LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS
BULLETIN
February 03/08
Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to
Saint Luke 2,22-40. When the days were completed for their purification
according to the law of Moses, they took him up to Jerusalem to present him to
the Lord, just as it is written in the law of the Lord, "Every male that opens
the womb shall be consecrated to the Lord," and to offer the sacrifice of "a
pair of turtledoves or two young pigeons," in accordance with the dictate in the
law of the Lord. Now there was a man in Jerusalem whose name was Simeon. This
man was righteous and devout, awaiting the consolation of Israel, and the holy
Spirit was upon him. It had been revealed to him by the holy Spirit that he
should not see death before he had seen the Messiah of the Lord.
He came in the Spirit into the temple; and when the parents brought in the child
Jesus to perform the custom of the law in regard to him, he took him into his
arms and blessed God, saying: Now, Master, you may let your servant go in peace,
according to your word, for my eyes have seen your salvation, which you prepared
in sight of all the peoples, a light for revelation to the Gentiles, and glory
for your people Israel." The child's father and mother were amazed at what was
said about him; and Simeon blessed them and said to Mary his mother, "Behold,
this child is destined for the fall and rise of many in Israel, and to be a sign
that will be contradicted (and you yourself a sword will pierce) so that
the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed."There was also a prophetess, Anna,
the daughter of Phanuel, of the tribe of Asher. She was advanced in years,
having lived seven years with her husband after her marriage, and then as a
widow until she was eighty-four. She never left the temple, but worshiped night
and day with fasting and prayer. And coming forward at that very time, she gave
thanks to God and spoke about the child to all who were awaiting the redemption
of Jerusalem. When they had fulfilled all the prescriptions of the law of the
Lord, they returned to Galilee, to their own town of Nazareth. The child grew
and became strong, filled with wisdom; and the favor of God was upon him.
Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Lessons from Lebanon Mark Silverberg. By:
Mark Silverberg. January 2/08
Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for February 02/08
Sfeir: External
Powers Push Lebanon to War-Naharnet
Army Warns: Attacking Soldiers Serves Israel's Interests,
Confuses Investigation-Naharnet
Lebanese Trapped in
Shelter by Heavy Fighting in Chad-Naharnet
Israelis Asked to
Prepare 'Rocket Rooms' for War-Naharnet
Israeli Attempt to Reopen Channel to
divert Water from Lebanon Thwarted-Naharnet
Suleiman Reportedly
Received Results of Riots Probe-Naharnet
Geagea: March 8 Wants a Return of the Arab
Deterrent Force. We Won't Allow it-Naharnet
March 14 Demands
Comprehensive Probe into Sunday's Riots-Naharnet
EDL Working on Problem after Snow Storm
had Passed-Naharnet
Clashes Over Posters Erection Leave 3
Injured-Naharnet
Aoun: Document of Understanding Survived Assassination Attempt-Naharnet
Haaretz: Nasrallah
Rules Lebanon-Naharnet
Can the Lebanese Maintain their
Coexistence?-Naharnet
Israeli Army Needs to Make Big Changes
Ahead of New Conflict-Naharnet
March 14 Demands Comprehensive Probe into
Sunday's Riots-Naharnet
Geagea: March 8 Wants a Return of the Arab Deterrent Force. We Won't Allow it-Naharnet
Power Plant Working on
Problem after Snow Storm had Passed-Naharnet
Clashes Over Posters Erection Leave 3
Injured-Naharnet
Hizbullah's Victory Helps Netanyahu Rule
Israel-Naharnet
Jumblat: Winograd Report Denies Charges of
Collaboration with the Enemy-Naharnet
Investigators
set to hand over report on protest shootings-Daily
Star
Jumblatt, Geagea attack opposition over protests-Daily
Star
Fadlallah calls on media 'not to pour fuel on
fire' regarding riots-Daily Star
Iran: 400 rebuilding projects finished since 2006
war-Daily Star
'Fighting weaker forces has made Israeli Army
soft' -AFP
Winograd, latest act in a long play-Daily
Star
Instability undermines human rights in Lebanon-Daily
Star
Respite lets Lebanon shake off three days of
severe winter weather-Daily Star
Language - a tool to transform different into
dangerous-Daily
Star
March 14 Demands Comprehensive Probe into Sunday's Riots
The pro-government March 14 alliance on Friday demanded a comprehensive probe
into Sunday's riots such as it not only covers the military institution but also
takes into account the circumstances inciting for violence. A statement issued
by March 14 also stressed that the investigation should take into consideration
the timing of the protest which coincided with a meeting in Cairo of Arab
foreign ministers. The statement, read by former MP Faris Soeid, also pointed to
the fact which proved that there were no power cuts during the time of the
protest. Demonstrators last Sunday took to the streets of Mar Mikhael,
protesting against alleged long spells of power cuts in Beirut's southern
suburbs. Demonstrators quickly degenerated into violence, leaving eight people
killed and more than 40 wounded.
