LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
October 26/08

Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Luke 13,1-9. At that time some people who were present there told him about the Galileans whose blood Pilate had mingled with the blood of their sacrifices. He said to them in reply, "Do you think that because these Galileans suffered in this way they were greater sinners than all other Galileans? By no means! But I tell you, if you do not repent, you will all perish as they did! Or those eighteen people who were killed when the tower at Siloam fell on them --do you think they were more guilty than everyone else who lived in Jerusalem? By no means! But I tell you, if you do not repent, you will all perish as they did!" And he told them this parable: "There once was a person who had a fig tree planted in his orchard, and when he came in search of fruit on it but found none, he said to the gardener, 'For three years now I have come in search of fruit on this fig tree but have found none. (So) cut it down. Why should it exhaust the soil?'
He said to him in reply, 'Sir, leave it for this year also, and I shall cultivate the ground around it and fertilize it;
it may bear fruit in the future. If not you can cut it down.'"

William of Saint-Thierry (c.1085-1148), first a Benedictine, then a Cistercian monk
Meditations 5:6-7 (©Cistercian Fathers series)/"If you do not repent, you will all perish"
Alas for me! My conscience accuses me, and Truth does not excuse me so that he can say: "For he knew not what he did." By virtue of the price of your precious blood, therefore, forgive me all my sins, O Lord, whether committed knowingly or not... Lord, truly I have sinned by my own will and much, after I had received the knowledge of the truth, and I have offered an affront to the Spirit of grace. After receiving from him the free remission of my sins in baptism, after receiving the knowledge of the truth, I have returned to those sins «like a dog to his vomit» (2Pt 2,22; Prv 26,11). But have I spurned you also, Son of God? I have spurned you, if I have denied you, although I should not think that Peter trod you underfoot, for all that he came to deny you. He loved you most ardently even while declaring once, twice, and even thrice that he did not know you... Satan has sought out my faith sometimes, to sift it as wheat; but your prayer has reached even to me, so that my faith in you should never fail (Lk 22, 31-32)... You know that my mind has always wanted to abide in your faith; preserve it in me unto the end. I have always believed in you... I have always loved you, even when I sinned against you. I shall be sorry for my sin until I die; but I shall never repent of having loved you unless it be because I did not love you as I ought.

Interview
Manuela Paraipan: Interview with Information Minister Tarek Mitri, 25/10/08

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
New Opinion: Rebuking Samir Geagea.NowLebanon.com 25/10/08
Arabs and Muslims won't even work together to save themselves- The Daily Star 25/10/08

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for October 25/08
Aoun: Iran is Lebanon's Vital Depth-Naharnet
Bunny in Bag Sparks Panic in Jamhour-Naharnet
Syrian Army Officer Discloses to Lebanese Court his Terror Mission in Beirut-Naharnet
Bellemare to Break the Silence Soon -Naharnet
Abssi's Son in Law Killed in Syria-Naharnet
Nasrallah: Rumors I was poisoned are 'psychological warfare'-Ha'aretz
Russian Arms Exporter Sanctioned Over Iran-Washington Post
Williams Reminds Lebanese of Major Challenges-Naharnet
Political Considerations Might Further Complicate Abu Jamra's Withdrawal from Cabinet-Naharnet
U.N. Investigation Team Hears Testimonies of New Witnesses in Hariri Case-Naharnet
Bush Reiterates Support for Moderation in Lebanon on Occasion of 25th Anniversary of Attack on Marines-Naharnet
Peacekeepers Mark U.N. Day, Graziano Appreciates Lebanese Support-Naharnet
Army Detonates Small Bomb in Sidon-Naharnet
Siniora and Abu Jamra cut deal to define deputy PM's powers-Daily Star
Conference looks at restrictions affecting role of media-Daily Star
'US hegemony is a thing of the past' -Daily Star
Salameh expects falling crude prices to slash inflation rate-Daily Star
w charity takes aim at deprived North-Daily Star
Lebanese kindness helps put the driving in perspective-Daily Star
Peacekeepers in South mark UN Day with vow to work for stability-Daily Star
storm, a flood, and a welcome pledge of accountability in Beirut
Jordanian poet accused of 'atheism and blasphemy'-Daily Star
Ultra-Orthodox party refuses to join Livni coalition-(AFP)
Obama or McCain, expect tussles over foreign policy-Daily Star
US federal judge seeks definition of 'enemy combatant' -(AFP)

