LCCC
ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
March 11/09
Bible Reading of the day.
Isaiah/33:1
Woe to you who destroy, but you weren’t destroyed;
and who betray, but nobody betrayed you!
When you have finished destroying, you will be destroyed;
and when you have made an end of betrayal, you will be betrayed.
Isaiah. The work of righteousness will be peace;
and the effect of righteousness, quietness and confidence forever
Free Opinions, Releases, letters &
Special Reports
International Christian Concern:
Libya Tortures Four Christian
Converts from Islam 10/03/09
The Myth of the Two
Talibans.By Walid Phares 10/03/09
Reuters: Interview with Hezbollah's
Deputy leader Sheikh Naim Kassem
10/03/09
Handing the Swat Valley to the Taliban was shameful
and wrong.Slate 10/03/09
The Attack on Syria's al-Kibar
Nuclear Facility.by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Joshua D. Goodman 10/03/09
Israeli – Iranian welfare/Future
News 10/03/09
Latest News Reports From
Miscellaneous Sources for March
10/09
Suleiman Says Only Political
Will Can Disrupt Polls-Naharnet
Syria Demands Unity Government after Elections, Feltman Replies: This is a
Lebanese Issue-Naharnet
Arab
Parliamentary Union Stresses Support for Efforts to Liberate Lebanese Land-Naharnet
Police: New via-Syria drug route revealed-Ynetnews
Saudis and Syrians cement detente-BBC News
Sfeir called on the loyal
citizens not to demonstrate at Bkerke/Future
News
Mustafa Shehadeh’s Appointment
Angers Syria/Future
News
The turbans conflict’: The
struggle within Hezbollah/Future
News
Al-Assad: “Lebanon will pay the
price if the Special Tribunal was politicized”/Future
News
Kataeb condemns March 8 comments
on the judicial formations/Future
News
Geagea Meets Kuwaiti Emir-Naharnet
Syria Demands Unity Government
after Elections, Feltman Replies: This is a Lebanese Issue-Naharnet
Soldier Opens Fire on MP's
Wife/Naharnet
Obama's Outreach to Adversaries Takes Unexpected Turn With Taliban ...FOXNews
Iran seen as target of Saudi overtures to Syria-Reuters
Opposition in Syria is dying with dissident-Los
Angeles Times
Netanyahu will focus first on PA, not Syria, senior adviser says-Jerusalem
Post
Committee to Discuss MoU as Hariri, Hizbullah Keep Up-to-Date with Contacts-Naharnet
ElBaradei: Iran Could be a Positive Force in Lebanon-Naharnet
Ban Calls for
Self-Restraint Ahead of Lebanon Elections-Naharnet
Saniora: Lebanon to Import
Natural Gas from Egypt-Naharnet
Former U.S. Official: High
Probability of 'Explosion' in Lebanon, the Region-Naharnet
Aoun: I Will Not Grieve
over Feltman-Naharnet
Saudi Affirms Commitment
to Lebanon Stability-Naharnet
Symbolic Rebuilding for
Devastated Nahr al-Bared-Naharnet
Israel Reiterates Travel
Warning over Fear of Hizbullah Attack-Naharnet
Assad: No Guarantees that
Hariri Tribunal won't be Politicized-Naharnet
Lebanese Woman Kidnapped
for Ransom in Venezuela-Naharnet
Israeli Army Steps Up
Security along Border-Naharnet
Sfeir called on the loyal citizens
not to demonstrate at Bkerke
Date: March 9th, 2009 Source: Future News
Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir thanked Monday those who
call for a demonstration at Bkerke next Sunday and asked them not to,
considering the current circumstances the nation is passing through. The
Maronite Patriarchate Secretariat issued a statement that said: “We have come
across information that some worshipers- Maronite and non-Maronite Lebanese are
calling people to come to Bkerke next Sunday, to express loyalty to his eminency
and to the Patriarchate. He thanks all their concern and calls them not to
perform the demonstration, considering the critical circumstances the country is
undergoing, asking God to reward them and unite the Lebanese for the nation’s
sake.”
Mustafa Shehadeh’s
Appointment Angers Syria
Date: March 10th, 2009 Source: lebreports
Hezbollah’s recent appointment of Mustafa Shehadeh, the man responsible for
killing Syrian troops two decades ago in Lebanon has angered Syrian authorities,
a Lebanese website said Tuesday. The report pu8blished by Lebreports blog said
Shehadeh was appointed head of Hezbollah’s military wing in Beirut. It did not
however give the exact date of the appointment that brought back memories of the
tension that existed between Syria and Hezbollah in the 80s.
It is said that Shehadeh was responsible for opening fire at Syrian soldiers
when they tried to storm a Hezbollah barracks in Beirut in 1987. The Syrians had
then cold-bloodedly killed 20 Hezbollahis for refusing to surrender.Sources
close to Damascus link the appointment of Shehadeh as part of the changes
currently taking place at the party’s military leadership as it lost confidence
in the Syrian regime after the murder of their military leader Imad Moughnieh in
Syria last year.
Some of these measures are Hezbollah’s banning of security officials to travel
to Syria, and narrowing down the party’s representation in Damascus to public
relations, the sources, who asked not to be named, said. The sources concluded
“out of fifty military and security officials of Hezbollah who used to live in
Damascus or visit it regularly, only eight of them remain.” A source close to
Hezbollah said the party has also asked Hamas officials who reside in Damascus
Kfar soussah neighborhood to choose between living there or come to Beirut’s
southern suburbs. Kfar soussah, is reportedly the haven of the Syrian military
intelligence and houses hundreds of Islamists and pro-Syrian activists.
The turbans conflict’: The struggle within Hezbollah
Date: March 9th, 2009 Source: Lebreports.blogspot.com
The conflict within Hezbollah between the party's secretary- general, Hassan
Nasrallah, and his deputy, Naim Kassem, is no longer a secret. This conflict
started before the 2006 war, when Kassem objected to allowing Nasrallah a fourth
term as party leader.
Hezbollah’s charter allows only two consecutive terms, but a majority of party
members supported allowing Nasrallah, who took command in Hezbollah in 1996, to
remain as secretary-general.
Lebreports.blogspot.com, an investigative Lebanese website, claimed Monday that
Kassem, supported by some other party officials, moved to block Nasrallah’s
extension. They failed to do so, and then Nasrallah exposed the plot. Kassem
remained as deputy secretary-general, but his associates were purged and
replaced by Nasrallah loyalists.
According to the report, Kassem then convinced Sheikh Mohammed Yazbek, the
personal representative in Lebanon of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, to support a move to remove Nasrallah from the leadership.
Lebreports said that Kassem’s followers alleged that Nasrallah misappropriated
party funds provided by Tehran, giving it to his followers and spending more
than $2 million a month on a personal security force of 150 men armed with
advanced weapons, including Israeli-made guns.
Kassem and Yazbek went to Tehran to see Khamenei, according to the website.
The Iranian leader then reportedly sent a delegation of Revolutionary Guard
intelligence officers to Lebanon to assess the crisis within Hezbollah. On the
basis of their report, Khamenei ordered Nasrallah removed as Hezbollah’s
military commander and appointed Kassem in his place, according to the
Lebreports blog.
