LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
January 09/09


Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 4,14-22. Jesus returned to Galilee in the power of the Spirit, and news of him spread throughout the whole region. He taught in their synagogues and was praised by all. He came to Nazareth, where he had grown up, and went according to his custom into the synagogue on the sabbath day. He stood up to read and was handed a scroll of the prophet Isaiah. He unrolled the scroll and found the passage where it was written:  The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to bring glad tidings to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim liberty to captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, and to proclaim a year acceptable to the Lord." Rolling up the scroll, he handed it back to the attendant and sat down, and the eyes of all in the synagogue looked intently at him. He said to them, "Today this scripture passage is fulfilled in your hearing." And all spoke highly of him and were amazed at the gracious words that came from his mouth. They also asked, "Isn't this the son of Joseph?"


Origen (c.185-253), priest and theologian
Homilies on Saint Luke's Gospel, no.32 (SC 87, p.386-392)
"The eyes of all in the synagogue looked intently at him"

When you read that Jesus «taught in their synagogues and was praised by all» take care not to hold as happy those who heard Christ at that time and to think of yourself as being deprived of instruction. For, if Scripture is true, our Lord did not speak only in former times in the congregations of the Jews but in our own congregation today, too, and not just here and now but in all the congregations the whole world through... Jesus is «praised by all» even more today than when he was known only within a small area...«He has sent me,» he says, «to bring glad tidings to the poor». The poor stand for the pagans; these were indeed the poor ones who had nothing: neither God, nor Law, nor prophets, nor righteousness, nor any kind of assurance. Why did God send him as a messenger to the poor? To «proclaim liberty to captives» – 'captives' is what we were: prisoners in chains for so long, subjected to Satan's power. And to «proclaim recovery of sight to the blind» since his word restored sight to the blind...«Rolling up the scroll, Jesus handed it back to the attendant and sat down. And the eyes of all in the synaogue looked intently at him». Even now, if you want to, here in our own congregation, you can look intently at the Savior. When you turn your heart's most profound gaze towards the contemplation of Wisdom and Truth, the only Son of God, then your eyes are looking intently at Jesus. How blessed was that congregation of which Scripture says that «the eyes of all looked intently at him»! How I would wish that our own assembly might merit the same testimony and that the eyes of all, catechumens and faithful, women, men and children, might see Jesus with the eyes of their soul! For after contemplating him your face and your countenance will be alight with his light and you will be able to say: «The light of your countenance has set its seal on us, Lord» (Ps 4,7 LXX).

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
A Plan for Gaza: Demilitarization and Internationalization.By WALID PHARES 08/01/09

No new Lebanon confronation, yet-By: Nicholas Blanford/Times Online 08/01/09
The Iran - Hamas Connection-By Mark S. Hanna-American Thinker 08/01/09
Is this leadership? By: Manuela Paraipan, 08/01/09
Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model.By Zachary Abuza-Middle East Quarterly 08/01/09

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for January 08/09
Suleiman: Commitment to UNSCR 1701 and For Supporting Lebanon's Candidacy to UNSC-Naharnet
PFLP-GC No Confirmation or Denial Over Firing Rockets on Israel-Naharnet
Geagea: Government the Only Side Entitled to Open New Front-Naharnet
Lebanese rockets raise fear of 2nd front-The Associated Press
Abbas says hopes Lebanon rocket incident isolated-Reuters
Rockets Fired from Lebanon Hit Northern Israel, Israel Fires Back-Naharnet
Lebanon Fires Rockets into Israel’s North-New York Times
Rockets from Lebanon, Gaza strike Israel-Boston Globe
Israel fires into Lebanon after rockets -security-Reuters
Who is behind the Lebanon rockets?BBC News
Israel Asks Lebanon to Stop Rocket Attacks-Naharnet
UNIFIL on Alert, Hizbullah Claims it Wasn't Behind Rocket Attack-Naharnet
UN force in Lebanon urges restraint after attack-Reuters
Lebanon minister says Hezbollah not behind attack-Reuters
Gaza conflict has potential to draw in Hezbollah-Los Angeles Times
Oil Rises as Lebanon Rockets Hit Israel, Widening Gaza Conflict-Bloomberg
Lebanon criticises rocket attack into Israel-Reuters
Rockets from Lebanon challenge Gaza offensive-Reuters
Lebanon: Rockets Show 'Intentions Not Good' - Patriarch-Stratfor
UNRWA '99.9% certain' gunmen didn't fire from shelled school-Jerusalem Post
3,000-Strong New Resistance Group Opponent of Hizbullah Established-Naharnet
Israel military steps up Gaza airstrikes-CNN
China urges ceasefire in Gaza and backs Egyptian proposal Reuters

Rockets Fired from Lebanon Hit Northern Israel, Israel Fires Back
Naharnet/At least three Katyusha rockets launched from south Lebanon hit northern Israel Thursday, prompting immediate retaliation by the Jewish state and threatening to open a second front.
Media reports said Israel responded to the 8:00 am Katyusha attack by firing five shells on the western sector of south Lebanon.
One report said the shells into northern Israel were fired from the outskirts of the southern town of Tair Harfa. "Three rockets landed in Israel fired from Lebanon," said police spokesman Micky Rosenfeld, adding that two people were lightly wounded in the area around the northern town of Nahariya.
"We carried out direct fire at the source of the rocket fire from Lebanon," an army spokeswoman said.
Rosenfeld said police sappers and bomb disposal units were working on the scene.
A Lebanese army spokesman told AFP: "Between two and three rockets were fired from southern Lebanon. Israel has retaliated with five or six rockets."
The rockets fell a day after Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah warned that "all possibilities" were open against Israel amid its deadly offensive in Gaza.
The last time rockets from Lebanon were launched was on June 17, 2007 slamming into the northern town of Kiryat Shmona causing minor damage and no injuries.
At the time, Hizbullah denied responsibility and Israel also said Hizbullah was not involved in the attack, blamed on an unnamed Palestinian organization. A Hizbullah spokesman had "no immediate confirmation" on the subject.
The U.N. peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL, said it was investigating.
Palestine Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) official Anwar Raja did not confirm or deny the group's involvement in the attack on northern Israel. Al-Arabiya TV said the Lebanese army was searching the area from where the rockets were fired.
Tair Harfa residents said they heard loud explosions in the morning. Israel and Hizbullah fought a 34-day war in 2006, after Shiite fighters seized two Israeli soldiers in a deadly cross-border raid. During the conflict, Hizbullah sent more than 4,000 rockets into northern Israel.
The war killed more than 1,200 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and more than 160 Israelis, mostly soldiers.
Israel is currently in the 13th day of a massive offensive in the Gaza Strip.
Hizbullah carried out its deadly raid in 2006 two weeks into Israel's last major operation in Gaza, launched after Gaza militants seized another Israeli soldier in a raid near the Palestinian territory. In his address on Wednesday, Nasrallah said: "We have to act as though all possibilities are real and open (against Israel) and we must always be ready for any eventuality." His comment marked the first time he has spoken so openly on the possibility of a renewed conflict with Israel since the war in Gaza began on December 27. Palestinian Islamist group Hamas denied on Thursday it was responsible for firing rockets into northern Israel from south Lebanon.
"We cannot blame any Palestinian faction and we don't know who fired the rockets," Hamas spokesman in Lebanon, Raafat Morra, told AFP. "Hamas is pursuing its combat inside Palestine and our principle is not to use any other Arab soil to respond to the occupation. This is our firm policy," he said.
"Basically what is happening is the fault of Israel because it is impossible to contain the Arab and Islamic world after the Gaza massacre." Israeli media citing unnamed military sources said the rockets could have been set off by Palestinian groups in retaliation for the war in Gaza. A Lebanese government official said authorities are trying to determine who launched the rockets. The official also said Lebanon is committed to a U.N.-brokered truce that ended the 2006 war.(AFP-AP-Naharnet) Beirut, 08 Jan 09, 10:02

Israel Asks Lebanon to Stop Rocket Attacks
Naharnet/The Israeli army said Thursday that both the Lebanese government and the Lebanese army must prevent rocket attacks on Israel.
An Israeli military spokesman said in a statement that "Palestinian members seek to drag Lebanon into escalation and we believe that the government and the Lebanese army must stop the firing (of rockets)."The statement came hours after four Katyusha rockets fired from south Lebanon hit northern Israel, slightly wounding two women. Beirut, 08 Jan 09, 14:00