Abssi's Son-in-Law Killed in Syria
Naharnet/The son-in-law of Fatah al-Islam leader Shaker al-Abssi, better known by his code name of Abu Ibrahim, was killed in a clash with Syrian Security agents at the Damascus refugee camp of al-Yarmouk on Oct. 9, the daily al-Liwaa reported on Saturday. It said Abu Ibrahim, 35, is a Palestinian refugee living in Syria and had married Abssi's daughter, Wafaa, nearly 45 days ago. Syrian President Bashar Assad was quoted by the daily As-Safir recently as telling an unidentified Arab source that Wafaa Abssi, 25, had been arrested in Syria.
However another report said Wafaa, her mother and the rest of the Abssi family resided in Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh after the Lebanese Army cracked down on Fatah al-Islam at the northern camp of Nahr al-Bared. Beirut, 25 Oct 08, 09:12

Syrian Army Officer Discloses to Lebanese Court his Terror Mission in Beirut
Naharnet/An alleged Syrian army colonel who goes by the name of Firas Ghannam has testified to the military tribunal that he was assigned to detonate bombs in Beirut's Martyrs' Square on Feb. 13, 2006, apparently to foil plans to celebrate the first anniversary of ex-Premier Rafik Hariri's assassination.
The daily al-Mustaqbal said Saturday that Ghannam told the military tribunal he had received his orders from "Syrian intelligence officer George Salloum."
The bombs were to be detonated on the eve of the first anniversary of the Hariri crime. The report quoted Ghannam as saying he "did not intend to carry out the assignment," which he had accepted "to manage leaving Syria by infiltrating across the borders into Lebanon." Ghannam and an alleged Tunisian suspect identified as Munir Hilal were arrested in the eastern Bekaa valley on Feb. 11, 2006, according to the report. Upon the arrest security agents confiscated from Ghannam a "forged identity card and a hand grenade," the report added. It said Ghannam also testified to "relations" he had with Shehab Qaddour, better known by the code name of Abu Hureira, a ranking official of the Fatah al-Islam terrorist group who was killed in a clash with security forces in the northern city of Tripoli more than a year ago. The military tribunal, chaired by Brig. Gen. Nizar Khalil, concluded its interrogations of Ghannam and Hilal on Friday. It is scheduled to convene on Feb. 20 to debrief witness Omar Ghannam. Beirut, 25 Oct 08, 09:40

U.N. Investigation Team Hears Testimonies of New Witnesses in Hariri Case
Naharnet/Investigating Judge Saqr Saqr has received documents from the International Independent Investigation Commission, including testimonies of new witnesses in the assassination case of former Premier Rafik Hariri. Press reports on Friday said Saqr was likely to summon the new witnesses successively. They said that the commission will not include names of suspects in its final report which is expected to be issued by year's end. Beirut, 24 Oct 08, 08:51

