LCCC
ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
January 08/09
Bible Reading of the
day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ
according to Saint Mark 6,45-52. Then he made his disciples get into the boat
and precede him to the other side toward Bethsaida, while he dismissed the
crowd. And when he had taken leave of them, he went off to the mountain to pray.
When it was evening, the boat was far out on the sea and he was alone on shore.
Then he saw that they were tossed about while rowing, for the wind was against
them. About the fourth watch of the night, he came toward them walking on the
sea. He meant to pass by them. But when they saw him walking on the sea, they
thought it was a ghost and cried out. They had all seen him and were
terrified. But at once he spoke with them, "Take courage, it is I, do not be
afraid!"He got into the boat with them and the wind died down. They were
(completely) astounded. They had not understood the incident of the loaves. On
the contrary, their hearts were hardened.
Saint
Francis de Sales (1567-1622), Bishop of Geneva and Doctor of the Church
Letters/"Take courage, it is I!"
All ships have a compass which, when touched by the magnet, always turns towards
the polar star. And even when the boat is making its way in a southward
direction yet the compass does not cease turning towards its north at all times.
In the same way, let the fine point of your spirit always turn towards God, its
north... You are about to take to the high seas of the world; don't on this
account alter dial or mast, sail or anchor or wind. Keep Jesus Christ as your
dial at all times, his cross for mast on which to hoist your resolutions as a
sail. Let your anchor be profound trust in him and set out early. May the
propitious wind of heavenly inspirations ever fill the sails of your vessel more
and more and cause you to speed forward to the harbor of a holy
eternity...Should everything turn upside down, I don't say around us but within
us, that is to say, should our soul be sad, happy, in sweetness, in bitterness,
peaceful, troubled, in light, in darkness, in temptation, in rest, in enjoyment,
in disgust, in dryness, in gentleness, should the sun burn it or the dew refresh
it, ah!, this point of our heart, our spirit, our higher will, which is our
compass, should nevertheless always and at all times turn unceasingly, tend
perpetually towards the love of God.
Free
Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
It's all in how you
want to define 'victory'-By
YOSSI ALPHER
Jerusalem Post
07/01/09
The Solution of the Two
States or the Dissolution of the Two States-By Mamoun Fandy/Asharq Alawsat
07/01/09
Letter From Shebaa-By
Habib BattahWashington Report on Middle East Affairs 07/01/09
Strategic Reading in
the Gaza Conflict, An Eight Points Assessment.By: Dr. Walid Phares 07/01/09
In Gaza fight, Iran lurks in background.By:
Sally
Buzbee 07/01/09
Deepening Israeli
assault on Hamas divides Arab world-By Nicholas Blanford/07/01/09
Why Hezbollah is laying
low-Foreign Policy Passport 07/01/09
Arab leaders can
weather Gaza storm with ease-Reuters 07/01/09
Nicolas to the
Rescue-By NIDRA POLLER 07/01/09
Latest News Reports From
Miscellaneous Sources for January 07/09
Nasrallah: All Possibilities Open
Against Israel-Naharnet
Maronite Bishops Sound the Alarm: Gaza's Blaze Could Spread to Lebanon-Naharnet
U.S.
Puts Hizbullah's Waad on Blacklist-Naharnet
Maronite bishops fear Gaza
fighting might spread to Lebanon-Xinhua
Hamas'
Hamdan at Sidon Rally: Resistance Holding Out in Gaza-Naharnet
Sarkozy from Baabda:
Lebanon Can Depend on France-Naharnet
Nasrallah Calls for
Renewal of Commitment to Resistance on Occasion of Ashoura-Naharnet
Salloukh from New York:
Security Council Must Stop its Policy of Postponing Resolutions-Naharnet
Saniora: If Israel Attacks
it Would Find Lebanon United-Naharnet
Lebanon Tells Damascus it
is Ready to Begin Border Demarcation-Naharnet
Children Demonstrate in
Lebanon Against Gaza Offensive-Naharnet
EU, Egypt and Tony
Blair try to broker ceasefire-ABC Online
Russian presidential
envoy visits Syria over Gaza-Xinhua
The tragic theater of
war-Jerusalem Post
Neighbors / Rhetoric
strikes from the north-Ha'aretz
We'll halt operation
only when terror and smuggling stop, Olmert ...Jerusalem Post
Israel Applies Lessons
From 2006 War-New York Times
Sarkozy says may be
close to deal on Gaza-Reuters
Sarkozy: France wants
to be friend with all Lebanese-Xinhua
Egypt presses Hamas for
a Gaza cease-fire-MSNBC
Lebanon doubts
Hizbullah will open second front-Jerusalem Post
Hamas' Overmatched
Weaponry Could Prove Deadly-FOXNews
Diplomats push Syria
to pressure ally Hamas-The Associated Press
Gaza offensive to go
on until south Israel is calm: Barak-ABS CBN News
Strategic Reading in the Gaza Conflict
January 6, 2009
An Eight Points Assessment
By Walid Phares/CounterTerrorismBlog.org
After having advanced ten questions about the ongoing conflict in Gaza, at the
onset of the Israeli military operations against Hamas (December 28, 2008 on CTB)
and as Israel chose to commit ground forces inside the enclave, here is a
working reading of the main strategic developments and indicators at this time:
1. Israel's land thrust in Gaza indicates that the long range goal of the
campaign is to create changes on the ground, which are supposed to stop Hamas'
future rocket launches inside Israel. Many critics of Israel's action,
particularly the Jihadi propaganda machine, claim the ground operation hasn't
silenced the shooting. But the counter arguments here are that a) the operation
hasn't ended yet and b) Hamas' ability to launch is linked to its ability to
resupply its batteries or to build new missiles. Hence, the final military
outcome of the operation, if indeed this is a silence-the-rockets campaign, will
only show its success or failure at the end of the operation, or even after the
supplies of Hamas are depleted.
2) On the propaganda level, it is clear that the "Jihadi bloc" in the largest
(and most mainstream) sense is dominating the airwaves. The combined effects of
a number of Arab and Iranian media outlets (including the Qatari-funded al
Jazeera, al Manar, al Aalam, etc) on the region's audiences, as well as the
international media treatment of the conflict, all that, has tilted the balance
against Israel, so far. But one has to note that the blogosphere is witnessing a
different battle. On a variety of web sites and even in some newspapers many
dissident voices and pens in the Arab and Muslim world are voicing their
opposition to the Iranian-led "strategy" of shelling Israel. The anti-Hamas wave
is not necessarily a pro-Israel mood, but an anti-Iranian attitude.
3) On the diplomatic level, one can see two messages. A surface narrative
adopted by both the "Iranian led bloc" and their opponents in Egypt, Riyadh and
the West Bank, that is a criticism of Israel's action in Gaza. And a deeper game
underneath: The Tehran "axis" is inciting political escalation but would accept
a cease fire based on the initial status quo. The anti-Iranian bloc (Egypt, PA,
Saudi, Jordan, etc) does not wish a victory for Iran's allies in Gaza but a come
back to Abbas' Authority to the area. Interestingly, two governments who were
neutral on the conflict in general decided to shatter this "official"
neutrality: Qatar's Emir has sided with Hamas and Turkey's AKP Government has
blasted Israel openly. Hamas' new equation is now showing clearly who's who in
the region.