Nasrallah: All Possibilities Open Against Israel
Naharnet/Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah on Wednesday warned that "all possibilities" were open against Israel.
"We have to act as though all possibilities are real and open with Israel and we must always be ready for any eventuality," Nasrallah told tens of thousands of supporters via video link at his stronghold in Beirut's suburbs on the occasion of Ashoura.
"I tell (Israeli Prime Minister Ehud) Olmert, the loser, the defeated in Lebanon, that you cannot wipe out Hamas or Hizbullah," Nasrallah vowed.
"Your jets will not frighten us, and your threats will not frighten us. We are ready for any aggression," Nasrallah said, adding that in the event of a new offensive on Lebanon "you will discover what is waiting for you." "You will realize that the 2006 war was but a walk in the park," he said, adding: "We are ready to sacrifice our souls, our brothers and sisters, our children, our loved ones for what we believe in." Nasrallah reiterated his criticism of Egypt for failing to open the Rafah border with Gaza and attacked the U.N. Security Council for not acting to condemn the Israeli aggression which began Dec. 27.
Addressing Egyptian officials, he said: "Do you need more than 650 martyrs to open the Rafah crossing permanently to help the people of Gaza toward victory?"
"I am only asking for the opening of a crossing and not another front," he insisted. Nasrallah hailed Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez for expelling Israel's ambassador to Caracas saying that all countries, including Arab states, must follow his example. "Arab governments must learn from this great Latin American leader how to show their solidarity with the Palestinian people and must severe relations with Israel," he said. Jordan and Egypt are the only two countries in the Middle East to have diplomatic relations with Israel. Qatar has warm ties with Israel. Beirut, 07 Jan 09, 13:06

Hamas' Hamdan at Sidon Rally: Resistance Holding Out in Gaza
Naharnet/Hundreds of people rallied Wednesday in the southern port city of Sidon in support of Gaza upon request by the Lebanese-Palestinian Committee.
Hamas representative in Lebanon Ossama Hamdan told the rally: "I say with confidence that the resistance is holding out in Gaza."
PLO representative in Lebanon Abbas Zaki, for his part, said the PLO has "presented itself as a victim for the sake of our brethren in Hamas."
"We are willing to make compromises for each other so as not to offer Israel compromises," Zaki added. Education Minister Bahia Hariri said solidarity with Gaza "can only be achieved through confronting the aggression." Beirut, 07 Jan 09, 14:18

Maronite Bishops Sound the Alarm: Gaza's Blaze Could Spread to Lebanon
Naharnet/The Council of Maronite Bishops warned Wednesday against the spread of the war in the Gaza Strip to Lebanon and urged unity among Lebanese to ward off possible dangers. One of "the dangers of the fighting in Gaza is its spread to other areas and countries, including Lebanon," the Bishops said in a statement after their monthly meeting. They urged the Lebanese to "forget about their differences" and unite against such dangers. "The split of the Lebanese into two bickering teams is not a sign of good health" particularly when Gaza is ablaze and the fire "could spread to its neighbors." Beirut, 07 Jan 09, 12:56

Attack on Israel from Lebanon threatens 2nd front
By IBRAHIM BARZAK and STEVE WEIZMAN, Associated Press Writers Ibrahim Barzak And Steve Weizman, Associated Press Writers
JERUSALEM – Lebanese militants fired at least three rockets into Israel early Thursday, threatening to open a new front for the Jewish state as it pushed forward with a bloody offensive in the Gaza Strip that has killed nearly 700 people.
Two people were lightly injured, and the rockets that exploded in Israel's north raised the specter of renewed hostilities with Hezbollah, just 2 1/2 years after Israel battled the guerrilla group to a 34-day stalemate. Hezbollah started the 2006 war as Israel was battling Palestinian militants in Gaza.
No group claimed responsibility and Lebanon's government, wary of conflict, quickly condemned the rocket fire. Israel fired mortar shells into southern Lebanon in response. For a second straight day, Israel said it suspended is Gaza military operation for three hours to allow in humanitarian supplies.
In new fighting Thursday, Israel killed at eight people, including five militants, raising the death toll from its 13-day offensive to 696 people, according to Palestinian medical officials.
The offensive is meant to halt years of Palestinian rocket attacks on southern Israel, but with roughly half the dead believed to be civilians, international efforts to broker a cease-fire have been gaining steam. One of the Lebanese rockets went through the roof of a retirement home in Nahariya, about five miles from the border, and exploded in the kitchen as some 25 residents were eating breakfast in the adjacent dining hall. One resident suffered a broken leg, another bruises, apparently from slipping on the floor after emergency sprinklers came on. "The rocket entered through the roof, hurling the water heaters into the air. It went through bedrooms upstairs and then into the kitchen. There was a serious blast," said Henry Carmelli, the home's manager.
About three hours later, air-raid sirens went off again. Residents in two northern towns reported explosions of incoming rockets, though some reports suggested there had been a false alarm. Police said they were searching for the fallen projectiles.
Israel has repeatedly said it was prepared for a possible attack on the north since it launched its bruising campaign against Hamas militants in Gaza on Dec. 27. Israel has mobilized thousands of reserve troops for such a scenario, and leaders have warned Hezbollah of dire consequences if it enters the fighting.
Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora condemned both the attacks and Israel's retaliatory fire. The attacks are "the work of parties who stand to lose from the continued stability in Lebanon," Saniora said.
Hezbollah, which did not comment, has said it does not want to draw Lebanon into a new war. Small Palestinian groups, who have rocketed Israel twice since the end of the 2006 war, have recently threatened to open a new front against Israel if the fighting in Gaza continued.
An Israeli Cabinet minister, Meir Sheetrit, suggested that Lebanese splinter groups, not Hezbollah, were responsible. He said the government had no interest in renewing hostilities. "Even though we have the ability to respond with great force, the response needs to be carefully considered and responsible," Sheetrit told Army Radio. "We don't need to play into their hands."
Shortly after the first rockets fell around the town of Nahariya, five miles south of the Lebanese border, Lebanese TV stations reported Israeli mortar fire on open areas in southern Lebanon. The Israeli military confirmed it carried out "pinpoint fire" in response without elaborating. Israeli defense commentators said they expected the incident to be a one-time show of solidarity with the Palestinians, not a declaration of war. Still, police said public bomb shelters throughout the north were opened.
Palestinians reported some two dozen airstrikes in Gaza on Thursday. One militant was killed and 10 wounded in Gaza City, while an airstrike in northern Gaza three members of a rocket-launching cell, Palestinian medical officials said. The attack took place about 150 yards from a hospital and wounded 12 bystanders. The Israeli army has repeatedly said militants use civilian areas for cover.
Also, there were clashes between Israeli armored forces and Hamas militants in southern Gaza.
The Israeli offensive has reduced Palestinian rocket fire, but not stopped it altogether. Several barrages were reported Thursday, including one strike that damaged a school and sports center in the southern city of Ashkelon, police said. Both buildings were empty.
For a second day, Israel's Defense Ministry said the offensive was halted for three hours to allow Gaza residents to stock up on supplies and to allow aid shipments into the besieged area. Ministry spokesman Peter Lerner also said some 300 Palestinian holders of foreign passports would be allowed to leave.
The lull appears to be in response to international pressure on Israel to try relieve civilian suffering in Gaza. U.N. spokesman Chris Gunness said three hours was "wholly inadequate" and would not be enough to relieve widespread food and water shortages.
After Wednesday's lull, Israel quickly resumed its offensive, bombing suspected smuggling tunnels near the border with Egypt after Hamas responded with a rocket barrage. Israeli planes destroyed at least 16 empty houses.
The tunnels are Hamas' lifeline, used to bring in arms, money and basic goods. Israel says local homes are used to conceal the tunnels.
Of the 696 Palestinians killed since Dec. 27, some 350 were civilians, among them 130 children, according to Palestinian medical officials.
Eleven Israelis have been killed, including three civilians, since the offensive began. The army said Thursday that an infantry officer was killed by an anti-tank missile.
Growing international outrage over the human toll of Israel's offensive, which includes 3,000 Palestinians wounded — could work against continued fighting. So could President Bush's departure from office this month and a Feb. 10 election in Israel.
But Israel has a big interest in inflicting as much damage as possible on Hamas, both to stop militant rocket fire on southern Israeli towns and to diminish the group's ability to play a spoiler role in peace talks with Palestinian moderates. Despite the heavy fighting, strides appeared to be made on the diplomatic front with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice saying the U.S. supported a deal being brokered by France and Egypt. While the U.N. Security Council failed to reach agreement on a cease-fire resolution, Egypt's U.N. Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz said representatives of Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian Authority agreed to meet separately with Egyptian officials in Cairo. Israeli envoys arrived in Egypt on Thursday to discuss the proposal.
In Turkey, a Mideast diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly said that country would be asked to put together an international force that could help keep the peace. And diplomats in New York worked on a U.N. Security Council statement backing the cease-fire initiative but failed to reach agreement on action to end the violence. For Israel to accept a proposed cease-fire deal, "there has to be a total and complete cessation of all hostile fire from Gaza into Israel, and ... we have to see an arms embargo on Hamas that will receive international support," said government spokesman Mark Regev.
For its part, Hamas said it would not accept a truce deal unless it includes an end to the Israeli blockade of Gaza — something Israel says it is not willing to do. Israel and Egypt have maintained a stiff economic embargo on Gaza since the Hamas takeover.
The Palestinian Authority controls the West Bank while Hamas rules Gaza — two territories on opposite sides of Israel that are supposed to make up a future Palestinian state. Hamas took control of Gaza from forces loyal to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in June 2007.
The Israeli Cabinet formally decided on Wednesday to push ahead with the offensive while at the same time pursuing the cease-fire.
The military has called up thousands of reserve troops that it could use to expand the Gaza offensive. Defense officials said the troops could be ready for action by Friday. In Geneva, the international Red Cross said it found four small children alive next to their mothers' bodies in the rubble of a Gaza home hit by Israeli shelling. The neutral aid group says a total of 15 dead were recovered from two houses in the Zaytun neighborhood of Gaza City on Wednesday.
A Red Cross spokesman said rescuers had been refused permission by Israeli forces to reach the site for four days. It said the delay in allowing rescue services access was "unacceptable."
**Weizman reported from Jerusalem and Barzak from Gaza City. Associated Press writer Sam F. Ghattas contributed to this report from Beirut, Lebanon.