Hashem Safieddine, president of Hezbollah’s executive board and Nasrallah’s
cousin, objected strenuously and threatened to resign. So did Nawwaf Al-Moussawi,
the party’s external affairs chief, former MP Amin Assayed, and a number of
current MPs and some members of Hizbullah’s Shura Council, the party’s top
decision-making body. They urged Khamenei to reverse his decision, warning him
that conflict within Hezbollah was not in Iran’s interests.
Khamenei did so, but the power struggle continued. Kassem, Yazbek and Sheikh
Nabil Kaouk, Hezbollah’s commander in south Lebanon, clashed with Nasrallah,
Safieddine, Moussawi and others. This became known as “the turbans conflict.”
The struggle affected Hezbollah’s military. Kassem sought to bring in a new
military commander from the Berro clan, which is influential in South Lebanon,
to replace Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in Damascus on February 12,
2008. But Nasrallah appointed his own man, Mustapha Chehade, according to
Lebreports.
This was a slap in the face for Kassem. But he got his revenge in May 2008 by
inciting the Shiite community in Beirut’s southern suburbs and orchestrating the
assault by Hezbollah forces on Sunni-dominated West Beirut, Lebreports said.
Nasrallah had repeatedly pledged that Hizbullah would never turn its weapons on
other Lebanese and Kassem’s plot was thus a major blow to Nasrallah’s prestige
and credibility. But, Lebreports claimed, Kassem’s action was widely acclaimed
by Shiites and bolstered his standing within Hezbollah.
Nasrallah still refused to surrender any of his powers. Lebreports said that he
refused requests from several party officials affiliated with Kassem that he, as
deputy secretary-general, be allowed to appoint two or three MPs in parliament.
This would give Kassem considerable political clout and strengthen his hand to
move against Nasrallah.
Rebuffed, Kassem vowed to take care of Nasrallah after the parliamentary
elections scheduled for June 7. He apparently did not want to jeopardize the
party’s prospects in the elections by stepping up the power struggle within the
party during that period.
Lebreports said that Nasrallah began to fear for his position. He suspected that
the engagement between Syria and Israel and between the United States and Iran
could radically transform the political landscape in the region and trigger
moves against Hezbollah, thus endangering his position and even his life.
Nasrallah even expressed his fears in public. During a recent speech he said:
“If I get murdered, the deputy secretary-general is waiting.” Then he added:
“I’m kidding.”
Even so, Lebreports added, Nasrallah has reinforced his personal security. As
well as his own team of bodyguards, he has recruited a group known as the
Committee of Linkage and Coordination, which operates mainly in Beirut’s
southern suburb, a Hezbollah stronghold. It collects local and regional
intelligence and its main mission now is to protect Nasrallah from Israeli and
Syrian intelligence, and some “white turbans within Hezbollah,” an apparent
reference to his party rivals led by Kassem and his associates.
Israeli – Iranian welfare
Date: March 10th, 2009 Source: Future News
The interests of two states have never intersected against Arabs the way Israeli
and Iranian interests interconnect against our region.
The challenge of Israeli and Iranian aspirations is growing and getting more
hostile. Aspirations that begin from Palestine and do not stop in Iraq, going
through Lebanon, and feed on ethnic, religious, and sectarian divisions in the
region.
Both states do not want Lebanon an independent and strong country. Israel has
declared more than once its approval to keeping Lebanon under the Syrian
tutelage to “control Hezbollah”. Despite its withdrawal from the South of
Lebanon in 2000, Israel has kept the conflict unresolved and benefited from the
spiraling of the internal political disputes. It refused to deliver the maps of
minefields to the Lebanese government and kept its occupation to Shebaa farms
and Kfarshouba hills under the pretext that the borders between Damascus and
Beirut haven’t been demarcated yet.
As for Iran, it focused its efforts on enhancing the interests of one Lebanese
counterpart, and made a clear position defiant to the Cedars Revolution, which
released Lebanon from the Syrian hegemony, along with its perpetual pretext that
the priority is for fighting Israel.
The question here is: when has Iran fought a war against Israel? When has it
sacrificed a martyr in the conflict with Israel? On the contrary, in the 1980s,
during Iran’s war against Iraq, Lebanon would receive the bodies of Lebanese
victims who were killed there.
Israel and Iran both acted out against the famous slogan of concealed Imam
Moussa El Sadr: “the peace of Lebanon is the best aspect of war against Israel.”
Iran has always instigated sectarian conflicts in Lebanon. This is boldly
revealed through the famous political slogan raised by Hezbollah, one of Iran’s
factions, “the Islamic revolution in Lebanon” which hits the Lebanese formula
and strokes the sensitivity of its structure.
Israel has always done just the same as it entered the civil Lebanese
contradictions, those who have forgotten these facts can refer to the book “War
of Shadows” which was prohibited in Lebanon in the 1980s.
Israeli-Iranian interests also intersect in the outlooks of the two states to
the Palestinian cause.
Tel Aviv does not want the establishment of a Palestinian state, as it has been
acting out against this option since the beginning of Madrid Conference to
Israel’s rejection to the Arab peace initiative.
As for Tehran, it also refuses this alternative, from its Supreme Leader down to
the very last member of the Iranian revolutionary guards.
The Iranian stance from the Palestinian cause is based on its aspiration to
eradicate Israel, with the blood of Palestinians alone, while it offers it’s
“blessings” and the “benevolent prayers” to those who died defending
“self-esteem”, which we don’t know how it should be.
Both states base their policies with the United States on the Palestinians’
blood: Israel, on one hand, is trying to prove the interface between
Palestinians and terrorism to attain Washington’s consent to take action against
unarmed Palestinians in the occupied territories.
Iran, on the other, is trading Palestinian blood to heave proposals from the
United States and engage in negotiations on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to
attract the ragged public of the Arab world and penetrate it.
Now we can precisely interpret the words of Iranian President Ahmed Nejad that
the difference between Iran’s fundraising conference and the donors’ conference
for rebuilding Gaza, held in Sharm El-Sheikh, is "as the difference between man
and the devil."
Iran has tried to do all it could to seize the Palestinian cause. In this term
we recall the “day of denying unbelievers” launched in Iran during the rule of
El Khomeini. Iran tried then to politicize the rituals of Hajj and when it
failed, it established the “International Jerusalem Day” dedicated on the last
Friday of Ramadan.
The situation is no better in Iraq. There is a difference between the “Death
Troops” (originated and trained in Iran), that has a role similar to the Israeli
“undercover forces in Palestine”.
Israel and Iran have successively stroke Iraq militarily, and they both declared
their overwhelming joy as it was occupied by US forces.
Any quiet reading of the nature of the demographic changes occurring in
Mesopotamia shows the reality of the main manipulators of this rotten and
corrupted reality, but any informed person knows the regions where each of
Israel and Iran operate in Iraq.
Then again, who has an interest in the division, destruction, and bombardments
happening in Iraq more than those two states? Perhaps it is better to ask how
the situation in Tel Aviv would have been if Baghdad, with all the Arab depth
and strength it represents, remained free? Was Iran to dare tampering with Arab
issues if Iraq was still the same independent and sovereign Arab country?
Who has worked on enhancing Arab-Arab disputes more than Israel and Iran?
Anyway, these two states are forces occupying the Arab lands.