4) Many in the analyst community have been speculating on Hezbollah's next
moves. Some predict that Hezbollah has to strike in order to fulfill its
"alliance duties" while other commentators go as far as asserting that the
Iranian backed organization in Lebanon will sell out Hamas. I believe the two
assessments are extreme. Hezbollah, as much as Syria and Iran are solidly behind
Hamas, is part of the "axis." But the timing and weapons of intervention against
Israel is a matter of regional consultation with Tehran. Hezbollah is awaiting
Iran's decision as to where and how to strike, and more importantly, when.
Analysts need to better understand the geopolitics of the region and its
players.
5) Hamas will continue to fight inside Gaza and launch rockets onto Israel until
it loses (or about to lose) its command and control systems inside the enclave.
It is only then that it may strike beyond the scope of its tactics: meaning
deeper inside Israel with suicide bombs and possibly overseas. One has to
understand the escalation parameter that Hamas and its backer, the Iranian
regime, have adopted. Also keep in mind, that Hamas' and the "axis'" immediate
goal is to reach a cease fire, thus not using the last-choice-weapons is a
rational choice, for now.
6) From the statements made by Mahmoud Abbas' cabinet and spokespersons over the
past days, one can conclude that the PA is very nervous about a Hamas victory,
because it will mean the final demise of the Fatah legacy and influence. But
Abbas is also nervous about a full "regime change" in Gaza because it would
frame his government as a "collaborator" with Israel. Hence the most pragmatic
position Abbas can adopt at this stage is to condemn "Israeli" actions but wait
for final results on the military level.
7) President Bush will continue his support to Israel (with concerns over the
humanitarian situation) and his criticism of Hamas till January 20th. At first,
President elect Obama will continue a US policy of backing its ally and
supporting a two-state solution. But the forthcoming administration may try a
different route, possibly identical to French President Sarkozy's shuttle
diplomacy in the region. However, as I believe, the Iranian confrontation with
Israel (via Hamas) is much deeper and wider than any moderation can reduce, at
this stage.
8) The United Nations' institutions will eventually become the last resort to
resolve the crisis but only after a new strategic landscape would have emerged
in Gaza. The US is vetoing any Security Council resolution which will bring back
the status quo ante. A resolution in the UN General Assembly can be easily voted
by the OIC members, but won't have effects on the military situation. The
Secretary General has already called for a cease fire but would need a chapter 7
resolution from the Security Council to seriously end this round of violence.
More assessment is to come.
****
Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European
Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of The Confrontation.
U.S. Puts Hizbullah's Waad on Blacklist
Naharnet/The
U.S. Treasury has put the Waad Project, a Hizbullah-run construction company, on
its blacklist.
"The Waad Project is another example of Hizbullah's use of deceptive tactics to
support its military and terrorist apparatus," said Under Secretary for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. A press release said
Hizbullah established the Waad Project, in part, because Jihad al-Bina--Hizbullah's
main construction company--had difficulty receiving funds from donors following
its designation under E.O. 13224 by the Treasury Department on February 20,
2007. It said Hizbullah chief Hassan Nasrallah publicly endorsed the Waad
Project in May 2007. Hizbullah, according to the press release, has used the
Waad Project to rebuild its command headquarters in Beirut's southern suburbs,
which was destroyed in the summer 2006 war with Israel. The Waad Project has
built Hizbullah's underground weapons storage facilities and parts of the
group's military infrastructure in Lebanon, the Treasury Department said.
Additionally, the Waad Project's website has provided telephone numbers for
those wishing to donate aid to Hizbullah, Jihad al-Bina, and the Hizbullah-controlled
Martyrs Association, an organization named as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist in July 2007 for providing financial support to Hizbullah, the press
release said.
It said that the Waad Project has tried to hide its affiliation with Hizbullah,
just as Jihad al-Bina used deceptive means to seek funding projects from
international development organizations. Furthermore, it went on to say, the
general manager of the Waad Project has stated that donors to the Waad Project
have "wished to remain anonymous because Hizbullah is a terrorist organization
and they preferred not to be identified due to the risks of dealings with a
terrorist group."
Under E.O. 13224, any assets held by the Waad Project under U.S. jurisdiction
are frozen and U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transactions
with the Waad Project. Beirut, 07 Jan 09, 08:02
Nasrallah Calls for Renewal of Commitment to Resistance on Occasion of Ashoura
Naharnet/Hizbullah
Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah called for a massive rally on
Wednesday on the occasion of Ashoura to renew commitment to the resistance and
express animosity toward Israel and the United States. "Regardless of
(Wednesday's) weather, you are called upon to renew your commitment to the
resistance and to renew your animosity to Israel and the Great Satan which
orders Israel," Nasrallah told a Tuesday evening Ashoura gathering.
Nasrallah said holding Hamas responsible for the war in the Gaza strip was
similar to accusations made against Hizbullah for igniting the July 2006 war
with Israel.
"U.N. Security Council resolution 1701 is unjust because it held us responsible
for the 2006 war," he said about the resolution that ended the 34-day conflict.
The Hizbullah chief pointed that Hamas had two choices: "Either to extend the
truce with Israel and die of hunger, or end the truce and break the siege.
During the gathering, Nasrallah told thousands of supporters that only the Hamas
leadership in Gaza is the decision-maker and it alone accepts or rejects calls
for calm.
"The resistance was never and shall never be anyone's pawn. During the July 2006
war neither the Syrian nor the Iranian leaderships knew about the operation for
capturing the Israeli soldiers. We carried out the operation and we alone take
responsibility," he said. Israel began its 34-day offensive on Lebanon in July
2006 after Hizbullah seized two Israeli soldiers in a deadly cross-border raid.
"Iranian officials come to me not to present decisions, rather to consult,
discuss and ask how to best offer help according to their capabilities," the
Hizbullah chief said. Nasrallah also accused some Arab regimes of attempting to
"confiscate the decision of the true resistance in Palestine.""Calls have been
made for holding an Arab Summit … this is the least that could be done," he
said. Beirut, 06 Jan 09, 22:51
Nasrallah: All Possibilities Open Against Israel
Naharnet/Hizbullah
leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on Wednesday warned that "all possibilities" were
open against Israel.
"We have to act as though all possibilities are real and open with Israel and we
must always be ready for any eventuality," Nasrallah told tens of thousands of
supporters via video link at his stronghold in Beirut's suburbs on the occasion
of Ashoura. "I tell (Israeli Prime Minister Ehud) Olmert, the loser, the
defeated in Lebanon, that you cannot wipe out Hamas or Hizbullah," Nasrallah
vowed. "Your jets will not frighten us, and your threats will not frighten us.
We are ready for any aggression," Nasrallah said, adding that in the event of a
new offensive on Lebanon "you will discover what is waiting for you."
"You will realize that the 2006 war was but a walk in the park," he said,
adding: "We are ready to sacrifice our souls, our brothers and sisters, our
children, our loved ones for what we believe in." Nasrallah reiterated his
criticism of Egypt for failing to open the Rafah border with Gaza and attacked
the U.N. Security Council for not acting to condemn the Israeli aggression which
began Dec. 27. Addressing Egyptian officials, he said: "Do you need more than
650 martyrs to open the Rafah crossing permanently to help the people of Gaza
toward victory?" "I am only asking for the opening of a crossing and not another
front," he insisted.