Bellemare to Break the Silence Soon
Naharnet/Exclusive information obtained by Naharnet revealed that the final report by the U.N. commission investigating former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination will be issued next November. The commission head Daniel Bellemare will not wait till the end of the designated six months period in December to present his report to U.N Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. According to U.N. practices, the drafting and finalization exercise of reports takes up to a three-week to one month period before it is issued. Therefore, one can expect that the commission has not even started to draft its report during the month of October and would only start this exercise by the first week of November. Statements made by Bellemare in his last report and in briefings to the Security Council reveal two major facts: First, the report will not name any defendant, witness, or concerned individual related to the investigation. As Bellemare stated in April 2008, when he presented his first report to the Council, no names will be disclosed by the commission throughout the duration of its mandate. Names would only be announced when indictments will be issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon when and if sufficient evidence is established for issuing indictments.
Second, the report will not provide an all the details of the investigations that will only be revealed in court.
Investigation Phases
1. The Fitzgerald Phase: a fact-finding period distinguished by collecting information about the local investigation and exploring the political and security situation, getting familiar with the circumstances surrounding the crime and investigating them. It is also a phase that was not governed by accurate legal safeguards and formalities, but rather was a surveillance mission to put the U.N. and the Security Council in the picture, thus allowing them to take the appropriate decision regarding dealing with the crime.
2. The Mehlis Phase: during which the rules of the investigating commission prevailed but he was not forced, under the nature of his legal mandate and role, to verify the summaries, conclusions and results with tangible and material evidence, since at this point no decision to set up a special court on Lebanon was yet taken.
3. The Brammertz Phase: A phase known with a clear assignment to the probe and a set time frame for the task at hand that would be followed by a unambiguous path for setting a Special Tribunal for Lebanon in line with a U.N. Security Council agreement. This is what made Brammertz expand his investigation and go into a lot of technical details without having to go back to square one or ignoring data collected by his predecessor, Mehlis. Brammertz focused on gathering all the possible evidence to back up the various scenarios.
4. The Bellemare Phase: This phase dealt with building legal foundations designed to move the probe dossier to the international court and to collect solid facts and evidence acceptable by the tribunal. The confidential nature of the investifation does not at all mean that it lost essential elements or that Bellemare wished to keep data to himself and deprive the public of access to the information.
Reasons for Bellemare's silence
It is known that Bellemare takes into account the dual nature of his role as the head of the commission and the forthcoming general prosecutor of the International Tribunal for Lebanon which imposes on him confidentiality standards to preserve not only the integrity of his work as Commissioner and a Prosecutor, but also the safety and security of people whose lives could be threatened since criminals are still out there and might make use of any information that comes out of the commission to intimidate, terrorize or kill them.
Bellemare understands the sensitivity and influence of his role on the Lebanese scene. The philosophy of the International Tribunal is based on helping Lebanon put an end to the period of impunity, solve its problems and help the Lebanese institutions in accordance with international norms. Therfore he is careful not to take any steps that might negatively impact the credibility of the process of seeking the truth, to help put an end to the "culture" of impunity and restore faith in justice and the rule of law.
Bellemare is working in a responsible way on the basis of protecting his work from any penetrations that could harm the proceedings of the international tribunal at a later stage. His full silence is a part of this rule. However, this silence is not "eternal." It has been known that Bellemare is studying with his assistants ways to keep his word to the Lebanese public opinion and its legitimate right to know and be informed of of the progress of his work in his dual capacity as the investigator now and general prosecutor at a later stage.
Bellemare is keen to preserve the independence of the Commission in its work and to prevent its inclusion in political debates to serve political agendas that have nothing to do with the essence of the work of the Commission or its objectives, which are essentially to be part of the solution in Lebanon and not part of the problem -- a solution that could complete and consolidate what the Lebanese are trying to achieve through dialogue, reconciliation and reforms by promoting justice and ending impunity.
It is expected that the care and secrecy will continue even during the tribunal proceedings, since available information indicates that some of the witnesses who testified in the Hariri case will not have their identity exposed even after the end of their testimony. Some of the court sessions will not be public.
Investigation sources affirm that a lot of statements by some Lebanese politicians over the past few weeks does not in any way relate to reality. Such politicians were never contacted or summoned by the commission as witnesses and were never even considered as suspects. The Commission's database does not include their names, a fact that will be proved in the future.
The source continued that using the media to spread fabricated news and misinformation about the work of the Commission are useless and time will tell soon. If Bellemare has chosen not to reply to any of the speculations published in the press it is because throughout his long career in prosecution he used a tribunal as a vehicle of communication and what he has to say will be heard by all. Beirut, 24 Oct 08, 13:56

Williams Reminds Lebanese of Major Challenges
Naharnet/U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams has said Lebanon is making important steps towards a return to normalcy but warned that many challenges remain. "We have recently seen Lebanon make important strides towards a return to normalcy since the Doha Accord in May, with the election of a president, the establishment of a national unity government and the revival of state institutions," Williams said in a statement on the occasion of U.N. day.
U.N. day marks the founding of the United Nations with the entry into force of the organization's Charter on 24 October, 1945. The U.N. strongly supports efforts towards reconciliation and the resumption of the national dialogue, Williams said Friday. He warned, however, that the country is facing major challenges.
"The country is heading towards parliamentary elections next year that have to be organized and held in an atmosphere that will both build on your history but which will also take place in conditions of peace and security," he said. "There are security concerns and socio-economic challenges that are weighing on the everyday lives of the Lebanese that have to be resolved," he added. He said U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon has personally expressed his commitment to helping Lebanon resolve all its salient issues and implement Security Council Resolutions, including Resolution 1701. "The United Nations does not and cannot work alone. We are here to serve Lebanon and our strong cooperation with the Lebanese authorities remains the backbone of the organization's work," he said. "Our work also depends on our partnerships that have been built with the segments of Lebanon's civil society, which has played an important role in developing the diverse and vibrant society that makes Lebanon special in its own way," he added. Beirut, 25 Oct 08, 06:26