While Israel occupies Palestine, part of Lebanon, and a part of Syria as well,
Iran occupies islands of the Emirates and calls the Gulf a “Persian state”.
Syria Demands Unity Government after
Elections, Feltman Replies: This is a Lebanese Issue
Naharnet/Damascus has reportedly told U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman that it wants a national unity
government following Lebanese elections. Feltman replied: This is a Lebanese
issue. Pan-Arab daily Al Hayat on Tuesday quoted high-ranking political sources
as saying that Damascus "took the initiative" to discuss Lebanon during weekend
talks with Feltman and fellow envoy Daniel Shapiro. The sources said Syrian
officials conveyed to the U.S. delegation their country's keenness on holding
Lebanese parliamentary elections on time. This was okay. But when it came to
renewing their call for the establishment of a Lebanese national unity
government following the June 7 elections, Feltman allegedly told the Syrian
officials: "This is a Lebanese issue." The sources said the U.S. delegation
discussed with Syrian officials the "principles of holding elections without
Syrian meddling, not more." They said Hizbullah and AMAL Movement leaders have
recently been emphasizing the formation of a national unity government following
Lebanese elections. On Saturday Feltman and Shapiro held four hours of talks
with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem and other officials. "What we did
is give the Syrians the opportunity to raise their vision about the bilateral
relationship, their concerns, and we were able to do the same," Feltman said
following a series of meetings with Lebanese political and religious leaders on
Sunday. "Talking to people is not a reward. We talk to people in order to solve
a problem," he added. He also sought to ease Lebanese concerns about a
U.S.-Syria rapprochement saying: "There is no contradiction between a strong
support to Lebanon and an attempt to solve a problem through dialogue with
Syria." On Saturday, Feltman emerged from the talks with Muallem, saying Syria
can be a "constructive" Mideast force. Feltman said he and Shapiro held the
"view that Syria can play an important and constructive role in the region," in
a conference call with reporters in Washington after with Muallem and other
Syrian officials. "We found a lot of common ground today," Feltman said without
elaborating. Beirut, 10 Mar 09, 08:48
Soldier Opens Fire on MP's Wife
Naharnet/A Lebanese soldier opened fire towards the car of MP Hashem
Alameddine's wife in Dinniyeh province after her driver sped away, refusing to
allow the soldier to inspect the vehicle in which he found a weapon. The
National News Agency said Tuesday that as the car was passing through an army
checkpoint in Minyeh, the soldier found a weapon, intended for the legislator's
protection. When the soldier asked the driver to inspect the weapon, the man
sped away. The soldier then opened fire in the direction of the vehicle to stop
it, NNA said, without giving further details. Beirut, 10 Mar 09, 13:20
Committee to Discuss MoU as Hariri,
Hizbullah Keep Up-to-Date with Contacts
Naharnet/A trilateral ministerial committee set up by Cabinet will meet on
Tuesday to discuss the Memorandum of Understanding between Lebanon and the
international tribunal. Pan-Arab daily Al Hayat said Mustaqbal Movement leader
Saad Hariri and Hizbullah Secretary General's political assistant Hussein Khalil
maintained contact with each other to follow up on efforts exerted by the
ministerial committee "to avoid any bickering over the international tribunal."
Al Hayat said ministerial sources hoped that efforts exerted to produce a "new
version" of article 3 of the MoU would move forward after Opposition cabinet
ministers voiced reservations. State Minister Jean Oghassabian on Tuesday ruled
out any dispute would flare over the MoU. He told the Voice of Lebanon radio
station that a proposal that calls for the return to the text of the Court
charter is now under consideration. In turn, Tourism Minister Elie Maroni said
Cabinet agreed that the committee should not take more than one week to complete
its work. Beirut, 10 Mar 09, 11:05
Geagea Meets Kuwaiti Emir
Naharnet/Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea on Tuesday discussed the Lebanon
situation with Kuwaiti Emir Sheik Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jaber al-Sabah. "It is
important to have serious relations between Lebanon and Syria," Geagea said
after meeting the Emir. He also stressed the importance of Arab reconciliation.
Geagea, who arrived in Kuwait Monday evening, is due to meet several other
Kuwaiti officials. His visit, which will last a few days, came upon an
invitation from the Emir of Kuwait, the state-run National News Agency said.
Geagea is accompanied by MP Strida Geagea, former cabinet minister Joe Sarkis as
well as LF external affairs officer Joseph Nehme. Beirut, 10 Mar 09, 10:12
Ban Calls for Self-Restraint Ahead
of Lebanon Elections
Naharnet/U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon on Monday called on Lebanese leaders to exercise
self-restraint ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections, which "will bring
added challenges that may test the country's frail domestic stability." In a new
report, Ban said the recent hostilities in Gaza have posed the most serious
challenge since the adoption of a resolution which helped end the war between
Israel and Hizbullah in the summer of 2006.
Rockets fired into Israel from south Lebanon and return fire led to heightened
tensions along the so-called Blue Line that separates Israeli and Lebanese sides
and "endangered the cessation of hostilities agreement," Ban wrote in his latest
report to the Security Council on Resolution 1701.
1701 called for renewed respect for the Blue Line, the disarming of militias and
an end to arms smuggling, among other measures.
"The firing of rockets from southern Lebanon towards Israel, which I condemn in
all instances, constituted a serious violation" of the resolution, Ban wrote.
The attacks were launched from sites close to populated areas, including a
school in session at the time, "putting innocent civilians at risk."
He said that "the fact that the Israel Defense Forces returned fire with
artillery shells into Lebanese territory on 8 and 14 January without providing
prior warning to the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is also a cause for
serious concern," noting that these acts endangered civilians, as well as U.N.
blue helmets and soldiers of the Lebanese Armed Forces. "At the same time,
I was encouraged by the measures that were taken by all parties to avoid an
escalation," he wrote, with the resolution's mechanisms having served as an
"effective deterrent and prevented an escalation of the situation in southern
Lebanon."
But he cautioned that these incidents "also highlight the precarious nature of
the current cessation of hostilities and the necessity for both parties to take
further steps to address a number of unresolved issues," including disarming
militant groups. Ban said that he is pleased that the parties have made strides
to visibly mark the Blue Line, encouraging Lebanon and Israel to stay the course
and build on existing momentum to curb inadvertent violations and boost
confidence.
He renewed his demand that Israel "immediately" stop violations of Lebanese
airspace. The Security Council will be briefed on the report by Michael
Williams, the U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon, in a closed meeting Tuesday.