Nasrallah hailed Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez for expelling Israel's
ambassador to Caracas saying that all countries, including Arab states, must
follow his example. "Arab governments must learn from this great Latin American
leader how to show their solidarity with the Palestinian people and must severe
relations with Israel," he said. Jordan and Egypt are the only two countries in
the Middle East to have diplomatic relations with Israel. Qatar has warm ties
with Israel.
Beirut, 07 Jan 09, 13:06
Maronite Bishops Sound the Alarm: Gaza's Blaze Could Spread
to Lebanon
Naharnet/The
Council of Maronite Bishops warned Wednesday against the spread of the war in
the Gaza Strip to Lebanon and urged unity among Lebanese to ward off possible
dangers. One of "the dangers of the fighting in Gaza is its spread to other
areas and countries, including Lebanon," the Bishops said in a statement after
their monthly meeting. They urged the Lebanese to "forget about their
differences" and unite against such dangers."The split of the Lebanese into two
bickering teams is not a sign of good health" particularly when Gaza is ablaze
and the fire "could spread to its neighbors." Beirut, 07 Jan 09, 12:56
Hamas' Hamdan at Sidon Rally: Resistance Holding Out in
Gaza
Naharnet/Hundreds
of people rallied Wednesday in the southern port city of Sidon in support of
Gaza upon request by the Lebanese-Palestinian Committee.
Hamas representative in Lebanon Ossama Hamdan told the rally: "I say with
confidence that the resistance is holding out in Gaza."
PLO representative in Lebanon Abbas Zaki, for his part, said the PLO has
"presented itself as a victim for the sake of our brethren in Hamas."
"We are willing to make compromises for each other so as not to offer Israel
compromises," Zaki added.
Education Minister Bahia Hariri said solidarity with Gaza "can only be achieved
through confronting the aggression." Beirut, 07 Jan 09, 14:18
Sarkozy from Baabda: Lebanon Can Depend on France
Naharnet/French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that France congratulates itself
with what President Michel Suleiman has done in Lebanon.
At a press conference on Tuesday from Baabda Palace following his meeting with
Suleiman, Sarkozy hoped that the spring 2009 parliamentary elections would take
place on time and with transparency. "Lebanon must know that it can depend on
France," he stressed, adding that France wishes to be a friend to all Lebanese
and hopes to see a free and independent Lebanon. Following the meeting, Sarkozy
headed to south Lebanon to meet with the French peacekeepers working under the
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). He wanted to carry a message of unity to
the troops from France.
Sarkozy also met with Prime Minister Fouad Saniora, Defense Minister Elias Murr,
Army Commander Gen. Jean Qahwaji and State Minister Nassib Lahoud who was acting
as Foreign Minister. Following the meeting, Saniora said: "The French move is
very good. The sense of awareness in Lebanon is great. Everyone knows that it
would not benefit Lebanon to be drawn into confrontations of any kind." "We
believe Israel always works on finding excuses and means for making trouble.
However, everyone in Lebanon is greatly aware of that," Saniora added. Beirut,
06 Jan 09, 17:39
Deepening Israeli assault on Hamas divides Arab world
By Nicholas Blanford | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
from the January 7, 2009 edition
Monitor correspondent Nicholas Blanford about Arab reaction to the Israeli-Hamas
conflict in Gaza.
Subscribe iTunes | More Audio
Beirut, Lebanon - Israel pressed deeper into Gaza Tuesday in its assault on
Hamas. As the battle grew deadlier, calls for a cease-fire mounted as did
outrage at Israel after two strikes outside United Nations schools killed at
least 34 Gaza civilians.
Across the Arab world the conflict continues to tear at the rift between
factions that extol resistance to Israel and the Western-friendly autocracies
and monarchies that rule in the region. As anger at Israel grows, Hezbollah in
Lebanon and Hamas backers in Iran and Syria gain more currency on the street at
the expense of American allies: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. And this
shifting tide of support could have an impact on US policy in the Middle East
for decades.
"This conflict, like the July [2006 Hezbollah-Israel] war, is one in which the
stakes are very high for both sides," says Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a Lebanese expert
on the Shiite militant group Hezbollah. "I would expect now an even-deeper
polarization in the region."
As with the 2006 Lebanon war, the Gaza conflict suggests that the most dynamic
forces at play in the modern Middle East are not states but the powerful
militant organizations – Hezbollah and Hamas – that have emerged and evolved
over the past two decades.
"These are very powerful, legitimate, and perplexing actors for the world to
deal with. The really important actors are the militant nationalist, Islamist
resistance groups," says Rami Khouri, director of the Issam Fares Center of
Lebanon at the American University of Beirut.
These divisions between anti-Israeli factions and US allies were first thrown
into sharp relief in July 2006 when Hezbollah fought the Israeli army to a
surprising standstill in south Lebanon. At the onset of that conflict, Saudi
Arabia implicitly accused Hezbollah and its backer Iran of "uncalculated
adventures," an unusually stinging rebuke.
But in this war between Israel and an Islamist militant group, the verbal barbs
have been sharper. The Saudis, while providing humanitarian aid to Gazans, have
implicitly blamed Hamas for the offensive, saying that the "massacre would not
have happened if the Palestinian people were united behind one leadership."
On the other side, Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah charged the Sunni
Egyptian regime of conspiring with Israel and urged Egyptians "to take the
streets in their millions."
"Can the Egyptian police kill millions of Egyptians? No, they cannot," he said.
This was an unprecedented call from the politically astute leader who has always
been wary of aggravating Sunni-Shiite tensions.
"The gloves have come off and Hezbollah is no longer afraid of antagonizing the
Sunnis," says Ms. Saad-Ghorayeb.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Aboul-Gheit shot back at Sheikh Nasrallah,
saying that Hezbollah had destroyed Lebanon in 2006 and accused him of having
"insulted the Egyptian people."
I found Nasrallah's comments to be objectionable, but I also found them to be
ineffective because they had absolutely no effect on the ground," says Nabil
Fahmy, an Egyptian diplomat and former ambassador to Washington. "What has had
more of an effect in galvanizing the Egyptian people, understandably, is the
bombing itself."
The Israeli offensive has triggered demonstrations in Europe and the Arab world.
While Europeans have largely directed their protests at the Israeli government,
Middle Easterners are pointing their ire at Egypt, with thousands marching on
Egyptian embassies in Beirut and Amman, Jordan.
But as the war drags on, unease is growing among so-called Arab "moderates."
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan have become more vocal in their denunciations of
Israel's excessive military force. King Abdullah of Jordan has sacked his
intelligence chief in what may be a move related to the Gaza crisis. Last week
he and his wife, Queen Rania, donated blood for Palestinians in Gaza.
The violence hastened steps Tuesday to reach a cease-fire arrangement and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice headed to the UN to consult with Arab
officials.
Syria, which hosts Hamas's leadership, also has been drawn into the diplomatic
moves with French President Nicolas Sarkozy, holding talks Tuesday with his
Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad in Damascus as part of a tour with European
officials.
Syria is in an unusual position. It is the sole Arab state member of the
so-called "resistance front," it continues to maintain an alliance with non-Arab
Iran, backs Hezbollah and Hamas, and has acted to scuttle US policy gains in
neighboring Iraq and Lebanon.