Analysis: No new Lebanon confronation,
By: Nicholas Blanford, Beirut - Times Online
The firing of Katyusha rockets into Israel from south Lebanon this morning was not unexpected given that the volatile border between the two countries tends to heat up during periods of heightened Israeli-Palestinian violence.
But it is unlikely at this stage that it signals the beginning of a new confrontation between Israel and the militants of Lebanon’s Shia Hezbollah.
No claim of responsibility has been made for the rocket salvo, although Palestinian militants, possibly with the tacit blessing of Hezbollah, are the most likely culprits. The Lebanese government has launched an investigation into the incident and the army in southern Lebanon is on full alert.
Hezbollah, which fields a powerful military wing that fought the Israeli army to a standstill in the month-long war of summer 2006, has little to gain from opening a new front with Israel at this stage. It is currently rebuilding and expanding its military capabilities, a process that began the moment the ceasefire ended fighting with Israel on August 14, 2006. The organisation has mounted a massive recruitment, training and re-armament drive, unprecedented in scale since Hezbollah emerged in Lebanon more than two decades ago.
Israel says that Hezbollah’s arsenal of rockets, some with an estimated range that brings southern Israel within reach, has tripled since the end of the 2006 war.
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s charismatic leader, warned Israel yesterday that his organisation was “prepared for every possibility and ready for all aggression”.
“The Zionists will discover that the war they had in July [2006] was a walk in the park if we compare it to what we’ve prepared for any new aggression,” he said.
So far, however, Hezbollah has restricted its support for its Palestinian ally Hamas to speeches and demonstrations in Beirut rather than military attacks on Israel.
In June, Lebanon goes to the polls in what is expected to be a tense and closely fought parliamentary election. An electoral win for Hezbollah and its allies against the Western-backed parliamentary majority block will strengthen its determination to hold onto its weapons and continue the struggle against Israel. Triggering a potentially devastating fresh war with Israel for the sake of Hamas in Gaza will not sit well with its Shia constituents, let alone other Lebanese, which is a compelling reason for Hezbollah to limit its actions.
However, Hezbollah will not want to see Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups in Gaza and the West Bank crushed to the extent that they can no longer mount armed resistance against Israel. If Hamas looks to be facing defeat, it is possible that Hezbollah will come to its assistance from Lebanon. Instead of blindly firing rockets into Israel, Hezbollah might attempt to shoot down Israeli jets which fly in Lebanese airspace on a near daily basis in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
The downing of an Israeli aircraft by Hezbollah would be considered a “red line” by Israel, but Hezbollah could argue with some justification that its action was a legitimate defense of Lebanese sovereignty rather than act of aggression against Israel.

UN force in Lebanon urges restraint after attack

Thu Jan 8, 2009
BEIRUT, Jan 8 (Reuters) - The commander of U.N. peacekeepers in Lebanon called for "maximum restraint" following a rocket attack into Israel from south Lebanon, a spokesman for the peacekeeping force said. The peacekeepers, known as UNIFIL, had taken immediate steps to identify the perpetrators and deployed additional troops, the spokesman said. The Lebanese army had also deployed extra troops, he said. Both the Lebanese and Israeli governments had underlined their commitment to a U.N. resolution that halted a 34-day war in 2006 between the Lebanese guerrilla group Hezbollah and Israel, the spokesman said.
Major General Claudio Graziano had called for "maximum restraint to avoid the escalation of the situation", the spokesman said, adding that there had been no claims of responsibility for the attack. The rocket attack from south Lebanon was seen as linked to Israel's offensive in Gaza. (Reporting by Tom Perry; Editing by Louise Ireland)

A Plan for Gaza: Demilitarization and Internationalization
By WALID PHARES
http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2009/01/08/a_plan_for_gaza_demilitarization_and_internationalization/5110/
January 08, 2009
Middle East Times
It may be somewhat early to discuss a comprehensive solution for the future of the Palestinian state on the one hand and to predict the way the global war with terrorism will end on the other hand. But it is urgent to remember the intentions of the Iranian and Syrian regimes and their proxy, Hezbollah, when thinking in terms of saving the civilian populations of Gaza from war, shielding the Israeli populations from rockets and avoiding an escalation of violence that could engulf the entire region.
So is there a plan to bring peace to the southern shores of the Levant? In an interview with Al-Jazeera, Israeli President Shimon Peres said his country will stop military operations when the strikes by Hamas and its allies will come to an end. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said his Palestinian Authority (PA) is ready to assume responsibility for the sake of his people.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdallah said their governments are ready to solve the crisis in Gaza if the PA is part of it. The United States, the European Union and the United Nations all affirmed that everything has to be done to end the war in Gaza.
Excellent. If all the above players are ready to stop the violence, end the war and save Palestinian and Israeli civilians from bloodshed, then the plan seems to be clear: demilitarization and internationalization of Gaza.
Establishing a fully-fledged U.N. sponsored and managed security system in the enclave has precedents across the planet: Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and to some extent in Lebanon and possibly in the near future, Darfur.
When an area slips under the control of a militia which is not bound by a peace treaty, or operating under international law, and when a population comes under fire from any party because of the military actions of such a militia, and until a recognizable and recognized sovereign state becomes responsible for such an enclave, the U.N. Security Council must step in and apply Chapter 7 of the charter, that is to bring peace to civilian populations.
In this case, the United Nations has a duty to seize Gaza and manage its peace until an internationally recognized and responsible Palestinian state rises again in that province.
So how will this be accomplished?
1. The Security Council meets and declares Gaza as an area under U.N. emergency management and vote, under Chapter 7, for a strong multinational force (MNF) to enter the enclave in coordination with Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
2. The MNF should not include forces whose governments are in a state of war with Israel or with the Palestinian Authority and must have diplomatic relations with both, for the purpose of peace building.
3. The MNF proceeds with the disarming of Hamas and all other militias first. Gaza should be demilitarized fully. Israeli forces would withdraw to the lines of demarcation fully.
4. The MNF would reestablish police centers and remit them to a reformed and transparent PA.
5. The MNF would protect the civilian population, in coordination with the PA units.
6. The Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference would provide all needed expenses for the MNF and the PA security forces. A consortium of oil producing governments from the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) would grant Gaza's U.N. sponsored local administration $10 billion or so to end the economic crisis, fund new schools, hospitals and basic infrastructure.
7. The Arab League would commit to grant Gaza residents visas to visit all Arab countries and work permits if they wish so.
8. Israel commits to allow Gaza workers to travel to the West Bank and vice versa.
9. The final security and economic arrangements would be integrated in the final status negotiations between the PA and Israel.
10. The PA and Israel would resume their direct negotiations for a peace settlement.
This 10-point plan can first of all bring peace and security to the Palestinian population in Gaza, the Israeli civilians in the surrounding areas, and also engage the responsibility of the United Nations, the European Union, the Arab League and the OIC in peace making.
Evidently, such a plan will have no chance to see light as long as any party to the conflict thinks they can count on a military solution only and particularly as long as Hamas is instructed by Tehran and Damascus to sink the peace process.
Walid Phares is the coordinator of the Trans-Atlantic Legislative Group on Counter Terrorism based in Washington D.C. and Brussels and the director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies as well as a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy.