The daily Al Mustaqbal on Tuesday said the Security Council will not respond to
Ban's report. Beirut, 09 Mar 09, 22:01
Lebanese Woman Kidnapped for Ransom
in Venezuela
Naharnet/Armed assailants have kidnapped a Lebanese woman for ransom from the
Venezuelan island of Margarita, the World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU) said
Monday. The gunmen snatched 31-year old Feryal Darwish Issa, a mother of two,
only meters away from her residence and later contacted her husband, Adnan Issa,
for ransom, WLCU director Ahmed Nasser said in a statement. The sum of the
ransom was not disclosed. Nasser said he immediately informed the Foreign
Minister Fawzi Salloukh and expatriates director general Haitham Jumaa of Issa's
kidnapping. A follow-up committee has been assigned to the case, Nasser said,
adding that the Venezuelan government and the Lebanese ambassador condemned the
crime and vowed to ensure Issa's prompt release. Beirut, 09 Mar 09, 16:31
Israeli Army Steps Up Security along
Border
Naharnet/A number of Israeli tanks have been deployed in the vicinity of the
southern town of Kfarshouba as reconnaissance flights violated Lebanon's
airspace over Shebaa Farms, the National News Agency reported Monday. The
Merkava tanks were spotted in the afternoon on the environs of al-Alam, Rmatta
and Summaqa, facing Kfarshouba. Earlier, anti-armor tanks patrolled the border
line from al-Gajar to al-Abasiyya for an hour, the NNA reported. The army patrol
coincided with repair works on the Jabal al-Sheikh's observation post in
addition to inspections of the electronic surveillance system at the border
fence surrounding Berkat al-Noqar.
Meanwhile, gunfire and explosions were heard coming from Shebaa's south east
outskirts. Beirut, 09 Mar 09, 16:01
Symbolic Rebuilding for Devastated
Nahr al-Bared
Naharnet/The symbolic rebuilding of a Palestinian refugee camp devastated by
deadly battles between Islamists and the army in Lebanon 18 months ago began on
Monday despite a major funds shortfall.
Thousands of Palestinian refugees fled Nahr al-Bared north of Tripoli in the
summer of 2007 from heavy clashes between the army and the Islamist militant
group Fatah al-Islam that killed some 400 people including 168 soldiers.
Government representatives and Palestinian diplomats attended a foundation
stone-laying ceremony hailed by U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees (UNRWA)
chief Karen AbuZayd as "a new beginning for the refugees whose homes and
livelihoods were destroyed." UNRWA had appealed for 450 million dollars for the
rebuilding effort, which was scheduled to be completed in around three years,
but so far only 120 million dollars has been received. AbuZayd said on Monday
that because of the cash shortfall the project would permit the return of only a
quarter of the 27,000 former residents now living outside the camp.
A "disappointing donor response" to the agency's Nahr al-Bared appeal "will
allow us to construct only the first two of the eight phases envisaged for the
project," she said, and urged donors to be "more forthcoming and generous." "The
refugees from Nahr al-Bared will remain in a state of displacement for months to
come, living either in rented housing or temporary shelters UNRWA has built with
the support of donors," AbuZayd said.
Since the end of the battles 18 months ago, some former residents have returned
to the newer part of the camp which suffered less destruction.
They live in renovated buildings, garages, warehouses or homes provided by UNRWA.
The remainder are in the nearby Beddawi camp or other camps.
On the sidelines of Monday's official ceremony, which took place under tight
security, some 300 Nahr al-Bared residents staged a protest demanding that the
rebuilding effort be speeded up. There was some jostling and soldiers fired in
the air when the protesters tried to approach barbed wire barriers put up by the
military to cordon off access to the foundation stone ceremony. "We demand the
lifting of security measures at the camp entrance and a serious commitment to
reconstruction, because thousands of people still live in warehouses and
temporary accommodation," Othman Badr, who heads a committee for Nahr al-Bared
refugees, told AFP.
The three-month conflict in the summer of 2007 devastated large swathes of Nahr
al-Bared. Once home to 31,000 U.N.-registered Palestinian refugees, the camp was
built in 1949 and is one of 12 across the country. Lebanon's population is more
than four million, and UNRWA says there are between 350,000 and 400,000
Palestinian refugees, most living in the camps. Other estimates put the number
of refugees at 200,000 to 250,000 as UNRWA does not strike from its lists the
names of those who emigrate. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have no legal
status, and unlike Lebanese citizens they do not enjoy free medical care or
social security benefits even if employed. Unemployment among camp residents
exceeds 60 percent, according to UNRWA.(AFP) Beirut, 09 Mar 09, 20:05
Assad: No Guarantees that Hariri
Tribunal won't be Politicized
Naharnet/Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said there were no guarantees that the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon will not be politicized, in an interview published
by the United Arab Emirates-based al-Khaleej newspaper on Monday. "If the United
Nations and the Security Council do not carry out their duties, do you expect
small institutions stemming from them to work independently?" Assad ridiculed.
"There are no guarantees. But if politicization exists, Lebanon would be the
first to pay the price," Assad said, adding that he hoped the court would not be
politicized. Turning to the issue of upcoming Lebanese elections, Assad believed
the polls "would not bring stability." "Lebanon lives on consensus and explodes
in the absence of harmony," Assad stressed. "Consensus brings stability," he
concluded. "The winning side in elections could either take Lebanon toward
consensus or vise versa." Beirut, 09 Mar 09, 11:39
Former U.S. Official: High
Probability of 'Explosion' in Lebanon, the Region
Naharnet/Retired General Brent Scowcroft, a former U.S. National Security
Advisor, has said that the situation in the Middle East is "fragile,"
particularly with regard to Lebanon, Iraq, and the Palestine territories. The
U.S. should not "wait until the change of governments because the region is
fragile and the probability of it exploding in Lebanon, or Iraq, or Palestine is
high," Scowcroft told the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat in remarks published Tuesday.
Scowcroft stressed that the U.S. should become actively involved in the region
ahead of the change in the Israeli government. He added that, were any explosion
in the region to occur, it would "topple… hope for compromise" and thus the U.S.
needs to "get involved and get involved strongly." Beirut, 10 Mar 09, 09:52
Saniora: Lebanon to Import Natural
Gas from Egypt
Naharnet/Prime Minister Fouad Saniora told the daily Al Ahram in an interview
published Tuesday that Lebanon will sign a treaty to import natural gas from
Egypt.
Saniora described as "very good" Lebanese-Egyptian relations, adding that Cairo
supports Lebanon in the political, economic, military and cultural sectors.
He also said Lebanon was looking forward to establish good relations with Syria
based on mutual respect. Beirut, 10 Mar 09, 09:19
Libya Tortures Four Christian Converts from Islam
Other Christian converts on the run fearing for their lives
International Christian Concern
2020 Pennsylvania Ave. NW #941 • Washington DC 20006-1846 www.persecution.org/
Email: icc@persecution.org
WASHINGTON, D.C. (March 9, 2009) - International Christian Concern (ICC) has
learned that Libyan intelligence officials have detained and tortured four
Christians for converting from Islam. The Christians have been imprisoned for
the past seven weeks in Tripoli, Libya's capital.
Libya's External Security Organization is believed to be behind the detention
and torture of the Christians, according to our sources. The security agents
have barred the families from visiting the detained converts and are putting
severe physical and psychological pressure on the Christians in order to force
them to reveal the names of other converts. Fearing for their lives, converts
from Islam are on the run.
The detention and the torture of the Christian converts come at a critical time
in Libya's relations with the international community. The country has been
improving its relations with the international community following the lifting
of sanctions imposed on it due to its involvement in the bombing of an American
airliner in which 270 people were killed.
By torturing the four Christian converts and stifling religious freedom, Libya
is once again violating basic principles of the international human rights law.
ICC's Regional Manager for Africa, Jonathan Racho, said, "We call upon Libyan
officials to stop torturing the four Christians and release them from detention.