Protestors tossed stones at soldiers and the army fired warning shots in the air
to disperse the crowds. A probe is underway to determine whether a third party
was involved in the shootings. March 14 expressed surprise at some parties which
linked outcome of the investigation to the "future of Lebanon's regime and the
fate of the Arab initiative." The statement also insisted that investigations
include "political parties that provided some protestors with rubber tires and
groups that tried to disarm army troops." It also warned against continued
attacks on Lebanese army positions, and called on the anti-government March 8
coalition to "shoulder responsibility in this regard." March 14 urged the
judiciary to include the attacks on army posts to the probe. Army positions in
Beirut have been subject to grenade and concussion bomb attacks since Monday.
Beirut, 01 Feb 08, 20:38
Suleiman Reportedly Received Results of Riots Probe
Army Commander Gen. Michel Suleiman has reportedly received a copy of the
results of the probe into Sunday's riots that left eight people killed and more
than 40 wounded. The daily As Safir on Saturday said the testimonies of more
than 200 army officers and soldiers over the past five days focused on
determining the responsibilities in Sunday's incidents. It quoted sources as
saying that the army command had pledged to deal with the issue "seriously,"
particularly since no orders were given to the military to shoot at
demonstrators who blocked several roads with burning tires and garbage bins to
protest alleged long spells of cuts in Beirut's southern suburbs. The sources
said investigators were also trying to determine whether a third party was
involved in the shootings.
A meeting was held on Friday between Prosecutor General Saeed Mirza as well as
military prosecutors Jean Fahd and Rahif Ramadan.
Sources said that the meeting focused on three directions:
- Determine the responsibilities of the soldiers
- Development of protests starting from the decision to gather and burn tires
which led to exchange of verbal attacks and fist fight all the way to the
shootings
- The hypothesis that a third party was involved
There were reports that security forces were hunting down a man suspected of
involvement in Sunday's incidents.
Fahd had announced that dozens of people, including military personnel, were
being questioned over Sunday's bloody riots and said results of the probe are
expected soon.
Hizbullah has urged the army to swiftly bring to justice those responsible for
the bloodshed, saying it was the only way to contain public anger. Other
opposition figures have squarely blamed the army for the shooting.
Suleiman promised a transparent investigation during condolence visits to
Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.
Beirut, 02 Feb 08, 10:41
Sfeir: External Powers Push Lebanon to War
Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir accused certain factions of acting against
Lebanon's interests and following Syria's trends.
Sfeir, in an interview with al-Akhbar daily, said: "some Lebanese factions
behave against the national interest. Some people follow Syria, not out of
affection, but because it has a say and influence in Lebanon that could provide
them with posts, gains and interests."
He urged all the feuding Lebanese factions to "speed up" the election of Army
Commander Gen. Michel Suleiman president and "rally around him."
Sfeir said "some factions do not want him to be a strong president and try to
impose conditions on him or hamper his election."
He accused unidentified external powers of "pushing Lebanon to war that is
rejected by the Lebanese. We know that they have domestic tools."
He cautioned against a "campaign aimed at stripping the homeland of its
institutions."
"We need a president to rule the nation, not a president cuffed by conditions,"
Sfeir noted. Beirut, 02 Feb 08, 12:45
Army Warns: Attacking Soldiers Serves Israel's Interests,
Confuses Investigation
The Army Command on Saturday cautioned that attacks targeting soldiers in Beirut
and its suburbs deal a blow to security and stability and serve interests of the
Israeli enemy. The command, in a statement, said some army posts in Beirut and
its suburbs have been recently targeted by "sporadic attacks, the latest of
which was opening fire at an observation post in Galerie Samaan area which
wounded two soldiers."
The command stressed: "Targeting the army is targeting security and stability,
which is what the Israeli enemy has been seeking with all means, especially in
the post July 2006 war era."It added that attacking the army "directly confuses
the investigation carried out by the military and judiciary … to reach the
truth" regarding riots that killed several people and wounded scores last
Sunday. The statement noted that "only the judiciary has the right to announce
the outcome (of investigations) irrespective of "political and street
pressures."The army command warned religious authorities, political leaders and
"all citizens" against "schemes aimed at targeting the will of the Lebanese
people to maintain joint existence and drive a wedge between the army and the
people. Beirut, 02 Feb 08, 15:13
Lebanese Trapped in Shelter by Heavy Fighting in Chad
Several Lebanese people were trapped Saturday in a shelter in Ndjamena where
heavy fighting broke out between Chadian rebels and government forces.