Still, its relations with Europe have thawed lately and there are hints of a
renewed dialogue with the US under President-elect Barack Obama's
administration. On the other hand, Syria's ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt have
worsened.
"The Syrians have strong reason to believe that Hamas will not be defeated in
this war, and on the contrary, will score a point for its allies, vis-à-vis
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who are loudly critical of Hamas today," says Sami
Moubayed, a Syrian political analyst. "It's not on Syria's agenda to make up
with either Egypt or Saudi Arabia, given their positions on the current war.
Syria is sticking by its allies and continuing to build-bridges with Europe."
But it is the powerful nonstate actors of Hezbollah and Hamas that draw most
attention. Nasrallah's televised addresses are watched avidly by friends and
foes alike for clues on what his enigmatic organization might do next. Hezbollah
and its allies are in a strong position to triumph at the polls in June to form
a new parliamentary majority and government. Hamas, having won elections in
2006, is the ruling authority in Gaza.
But with power comes responsibility. Hezbollah has refrained so far from coming
to the assistance of its ally Hamas by opening up a new front in northern Israel
largely because of the domestic political backlash such a move would invoke.
Hamas, too, even if it emerges from this war claiming victory, may find its
military options curtailed.
"In the short term, there will be a perception that they [Hamas] are stronger
and that countries that supported them are stronger," says Mr. Fahmy, the
Egyptian diplomat. "But if whoever is controlling Gaza a few months down the
line cannot give people a better lifestyle … then I don't think they will
continue to be heroes."
In Gaza fight, Iran
lurks in background
By SALLY BUZBEE, Associated Press
Writer Sally Buzbee, Associated Press Writer –
Slideshow: Israeli troops invade Gaza Play Video Video: Israel nears major Gaza
towns, ignoring pleas AP Play Video Video: Global protests over Gaza offensive
BBC CAIRO, Egypt – Israel's fight with Hamas in Gaza, like the war with
Hezbollah in Lebanon two years ago, is not just a struggle over the Palestinian
issue but a broader proxy battle between Western allies and Iran for the very
future of the Middle East.
Unlike the Lebanon war, the fighting in Gaza contains faint stirrings of change
across the region that could bring a more hopeful outcome for Israel, the
Palestinians and the West.
Chief among them is the inauguration of a new U.S. president. The Bush
administration had long ago lost most ability to get even allies in the Middle
East to robustly push U.S. goals. Incoming President Barack Obama won't, of
course, instantly change Arab resentment toward America, and he has made clear
that he will continue with traditionally strong U.S. support for Israel.
But Obama and the team he has chosen might be more willing to accept the type of
arrangement that many believe is needed to relieve the suffering in Gaza and
figure out a political solution. That will likely involve giving Hamas some
face-saving partial authority role in the crowded territory it seized in 2007
after winning elections. That alone might end the blockade of Gaza that has
frustrated the hopes of Palestinians there, who have long had little ability to
work or move about or live normal lives. That anger and dismay has boosted
support for Hamas.
Supporters of such a policy, including many Europeans, think it is the only way
to lure Hamas toward eventual political accommodation with Israel, whose right
to exist is rejected by the militants. They note that Hezbollah guerrillas on
Israel's northern border seem loath to engage Israel again militarily since
gaining a larger role in Lebanon's politics in the wake of the 2006 war.
It is surely a huge gamble that militants will trade political participation for
violence. But such a tactic has worked in the past with other, once-radical
Palestinian factions.
Obama also has indicated he may be willing to talk to Iran — a country most view
as key to the overall Middle East puzzle. The Islamic Republic gained
significant regional clout after its protege, Hezbollah, held out against Israel
in the 2006 war. That in turn directly hurt the credibility and influence of
many Arab moderates.
Iran is controlled by hard-liners whom the West accuses of seeking a nuclear
capacity, and its president has called for an end to Israeli rule or for the
Jewish state to be "wiped off the map." Iran also is said by Israel and the
United States to provide economic and military support to Hamas and Hezbollah
militants.
But factions in Iran have also long wanted some type of deal and recognition
from the United States. In that reality could lie the seeds of negotiating power
on issues the West cares about, such as Israel and alleged Iranian support for
Islamic militants — as long as the U.S. bargains tough and with its eyes wide
open.
More subtly, two recent trends could change the overall dynamic of Iran
seemingly ascendant in the Middle East, while the West's Arab allies stumble and
appear weak.
For one, Iran is poorer today than just a few months ago because of the plummet
in the price of oil and its own economic mismanagement. The financial crisis
does means its leaders must pay more attention to domestic woes and their own
dissatisfied public, and not just on foreign issues and the Palestinians or
Hezbollah. The hard-line president faces a tough re-election battle this summer.
Second and more profoundly, the Iraq war is going better. That may seem totally
disconnected from Gaza for now, but it is, in fact, hugely important for the
immediate and long-term future of the entire Middle East.
While violence in Iraq is sure to continue, there is now a definite end game in
sight — the fact that the United States and Iraq have agreed on a general
timetable for the drawdown of many U.S. troops, and reached a deal for more
Iraqi sovereignty.
For American allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, long dismayed by what they
saw as a misguided U.S. occupation of Iraq, that change will create great
relief.
Importantly, it gives them more credibility with other Arabs. No longer can they
be criticized for their roles as "stooges" of the U.S. Iraq policy, and that in
turn could strengthen their willingness — and their hand — to dig in for tough
diplomacy on Gaza.
All along, Hamas and Hezbollah have played the spoiler role with great glee,
provoking and poking at Israel, and when it responds with attacks, trumpeting
that only they defend the Palestinians and their children.
One of Hamas' strengths has been its ability to criticize more moderate Arabs
for weakness and an inability to improve the lives of Palestinians.
Indeed, Arab allies have been divided internally, more interested in scoring
points against each other and competing on diplomacy — mainly Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and Qatar — than in pulling together in the same direction to solve the
big issues.
The Western and moderate Arab goal is to turn around that dynamic and convince
the Arab public that political accommodation — that is, peace deals — are the
real solution, not the current path of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.
Among the hopeful signs: This time, Egypt spoke strongly against Hamas, and even
Saudi Arabia's cautious foreign minister obliquely blamed the militants for the
fighting. Turkey is ideally placed to bring all players to the table if it gets
some stronger backing from the West — Israel, the moderates, the militants and
their backers.
But it will still take hard-nosed, smart and extremely committed diplomacy from
the West and from the United States in particular.
*Sally Buzbee is Chief of Middle East News, based in Cairo, for The Associated
Press.
Nicolas to the Rescue
Why would the French president want to save Hamas?
By NIDRA POLLER | From today's Wall Street Journal Europe
No sooner had Israel hit Hamas command and control centers last week than
Nicolas Sarkozy scolded Jerusalem for using "disproportionate force" and called
for an immediate 48-hour humanitarian cease-fire. Does this echo of Jacques
Chirac's rhetoric indicate a simple reversion to -- some would say continuation
of -- France's politique arabe?
The French in 2006 succeeded in presenting an overdue Israeli riposte against
unprovoked Hezbollah attacks as a humanitarian crisis in Lebanon. The cease-fire
deal hammered out at the United Nations by then French Foreign Minister Philippe
Douste-Blazy and Condoleezza Rice effectively saved Hezbollah and undermined
democratic forces in Lebanon. Does Mr. Sarkozy now want to save Hamas?