The Iran - Hamas Connection
By Mark S. Hanna -American Thinker
http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/01/the_iran_hamas_connection.html

January 08, 2009
Since December 27, the Palestinians have taken a pounding unlike anything they have experienced since the war of 1948. Hundreds are dead and thousands wounded as a result of this unexpected war in which Hamas has drawn Israel.
Reminiscent of the 2006 war with Hezbollah, this Hamas war of 2008 raises numerous questions as to the timing, motives and objectives (not to mention wisdom) of hurling hundreds of rockets at Israel following the December 19 expiration of the ceasefire. One of the most critical of the questions is whether Tehran was behind Hamas' escalation leading to the Israeli retaliation.
With the war only days underway, evidence for Tehran's explicit complicity has yet to be established. But terrorism expert Walid Phares has argued that from a strategic perspective, Iran's involvement can be expected. "Hamas is a direct ally of Iran and strategic decisions by the jihadi group are made in Tehran...just as we saw in Lebanon in 2006 -Tehran is pulling the strings and very smartly."
A closer look at Iran's relationship to Hamas over the last two decades as well as the purpose and results of the 2006 war lends support to his thesis and reinforces that the recent actions of Hamas are being directed by the Iranians to further their messianic mission toward hegemony in the region leading to a global Caliphate.
Hamas' origins date back to the late 1980s where it originated as the armed military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Palestine. As they emphatically declare in their founding Covenant, "The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of the Moslim (sic) Brotherhood in Palestine" with an unequivocal objective "...to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine." Their official slogan summarizes their dream: "Allah is the target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes."
Originally resistant to the Khomeinist brand of the Iranian Shi'ite revolution, Hamas made efforts early in its history to resist Iran and pursue a more independent path toward the fulfillment of their vision. But by 1990 when the first intifada began, Hamas began to see Iran as an ally that could assist in its Covenant purposes to eradicate the Jewish state and replace it with an Islamist one.
Following the defeat of Iraq in the first Gulf War, Hamas recognized Iran as the emerging power of the region and by 1992 sent an official delegation to Tehran to meet with Ayatollah Ali Khameinei. Pledging military and financial support, Iran received Hamas, eventually giving them permission to open an office. Hamas responded in kind announcing that Hamas and Iran shared an "identical view in the strategic outlook toward the Palestinian cause in its Islamic dimension."
Ties between the two continued to tighten following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and in particular after Hamas' electoral victory in 2006. The international isolation of Hamas and refusal of the US, Europe and most Arab states to fund the newly elected military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood prompted Iran to announce $50 million in support in 2006. By mid 2007, Iran's known support for Hamas reached at least $120 million with pledges of an additional $250 million more, not including the military training and weapons Hamas received from Iran. By 2008, Iran was the primary supporter of Hamas and by some estimates had achieved proxy control of the organization.
That Hamas has been brought under the Islamic Republic's wing was confirmed through a Hamas commander's own confession last spring when he verified that Hamas has been receiving military training by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard since 2005. "We have sent seven ‘courses' of our fighters to Iran," he said. "During each course, the group receives training that he will use to increase our capacity to fight...Those who go to Iran have to swear on the Koran not to reveal details, even to their mothers."
Just ten days prior to the ceasefire's expiration on December 19, Ahmadinejad himself -- as if he knew something was about to happen -- emphasized the larger partnership between the two, vowing to Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh to support them "until the big victory feast which is the collapse of the Zionist regime."
An excellent overview of Iran's strong influence in and over Hamas has been detailed by Meyrav Wurmser of the Hudson Institute, who argues persuasively that Iran's use of Hamas as a strategic asset is part and parcel of their grand design to establish the Caliphate from which their revolutionary jihad can be prosecuted more effectively for the subjugation of the West and world to Islam. This was also the purpose of the 2006 Israeli war with Hezb'allah.
Referred to as the First Israeli-Iranian War by Wurmser, the war was the beginning of a deliberate military effort by Iran to demonstrate to the Islamist world Iran's resolve (via Hezb'allah) to eradicate Israel and advance the Islamic revolution. Even to Iran, the results of the war were astonishing, confirming the military and strategic utility of using its proxies to diminish the perception of Israel's power, destabilize the region, and distract the international "community" while enhancing its own stature, prestige and power in the region.
That Iran achieved its objectives in the First Israeli-Iranian War, former Israeli Defense Minister and Ambassador to the US Moshe Arens lamented,
The perception in the Arab and Muslim world has already been mentioned; they believe that Israel was defeated by a few hundred Hizballah fighters, not by a big, strong army comparable to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Some 1.25 million residents were forced to evacuate their homes in the North of Israel or to sit in bomb shelters for over a month...I believe that if the Israeli public were polled, the majority would conclude that we were defeated.
While the military might of the IDF certainly overwhelmed Hezb'allah, it was the Lebanese Islamists' resolve to keep the rockets firing and actually survive the massive and disproportionate offensive by Israel that, in spite of the military and strategic advantages Israel gained after the war, led Israel and the world to perceive the war as a loss.
Of course for Hezb'allah, the perceived outcome was just the opposite. General Secretary of Hezb'allah Hassan Nasrallah's popularity soared among the Muslim masses around the globe, with his picture being plastered in windows, on doors and t-shirts in the same way Bin Laden's was after 9-11. And even though nearly decimated by Israel, Hezb'allah and its leader became the region's new giant slayer, reviving hope that Israel could be defeated thus enabling Nasrallah to further consolidate power in Lebanon.
But as mentioned, the real prize went to Iran, which proved through its proxy war it was able to successfully divert attention from the nuclear issue, undermine the power and influence of the more secular Arab states namely Egypt and Saudi Arabia, bog Israel down in an unpopular war and prevent it from fully accomplishing its declared war objectives, destabilize the region further leaving a greater power vacuum (which it of course moved to fill), rally the United Nations to deploy forces ensuring further protection for Hezb'allah, and emerge as the de-facto leader of the Islamist movement dedicated to the messianic tenets of Israel's destruction and implementation of the Caliphate.
The current war between Hamas and Israel -- which may be the Second Israeli-Iranian War -- follows the same pattern as the 2006 war with Iran and its allies vying to produce a similar outcome. A perceived defeat for Israel and victory (simply by surviving) for Hamas and the Palestinians would certainly buy more time for Iran's nuclear development ambitions, continue to isolate Egypt, Saudi and Jordan from the larger Islamic community (as we are seeing), further destabilize the region by increasing Hamas' power, and bring more pressure to bear against Israel by the western nations for their "disproportionate" response and "inhumane" treatment of Palestinians, all of which -- Iran has certainly calculated -- move the Islamist ball further down the field toward the goal of Caliphate.
2 Comments on "The Iran - Hamas Connection"

3,000-Strong New Resistance Group Opponent of Hizbullah Established
Naharnet/Arab Islamic Council Secretary-General in Lebanon Sayyed Mohammed al-Husseini announced the launch of the Arab Islamic Resistance, a group rival of Hizbullah, aimed at confronting the enemies of Arabism. Husseini, in an interview with al-Arabiya television network, said the group includes more than 3,000 "Mujahid from various military and development fields as well as the civil defense." Husseini said more than 1,500 men have requested membership in the group since the door for volunteering was opened. He said the new resistance group "has number and equipment that would please both the friend and the brother and frighten the enemy."
Husseini vowed a "lot of surprises," particularly on the subject of weapons, uncovering what he called "Arabism rocket" which is made by the resistance. He described the invention as "distinct." Al-Arabiya said the establishment of the group came in a statement released by the Arab Islamic Council on Wednesday
The statement said the group will be the "spearhead and in the frontlines to confront the enemies of Arabism … asserting that our resistance existed to defend the Arab world."(Photo courtesy of al-Arabiya) Beirut, 08 Jan 09, 11:35