Peacekeepers Mark U.N. Day, Graziano Appreciates Lebanese Support
Naharnet/Peacekeepers have observed the annual U.N. Day to commemorate the 63rd anniversary of the founding of the world body and awarded certificates of recognition to long-serving Lebanese staff members of UNIFIL. The ceremony was held at the UNIFIL headquarters in the border town of Naqoura on Friday.
UNIFIL commander Maj. Gen. Claudio Graziano, senior officers from the Lebanese Armed Forces, representatives from various U.N. agencies and local and international nongovernmental organizations took part in the ceremony. "Your sense of duty and continued dedication to service represent an example to all of us as we strive to contribute to the establishment of sustainable peace in South Lebanon," Graziano said as a tribute to nine honored Lebanese staff members who have served for more than 25 years with UNIFIL. The United Nations came into existence officially on October 24, 1945 with the entry into force of the organization's Charter and since 1948 that date is celebrated as U.N. day. Peacekeepers representing the 28 different national contingents that make up UNIFIL held a ceremonial parade in Naqoura. Graziano hailed all those who were killed for the cause of peace. "Since 1948, there have been a total of 63 U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world, during which over 2,500 peacekeepers have lost their lives while serving the cause of peace," Graziano said. "In its 30 years of existence, UNIFIL has lost 275 peacekeepers in the line of duty." "Sacrifices will not go in vain," he added. "On the contrary, they urge us to continue seeking peace and stability."Acknowledging the Lebanese army as a "key partner" to UNIFIL's mission, he recalled the ultimate sacrifices made by its soldiers, particularly the army de-miners, while serving the people of south Lebanon over the past two years.Graziano also thanked the Lebanese state, civil and religious authorities and the population for their "big support and cooperation with UNIFIL."He said the success of UNIFIL's mission was impossible without the support of the Lebanese people in general and the southerners in particular. Beirut, 25 Oct 08, 05:27

Army Detonates Small Bomb in Sidon
Naharnet/A Lebanese Army sapper on Saturday detonated what was believed to be a small bomb deserted in a field off the Iman school in the southern provincial capital of Sidon. The bomb, a rusty canister linked to two wires, was safely detonated without evacuating students from the school, which is 500 meters off the site, police reported. Obviously it did not target the school in the first place, a police official said. The canister was detonated because the army sapper decided it was not safe to move it, the official added without further elaboration. Beirut, 25 Oct 08, 13:00

Nasrallah: Rumors I was poisoned are 'psychological warfare'
By Yoav Stern , Haaretz Correspondent
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah dispelled as 'psychological warfare' reports that he had been poisoned last week and was saved by a team of Iranian doctors, during an interview he gave Friday night to Hezbollah television station Al-Manar. Nasrallah added that recently there has been a flurry of negative reports slamming the organization, including that the Lebanese terrorist organization is involved in drug trafficking in South America and that they are riven by internal disputes. Nasrallah also hinted that the reports that he had been poisoned had an Israel connection, though he did not elaborate. The Iraqi Web site Almalaf on Wednesday quoted diplomatic sources in Beirut as saying Nasrallah was poisoned last week by a particularly poisonous chemical substance. His medical condition was apparently critical for a number of days, until the Iranian doctors arrived and managed to save his life. The site claimed that the sources believed it was highly likely that the poisoning was an Israeli assassination attempt.