Libya must respect the rights of its citizens to worship freely and not to be
tortured. We particularly ask the Libyan leader and the current head of the
African Union, Mr. Muammar Gaddafi, to set the prisoners free and demonstrate
his country's commitment to respect human rights."
Please pray for the safe release of the detained believers. Also pray for
comfort and strength of their families.
Please call the Libyan embassy in your country and politely ask the Libyan
officials to release the Christians.
Country Phone Fax Email
USA 202-944-9601 202-944-9606 libya@libyanbureau-dc.org
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Canada (613) 230-0919 (613) 230-0683
Australia (+61-2) 62907900 (+61-2) 62864522
Germany (+49-30) 2005960 (+49-30) 20059699 Libysch.Arab.Volksbuero@t-online.de
**ICC is a Washington-DC based human rights organization that exists to help
persecuted Christians worldwide. ICC provides Awareness, Advocacy, and
Assistance to the worldwide persecuted Church. For additional information or for
an interview, contact ICC at 800-422-5441.
You are free to disseminate this news story. We request that you reference ICC
(International Christian Concern) and include our web address,
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INTERVIEW-Hezbollah sees Lebanon unity government,
recognition
Mon Mar 9, 2009
* Kassem sees unity government post-election
* Sees narrow opposition win, international recognition
* Welcomes new British position on Hezbollah
* Sees no near-term war between Israel and Hezbollah
By Laila Bassam and Tom Perry
BEIRUT, March 9 (Reuters) - Hezbollah expects Lebanon's parliamentary election
to produce a unity government that will be internationally recognised even if
the Iran-backed group and its allies wins a majority.
Deputy leader Sheikh Naim Kassem also welcomed a review of policy towards
Hezbollah by Britain, which says it is willing to talk to the political wing of
a movement listed as a terrorist group by Washington.
"We welcome this British revision and perhaps there will be meetings in the
coming days," Kassem told Reuters in an interview. "There is no request for a
meeting but we expect this to happen soon," he said, adding that Hezbollah
already had "wide contacts" with other European governments. [ID:nL4702156]
Hezbollah, a political movement with a powerful guerrilla army, has widespread
support among Lebanon's Shi'ite community -- one of the largest religious groups
in a country run according to a sectarian power-sharing system.
Its military arm is on Britain's list of banned organisations, but Hezbollah
itself makes no distiction between its political and military funcions.
The group heads a pro-Syria coalition that hopes to overturn the parliamentary
majority held by an anti-Damascus alliance backed by many Arab and Western
governments, including the United States.
Kassem forecast a narrow victory for Hezbollah and its allies, including
Christian politician Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement, and said he expected
the formation of another national unity government after the June 7 election.
"I expect that there will be a government of national unity, regardless of who
is the loser or winner," Kassem said. He said he had not the "slightest concern
of a boycott" of the government were Hezbollah and its allies to win a majority.
Some of Hezbollah's rivals have said Western states may shun the government if
the group and its allies won the election, drawing on a precedent set by a
boycott of Hamas after it won a Palestinian legislative election in 2006.
"We are meeting with delegates of European states and international institutions
and they tell us clearly ... that they will deal with whoever wins, even if the
opposition wins," Kassem said.
Majority leader Saad al-Hariri, a Sunni politician backed by Saudi Arabia, has
rejected the idea of a post-election unity government. Some of his allies have
not ruled out taking part.
The rival alliances have been sharing posts in a unity government since July
under a deal brokered by Qatar to defuse a political conflict that took Lebanon
to the brink of civil war.
DON'T "INVENT" PROBLEMS WITH IRAN
The political conflict in Lebanon has partly been fuelled by regional rivalry
between Saudi Arabia and Syria. Ties between the countries hit a nadir after the
2005 assassination of Lebanese statesman Rafik al-Hariri.
Kassem said it was too early to see "wide effects" from a thaw in ties between
Riyadh and Damascus "but we can detect a climate of political detente in Lebanon
because of this rapprochement".
Saudi Arabia is also concerned about Syria's close ties to Iran, a Shi'ite
Islamist state viewed with suspicion by Riyadh.
Kassem, whose group was founded with the help of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in
Lebanon in 1982, said Arab states should not "invent a problem called
Arab-Iranian relations".
The United States, which has close ties with Arab countries including Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, aimed to "instigate an Arab-Iranian problem for the benefit of
Israel", he added.
Hezbollah, which fought a 34-day war with Israel in 2006, saw little prospect of
another conflict with Israel in the near term, Kassem said. "But in the distant
future all things are possible," he added.
With Benjamin Netanyahu set to lead a new government in Israel, Kassem also said
he saw no chance of progress in any peace talks between Israel and Syria and the
Palestinians. (Writing by Tom Perry)
Swat? Not!
Handing the Swat Valley to the Taliban was shameful and wrong.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, March 9, 2009, at Slate
http://www.slate.com/id/2213246/
Residents flee the Swat Valley A whole new fashion is suddenly upon us. If only,
in the confrontation with reactionary Islamism, we could separate the moderate
extremists from the really extreme extremists. In the last few days, we have
heard President Barack Obama musing about a distinction between good and bad
Taliban, the British government insisting on a difference between Hezbollah the
political party and Hezbollah the militia, and Fareed Zakaria saying that the
best way of stopping the militants may be to allow them to run things in their
own way, since an appetite for the imposition of sharia does not equate to a
thirst for global jihad and may even partially slake that thirst.
would be foolish to doubt that there is some
case to be made for this: The Karzai government in Afghanistan has been making a
distinction between the "Mullah Omar" madmen and the merely localized Taliban
for some time, offering various sorts of amnesty and accommodation to the
latter. In Lebanon, anyway, Hezbollah takes part in elections and so far abides
by the results (also serving as a proxy for possible future talks with Iran). In
Iraq, the initial success of the counter-al-Qaida insurgency depended on the
suborning and recruitment of other Sunni insurgents who were hostile to Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi and Osama Bin Laden. One of the many reasons that I have always
opposed the use of torture and other extralegal methods is that such conduct
destroys the possibility of "turning" certain kinds of Islamic militants and
making potential allies of them.
However, one should be careful of the seductions of this compromise. In a
wishful attempt to bring peace with the Taliban in Pakistan itself, the
government has recently ceded a fertile and prosperous and modernized valley
province—the former princedom of Swat—to the ultraviolent votaries of the one
party and the one God. This is not some desolate tribal area where government
and frontier have been poorly delineated for decades, as in Waziristan. It is a
short commute from the capital city of Islamabad. The Taliban have never won an
election in the area; indeed, the last vote went exactly the other way. And
refugees are pouring out of Swat as the fundamentalists take hold and begin
their campaign of cultural and economic obliteration: no music, no schooling for
females, no recognition of the writ of the central government. (See the
excellent report by Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah in the March 5 New York
Times.)
According to this and other reports, the surrender of authority by the already
crumbling Pakistani authorities has had an emboldening effect on the extremists
rather than an appeasing one. The nominal interlocutor, Maulana Sufi Muhammad,
with whom the deal was signed, is related by clan and ideology to much fiercer
and younger figures, including those suspected in the murder of Benazir Bhutto,
in the burning of hundreds of girls' schools, in the killing of Pakistani
soldiers, and in the slaughter of local tribal leaders who have resisted Taliban
rule. Numberless witnesses attest that the militants show not the smallest
intention of abiding by the terms of the so-called "truce." Instead of
purchasing peace, the Pakistani government has surrendered part of its heartland
without a fight to those who can and will convert it into a base for further and
more exorbitant demands. This is not even a postponement of the coming
nightmare, which is the utter disintegration of Pakistan as a state. It is a
stage in that disintegration.