Is this leadership?
By: Manuela Paraipan,

NOW Lebanon
January 8, 2009
The situation in Gaza is brutally clear. Hamas ended the truce. It said it has no interest in either prolonging it or entering into a different kind of agreement that would ensure a relative calm on both sides. Furthermore, Hamas marked the end of the truce by firing rockets into Israel. What should have Israel done? Ignore it? It couldn't since the rockets were the handiwork of what it considers a terrorist group on a sovereign country and its citizens. Many have responded, saying that the response is disproportionate, without questioning the wisdom of the decision taken by Hamas to end the truce in the first place.
Those who can never see that, as the cliché says, it takes two to tango, will run to find excuses for poor old Hamas: The leadership is in Syria, enjoying the hospitality of President Assad's regime and as such is hostage to its regional strategies; that the party receives support from Iran and inspiration from Hezbollah, and as such, work in cahoots with people that do not put the well being of the average Palestinians before their own regional ambitions.
But these are not excuses; these are in fact the reasons why the party exists; they are its raison d'être: to do the bidding of others. And in doing so, it has put its people second. This is the real outcome of Gaza's democracy. When one betrays its own kind, what else is there to claim to stand for? Where is Khaled Meshaal? Certainly not in the streets of Gaza supporting his people. The Hamas leadership may exhort people to take the route of martyrdom as long as it's not theirs. Hypocrisy, servitude and cowardliness have no limits when Hamas is involved.
But let us not forget also the role that countless Arab and Muslim regimes have played in abusing the Palestinian card for their own ends. (For what would they do without the Palestinian card?). They have sent the Palestinians weaponry, educated them to become suicide bombers and encouraged them to glory in the ghetto, while their leaders have been allowed to bully and brutalize, be politically dysfunctional and morally bankrupt in their attempts to present the world a sorry excuse for a state. It is not the Israelis or the rest of the world that hates the Palestinians; it is their own leaders and Arab nations that have exploited the cause to whip up the masses on their own streets.
When one brushes aside the propaganda from all sides, we see two people that are fighting to defend themselves, be it their land, dignity, rights or freedom. Neither is going to go away. If and when they understand the simple but highly sensitive concept of partnership, then the cycle of violence will stop.
**Manuela Paraipan is a Bucharest-based independent foreign policy analyst. She wrote this piece exclusively for NOW Lebanon

Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model
by Zachary Abuza
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2009, pp. 15-26
http://www.meforum.org/article/2044

Islamist terrorism may have its roots in the Middle East, but it has long since expanded globally. Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, is no exception. Jemaah Islamiyah has for more than fifteen years fought to transform Indonesia into an Islamist state. In recent years, its terrorist campaign has suffered setbacks. As Jemaah Islamiyah regroups, it builds upon the experience of Middle East terrorist groups. From Al-Qaeda, it adopts philosophical underpinnings that guide its dual strategy. From Hamas and Hezbollah, it borrows an "inverse triangle model" in which a broad network of social services supports a smaller jihadist core, and from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf emirates it adopts a model of charities and NGOs that help Jemaah Islamiyah advance its jihadist goals.

What Is Jemaah Islamiyah?

Jemaah Islamiyah was founded sometime in 1992 or 1993 by former members of Darul Islam, an Islamist movement that emerged during Indonesia's fight for independence from the Netherlands but that continued armed struggle for more than a decade after independence. Members of Darul Islam grew especially frustrated with their political emasculation under Muhammad Suharto's rule (1965-98). Jemaah Islamiyah's founders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, conceptualized the group as a covert organization that would topple the secular state through a combination of political agitation and violence. Jemaah Islamiyah's primary founding document, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah (PUPJI, The general guidebook for the struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah) outlines the role of clandestine cells and describes the Islamist struggle in terms of guerilla warfare. By the end of the decade, Jemaah Islamiyah had become an Al-Qaeda affiliate, receiving financial and material support from the group. Several top Jemaah Islamiyah operatives even received instruction in Afghan training camps.[1] Soon after its founding, Jemaah Islamiyah became an Al-Qaeda affiliate.

Jemaah Islamiyah sought advantage from the collapse of Suharto's authoritarian rule and Indonesia's descent into a chaotic decentralized democracy. Beginning in 1998, Jemaah Islamiyah launched the "uhud project," whose goal was ridding regions of the country of both Christians and Hindus in order to establish pure Muslim enclaves, governed by Shari‘a (Islamic law). Its two paramilitaries, Laskar Mujahidin in the Moluccas and Laskar Jundullah in Central Sulawesi, engaged in sectarian bloodletting against Christians and Hindus until, in 2002, the government was able to broker the Malino accords, enabling a fragile truce. Meanwhile, Jemaah Islamiyah began a bombing campaign in 2000, killing several hundred people, including 202 in one attack in October 2002 at a Bali disco.

Indonesian authorities fought back. Security forces arrested more than 450 Jemaah Islamiyah members, prosecuted over 250 terrorists, and eviscerated the organization's regional cell system. Victory was not complete, however. More than a dozen hardened Jemaah Islamiyah leaders remain at large; some, such as Noordin Muhammad Top, have significant organizational skills. Others, such as Zulkarnaen and Dulmatin, have technical and military capabilities. As recently as June 2008, police raids have netted large caches of bombs and bomb-making material,[2] suggesting that Jemaah Islamiyah's commitment to terrorism remains high.

Justifying a Soft Power Strategy

With the exception of Ali Ghufreon (known also as Mukhlas), awaiting execution for his role in the 2002 Bali bombing, Southeast Asian jihadists have no important homegrown theoreticians. Jemaah Islamiyah has filled the gap by drawing upon the works of Al-Qaeda's three most important thinkers—Abu Musab as-Suri, whose main work is the 2002 tract "Call to Worldwide Islamic Resistance"; Abu Bakr Naji, who wrote the 2004 document "The Management of Savagery"; and Abdul Qadir (Dr. Fadl), who, in November 2007, penned "Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World."

Together, these authors provide theoretical sustenance to Jemaah Islamiyah's revitalization of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, a civil society organization affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah, and other overt organizations. Suri, for example, argued that Al-Qaeda's blanket opposition to democracy was counterproductive and that jihadists should instead work with Islamist political leaders and parties. Naji concurred. "If we meditate on the factor common to the movements which have remained, we find there is political action in addition to military action," he explained. "We urge that the leaders work to master political science just as they would to master military science." Naji's specific recommendations that jihadists be able to justify their actions in Islamic law and reach the people directly without reliance on state media parallel the strategy implemented in Egypt by Sayyid Qutb who, in the Muslim Brotherhood, combined a mass-based movement and a network of covert cells. Jemaah Islamiyah has also adopted the substance of Qadir's tract which argued that most terrorism is illegal by Islamic law, that violent jihad should only be waged in defense, and that fighting Muslim leaders, even those decried as apostates, is illegal unless rebellion would lead to tangible improvement in Muslims' lives.[3]

Today, Jemaah Islamiyah pursues a three-front strategy of recruitment and expansion of cells, religious indoctrination and training of its members, and instigation of sectarian conflict. Indeed, Noordin Mohammad Top wrote an 82-page tract about how to establish jihadi cells on a six-month timetable.

The PUPJI outlines the three phases of jihad: iman (faith of individuals), hijrah (building a base of operations), and then jihad qital (fighting the enemies of Islam). One section of the PUPJI, "Al-Manhaj al-Harakiy Li Iqomatid Dien (The general manual for operations)," states that Jemaah Islamiyah can engage in overt activities in order to proselytize and build a base of support. But the bulk of the document is a guide for clandestine operations and cell-building, the path Jemaah Islamiyah leaders most closely follow.

The Rebound

After the Indonesian crackdown that began in 2003, Jemaah Islamiyah reverted to recruitment and indoctrination for several years, but it has again begun to build a base of operations, especially in Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas. As the group sought to recover from the blows inflicted by Indonesian counterterror forces, debate raged about how to move forward. The International Crisis Group's Sydney Jones, a leading expert on Indonesia, describes factional rifts inside Jemaah Islamiyah between proponents of sectarian bloodletting and those who wish to target the Indonesian government and Western targets.[4] Such strategies, however, are not mutually exclusive. Since 2004, Jemaah Islamiyah has increased bombings, assassinations, and raids on military and police facilities. The November 2005 beheadings of three Hindu schoolgirls was meant to undermine confidence in the state.[5]

By provoking sectarian attacks, Jemaah Islamiyah can broaden its definition of a defensive jihad. Such vigilantism enables it to contend that Jakarta has abdicated responsibility by not coming to the defense of the Muslim community, enabling Jemaah Islamiyah to pursue its goals with greater popular support. Since mid-2006, the Indonesian police have taken seriously the threat of sectarian violence after uncovering documents emphasizing the centrality of sectarian bloodletting to Jemaah Islamiyah's efforts to regroup.

Religious indoctrination has become a parallel component of Jemaah Islamiyah strategy. The group has sent high-level cells to Pakistan for advanced religious training. In 2003, for example, Jemaah Islamiyah sent nineteen children or brothers of high-ranking Jemaah Islamiyah members to study in the Lashkar e-Toiba madrasa, an Islamic school in Lahore, Pakistan, which has ties to the Taliban. Although Pakistani security arrested and deported them in fall 2004,[6] Jemaah Islamiyah has been able to conduct more such training in Indonesia where the group runs a network of approximately sixty madrasas and has launched its own publishing houses: Al-Alaq, the Arafah Group, the Al-Qowam Group, the Aqwam Group, and Kafayeh Cipta Media.[7]

Such a strategy is not unique to Indonesia and, indeed, has been frequently practiced in the Middle East. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood regrouped in the wake of the Egyptian government's mid-1990s crackdown by concentrating on mosques, publishing, and proselytizing.[8] Likewise, for more than a decade before Israeli Arabs became involved in Palestinian violence, the Islamic Movement within Israel maintained its own educational institutions and publication houses in the Israeli town of Umm al-Fahm.[9] Lebanon, too, has become home to a number of Islamist publishing houses.