Russian Arms Exporter Sanctioned Over Iran
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, October 25, 2008; Page A12
The State Department has slapped financial sanctions on Russia's state arms exporter for its dealings with Iran, but in an unusual move, it granted the company a partial waiver to permit the sale of nearly two dozen Russian helicopters to Iraq, U.S. officials said yesterday.
The new sanctions -- required by U.S. law to thwart the sale of sensitive technology that could help Iran, North Korea and Syria develop weapons of mass destruction or missile systems -- were also imposed on 12 other companies or organizations based in China, Iran, North Korea, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denounced the sanctions on Russia's Rosoboronexport, and its subsidiaries, as illegal and unjust. The company had been sanctioned by the United States in 2006 but would have come off the list had the State Department determined that it had not made any suspect sales in the past two years.
"These new sanctions were introduced without any international legal foundation whatsoever," Lavrov said in Moscow. "Russia will of course take this into account in practical affairs and relations with the United States, such as in trade and economic and other spheres."
He added that Russia would not change its policies on Iran because of the sanctions. "All our trade and all of our military-technical cooperation with Iran is carried out in strict accordance with current international legal norms," he said. "There can be no other explanation here than the rather arrogant extra-territorial implementation of American laws."
State Department officials declined to specify why the companies were placed on the list, saying the reasons are classified.
Spokesman Gordon K. Duguid said the sanctions, which will remain in effect until September 2010, prohibit any agency of the U.S. government from entering into a contract with the sanctioned companies for any goods, services or technology and ban any participation in U.S. assistance programs.
However, the notice published Thursday in the Federal Register excludes dealings "to the extent the Secretary of State otherwise may have determined," which is how the Russian helicopter deal survived, State Department officials said.
The Defense Department earlier this year gave a U.S. company a $325 million contract to supply 22 Russian-made M-17 troop transport helicopters. According to an account on Wired magazine's Danger Room blog in July, and confirmed by U.S. officials, the U.S. company, Carlyle Group-owned ARINC, purchased the helicopters as commercial items from Kazan, a Russian helicopter manufacturer, in an effort to avoid direct work with the sanctioned Russian state agency. But Kazan is linked to Rosoboronexport via a holding company called Oboronprom, and Rosoboronexport is also linked to a company in the UAE that was hired to convert the copters for military use.
Without the waiver, the lucrative sole-sourced deal was potentially in violation of the law. "This was a screw-up," one U.S. official said.
The sanctions against two North Korean companies -- Korea Mining Development and Korea Taesong Trading -- come just two weeks after the Bush administration removed North Korea from the State Department's list of terrorism sponsors in an effort to rescue a deal to eliminate Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. The announcement of the sanctions was delayed to accommodate concerns that the sanctions might complicate the agreement with North Korea.

Rebuking Samir Geagea
October 25, 2008
Now Lebanon
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea
It is an irony that the only former wartime leader who actually served time in prison after the Lebanese civil war ended is the one routinely accused of having the heaviest past. Yes, we know that Samir Geagea is no altar boy, but it is sometimes tiresome to hear people suddenly raise the bass in their voice when mentioning him; to suddenly hear them go off on unrequested tangents describing his grim legacy. Either Geagea should benefit from the same blanket forgiveness that the Lebanese accorded to all their wartime leaders, or let’s just admit we’re all hypocrites.
These thoughts come to mind following the statement by Sleiman Franjieh earlier this week that inter-Christian reconciliation could only take place once Geagea would “admit to his crimes, apologize publicly, then quit politics.” That was quite a statement, because Geagea not only spent 11 years behind bars for crimes both real and imagined, which should represent some measure of atonement; he was also one of the few militia leaders to publicly apologize for his militia’s previous actions—an apology that was so poorly received in some quarters that the otherwise bold move soon looked like a tactical error.
We have no illusions about the potential for inter-Christian reconciliation. The Syrians have plainly told Franjieh that they don’t want it to happen, so he’s only implementing their decision by ratcheting up the absurd conditions for dealing with Geagea. Meanwhile, Michel Aoun has insisted that no reconciliation with the Lebanese Forces is needed and is throwing himself into the mud of regional rivalry — appealing to Iran and avoiding condemnation of Syria while also criticizing Saudi Arabia, even as Geagea has moved closer to the Saudis and built bridges to Egypt.
But our larger point is another one. Until when will wartime guilt be used by some figures as an unevenly applied battering ram in the political arena? We have no problem with remembering the war, and indeed regret that nothing was done during the postwar years to enhance remembrance. But if the only way of remembering the war now is to do so selectively, in order to score political points and abort political progress, then such memory serves no constructive purpose and will in no way reconcile the Lebanese. Quite the contrary; it will only divide them further.
That’s why Franjieh’s effort to paint Geagea as someone beyond the pale, as someone guiltier than the rest, is both destructive and very partial. Franjieh’s family may have been murdered by the Lebanese Forces, in a crime that was thoroughly heinous, but countless people were murdered at the hands of Franjieh’s postwar allies, particularly by his Syrian sponsors. When Franjieh accepted a prominent place in a postwar Syrian political order built on a foundation of amnesia, he accepted that such concepts as justice and retribution when applied to the war would be set aside. The same goes for Omar Karami, whose government passed an amnesty law in 1991 erasing most wartime crimes. That these two men should now be refusing to have anything to do with Geagea, on the grounds that he is a war criminal, is the height of duplicity.
We have few illusions about our wartime leaders. But justice was not served — nor was that ever the intention — when Geagea was sent to prison while all the other militia chiefs pursued their political interests without hindrance. All that the episode showed was that justice could be twisted to serve narrow political ends — at the time those of Damascus.
We may agree that Franjieh and Karami are free to reject any kind of reconciliation with Geagea. But their decision has to be a personal one. No one in the postwar political class (or for that matter Michel Aoun, who has more than a few victims to his name) is entitled to rebuke Geagea on the basis of high national principle. The postwar system was and is many things, but it certainly is not in even the remotest way principled.