In Afghanistan and Iraq, where many very hard-line Muslims take the side of the
elected governments against the nihilists, there is also a determined NATO or
coalition presence that can bring firepower to bear as part of the argument.
This was the necessary if not sufficient condition for the "awakening" movements
on which Gen. David Petraeus relied and still relies. But even in default of
that factor, the handing over of large swaths of sovereign and strategic
territory to the enemy was never a part of any such plan, and it would have been
calamitous if it had been.
Fareed Zakaria makes the perfectly good observation in his Newsweek essay that
no Afghans have been found among the transnational terrorist groups that
apparently most concern us. (He's righter than he knows: It's more likely now
that a wanted would-be hijacker would be a British citizen than an Afghan one.)
However, this can easily decay into being a distinction without a difference.
What the Afghan fundamentalists did do when they were in power was offer their
country as a safe haven to al-Qaida and give it a hinterland that included the
ability to issue passports, make use of an airport, and so forth. Comparable
facilities will now become available, much nearer to the center of things, in a
formerly civilized province of our ally Pakistan. This is incredible.
There is another symbiosis between state failure of that kind and the spread of
deadly violence. A state or region taken over by jihadists will not last long
before declining into extreme poverty and backwardness and savagery. There are
no exceptions to this rule. We do not need to demonstrate again what happens to
countries where vicious fantasists try to govern illiterates with the help of
only one book. And who will be blamed for the failure? There will not, let me
assure you, be a self-criticism session mounted by the responsible mullahs.
Instead, all ills will be blamed on the Crusader-Zionist conspiracy, and young
men with deficiency diseases and learning disabilities will be taught how to
export their frustrations to happier lands. Thus does the failed state become
the rogue state. This is why we have a duty of solidarity with all the secular
forces, women's groups, and other constituencies who don't want this to happen
to their societies or to ours.
By all means, let field commanders make tactical agreements with discrepant
groups, play them off against one another, employ the methods of divide and
rule, and pit the bad against the worst. C'est la guerre. But under no
circumstances should a monopoly of violence be ceded to totalitarian or
theocratic forces. For this and for other reasons, we shall long have cause to
regret the shameful decision to deliver the good people of the Swat Valley bound
and gagged into the hands of the Taliban, and—worst of all—without even a
struggle.
The Myth of the Two Talibans
By Walid Phares
Taliban Militias
In an interview with the New York Times this week (March 7), President Barack
Obama said he “hopes U.S. troops can identify moderate elements of the Taliban
and move them toward reconciliation.” The proposition came as a conclusion to a
larger picture: the battlefield situation in Afghanistan. According to the New
York Times he said the United States “was not winning the war in that country”
and thus the door must be opened to a “reconciliation process in which the
American military would reach out to moderate elements of the Taliban much as it
did with Sunni militias in Iraq.”
Following these statements a flurry of comments exploded throughout the
international media: while most of the mainstream press and networks in the West
praised the “new daring turn” in US policy, that is, the readiness to “engage
the Taliban,” most of the pan Arabist and Jihadi sympathizer outlets in the
region warned the move won’t be successful. In a panel discussion on BBC TV
Arabic in which I participated, a noted expert in Islamist affairs from Amman
said “there is no such thing as Taliban independent from the high ups like
Mullah Umar.” Another panelist, a seasoned Afghan journalist from Kabul added:
“In Iraq, you have a bigger US force, and a totally different geopolitical
context than in Afghanistan. Besides, he added, why would Washington want to
engage a Terror force which is not accepted by the population?” This was a small
sampling of the brouhaha reigning in the debate about the real strategic
intentions of the Obama Administration.
The Imbroglio of Good and Bad Taliban
In fact by my observations, it is even more complicated than that: the US
Administration is being advised that any change in strategy in Afghanistan is
better than the previous situation. It is being told that the surge model as
applied in Iraq may work, if modified to meet Afghanistan’s “complexities.” The
President must also be attracted to the idea that an “engagement” with some
quarters of the Taliban will fit perfectly with the global idea of engagement,
sit down and listening that he seems to have adopted for the entire region.
But many questions still need to be answered. Does the plan require a dialogue
with the Taliban organization as a whole or with elements “within” the
organization? Apparently the US channel is to be established with “elements” not
with the leadership of the network. Then the next question is: if they aren’t
part of the top leadership, are these elements able to sway the entire
organization towards engagement? Apparently not, according to experts on the
Taliban, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, the goal is to sway these
factions – called moderates - from the Taliban, not to steer the entire group in
another direction.
Mullah Omar, supreme emir of the Taliban
Here we have to pause and come to the first “complex” conclusion: while
President Hamid Karzai has extended an olive branch to Mullah Omar to join the
Government, an invitation quickly rejected, President Obama is announcing a more
modest goal that is to identify “moderate elements” from the Taliban and “strike
a deal with them.” But the modest narrative of the goal doesn’t make it
necessarily reachable. Here is why.
If the “moderate Taliban” we’re looking to identify are “inside” the network,
when they engage with the US, they will be lethally ejected by the hard core of
the group, backed by al Qaeda. Hence the next question will be to know if those
“dissidents” would actually secede and form a “moderate Taliban” organization
working with the US and the Karzai Government. From the names available on such
a list, including the former “Taliban ambassadors” to Pakistan and the
international community and those who sought Saudi Arabia’s help in launching a
dialogue, we can’t see strong commanders willing to surge militarily against the
mother ship. As far as we can project, there are no leaders and radical clerics
who would carry that task of establishing an all-out new “good Taliban,” even
with millions of dollars as incentive. A Taliban civil war is not going to
happen, for now. But is there another more attainable goal? According to the
Obama Administration and some experts, there may be other options.
Little “talibans?”
In recent months a new concept has been pushed via the Defense and counter
terrorism circles arguing that instead of chipping off from the actual “Taliban”
militia on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, attention must be focusing
on harvesting the local “taliban” (little ts). According to this theory, the
little “ts” are individuals and groups who have joined the large umbrella under
Mullah Umar but not the membership of the organization, or have proclaimed
themselves as “taliban affiliates.” Hence, in comparison with the Iraqi Sahwa
movement backed by US Coalition, these sub-militias of all walks of life would
become the target of American political charm and dollars. If identified and
reached out to – so believe the architects of the forthcoming Afghan “surge” -
they will become the Afghani parallel to the Sahwas of Mesopotamia. Note that
President Obama specified that it will be the “American military who would reach
out to these moderate elements.” Meaning they will be dealt with from a lower
level rather than from a full fledged diplomatic perspective.
Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban ambassador
In that case, unlike what the media has been speculating about, this is not a US
dialogue with the party it is at war with, headed by Mullah Umar and his emirs.
It is not even an attempt to break the mother ship into two and recuperate the
more moderate branch. There are no takers for a massive retreat from the Taliban
into the arms of Kabul’s Government or Washington’s “infidel” generosity.