Jemaah Islamiyah's Inverse Triangle

Like many Middle Eastern Islamist groups, Jemaah Islamiyah has embraced the inverse triangle in which a broad range of charities and nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) serve as cover for a narrower terrorist mission. And like many Islamist groups in the Middle East, as Jemaah Islamiyah regroups, it shows no intention of abandoning its core ideology even as some Indonesian officials wishfully see moderation where none exists. As the organization seeks to rebuild, it becomes an example of how Al-Qaeda affiliates, beaten back by successful counterterror strategies, regroup using both the democratic process they simultaneously fight and the legitimacy naively bestowed by the international community on any organization that calls itself a nongovernmental organization.

Jemaah Islamiyah has adopted a Hezbollah model of social organization in which most of the group's activities are overt charitable work and provision of social services even as a component of the organization clandestinely pursues terrorism. Beginning in the 1980s, Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shi‘i political group founded by Iran in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, began to construct a large network of educational institutions and social services both to complement their military wing and to serve as a recruitment tool. Slowly, Hezbollah built a state within a state in Lebanon, preventing anyone within its territory the option of remaining outside the group's influence. Even as Hezbollah conducts terrorist activities against Israel and within Lebanon itself, many in the international community refuse to define the group as a terrorist organization, in effect arguing that social work is exculpatory.[10]

Hamas has implemented the same model. While Hamas is a lethal terrorist organization that has employed at least sixty suicide bombings since the second intifada began in September 2000, many Palestinians and Europeans argue that the group's network of schools, orphanages, clinics, and social welfare organizations bestows some legitimacy.[11] In Iraq, too, militia leaders pursue the same strategy. Abdul Aziz Hakim, the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, has employed not only the Badr Corps, which has sponsored terrorism and conducted violent operations, but also the Shahid al-Mihrab Foundation, a charitable organization run by his son, Amar al-Hakim.

In Jemaah Islamiyah's case, the base of the inverse triangle is Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, an umbrella organization for political parties, NGOs, civil society organizations, and individuals committed to transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state.[12] Created in 1999, the organization has an office in Yogyakarta, publishes conspiracy-laden and vehemently anti-Semitic and anti-American books through Wihdah Press and its own magazine, Risalah Mujahidin, lobbies political officials, and in 2001 and 2003, held high-profile national conferences.[13] Muhammad Jibril, son of Jemaah Islamiyah leader Muhammad Iqbal Abdurrahman, runs Ar-Rahman Media, its multimedia publishing house. The use of diverse institutions is deliberate, even as the antipathy toward Indonesian democracy is pronounced. Muhammad Jibril told Al-Jazeera,

We want an Islamic state where Islamic law is not just in the books but enforced, and enforced with determination. There is no space and no room for democratic consultation.[14]

At a November 2006 sermon at a mosque in Kediri, East Java, Jemaah Islamiyah founder Ba'asyir urged his followers to go abroad to wage jihad, though without explaining why. "If you want to go on jihad, do not do it here [Indonesia] but in the southern Philippines or even in Iraq." He said the Bali bombers were legitimate jihadis even if their jihad was "not at the right time or place." Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia may have switched tactics with regard to the desirability of terrorism inside Indonesia, but they have not altered their commitment to violent jihad.

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has to some extent become Jemaah Islamiyah's equivalent of Sinn Fein, the political party that existed solely to mirror the Irish Republican Army's aims. Jemaah Islamiyah uses Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia to achieve whatever aims it can through the democratic process. Thus, the Majelis Mujahidin advocates for Islamic law components to all major bills and laws. It seeks, for example, to push Indonesian penal law into conformity with Islamic law[15] and has urged local Islamic communities to lobby regional representatives for Islamic law at the local level.[16] It is a strategy that is both well organized and effective. Nearly forty regional governments have taken steps to implement Islamic law, regulate interaction between men and women, obligate Qur'an reading, and ban alcohol.[17] The group has also pressured the media to replace secular programming with Islamic programming, legislating to force civil servants to wear Islamic dress, and mandating Arabic literacy.

Jemaah Islamiyah's engagement in the political process is a cynical short-term tactic in its longer-term strategy to eradicate democracy. "The democratic system is not the Islamic way," Ba'asyir explained. "It is forbidden. Democracy is based on people, but the state must be based on God's law—I call it Allahcracy."[18] "Islam's victory can only come though da'wa and jihad, not elections."[19] Many of Jemaah Islamiyah leaders hold concurrent positions in Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, giving themselves a patina of legitimacy and political cover. Since his release from prison in October 2004, Abdurrahman (Abu Jibril), for example, has used Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia as his base of operations. But his message has not necessarily changed. In one recruiting film produced by Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Abdurrahman calls on his congregants to wage a violent jihad. Armed with a pistol extended into the air he exclaimed, "You can't just have the Qur'an without the steel. You will bring down the steel."[20] His younger brother remains Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia's director of daily operations.[21]

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has grown increasingly confident and combative in dealing with the government, which it accuses of leading a witch hunt against Muslims. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has begun issuing "summons," or official complaints, to the police in order to intimidate them and influence investigations of suspected terrorists. In May 2006, for example, it issued a summons to the Indonesian National Police specialized counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88, for their raid on a Jemaah Islamiyah safe house in Central Java, in which two suspects were killed and two others were arrested.[22] As Ba'asyir said, "The struggle for Islam can only come through crisis and confrontation."[23]

Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia also serves as a link between Jemaah Islamiyah and Saudi financiers. Many Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia leaders hold or have held concurrent positions in Saudi charities and their Indonesian counterparts that have been used to support terrorist activities.[24] These include the Saudi Al-Haramain and the International Islamic Relief Organization. Two Indonesian charities, KOMPAK and the Medical Emergency Relief Charity, respectively serve as their counterpart or executing agencies. While U.S. Executive Order 13224 and the U.N.'s 1267 Committee on January 22, 2004, designated the Indonesian branch of Al-Haramain as a funder of terrorism, four months after the designation, Al-Haramain was operating openly in East Java.[25]

KOMPAK

Jemaah Islamiyah used or co-opted many of these charities between 1999 and 2001, during a period of sectarian bloodletting in the Molucca Islands between Jemaah Islamiyah's paramilitaries and Christian and Hindu citizens. Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, a hard-line Islamist offshoot of the Muhammadiyah, the national Islamic organization, established KOMPAK in late 1998 ostensibly to provide relief assistance to people in conflict areas, such as Kalimantan, the Moluccas, and Central Sulawesi. It immediately partnered with the Saudi International Islamic Relief Organization although it recently suffered a setback when, on August 3, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department designated the Indonesian branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization, along with the Philippine branch and a Saudi director of the International Islamic Relief Organization, for financing terrorism, including Al-Qaeda. The United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee acted in concert although it did not designate the Indonesian branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization as a financier of terrorism until November 9, 2006.[26] While KOMPAK did not engage in conflict directly, its aid won support for Jemaah Islamiyah and its paramilitary organizations such as Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin.

Of the thirteen regional directors of KOMPAK, at least three were top-level Jemaah Islamiyah operatives.[27] KOMPAK, however, only came to the assistance of Muslim communities, which it worked to radicalize. KOMPAK officials, while acknowledging that they operate in regions struck by sectarian conflict such as Aceh, Poso, the Moluccas, and Bangunan Beton Sumatra, assert they alleviate the crises and provide necessary relief. They deny any links to jihad activities.[28] In 2003, Indonesian forces arrested several KOMPAK leaders for their involvement in sectarian violence and terrorism; several others went underground.

As with other jihadist organizations and corollary charities in North Africa, Iraq, Chechnya, and elsewhere, KOMPAK's support is not entirely indigenous. It serves as the executing agency of many Saudi and Persian Gulf funds, including from Al-Haramain and the International Islamic Relief Organization.

Aris Munandar, a top KOMPAK and Al-Haramain official, was a key financial conduit between Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. Agus Dwikarna not only served as head of KOMPAK for South Sulawesi but also was the regional branch officer for the International Islamic Relief Organization and treasurer of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Munandar, who was a leading member of Jemaah Islamiyah, used KOMPAK to support both the sectarian bloodletting in the Moluccas and Sulawesi and Al-Qaeda operatives' training of Jemaah Islamiyah members.[29] KOMPAK also produced a number of jihadi videos for fundraising and recruitment purposes.