Reluctantly yielding the presidency of the European Union to the Czechs on Jan.
1, Mr. Sarkozy held on to his prerogatives and tried for a solo diplomatic
exploit with Gaza. The emergency meeting of his EU counterparts convoked by
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner yielded a shaky consensus on a vague
cease-fire demand. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni flew in and out of Paris
on New Year's Day to reiterate, politely but firmly, her government's intention
to pursue the military operation to its necessary conclusion.
Mr. Sarkozy -- upstaging an official EU delegation -- left Monday for his own
two-day mission to Cairo, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Damascus and Beirut, ending with
a visit to French U.N. peacekeeping troops in southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah
rearmed under the "watchful eyes" of those U.N. troops. Hezbollah, Hamas and
their patron, Iran, are seeking to destroy Israel; Messrs. Sarkozy and Kouchner
are seeking "the path to peace" -- paved with the kind of peacekeepers that have
failed so miserably in Lebanon.
It doesn't make sense. While Egypt's Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul-Gheit blames
Hamas for provoking the Israeli intervention, and moderate Arab governments
stand by with folded hands as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood
gets its comeuppance, why would the French president, who has consistently
displayed his affection for Israel, want to save Hamas's neck?
Mr. Sarkozy's detractors are not at a loss for explanations: vainglorious
ambition; erratic, overexcited haste making waste; cynical concern for France's
Arab-Muslim markets, combined with cowardly surrender to its restless immigrant
communities; low-down betrayal of Israel and the Jews. Without dismissing any or
all of these motivations, it might be helpful to explore the conjunction of a
Nicolas-to-the-rescue self-image and a power-to-the-peacemakers European
strategy.
In 1993, as mayor of the chic Parisian suburb of Neuilly, Nicolas Sarkozy helped
rescue kindergartners from a self-described "human bomb" who had wired their
classroom with explosives. Mr. Sarkozy's enemies accuse him of grandstanding,
but the image of the young mayor carrying a liberated child corresponds to his
conception of political action. Hand-wringers denounced the use of excessive
force when commandos ended the two-day siege by shooting the hostage taker in
the head.
A rescue exploit also marked the beginning of Mr. Sarkozy's presidency. With the
help of his soon-to-be ex-wife Cecilia, he pried five Bulgarian nurses and a
Palestinian doctor out of the Libyan prison where they had been held since 1999,
accused of injecting children with HIV. As a reward for releasing the health
workers, Moammar Gadhafi was invited five months later to pitch his tents in the
center of Paris, parade around town in his flowing robes and, reportedly, sign
on for a nuclear power plant and other goodies.
Lebanon was rescued à la française last spring when a Hezbollah show of force
threatened to destroy the last shreds of legitimate government power. An
accommodating Michel Suleiman was ushered into the presidential slot,
Hezbollah's might-makes-right power was tacitly accepted, and President Sarkozy
led a French delegation to congratulate the Lebanese on their "peaceful"
conflict resolution.
Russia's August invasion of Georgia inspired another high-profile
rescue/rehabilitation operation. Messrs. Sarkozy and Kouchner zipped back and
forth between Tbilisi to Moscow and negotiated a cease-fire deal that left
Georgia dismembered of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and encouraged similar threats
to the sovereignty of Ukraine.
And now Mr. Sarkozy has turned his diplomatic skills to Gaza. Unlike Mr. Chirac,
who was viscerally anti-Zionist, Mr. Sarkozy's sympathies for Israel don't
appear feigned. As a sincere friend of the Jewish state, Nicolas Sarkozy
believes he can speak frankly, criticize freely and act wisely. (He takes the
same position vis-à-vis the U.S. and the war in Iraq.) Determined to forge the
same forthright relations with the Arab world, he has been trying, in vain, to
include Israel in a new, improved Mediterranean Union.
But what does he have in mind for this stage of the conflict? There have been
hints of a plan to persuade Syria, Egypt and Lebanon to persuade Hamas to
promise to eventually stop shooting rockets into Israel, in exchange, one might
guess, for maximal concessions from Israel.
How can an intelligent man like Nicolas Sarkozy carry his penchant for
negotiation to the absurdity of protecting Hamas, which figures on the EU list
of terrorist organizations? If Israel is not allowed to defend itself against
terrorists who have fired some 6,500 rockets at Israeli civilians since 2005, it
follows that anyone can do anything to Israel without fear of retribution. Is
this the assumption behind the notion of "disproportionate force"?
Mr. Sarkozy's condemnation of Hamas for "irresponsible . . . inexcusable"
action, repeated at every step of the peace junket, is meaningless when combined
with his demand that Israel silence its guns. Syrian President Bashir al Assad,
reintegrated into the international community by the grace of Mr. Sarkozy, lent
a deaf ear to his requests for a calming influence on Hamas. The Syrian dictator
only condemned Israel's "war crimes."
Israeli President Shimon Peres urged his French counterpart to refrain from
bringing a cease-fire resolution before the U.N. Security Council -- but to no
avail. Bernard Kouchner went straight to New York to convince the Americans to
facilitate said resolution. This too is expected to fail. Stumped by an American
administration that has not said its last word, rebuffed by an Israeli
government determined to handle the situation on its own terms and timetable,
rejected by an ingrate Syrian dictator, the French president has little to show
for his end run around the EU delegation.
As long as Washington stands with its Israeli ally, the French president's
influence will be limited. But the days of moral clarity in the White House
might soon be over. George W. Bush -- who declared: "Another one-way cease-fire
that leads to rocket attacks on Israel is not acceptable" -- is on his way out.
The world is waiting for Barack Obama to set things right.
What lurks behind the president-elect's cautious silence on this major conflict?
Nicolas Sarkozy's troubling peacemaking is eerily similar to Mr. Obama's winning
campaign arguments. Declaring a firm commitment to Israel's security, the
candidate promised to improve America's relations with its European allies and
the Arab-Muslim world, and resolve conflicts by dialogue and astute diplomacy.
As virulent anti-Israeli demonstrations flare across the U.S., the dangers of
the French president's illusions may soon be multiplied by a real world power.
**Ms. Poller is an American writer living in Paris since 1972.
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,
December 2008, pages 42-44
Special Report
Letter From Shebaa
By Habib Battah
Though few Lebanese have ever visited or seen it, the largely isolated village
of Shebaa has become a defining issue in Lebanese politics
IN BETWEEN the rugged mountains at the southeastern tip of Lebanon, our tour bus
winds down a quiet road under the watchful eye of an Israeli observation post.
Perched high in the hills above us, the commanding position is marked by a
towering antenna surrounded by a multi-story perimeter fence. It is the first
human settlement we have seen for miles and the first sign that we are nearing
Shebaa, one of the most contentious and volatile border regions in the Middle
East.
As the only vehicle on the road, our visit was probably met with much curiosity
from the Israeli officers manning the hilltop, which overlooks the junction
point between Syria, Israel and Lebanon; three neighbors at war for decades. The
Israelis, who clearly dominate the landscape, may have shifted from curiosity to
suspicion when our driver suddenly stopped in the middle of the road to give
everyone on board a better view. Digital cameras became ubiquitous as passengers
crowded around the front of the cabin (in typical Lebanese fashion) to get a
good shot. One man even began to screw on a telephoto lens. “Do you want to get
us killed?” a woman seated across the aisle shouted at him in Arabic.