Manuela Paraipan: Interview with Information Minister Tarek Mitri, 25/10/08
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=16&article_id=97079
Mitri: 'Most of Lebanon's conflicts have both an international dimension and an Arab dimension'
And 2006 'was not a war against Hizbullah as israel claimed. it was a war against lebanon'
Saturday, October 25, 2008
Interview
During her fact-finding stay in Beirut, Manuela Paraipan, a Middle East editor for the World Security Network Foundation, had the opportunity to meet many ordinary Lebanese people as well as people in high-ranking political offices. One of them was Information Minister Tarek Mitri, who was the acting foreign minister after the summer 2006 war with Israel. He played a vital role in the negotiations leading to the cessation of hostilities. His answers to Paraipan's questions provide good insight into the complexity of Lebanese politics.
Manuela Paraipan: In 2006 you were acting foreign minister and the special envoy to the UN during the July war. Looking back at that experience, what were the crucial moments that you remember for both you and Lebanon? And why did it take so long for your task to ask for a cease-fire to be successful?
Tarek Mitri: Let me start with the second question. From day one we asked for a cease-fire. We went to Rome and asked for a cease-fire, but the Americans said that the conditions for a durable one were not there.
This was the leitmotif that I heard in New York. They were originally hoping to draft a resolution that would address the root cause of the problem, as they put it, but then they thought the time was not ripe for such a resolution.
Our position has always been to support a cease-fire with no conditions, and then whatever we agree upon, with respect to the international, multinational force, it will come later. We did not actually get the cease-fire. We got the cessation of hostilities with a series of conditions that would make the cease-fire a lasting one.
Q: Going back to my first question [about crucial moments]
A: Although my country was a victim of the Israeli aggression it has been portrayed as the aggressor, simply because Hizbullah had crossed the Blue Line. True, Hizbullah did cross the line, but the Lebanese government has clearly stated it was neither informed nor did it condone this action of Hizbullah's.
I saw my job as trying to redress the situation, by making it clear Lebanon is a country that has always respected the international legality and my government could not be held responsible for what happened in the South. This was not a war against Hizbullah as Israel claimed; it was a war against Lebanon.
The second most difficult part of the task was when both the French and the Americans came with the first draft of UN Resolution 1701. We have had problems with that draft. France was coordinating with us, listening to our position and trying to accommodate our sensitivity. However, after their negotiations with the Americans they came to us with a totally unacceptable draft.
Q: Why unacceptable?
A: There was no clear reference to a full stop of the military operations, a distinction they were making between defensive and offensive operations. They wanted to give Israel the right to continue its defensive operations, and those of us who know the history of Israel know that every war that Israel started was supposedly a defensive war. The concept of defensive war is in Israel very elastic, and this is something we could not accept. Also, we could not accept that the resolution made no reference to Shebaa Farms. The earlier draft of the resolution wanted to send an international force under Chapter VII [of the UN Charter]. We wanted the role of UNIFIL to be enhanced and we were kind of in favor of an international force under Chapter VI plus, but not VII.
Q: Why were you against Chapter VII?
A: In Lebanon that would have been perceived as a military intervention rather than a peacemaking, peacekeeping force and it would have been resisted. We would have gone from one war to another one.
These were two very difficult moments: To redress the perception that the war with Israel was not against one organization, but one country. Now you hear them say they did not break the bones of Lebanon, that they did not bomb the infrastructure, electricity plants etc. Well yes, they spared some, but they destroyed bridges, buildings and the country as a whole.
The second moment was when we expressed our reservations about what was drafted. Things improved after that. We are a small nation, we know we cannot get everything we want from a UN Security Council resolution, and 1701 is a compromise, but it did accommodate the Lebanese requests to the best of what was possible at the time.
Q: In 1989 and in 2008 the political leadership looked to the Taif Accord in Saudi Arabia and respectively to Doha in Qatar, in order to save the country from darker times. Why do the Lebanese go outside the country to solve their problems or at the very least to pretend to do so? Is Lebanon not good enough for them? Can't they manage to solve their own issues?
A: They can and there were occasions when they did, but it so happens that in both of these situations the Lebanese leaders had to go outside, most likely for two reasons. Firstly, with the Taif Accord, it had to do with the pertaining security situation. You could not bring the Parliament to meet. When they tried to meet, there were people shooting at them from all places. Secondly, when we went to Doha we needed a party to provide security for all to be able to move. I remember that the road to the airport was closed. Had it not been for the Qataris and all their relations, traveling out of Lebanon and coming back would not have been possible.