The Indonesian crackdown broke KOMPAK into disparate cells, but the organization did not cease its commitment to radicalization. One such splinter group, KOMPAK in Ambon, conducted the October 2005 Bali II bombings. Indonesian prosecutors believe that one mid-level Jemaah Islamiyah operative, Abdullah Sonata, received 11 million rupiah (US$15,000) and 100,000 Saudi riyals ($36,500) in 2004 from a Saudi named Syeikh Abu Muhammad to finance militant operations and to send Jemaah Islamiyah terrorists to Mindanao. Other KOMPAK members acquired weaponry with which to instigate a new wave of sectarian bloodletting in Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas.[30] Dulmatin, who is one of Jemaah Islamiyah's leading operatives and has been in hiding in the southern Philippines since early 2004, ordered other KOMPAK members to dispatch suicide bombers to the Philippines. Abdullah Sonata asserted that he sent ten although only four got through.[31]

It is clear, therefore, that the KOMPAK network, funded by Saudi charities, helped develop Jemaah Islamiyah. It also illustrates clearly that terrorist organizations can be created from social networks.

Hambali, Jemaah Islamiyah's top operative in Malaysia, established other charities including Pertubahan el Hassan, as conduits for funds to both Jemaah Islamiyah, its paramilitaries in the Moluccas, and the Medical Emergency Relief Charity. Initially, these charities served as ancillary organizations used to assist with jihadist activities. Over the last two years, however, Jemaah Islamiyah has begun to focus far more on charities. While the Indonesian military has made inroads tracking down terrorist leaders, the Indonesian government has been more willing to tolerate Jemaah Islamiyah charities in the belief that it can wean Jemaah Islamiyah leaders from violence and that it is better to have them involved in overt and nonviolent activities. Jakarta has, therefore, been unwilling to enforce United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee or U.S. Department of the Treasury designations, which make it illegal to raise funds for or donate to any proscribed individual or organization. The Indonesian government's strategy appears to mirror that of the Lebanese government's strategy with regard to Hezbollah. Beirut and many Western powers long tolerated Hezbollah, convinced that incorporating it into the Lebanese government might moderate the group. However, in Lebanon, such accommodation backfired precisely because the charities were only one aspect of a much broader strategy that included immutable commitment to jihad.

Tsunami and Earthquake

The December 2004 tsunami and the May 2006 earthquake in central Java, both massive humanitarian crises, provide a window into just how Jemaah Islamiyah and its charities operate to further Islamist agendas.

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra caused a tsunami which killed more than 165,000 Indonesians and displaced half a million others. Jakarta, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster, sought to tap Jemaah Islamiyah's social service network. On January 4, 2005, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia dispatched the first group of seventy-seven volunteers to Aceh from their Yogyakarta based headquarters.[32] Among them was a top Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia official who was a suspect in the October 12, 2002 Bali blast that killed 202 people.[33] Not all Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia personnel were engaged explicitly in humanitarian work; the group indicated that their primary goal was to provide "spiritual guidance" to victims, assist in the reconstruction of mosques, and guard against proselytizing by non-Muslim relief agencies. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia's non-humanitarian agenda led the Indonesian Air Force to expel nineteen Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia members from Aceh on January 11, 2005.[34]

Abdurrahman's Laskar Mujahidin also used the tsunami to propel itself to new relevance. Founded in January 2000 by Abdurrahman and Hambali, both of whom had experience fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, the group fielded approximately 500 armed combatants in the Moluccas who were equipped with high-speed motor boats, which they used to attack remote Christian and Hindu communities. After the tsunami, they established four base camps in Aceh including one outside the airport, adjacent to the camps of other domestic and international relief organizations, beneath a sign that read, "Islamic Law Enforcement." Unlike Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, which was more concerned with providing "spiritual guidance" and restoring "infrastructure in places of religious duties," the Laskar Mujahidin was deeply involved in relief work, including the distribution of aid and especially the burial of corpses.[35] Though the organization is vehemently anti-American, it gave cautious backing to the presence of U.S. and Australian troops.[36] It was clear, however, that their lobbying did persuade the government to call for the early departure of foreign troops.

Joining Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and Laskar Mujahidin was the Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MERC), an Indonesian executor agency for Saudi funding.[37] Established on August 14, 1999, amidst sectarian fighting, MERC now has twelve offices in Indonesia, concentrated in the regions most directly affected by sectarian violence. In 2000-01, MERC produced two well-publicized jihadi videos for fundraising purposes.[38] While MERC was never directly implicated in supporting Laskar Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin paramilitary operations to the degree that KOMPAK was, its one-sided approach to the Moluccas conflict, as well as the actions of some individual members, raised suspicions. There is some evidence that MERC received funding from the Indonesian branch of the Saudi-funded International Islamic Relief Organization.[39] MERC operations abroad, in particular in Iraq, the Palestinian territories, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, have also raised concerns about it being a conduit for terrorist funding. MERC sent a team of four doctors and other staff to Iraq in 2003. In 2004, U.S. forces killed one MERC employee, an ambulance driver, in a firefight. The group's website stated that they operate in the tribal areas of Pakistan with the support and permission of the Taliban. Other Islamist organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front and Hizb ut-Tahrir, though not directly connected to Jemaah Islamiyah, have also become active in Aceh in the wake of the tsunami. Both groups have engaged in sectarian violence.[40]

The Islamist charities flocked to Aceh for three reasons. The first was to garner good press and media attention, providing a needed makeover for groups associated with terrorism and sectarian violence while simultaneously highlighting the secular government's failure. Second, the Islamist charities sought to counter any Western influence.[41] Hence, Din Syamsudin, the head of the quasi-official Indonesian Ulema Council and president of the second largest Muslim organization in the country, Muhammadiyah, who has subsequently acted as a fundraiser for Hamas, warned:

All nongovernmental organizations, either domestic or international ... This is a reminder. Do not do this [proselytize] in this kind of situation. The Muslim community will not remain quiet. This is a clear statement, and it is serious.[42]

Paranoia about Western influence has become a prime motivator for Islamist groups in the Middle East. Prior to the rise of Al-Qaeda, for example, Saudi clergy preached that the Muslim world was subject to a Western "cultural attack" and "intellectual attack." In 1981, the World Muslim League, a Saudi NGO, published a book entitled, The Means of Combating the Intellectual Attack on the Muslim World, which highlighted a theme developed by ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, a professor at King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz University in Jeddah and mentor to Osama bin Laden.[43] Defense against a "cultural NATO" is a theme that Iranian hardliners have also recently adapted.[44] Hence, almost two years after the tsunami, Ba'asyir declared that "naked women are more dangerous than bombs" in his salvo about spiritual pollution and Western culture and values degrading Islam from within.[45]

Third, these groups saw the disaster as an opportunity to proselytize. Several groups in addition to Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia indicated that their primary goal was to provide "spiritual guidance" to victims, ensure that Islamic law was being followed, and to assist in the reconstruction of mosques. With 400,000 refugees and mosques at the center of rural community relief efforts, the potential for influence was great.[46]

The cynicism of the Islamist parties grated on local political movements. While Aceh is nearly 100 percent Muslim, the Acehenese secessionist movement, the Free Aceh Movement known by its acronym GAM (Gerakan Aceh Meredeka), urged the international community to force the Islamist groups to leave in apparent frustration with the government's unwillingness to do so:

We therefore call on the international community to demand that the FPI [Front Pembela Islam] and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia leave Acheh … The FPI and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia are not welcome in Acheh and have never been supported by the Achenese people, nor has their presence been requested. The FPI has been involved in sectarian killings in Maluku and Central Sulawesi and illegal attacks against non-Muslims and others in Java and elsewhere. Their intervention in Aceh is therefore counterproductive.[47]

Tsunami relief efforts provided a template for subsequent operations, most notably in the May 27, 2006 earthquake in central Java. The magnitude 6.2 earthquake killed more than 6,000 people, injured 78,000, and left up to 1.5 million homeless. The United Nations' World Food Program moved quickly into central Java and chose Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia as one of eight partner organizations to deliver ninety-five tons of food aid. The Australian government immediately protested Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia's contract,[48] but World Food Program spokesman Barry Came said, "We don't pick groups to distribute aid based on their religious or political beliefs. We choose based on the ability to deliver, and so far they've performed up to standard. We have no complaints."[49] He backed down, however, under international pressure.[50] Both Ba'asyir and Abdurrahman had been proscribed under U.N. Security Council 1267 Committee lists as specially designated terrorist financiers, and Ba'asyir, just released from prison, was reportedly planning to deliver the World Food Program aid personally.[51]

The episode highlights a major problem facing the West when combating Islamism: The United Nations and international agencies either refuse to perform due diligence or use moral equivalency to justify support for Islamist organizations. Not only do such organizations receive Saudi support as they pursue sectarian radicalization, but too often they also indirectly receive subsidies from Western taxpayers who fund international organizations.

