology. A Syrian nuclear plant was destroyed in an Israeli air attack last year.
One source, who has discussed foreign policy directly with Mr Obama in the last two weeks, has revealed that the president "is spending a lot of time thinking about Syria and how to improve relations".
During the election campaign, Mr Obama expressed support for tentative peace talks between Israel and Syria, which are still technically at war. While better relations with Syria could be key to improving the prospect of an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal in years to come, Mr Obama's decision to sanction direct talks with Damascus has another short term goal.
A Western diplomat, who has discussed the Middle East with members of Mr Obama's team, told The Sunday Telegraph: "It's really about Iran. If you can isolate Iran, it makes it much more difficult for Tehran to continue with its hard line approach.
"Obama seems to have decided to go after Syria first before he tackles Iran or Cuba, which are much more emotive subjects in the US."
And Mr Obama does not seem to be alone in wanting to bring Syria back from the brink of the axis of evil to the diplomatic mainstream. President Assad sent him a message of congratulations after his election, a rare gesture.
A British official in Washington added: "Syria has shown the odd sign of wanting to build up a broader relationship with the West. The fact that Syria doesn't want to totally disengage and that it does not want to be seen as a bloc with Iran is an opening."
Other senior sources in Washington say that there will be a "Syrian track" to American diplomacy under Mr Obama.
British officials believe that Syria is prepared to cooperate because they don't want al Qaeda getting a foothold in their country and they are keen to wean themselves from their dependent relationship with Iran. Those who have studied Mr Assad say he is uncomfortable being so reliant on Iran and that encouraging him to go his own way will decisively change the balance of power in the entire Middle East.
British officials see an opportunity in Mr Obama's plans to cement close relations with the new US administration, since the UK has for several months been working to improve the dialogue with Damascus, an enterprise that culminated in a trip to Syria by Foreign Secretary David Miliband in November. Britain has resumed intelligence sharing with Syria and Mr Obama is likely to have been briefed on information MI6 has shared with the CIA.
The British ambassador in Washington, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, is also an old Syria hand, having made a trip as a secret envoy to Damascus when he was Tony Blair's chief foreign policy trouble shooter. He is well versed on negotiating tactics and potential pitfalls.
The hope is that if Syria is treated as a serious player in the region it is more likely to play a constructive role and be less reliant on the security blanket of its relationship with Tehran.
But dealing with Syria is a diplomatic minefield, as former prime minister Tony Blair discovered to his embarrassment during a previous thaw. On a visit to Damascus after the September 11 attacks, Mr Blair had to stand side by side with President Assad at a press conference while the Syrian dictator lectured the West about terrorism and praised Hamas, which has its political headquarters in Damascus, as freedom fighters.