What the US move is about is much more pragmatic and realistic: nibbling off
from the wide pool of angry people and shifting them from frustration with
Karzai to enmity towards Umar. Indeed, there are tens of thousands of armed
males aggregating in villages, clans, tribes and neighborhoods, who wear turbans
and sometimes claim they are Taliban for a thousand reasons. These sub-militias
aren’t particularly ideological or maybe do not even understand much of the
doctrine they claim following. A number of experts and some strategists believe
today that these men of the Afghan underworld can become the “new army” against
the “bad Taliban.” Can they?
In fact not only it is possible but it should have been the case eight years
ago. However, there are two fundamental mistakes not to make.
Don’t announce them as the “moderates”
First, the Obama Administration and the US military strategists must not see
these new war constituents, nor announce them as who they aren’t. These
sub-militias sought to turn the tide against the real Taliban aren’t your
“moderate” guys. In reality they have no firm ideological affiliation. With few
exceptions perhaps, the tribal and urban forces to be targeted for “integration”
will simply shift alliances or allegiance for money and power. The American,
Western and international public must not be led to believe that a piece of
architecture will be successful in transforming radicals into moderates or
swaying away bands of armed men from extremism, let alone Jihadism. The mutation
to moderation happens not via cash deals but through years of schooling, an
efficient media and perseverant NGO work. It happens from younger into older
age. Hence forget about the “identification of moderate” part of the Obama
strategy. Inducing civil societies into liberalism, or even moderation, needs
Government crafting of a kind that doesn’t exist in Washington or Brussels for
the time being.
In addition, these militias and militants to be swayed away from Waziristan’s
exiles aren’t going to produce a national reconciliation. They do not represent
the radical ideological web which is behind the war against the new Afghan
democracy. National reconciliation takes place between two or more large,
historical and strategic forces. Instead we’re talking about recuperation of
elements extracted from the Taliban, not reconciliation with the latter. Hence
US stated goals should be even more modest in this regard.
Don’t call them “taliban”
The second fatal mistake not to commit is to call them Taliban, proto-Taliban or
crypto-Taliban. Even if for publicity purposes it suits the goal of soothing the
US and Western public, constructing a fictive identity to a plethora of
tribal-urban sub militias will backfire on the whole campaign. Here is why.
Since they aren’t a breakaway faction from the main organization, they can’t
form another Taliban to challenge the Mullah Umar leadership. And since they
have no ideology of their own they won’t be able to de-radicalize others. Hence
if they are baptized as the other “taliban,” instead of using the credibility of
the name to push back against the bad guys, the name will ultimately transform
them into what we don’t want them to be: Taliban! Void will be filled by the
forces with a greater doctrinal power, forceful clerics, and historical
leadership. If we call them nice Taliban or “little ts” we would be throwing
them back into the arms of the forces we want to sway them from. Knowing what I
know from the Jihadist strategies, it won’t take long before the two Talibans
would eventually sit down and strike a deal, and overwhelm the Kabul Government.
Learn from Iraq
If the Iraq Sahwa model is the inspiration for an Afghan engagement with local
forces, we need to learn the right lessons from it. In Iraq, the US didn’t
create good al Qaeda versus bad al Qaeda; it didn’t identify moderate elements
from al Qaeda to pit them against the mother force. The political dimension of
the surge, relied heavily on recruiting tribes, social cadres and Sunni elements
regardless of their affiliations and empowering them via a “new” organization,
called Sahwa Councils. We gave these new local allies an identity of their own,
not the identity of the forces they fought.
But more important, the greater dimension of the surge wasn’t the mere rise of
the Sahwas but the moving forward of the democratic political process with its
political parties, NGOs, movements and media. Swaying Sunni militias against al
Qaeda was only one component of the strategy; the larger strategy was to sustain
pressures until Iraqi forces, legislators and ministries are up and running. By
comparison in Afghanistan, we should make the case of a similar, not necessarily
identical process: mobilizing popular militias, giving them an identity of their
own, not calling them Taliban, and not expecting them to be the missing link to
the future but a force helpful in pushing the political process forward until it
can resist, contain and reverse the Taliban.
How to measure victory and defeat
President Obama, and before him President Bush, were always trying to measure
the success in the war in Afghanistan. While the latter spoke of victories, our
current President speaks of failures. The real issue is how to measure victory
or defeat. Is destroying al Qaeda and Taliban bunkers a definitive indicator of
victory? Are the relentless terror attacks by the Jihadists the other definitive
measurement of failures? I don’t think either parameter gives us an answer.
Rather it is the battle taking place over the conquest of the minds and hearts
of the school children and teens of the country that will make or break that
burgeoning Democracy. Unfortunately neither the past nor the current
Administration seems to see the war of ideas with such urgency.
Let’s be accurate and transparent
My recommendation to the Obama Administration is to be relentlessly accurate in
describing the choices it intends to make in Afghanistan and in the
confrontation with the Jihadists worldwide. If its final intention is to cut a
deal with the Taliban – in this article I won’t argue about the choice - it must
faithfully inform the US public of this choice instead of developing a phased
narrative of disengagement.
But if it seriously intends to fight the Taliban and al Qaeda by isolating them
further inside Afghanistan and mobilizing the international community, the
Administration also needs to prepare the American and Western public for that
choice. For in this age of hyper globalization, the Jihadi forces have an
astonishing capacity to outmaneuver the smartest strategies devised by their
enemies and, on the other hand, the public here at home has developed a
surprising ability to understand the intentions of both the Terror forces and of
its own Government. Transparency is everything in this age.
***********
Dr. Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a visiting scholar at the European
Foundation for Democracy and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War
against Future Jihad
March 9, 2009 12:49 PM Print
The Attack on Syria's al-Kibar Nuclear Facility
by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Joshua D. Goodman
inFocus
Spring 2009
http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/826/the-attack-on-syrias-al-kibar-nuclear-facility
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Israel's September 6, 2007, attack on Syria's al-Kibar nuclear facility
surprised the world—Syria most of all. The operation, executed by the Israeli
Air Force (IAF), was reminiscent of Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak
reactor, but with two noticeable differences. First, Israel remained silent
following the al-Kibar bombing, while in 1981 it boasted publicly about the Iraq
strike even before the pilots had returned. Second, whereas the international
community knew of Saddam Hussein's nuclear plans in 1981, few were aware of the
extent of Syria's nuclear program in 2007.
The IAF's attack raises two important questions: What was Syria hiding? Why did
Israel feel compelled to launch a military strike? Subsequent investigations
have painted a clearer picture of what took place at al-Kibar.
Early Indicators
In hindsight, there were several warnings in recent years that Syria might be
pursuing nuclear weapons. The December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate,
focusing on foreign missile development, noted the U.S. intelligence community's
concerns about "Syria's intentions regarding nuclear weapons." An unclassified
2004 report by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis stated
that Pakistani investigators had confirmed that Abdul Qadeer Khan—the Pakistani
nuclear scientist who ran a clandestine black market network—offered "nuclear
technology and hardware to Syria." The report expressed concern "that expertise
or technology could have been transferred."
Press reports also began to circulate in 2004 that Khan had visited Syria on
several occasions, and had met with senior Syrian officials in Iran. While Syria
denied this, Bashar al-Assad acknowledged in a 2007 interview with an Austrian
newspaper that he had received a letter from Khan in 2001. He claimed that he
rebuffed the overture, unsure "if it was an Israeli trap."