You have these reasons, and you have the fact that you need the good offices, in times of crises, of some third party. However, this is only one part of the answer.
The other is that Lebanon's conflict and tensions have more than one dimension. They are often local in their origin, implications and effects on our lives; they crystallize around issues like power sharing. This is what the Taif was all about. Doha too was in a way about power-sharing, a national unity government and electoral law, but also about putting an end to violence. The price is paid here, the effects are here and the actors are Lebanese. Be that as it may, most of these conflicts have both an international dimension and an Arab dimension. Sometimes this dimension exacerbates the local aspects. A perception that some Lebanese, maybe many, I don't know, developed is that the country is a battleground for all forces.
When the Iranian president says that he will fight the United States in Lebanon, some find it acceptable. When the Syrian president offers his opinion about Tripoli, again some find it acceptable. There is this perception that Lebanon is the place where other people's wars - regional or international - unfold. Conflicts invite foreign intervention, and thus peacemaking, although not the same people intervene in both cases, but that is what happens when you are a battleground.
In Doha, the Qataris were talking with the Iranians, Americans, Syrians, Russians, Chinese, Romanians maybe ... They were offering the good offices together with the eight members of the Arab committee on behalf of the Arab and international community. It is unfortunate that the Lebanese are not able to solve their problems within their own institutions.
Q: The political institutions did not work at that time.
A: We had a Parliament that was locked, and the key was thrown into the well. Governments and cabinets are formed and they receive either a confidence or no-confidence vote in Parliament; they fall in Parliament like everywhere else, but when the Parliament does not function and the presidency is vacant because the Parliament was locked, then the system is not able to generate solutions for the crisis on its own.
Somehow you need to invent, to do it yourself outside the norms of the institutions. In the Cabinet statement we have a paragraph - and we had much discussion about it - that the Doha Accord was an exceptional pact in an exceptional situation, and it should not become the rule but remain the exception.
This incredible situation emerged with respect to the share of the seats in Cabinet. This is unprecedented. I have never seen this anywhere in the world, and it made it extremely difficult for Cabinet to be formed. It took Premier [Fouad] Siniora two months of talks with the right, left and center, and the classical norms were left outside.
Q: What exactly happened?
A: The prime minister goes to the president with a list of names and they agree. This time, because of the quota that was established in Doha, there were people that thought they had the right to name the ministers because they were given the number of ministers. In fact, the 11 Cabinet members who are part of the opposition were not chosen by the prime minister and the president; they were named by the opposition. This is a very strange and unusual way to form a cabinet, and I hope it is the first and last time to do so and that we will return to normal procedures.
Q: If you allow me to build on what you just said, is the power sharing the main cause for the collapse of the political system's various stages?
A: There are two different problems, but those two problems are intertwined and maybe that's the difficulty. The power-sharing problem is a Lebanese problem. It is a local problem that has to do with the system, with reforming the system. In democracies the system is reformed from within, there are rules to follow.
Lebanon being a battleground for others is a distinct problem, but they become intertwined when there are forces in Lebanon who for reasons pertaining to their domestic objectives draw strength and support from outside. So local actors use foreign forces to advance the domestic agenda, and vice versa, foreign forces use local forces to drive their own agenda. This complication has a long history.
When I say that we should restore Lebanon's independence and sovereignty, these are not absolute terms. Nevertheless, we should at least immunize the country from direct, daily interference in its affairs. The problem is that you cannot do that unless you have peace between all groups and communities so that they do not need to capitalize on support from outside. It has to do with fear.
Q: Distrust as well?
A: With both fear and distrust. Often those who call on foreign support do so in the name of fear, of being threatened by others or in the name of a cause that transcends the borders of Lebanon. Of course, we have a cause on which all Lebanese agree, that Lebanon should defend itself against Israel and Lebanon should be in solidarity with the Arab world in defending the rights of the Palestinians and seeking a just and durable peace.
This is the strategic objective upon which the Lebanese agree. Where they disagree is how to achieve this objective. There are those who'd like to see Lebanon with the Arab world, but without choosing one regime over the other, without being part of an axis of radical countries versus moderate ones, without taking sides; in solidarity but at the same time a country that contributes to unity not division.