Our trip had been arranged by a Lebanese hiking group known as Vamos Todos (VT),
which prides itself on remote adventures for local nature-lovers. “We promised
to take you all over Lebanon, didn’t we,” a cheerful VT e-mail sent out a week
earlier had read. “Well now is the time to visit Shebaa...yes, you read it
correctly. It really is Shebaa!”
Nestled in the heart of shrub-covered no-man’s-land, Shebaa and its surrounding
hills occupy a strange place in the minds of many Lebanese. Although Israel
seized the territory during the 1967 war, few had ever heard of the place until
less than a decade ago. Now, with Lebanon’s new president warning he may use
“force” to regain occupied land, the Shebaa area is taking center stage as the
last militarily active front in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Many an international leader has tried to intervene. During their visits to
Lebanon in recent months, both French President Nicolas Sarkozy and U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have proposed defusing the issue. But the
villagers of Shebaa seem to have a different view. While speaking to some during
our tour this past summer, I found that the call-to-arms rhetoric was as alien
to them as it was for many Lebanese who have little clear conception of where
Shebaa is located, let alone what it looks like.
I was first struck by the isolation. We had driven for about half an hour along
a barren mountain range before spotting the Israeli observation post, passing
nothing but the odd shepherd after departing from a cluster of villages in the
southern Bekaa Valley. Before setting out, we were reminded one last time of the
authority of the Lebanese state when two soldiers standing under a ramshackle
tin roof waived us through their checkpoint. One wore plastic flip flops and
track shorts while holding a kettle of coffee.
I remembered these two troops later that morning when I stared up at the
glistening sophistication of the Israeli antenna tower. As our tour bus plugged
on beneath it, my thoughts and the desolate rocky expanse were suddenly
interrupted by a huddle of concrete low rises sprouting out of a small green
valley on our right. Finally, fabled Shebaa appeared before us—but as we closed
in, this village of resistance pride refused to be demystified.
Lebanese border towns with Israel typically are highly charged areas, draped in
posters of men who died fighting Israel’s 22-year occupation of the area and
with flags of Hezbollah, the political and paramilitary Shi’i force that hails
them as martyrs. But there was no such fanfare in Shebaa and no one spoke of
Hezbollah—ironic in that it was that party, more than anyone else, which put
this village on the map. By contrast, the only posters on display in Shebaa’s
town square were those of pro-Western politicians such as Prime Minister Fouad
Siniora and parliamentary majority leader Saad Hariri. Considering Shebaa’s
perceived history as a resistance battleground, it seemed odd.
The village, and more importantly its farmsteads, have become a defining issue
for Hezbollah following Israel’s abrupt withdrawal from southern Lebanon in
2000. While most of the country was celebrating, the Party of God vowed to keep
up the fight for a sliver of agricultural land adjacent to Shebaa, known as the
Shebaa Farms, which remained under Israeli control. Yet many in Lebanon found
the persistence perplexing. Hezbollah already had claimed a massive victory over
the Israelis. Why did they now need to perpetuate the decades-old conflict when
a cease-fire seemed so close at hand?
Israel, for its part, has refused to withdraw from the Shebaa Farms based on the
claim that it belonged to Syria. The Israelis thus link the Farms to the
adjacent Golan Heights, a much larger Syrian territory which it also captured in
1967. The United Nations agreed with Israel, verifying its pullout from Lebanon
as “complete” in 2000 and marking a “blue line” border between the two states.
This divided the village of Shebaa, which would remain on the Lebanese side,
from its farms, which were seen as part of the Israeli-occupied Golan. Both
Beirut and Damascus protested this decision, but could not produce enough
evidence to dispute it legally by proving that the farms were indeed Lebanese.
A major problem is that the border between Lebanon and Syria has been vague
since it was created by French colonial officials, and little has been done by
either country since to clarify that. Moreover, although several maps put the
farms in Syria, the Shebaa farmers consider themselves Lebanese. They possess
Lebanese citizenship and paid taxes to Lebanon well before the 1967 takeover.
Syrian officials, on the other hand, while publicly stating support for
Lebanon’s claim to the farms, have refused to make an official declaration,
saying this would require an act of border delineation, which “cannot happen”
while Israel controls the territory. Syria’s detractors were not convinced,
however, alleging that the previously unheard-of farms were merely being used as
a pretext to keep Hezbollah heavily armed and in a position to manipulate
Lebanese politics—a position it maintains today.
The residents of Shebaa, we hoped, would provide the real story. After all, it
was supposedly their farmlands that were at the heart of the dispute.
Our first stop was the mayor’s office. His staff had set out trays with heaps of
plump cherries fresh from the harvest to welcome us. Our group of about two
dozen hikers crowded into his conference room and listened intently as he
casually recounted Shebaa’s geographic traits, such as topography and rainfall.
He then assured us with little emotion that the farmlands on the Israeli side of
the observation post did indeed belong to Lebanon and that Shebaa farmers had
produced nearly century-old land deeds and tax documentation to prove it. (The
claim has been bolstered by Hebrew University researcher Asher Kaufman, who has
uncovered Mandate-era records in Paris indicating Lebanese possession of the
farms since at least the 1920s. But Kaufman has also argued that the Syrians
attempted to assert military control of the Shebaa area in the 1950s.)
Looking back over the last 40 years, the mayor lamented the untold millions of
dollars in taxable agricultural revenue that Shebaa’s municipality had lost
since Israel seized its farmsteads and subsequently expelled village farmers.
Tourism revenues would also have to be factored in, he added, since the Israelis
had built a ski resort atop Shebaa’s occupied snowcapped hills. Pictures of the
slopes and chair lifts, presumably taken off the Internet, were displayed as
part of a Shebaa village calendar that hung on the mayor’s conference room wall.
Contrary to most Western press reports, which indicate the area of the farms to
be 10 square miles at most, the mayor said local estimates ranged from 19 to 75
square miles. His guess, he told us, was somewhere in the middle, at about 40
square miles. It was a moderate, almost nonchalant approach—one which seemed to
characterize our talks with Shebaa villagers throughout the day.
After our meeting, we hiked down a lush valley to a favorite local picnic spot
near a creek where families had gathered to enjoy a Sunday lunch. Arabic pop
music blared from a makeshift restaurant where we were to eat. With such a
festive atmosphere, it was hard to imagine that the Israeli border was only a
few hundred yards away.
“We don’t have any problems here,” a man told me while enjoying a waterpipe and
a shot glass of Arak, Lebanon’s renowned alcoholic drink. “Everything is just
fine,” his table mate added. When I asked how close the border was, he grinned,
as if amused by my question, and pointed in the direction of Israel. “It’s right
over this hill,” he said.
But what about the war, the occupation, the resistance, I asked. They shrugged
and shook their heads. “There’s none of that here....Why don’t you join us for a
drink?”
I was confused. The villagers of Shebaa, I assumed, would be more passionate
than anyone about Israel returning the occupied territory, their territory. But
even though the villagers of Shebaa possessed deeds to much of the Shebaa Farms,
Hezbollah, the Lebanese state, even the international community seemed to be far
more passionate about them.