Still, a generalized assessment of Syria's nuclear intentions could not be
gleaned from these early warnings. Indeed, Western intelligence agencies were
unaware of the purpose of the al-Kibar facility until the summer of 2007.
According to an ABC News report, Israel's Mossad learned that Syria was building
a covert nuclear facility that summer, and proceeded to either place a mole
inside the plant or convince a worker to provide Israel with intelligence.
Through this source, Israel obtained important video footage, as well as
photographs, providing evidence that al-Kibar was indeed a nuclear facility
(with a large cylindrical structure, a pumping station, etc)Israel approached
the Central Intelligence Agency with this evidence, and, according to the
Jerusalem Post, the U.S. "looked up satellite coordinates for the site" and
"helped Israel pinpoint possible 'drop sites'." The two countries discussed the
possibility of the U.S. carrying out the strike; American officials even
examined options for doing so. Eventually, the White House conveyed the message
"that the U.S. preferred not to attack." In fact, "U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates attempted to convince Israel
'to confront, not attack'."
What Was Syria Hiding?
Syria's response in the wake of Israel's bombing was curious. The regime sought
no retaliatory measures. It did not even ask the U.N. Security Council to
discuss or condemn the incident. Rather, satellite photos show Syria's efforts
to scrub the site of any traces of the nuclear reactor that Syria denied having.
Reuters reported that Syria bulldozed the area, "removed debris and erected a
new building in a possible cover-up." Former U.N. weapons inspector David
Albright, president of the prestigious Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS), told the New York Times, "It looks like Syria is trying to hide
something and destroy the evidence of some activity. But it won't work. Syria
has got to answer questions about what it was doing."
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director Mohammed ElBaradei condemned
the U.S. and Israel for their "shoot first and ask questions later" approach.
Nonetheless, the IAEA began probing Syrian nuclear activity, and Syria gave its
inspectors access to the al-Kibar site in June 2008. (Syria later refused IAEA
requests to revisit al-Kibar and examine three other related sites.)
The IAEA released a report on November 19, 2008, containing a number of relevant
data points. The report establishes that construction of the al-Kibar facility
began between April 26 and August 4, 2001. Based on analysis of satellite
imagery, the IAEA also notes:
Imagery taken prior to and immediately after the bombing indicates that the
destroyed box-shaped building may have had underground levels. Its containment
structure appears to have been similar in dimension and layout to that required
for a biological shield for nuclear reactors, and the overall size of the
building was sufficient to house the equipment needed for a nuclear reactor of
the type alleged.
The IAEA's on-the-ground evaluation also found a water pump and other adequate
infrastructure to support a reactor. Environmental samples from the site also
yielded a "significant number of natural uranium particles" that were of
anthropogenic origin. (Syria claimed that the particles came from the missiles
Israel used to destroy the facility.)
Consistent with the caution for which the IAEA is known, its report did not
conclusively state that the Syrian site was a nuclear reactor—but the
implication was strong.
North Korea's Connection
Post-attack analysis also highlighted North Korea's connection to al-Kibar.
Shortly after Israel's strike, press reports suggested that the characteristics
of the Syrian facility were similar to North Korea's reactor in Yongbyon. David
Albright and Paul Brannan of ISIS confirmed this in April 2008. Specifically,
they "measured the footprint of the Yongbyon reactor building and compared it to
that of the suspected reactor building in Syria and found the two footprints
were approximately the same." Prior to Syria's construction of al-Kibar, the
Yongbyon model had been the only one of its type built in 35 years.
Video from inside the Syrian facility has also been described as "very, very
damning" by a nuclear weapons specialist who spoke to the Washington Post. The
video demonstrates that al-Kibar's core design was the same as the Yongbyon
reactor, "including a virtually identical configuration and number of holes for
fuel rods." The video also shows North Korean personnel inside the site.
Subsequent investigations have revealed that key materials for al-Kibar were
smuggled from China and possibly Europe into Syria by Namchongang Trading, a
North Korean firm.
Why Did Israel Attack?
There are several explanations for why Israel elected to launch a strike against
the Syrian facility. The most obvious is that Israel feared the prospect of
having a nuclear neighbor—particularly one with which Israel has been in a
constant state of war since the Jewish state's independence in 1948. The two
countries have clashed several times since the 1973 Yom Kippur war, including a
major engagement in the 1982 Lebanon war and occasional skirmishes at their
shared border. Moreover, Syria threatens Israel by proxy—through its support of
such terrorist groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
A second possible motivation is Israel's desire to re-establish deterrence in
the Arab world. Israel's failures in its 2006 war with Hezbollah weakened the
perceived deterrent that it held over its neighbors. The al-Kibar strike may
have been an attempt to reestablish the supremacy of Israel's military apparatus
in its enemies' eyes. Christopher Pang, head of the Middle East and North Africa
program at the Royal United Services Institute in London, told the Associated
Press, "In terms of deterrence, the effect was clear by invading Syrian
airspace, by showing that Israel is not only able, but willing, to still launch
strikes against Syrian targets."
The IAF's strike may also have been intended as a warning to Iran—or even a
practice run on an eventual bombing raid on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Obviously, al-Kibar differed greatly from the primary nuclear targets in Iran.
Indeed, al-Kibar was at least partially located above ground, and was within
Israeli warplanes' striking range. Nonetheless, al-Kibar was protected by the
same Russian-built Tor-M1 air defense system used to protect Iranian facilities.
Thus, Israel's strike may have been a test run to find flaws in Iran's air
defenses.
If indeed Israel's strategy was to diagnose Iran's air defense weaknesses, the
strategy appeared to backfire. The apparent failure of these systems prompted
Iran in December 2007 to purchase the more advanced S-300 system from Russia.
(Both Russia and Iran insist the deal had been in the works well before then.)
In the end, however, the Israeli operation seems to have been motivated by
necessity; the pictures collected by Israel's mole depicted a nearly complete
facility. Albright and Brannan argue that the late detection of the reactor,
coupled with the perception of a nearly operational facility, compelled Israel
to choose the military option as a measure of first resort. They write that
Israel's "analysis, which in hindsight must be viewed as a worst-case
assessment, was that Syria could soon load uranium fuel and start the reactor."
Israel did not want to attack after the reactor was fully operational, because
doing so would run the risk of spreading radioactive material.
A Warning For The Future
As primary energy grows more expensive, many countries are turning to nuclear
power. The expansion of "civilian nuclear programs" highlights the need for a
more robust non-proliferation regime; the Middle East alone has about a dozen
states with at least nascent nuclear programs. The existence of al-Kibar,
however fleeting, should serve as a serious warning about the current
non-proliferation regime, as well as U.S. engagement of Syria.
If Washington does attempt to engage Syria, it cannot simply ignore al-Kibar.
Syria's apparent nuclear development and subsequent deception reinforce
pre-existing concerns about the country's interest in regional peace and
stability. Pretending that the al-Kibar incident did not occur would send the
wrong signal to Syria and other potentially dangerous proliferators in the
Middle East.
**Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is director and Joshua D. Goodman is deputy director
of the Center for Terrorism Research at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.