Q: Maybe as a neutral state?
A: Not neutral, I would not go that far. There are people who support the idea, because of the country's social fabric, size, geography and history, but I don't think Lebanon can be neutral in the absolute sense of the word.
Lebanon is an Arab country, in solidarity with fellow Arabs that suffered from Israeli policy in the region and Lebanon is still under threat from Israel. Unless we reach a [comprehensive Arab-Israeli] peace agreement, the danger is there. The challenge is to find a way of limiting the use of the country as a bargaining chip by outside powers, limiting the use of nonstate actors as surrogates and limiting - and I use the word knowing that a radical solution is not at hand - the partisan politics that one Arab country plays in relation to other countries.
Q: As a scholar you wrote extensively about the Christian and Muslim relationship. What is it that the Christian-Western world - in form and rather secular in essence - fails to understand about Muslims, and what is it that the Islamic world is either not willing or not able to comprehend of the West?
A: I make a separation between Christian and Muslim relations and the relationship between the Western world and Islamic countries. Christian-Muslim relations have to do with religion, history, memory, social habits, legal systems and sometimes with political identities.
Q: This is all taking place at the people level then.
A: The relationship between the West and the Muslim world has to do primarily with global perceptions, with the unachieved independence of the Muslim world, with the perceived hegemony of the West (which is cultural, political, hard power versus soft power) and also with the problems of Muslim communities in Western countries, mostly immigrant communities, but also local ones that have not been adequately solved.
Some of these communities did not achieve full integration or adaptation to societies they are part of, and they are perceived often by the majority as a security threat, as social misfits. All of these issues have been exacerbated since September 11. When Americans asked, 'why do Muslims hate us?' the Muslims too asked, 'why do the Westerners, and in particular Americans, hate us?' They mirrored each other.
Also, many in the West as in the Islamic world believe there are these two monolithic entities that fight each other.
Q: Do you share that same opinion yourself?
A: I personally stand to contradict it. Both worlds are not monoliths and they are not at war with each other. You have countries at war with each other, political groups or individuals that don't like each other, but we are not in a scheme of war among religions or civilizations. This is too simple and too inaccurate to be taken seriously. The matter of perception here as elsewhere is very important.
Q: Can you give an example?
A: In the Muslim world, and I am not a Muslim myself, but I understand that Muslims have a deep sense of humiliation. They believe that since colonial times they have been humiliated by a powerful West. They have not recovered from this. This humiliation has been further aggravated in certain places, like in Palestine. I have heard Muslims say, 'how can we trust the West, if even the wall, the separation wall built by the Israelis, which everyone said was illegal, unacceptable and not conducive to peace, yet no one did anything, no one put pressure on Israel to change its behavior.' Muslims all over the world, and there are over 1 billion, felt humiliated by it, by the occupation of Jerusalem, and they cannot do anything about it. There you introduce another aspect, the perception of humiliation and loss of power, of not being able to fight against humiliation. This breeds at times extremist attitudes. Islamic terrorist groups find fuel for their activism and this is a problem for the Muslims to sort out, and it's a challenge for them. As for the West, I don't put blame on anyone; the blame is on all.
In a situation like this you cannot reduce one complex phenomenon to one dimension. I heard people saying that without Bush or bin Laden we would not have these problems. I don't think so. If the events of September 11 hadn't taken place, things would not have become so dramatic. But the seeds of the problem were already there.
Q: Why is it that post-Doha you still have clashes in Lebanon ? Any particular reason?
A: They are leftovers of the pre-Doha situation, but what is more important is that it appears as if we are able to contain these problems.
Q: The national dialogue ... Any thoughts on that?
A: It's a beginning. It's a good start, but only a beginning, nonetheless.
Q: Let's do an exercise of imagination. How do you see Lebanon in 10 years from now? Another Taif or Doha around the corner?
A: I think the Taif agreement was a rather comprehensive political reform, while Doha was an agreement that will last, so to speak, one year. It takes us through the elections. How I see Lebanon in a decade? I don't know. It's hard to predict, but I don't see a chance for the country, 10 years from now, without a workable democracy, a political system that generates solutions from within. If we'll have a third agreement, another Doha, it means Lebanon would be a failed state, would not be viable.
My hope is that we go back to normalcy. It is difficult, is going to take time, but at least we have to make sure we agree on the terms to move forward.