I put the question to the town’s local police, who had escorted us throughout
the hike. Acting almost as tour guides, they showed us around the town’s old
mills and picked yet more cherries for us to sample along the way. I asked them
about the absence of a visible Hezbollah presence and they seemed unmoved.
Hezbollah had launched several attacks on the Israelis from the Shebaa area in
the early 2000s, including a high-profile kidnapping operation. But why wasn’t
the Party of God being celebrated as it had been in other border villages in the
south? After all, in their absence as a bulwark who would defend against the
Israelis taking more territory, as Hezbollah claimed it would? Who would defend
Shebaa if the village didn't support Hezbollah?
“The two of us,” one of the policemen replied, smiling broadly. “We’ll protect
it.”
Laughter aside, I pressed them further on the issue and one admitted that
Hezbollah was a “Shi’i resistance,” and that Shebaa was a Sunni town. This came
as a surprise. Dozens of international and even Lebanese news reports had missed
this critical detail. But even so, Hezbollah presents itself as the national
resistance and draws at least some Sunni support. The policemen said they were
not against Hezbollah, but that the movement simply did not concern or involve
them. I thought back to the posters of Hariri and Siniora in the town’s square
and the explanation—though based on pure sectarianism—made uncomfortable sense
in the Lebanese context.
When we re-boarded our tour bus, I took one last look up at the Israeli
observation post with its array of sophisticated watchtowers and antennae, and
could not help but wonder if its towering proximity had also played a factor in
the villagers’ responses.
Barely a couple of weeks after our trip, Shebaa was back in the headlines. In
mid-July, Hezbollah declared a second major victory against Israel after
negotiating the release of the last remaining Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli
prisons. That the men were exchanged for the corpses of the two Israeli troops
kidnapped ahead of the July 2006 war was a vindication to Hezbollah and its many
supporters. They now wholeheartedly felt that the war, despite all its ruin, was
justified by the recognition of Hezbollah and thus Lebanon, as a force to be
reckoned with.
But the prisoner exchange would also have ramifications for the hamlet of Shebaa.
The battle for prisoners and land had always figured prominently in Hezbollah’s
rhetoric, forming the basis of the decade-long cross-border war of attrition it
waged with Israel in the 1990s. Now that all the prisoners had been freed, one
of the two fundamental cards was laid on the table, and Shebaa took center stage
as Hezbollah’s major raison d’etre, at least in a military sense. It was for
this reason, some speculated, that Lebanese President Michel Sleiman had made
his sudden pronouncement to liberate the farms “by force” if necessary. The
statement came just as the prisoner exchange negotiations were under way, only
two days before the actual trade took place on the border.
In a way, Slieman was riding a wave of diplomatic fervor. A month earlier, U.S.
Secretary of State Rice had made the landmark statement that “the time has come
to deal with the Shebaa Farms issue.” This came as surprise to many, since the
U.S. had long refrained from mentioning the territory so valued by Hezbollah.
Meanwhile, French President Sarkozy floated the idea of the U.N. taking control
of the Shebaa Farms from the Israelis.
Whether or not the plan was an effort to upstage Hezbollah by laying claim to
its central cause, the Shebaa dispute suddenly became almost irrelevant. In a
speech in early September, Hezbollah leader Sayed Hassan Nasrallah said the
fight against Israel would continue whether or not the farms were returned.
Today Western leaders are consumed with reports that Hezbollah has received
surface-to-air missiles capable of destroying Israeli aircraft as they routinely
violate Lebanese airspace. Hezbollah also has raised the issue of seven small
villages held in northern Israel that it says belong to Lebanon. Unlike the
cause of the remote villages, Hezbollah’s pledge to disrupt Israeli air
violations is sure to resonate deeply with the whole of Lebanon. For years,
Israeli warplanes have flown low across the entire country, unnerving residents
with their routine (at times daily) thunderous sonic booms.
In August, Hezbollah made one of its boldest statement to date, saying it will
“destroy Israel” if it attacks Lebanon again. Having enjoyed a summer of
relative calm, however, that is one reality many Lebanese would rather not
contemplate.
Habib Battah is a free-lance journalist based in Beirut and New York whose work
has appeared on CNN, Al Jazeera, Variety and the BBC. He blogs at <www.beirutreport.blogspot.com>
and is currently pursuing an M.A. at New York University.
The Solution of the Two States or the Dissolution of the Two States
07/01/2009
Asharq Alawsat
By Mamoun Fandy, Ph.D.
http://aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=15293
Despite the savagery of the incoming photos from Gaza, where the Israeli
military machine has turned the skies into a fireworks display at the start of
this New Year, one may momentarily extricate oneself from the feelings of anger
and sadness to think for a while, and to address a message both to Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert and to the head of the Hamas movement, Ismail Haniyeh. This
is the message, and I start by Haniyeh.
Mr. Ismail Haniyeh, I profess to you that any sane person will stand against the
vicious aggression mounted by Israel on Gaza and on the Palestinian people
there. But allow me, Mawlana [Arabic word translating as 'your majesty' but
often used in addressing Muslim clerics], to face you with the facts. Let us
assume that you attained victory against Israel, as Hezbollah attained victory
against Israel in 2006. Pray tell what would your expectations be for the future
of the Palestinian State, and for the role the Hamas movement would play inside
this presumed State? The political ceiling of Hamas will be the same as
Hezbollah's today: An armed political party that strives hard to be in the
internal Lebanese political equation in a formula that allows it to retain its
arms, arms which are of course futile vis-à-vis Israel, in the presence of a
multinational force that separates the two sides of the conflict, but at the
same time remain as a source of worry for the Lebanese competitors in the
political process. It did not get either the dates of the Levant or the grapes
of Yemen! [Arabic saying meaning that it came out empty-handed]
As to what your mother organization, the Muslim Brothers movement, has attained
in our Arab world in general, its ceiling in the Arab political process is
known. In various contingencies under regimes that are strong from the security
aspect, the fate of the Muslim Brothers anywhere will not differ from their fate
in Syria after the [ 1882] Hama blow and the end of the movement as a worrisome
organization for the regime at the time. Now the Muslim Brothers have become
mere pockets of dissidents abroad, as is the case with Ali Sadr-al-Din
al-Bayanuni, the General Supervisor of the Syrian Muslim Brothers group who
resides in Britain. Under a less severe security grip and some openness, as in
Egypt, the political ceiling of the Muslim Brothers is 80 seats in the People's
Assembly, or 18% of the parliamentary seats, with the movement still banned and
hounded. As for Kuwait and Jordan, the ceiling of the Muslim Brothers group
there is making a nuisance for the government and trying to harass it in the
Kuwaiti and Jordanian parliaments. The Muslim Brothers have not taken control of
either the Jordanian or the Kuwaiti Street. They have not brought down the
authority in either country. As for the Brothers of Sudan, they seized control
of the State then split among themselves, demolished it, and sat on the piles of
debris, as we say in Al Sa'id [Southern Egypt].
So pray tell what you, Hamas, can accomplish with the Israeli presence if the
military occupation of Gaza returns? Or what can the Hamas movement achieve
under the authority of Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas and the Fatah movement
if you are destined to reach reconciliation? If we take the first possibility,
which is the return of Israel as an occupation power holding Gaza in a vice grip
with its security bodies, then certainly nothing will remain of Hamas but
symbols abroad. As for the second possibility, namely reconciliation between
Fatah and Hamas, the maximum political gains for the Hamas movement in the
foreseeable future is to be, as I mentioned at the start of this article, like
Hezbollah in Lebanon. It should be noted here that the capabilities of Hezbollah
that qualified it for the gains it achieved in the Lebanese interior definitely
far exceed your movement's capabilities in terms of the number of cadres, their
training and discipline, and the quantity and quality of their weaponry.