Conclusion

The Hezbollah model is not new to terrorist organizations, but it is new to Jemaah Islamiyah. Jemaah Islamiyah has taken advantage of an opening: Political will in Indonesia to dismantle terrorist infrastructure has waned as the nature of the group's militancy has become apparent. Released from prison, the group's leaders have been able to focus on political, religious, and charitable work. The civilian infrastructure they have developed will make the group—still committed to terrorism—more durable over the long term.

Policymakers in Indonesia need to understand precedent. The existence of charities and social service networks has not made Hamas or Hezbollah any less violent although they have contributed to de-legitimization of governments. The Indonesian government should do what the Lebanese, Israeli, and Palestinian Authority governments did not: They must uproot social networks. Few governments have put forward a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the phenomenon of the inverse triangle, and most disaggregate the terrorist and social welfare arms and fund raising.

There is intense international pressure on the Indonesian government to ban Jemaah Islamiyah, but no politician in the world's largest Muslim community has the political courage to do so. As Indonesia's top counterterrorism official, Ansyaad Mbai, stated, the reason there is no ban on Jemaah Islamiyah "is because the political situation is still very sensitive."[52] Complacency and political expediency rule the day in Jakarta. As long as Jemaah Islamiyah members do not blow things up or simply target Western interests, Jakarta will do little.

It is not just courts and counterterrorism officials who have grown frustrated. A handful of Muslim reformers and liberals have been at the center of a push to rewrite Law No. 8 (1995) on nongovernmental organizations to tighten both the process of NGO incorporation and increase oversight. The proposed law will make fundraising by unregistered (or de-registered) NGOs illegal. The proposed law would make Jemaah Islamiyah's fundraising illegal under Indonesian domestic law.[53]

This unwillingness to take on terrorist infrastructure is regrettable. First, like Hezbollah and Hamas, Jemaah Islamiyah has a long-term timetable. Second, by pursuing overt strategies, Jemaah Islamiyah is able to forge closer ties and common cause with Islamists who might otherwise eschew their violence. Many Indonesians no longer see Jemaah Islamiyah as a radical fringe organization even though the group's agenda has not changed. Third, there is little evidence that Jemaah Islamiyah will abandon terrorism. Tactics may shift, but strategy does not. Herein, Hamas again provides an example that should worry Indonesian authorities. Its assumption of political control in Gaza has not tempered its commitment to terrorism; indeed, Hamas has become even more aggressive since the January 2006 Palestinian elections.

Herein, Washington and other Western governments have an interest. Indonesia may be half a world away from the United States, but any Islamist gains in the archipelago nation will have profound repercussions on U.S. national security. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, and the United States should not cede the Indonesian population to the same Saudi-funded Islamists who radicalized their Arab brethren, recruited unencumbered for years in Afghan and Pakistani refugee camps, and profess an inflexible hatred of the United States, Israel, and the West. Washington should pressure Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to uproot Jemaah Islamiyah's overt presence and cede them no political space where they can recruit and indoctrinate anew. Targeting their financial and social networks is essential to the long-term fight against terrorism.

Zachary Abuza is a professor of political science at Simmons College and author of Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Lynne Rienner, 2003), Muslims, Politics and Violence in Indonesia (Routledge, 2006), and Conspiracy of Silence: Islam and Insurgency in Thailand (U.S. Institute of Peace, forthcoming 2009).

[1] "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," Asia Report, no. 43, International Crisis Group, Jakarta/Brussels, Dec. 11, 2002; "Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous," Asia Report, no. 63, idem, Aug. 26, 2003.
[2] The New York Times, July 4, 2008.
[3] Lawrence Wright, "The Rebellion Within," The New Yorker, June 2, 2008.
[4] "Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi," Asia Report, no. 74, International Crisis Group, Jakarta/Brussels, Feb. 3, 2004.
[5] The Observer (London), Nov. 20, 2005; SperoNews, Nov. 9, 2006.
[6] Los Angeles Times, June 22, 2004.
[7] "Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry," Asia Report, no. 147, International Crisis Group, Feb. 28, 2008.
[8] See parallels, for example, in Israel Elad-Altman, "Democracy, Elections, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Feb. 2006.
[9] Raphael Israeli, "The Islamic Movement in Israel," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Oct. 15, 1999.
[10] See, for example, Augustus Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 152-60.
[11] See, for example, Alistair Crooke and Vanessa Shields, "The Road Ahead: Perspectives on Disarming Hamas," Conciliation Resources, London, June 2005.
[12] Author interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Ngruki, Solo, June 11, 2002.
[13] Author interview with Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia officials, Yogyakarta, June 12-13, 2002; Korgres Mujahidini Dan Penegakan Syari'ah Islam (Yogyakarta: Widah Press, 2001); "Should Not Fear Being Called ‘Radical,'" Farish Noor interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Al-Jazeera television (Doha), Aug. 21, 2006.
[14] Al-Jazeera, Aug. 21, 2006.
[15] Fatima Astuti, "Speculation on Formalizing Jemaah Islamiyah," IDSS Commentaries, The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, Aug. 9, 2006.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Luthfi Assyaukanie, "The Rise of Religious Bylaws in Indonesia," RSIS Commentaries, Rajarathnam School of International Studies, Singapore, Mar. 29, 2007.
[18] The Sunday Times (London), July 30, 2006.
[19] Ba'asyir, "Should Not Fear Being Called ‘Radical.'"
[20] Author's copy of video, untitled and undated.
[21] Author interview with Irfan Awwas, Yogyakarta, July 13, 2002.
[22] See for example, IslamOnline.net, Sept. 20, 2006.
[23] Author interviews at Al-Haramain's office, East Jakarta, Apr. 2004.
[24] "Interrogation Report of Omar al-Faruq," Badan Intelijen Negara (State intelligence agency) Jakarta, June 2002.
[25] Author's personal observation.
[26] "Security Council Committee Adds One Individual, One Entity to Al-Qaida Sections of Consolidated List," Security Council, SC/8801, Aug. 4, 2006.
[27] Time, Sept. 23, 2003.
[28] Author interview with H. Asep R. Jayanegara, secretary, Komite Penanggulangan Krisis, Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Jakarta, Jan. 8, 2003.
[29] Zachary Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah," NBR Analysis, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Dec. 2003.
[30] The Jakarta Post, Jan. 10, 2006.
[31] Abdullah Sunata, Philippine National Police, debriefing report, Aug. 12, 2005.
[32] "Baasyir's Mujahidin Bound for Aceh," Laksamana.Net, Jan. 4, 2004.
[33] Kyodo News International, Inc., Dec. 9, 2002; The Australian (Sydney), Feb. 24, 2005.
[34] "Military Expels Some Mujahidin from Aceh," Laksamana.Net, Jan. 11, 2005.
[35] "Baasyir's Mujahidin Bound for Aceh," Laksamana.Net, Jan. 4, 2004.
[36] Associated Press, Jan. 7, 2004.
[37] "Database of Terrorist Organizations and Activities," The Information Project, accessed Oct. 7, 2008; Eusaquito P. Manalo, "The Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group," (MA diss., Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004), p. 56. The MERC website has been closed or moved.
[38] "Pasir Hitum Teluk Galela" and "Dan Kesaksian Pun Menangis," previously available from the MERC website.
[39] Executive Order 13224, U.S. Treasury Department; U.N. 1267 Committee, Aug. 3, 2006.
[40] The Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 2008.
[41] "PKS Wants Foreign Troops Removed," Laksamana.Net, Jan. 11, 2004.
[42] Associated Press, Jan. 14, 2005.
[43] Uriya Shavit, "Al-Qaeda's Saudi Origins," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2006, p. 3-13.
[44] Qods (Tehran), Nov. 11, 2007; Islamic Student News Agency (Tehran), Mar. 2, 2008; Sobh-e Sadeq (Tehran), June 12, 2008.
[45] The Jakarta Post, Sept. 21, 2006.
[46] The New York Times, Aug. 1, 2006.
[47] Free Aceh Movement (GAM), news release, The Acheh Times, Jan. 10, 2005.
[48] "Downer Complains to WFP over Bakar Bashir," Unity, United Nations Association of Australia, Garran, no. 465, June 16, 2006.
[49] Associated Press, June 14, 2006.
[50] ABC News, June 15, 2006; NEWS.com.au (Australia), June 16, 2006.
[51] Associated Press, June 14, 2006.
[52] "Jemaah Islamiyah to be Banned," Laksamana.net, Mar. 21, 2005.
[53] Author interview with a drafter of the proposed law and a consultant to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Jakarta, July 8, 2008.
Related Topics: Radical Islam, Southeast Asia, Terrorism | Winter 2009 MEQ
To receive the full, printed version of the Middle East Quarterly, please see details about an affordable