Under the shadow of these postulates that are tied to the uniqueness of the
Palestinian perspective and Israel's heavy weight on its chest, and considering
the unsuccessful experimentations of the Muslim Brothers in the Arab countries,
I tell you, Mawlana, that you do not have ahead of you apolitical situation
better than that in which you are today. So accept commitment to a continued
ceasefire while you enjoy this popular sympathy on the Arab and Islamic domains.
The continuation of this sympathy if not assured. Hezbollah enjoyed sweeping
Arab and Islamic sympathy in the summer of 2006, but if it had started another
war after this it would not have found any one to support it except its men in
the [southern Beirut] suburb and some of the satellite TV heroes, the ones I
refer to as the new space astronauts. You have to cover yourself with the
political mantle the Arab countries are giving you today, and you have to
support their step in New York and its results. In my assessment, this is the
maximum that the Hamas movement can get today.
The second part of the message is directed to Mr. Ehud Olmert.
Mr. Olmert, you must know like Ismail Haniyeh the ceiling of what can be
attained in Gaza today. The most that Israel can do militarily today against
Gaza is what it has already done: Moving its tanks and soldiers and invading the
town with ground troops. In this you will not be stronger than the Americans in
their invasion of Al- Fallujah and the human and material losses inflicted on
them by this neglected, forgotten town. You will not be more capable than the
British and American NATO forces in Qandahar, where their Generals had to make a
semi-admission of defeat. You will not be more successful than the French who,
many decades ago, were exhausted by the rebels of Algeria until they departed
from their country. The results of the Israeli ground thrust into Gaza are
known. You will enter into a guerrilla war with the men of the Hamas movement in
Gaza's streets and narrow alleys. It will be a cruel war that will cost you a
lot and earn you the wrath of the entire world. Your army's men might have
learned some skills in street fighting from their last war in South Lebanon. But
you must realize that neither you nor any other force, however mighty, can
eradicate a resistance movement woven into the fabric of its local community
like the Hamas movement in Gaza, Hezbollah in South Lebanon, the Irish
Republican Army in Ireland or similar movements in the history of human
conflict. Of course you have the military might to erase Gaza in its entirety
from the map, and also South Lebanon. But what price will you pay if you go
ahead with such a lunatic act?
The ceiling of your achievements in Gaza will be similar to what you achieved in
your last war on Lebanon: Going into a losing battle, alienating international
opinion against you, and driving the Arab and Islamic Street to more radicalism
and extremism. The bloody scene you created in Gaza is very serious and reflects
only a strategic lack of direction that could destabilize regional security as a
whole, in addition to destabilizing the neighborhood countries that have
established peace with you like Egypt and Jordan and embarrassing and confusing
their leaders. As I have mentioned in two previous articles, the Israeli
military escalation against Gaza does not lay siege to Gaza alone but to all the
moderate Arabs who still have hope that peace will prevail in the area and that
the page of war will be closed.
**Mr. Haniyeh, Mr. Olmert, the ceiling of the present crisis in Gaza is known
and clear from various perspectives. Victory is unattainable for either one of
you. Neither will attain his strategic objectives, whether in the short or
foreseeable term.
Analysis: It's all in how you want to define 'victory'
By YOSSI ALPHER
Jerusalem Post
Israel's war with Gaza-based Hamas is a faithful expression of its broader
dilemma with militant Islam. That dilemma is being played out against the
backdrop of Israel's complex relations with a troubled Arab world.
As with Hizbullah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, Israel is now fighting a
non-state actor, backed by Iran and operating out of a sovereign no-man's land
or "black hole" from which Israel had previously withdrawn unilaterally.
Both the 2005 Gaza withdrawal and the current fighting reflect Israel's military
problem: none of the classic strategies for dealing with a military enemy seem
to work. Occupation, removal of occupation, deterrence, tit-for-tat punishment,
economic blockade-all have failed.
The enemy welcomes extreme hardship and loss of life ("martyrdom") and seemingly
would welcome reoccupation. Anything that highlights Gazans' human suffering
sells well in the Arab world and among human rights activists in the West. Any
opportunity to wage a war of attrition against Israelis - soldiers and
civilians, there is no difference in militant Islamist eyes - drives home the
militant Islamist message that the Zionist enterprise is doomed.
The leadership in Israel's Sunni Arab state neighbors is torn among its sympathy
for the plight of Palestinians, its anger with the militant Islamists, its fear
of Iran and its concern lest the Arab masses support Hamas, Hizbullah and Iran.
The regime in Egypt, in particular, is being targeted by Iran because it
(correctly) blames Hamas for this conflict and because of its silent complicity
with Israel in keeping the Rafah crossing closed.
Silent, because the entire Arab state system, which to its credit has agreed to
normalize relations with Israel once peace is achieved, appears to be too weak
to take serious action against the Islamist threat.
The ghoulish nature of the militant Islamist campaign was perhaps best
illustrated a few days ago when a suicide bomber in Iraq targeted an anti-Israel
protest there.
The non-Islamist psyche is hard put to grasp what is going on. That's why
Israel's official war aim of punishing Hamas in order "to bring about an
improved and more stable security situation for residents of southern Israel
over the long term" is probably based on faulty logic.
Hamas might accept these terms under duress, but not sincerely or for any length
of time.
Hence, however successful from Israel's standpoint the current ground offensive
is in Gaza, in its search for longer-lasting remedies Israel is once again, as
in 2006, reaching out to the international community. It wants to see some sort
of international force deployed as part of a solution to keep Hamas from
rearming.
Hizbullah's reluctance thus far to join the fray and open up a second Islamist
front against Israel by firing rockets over the heads of UNIFIL, offers silent
testimony to the efficacy of the arrangements instituted in southern Lebanon
through UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
But Hizbullah's silence also apparently reflects its aspiration not to spoil its
chances of becoming the dominant political power in Lebanon in next May's
elections. Herein lies a warning for Israel and its neighbors, including the
Fatah leadership in the West Bank.
Hizbullah parlayed its survival in the 2006 war into a political victory in
Lebanon, assisted by Qatari mediation (and bribes).
One political solution to the current Gaza conflict offered by Egypt, Qatar and
Fatah is renewal of Hamas-PLO unity talks.
If Hamas, riding on a wave of Palestinian and broader Arab sympathy, agrees to
return to such talks, it is important both for Israel and the moderate Arab
leadership that it not be allowed to exploit them to ride to power in the West
Bank as well.
Few Israelis and Arabs hold out the hope that Operation Cast Lead will actually
lead to the elimination of Hamas, whose true leadership is in Damascus and whose
Palestinian supporters easily number in the hundreds of thousands.
If Hamas' Gaza-based leadership and armed cadres can be significantly weakened
and a blow struck against one of Iran's two Mediterranean bases, this operation
will have to be considered a moderate success but not a decisive victory.
**The writer is coeditor of the bitterlemons.org family of Internet
publications. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
at Tel Aviv University. bitterlemons.org