The Voice of Lebanon radio station said families of at least five Lebanese
nationals trapped inside a shelter in Njamena, Chad's capital, urged Lebanon's
foreign ministry to "work immediately to salvage our loved ones," particularly
since there is no Lebanese embassy in Chad. Chad rebels advanced Saturday on
Ndjamena after fighting broke out between Chadian rebels and government forces
just north of the capital. "Fighting between government forces and rebels has
started at about 20 kilometers (12 miles) north of Ndjamena," a military source
said, adding that there was more or less an equal number of forces on both
sides.(AFP file photo shows Chadian governmental troops deployed in town after
fighting with rebels, in Biltine, the eastern district of Chad, in 2006) Beirut,
02 Feb 08, 14:03
Aoun: Document of Understanding Survived Assassination
Attempt
Gen. Michel Aoun said that the Document of Understanding signed between the Free
Patriotic Movement and Hizbullah has "survived a political assassination
attempt" from the bloody Mar Mikhael violence that left eight people killed last
Sunday. "This is not the first (assassination) attempt and will not be the
last," Aoun said in remarks published by the daily As Safir on Saturday. He was
referring to street protests which started at Mar Mikhael in Beirut's southern
suburbs on Jan. 27 and quickly degenerated to reach other areas of Beirut. Aoun
praised Christians' and Muslims' awareness of Sunday's incidents. He also hailed
religious and political alertness, particularly Hizbullah and Amal Movement, of
the problem."We are required to stay alert in the coming phase because those
seeking to target the (Document of) 'Understanding' are likely to try again,"
Aoun said. Beirut, 02 Feb 08, 10:13
Israeli Attempt to Reopen Channel to divert Water from
Lebanon Thwarted
Lebanese residents have thwarted an attempt by Israeli workers backed by Israeli
troops to reopen a channel that would allow them to divert rain water form
Lebanese territory, the state-run National News Agency reported. It said the
channel was shut by the Lebanese army for over a year after it had caused damage
to crops in the border Lebanese villages of Adassiyeh and Kfar Kila. NNA said
work stopped at the channel when a Lebanese army patrol, backed by Spanish
peacekeepers, was dispatched to the area after tension ran high. Beirut, 02 Feb
08, 15:57
Geagea: March 8 Wants a Return of the Arab Deterrent
Force. We Won't Allow it
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea said Friday that the sharp Lebanon divide is
reflecting on the Arabs, who are split along the lines of the March 14 majority
and March 8 opposition. "Inter-Arab differences used to reflect on the Lebanon
situation, contrary to the current situation. Inter-Lebanese differences reflect
on the Arab League status," Geagea said. He recalled that in the latest meeting
by Arab Foreign ministers "Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, Jordan and all the Gulf supported March 14, while Syria supported March
8."The Hizbullah-led March 8, according to Geagea, does not want presidential
elections and seeks fragmenting state institutions to achieve total "void."The
March 14 forces, he added, "would not permit that and would intensify efforts to
elect a new president." "We cannot differentiate Syria from March 8 anymore,"
Geagea said. Addressing a delegation representing March 14 Dentists Sector,
Geagea said: "I believe that March 8 does not want a blocking one-third share,
or even an additional share in government. Its plan is based on rejecting the
current status in order to regain the era that had persisted for 15
years."Syria, according to Geagea, "wants a return of its influence to Lebanon,
even if its army could not return to Lebanon, while Hizbullah's priority is
broad alliance throughout the Middle East to fight its own battles, according to
its own agenda."Hizbullah's priorities do not include "electricity, or bread.
Had it been that, the party would not have caused wars that resulted in
destroying Lebanon's economy and sent it 30 years back," Geagea added. "They
want to topple all constitutional institutions to achieve total void. They want
a return of the situation to what it was in 1975, which requires intervention by
Arab Deterrent Forces. That would allow Syria to return to Lebanon through the
main gate," Geagea said. He concluded by stressing that "we would not allow them
to create constitutional void, we support the government … and we would exert
all possible efforts to elect a new president." Beirut, 01 Feb 08, 17:43
Hizbullah's Victory Helps Netanyahu Rule Israel
A report on the Lebanon War against Hizbullah allows Israel's right-wing
opposition to win a snap election despite a slight boost to Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert's popularity, according to two polls published on Friday. The daily
Maariv reported that if general elections were held now the Likud party of
former premier Benjamin Netanyahu would triple its representation in the Knesset
to 32 and become the largest party in the 120-seat parliament.
With the support of the extreme right, religious parties and the Social Justice
party launched by Israeli-Russian billionaire Arkady Gaydamak last July, the
right wing could form a majority coalition of 73. Its poll showed Olmert's
centrist Kadima would tumble from 29 seats to 11 and that its current coalition
ally Labor, led by Defense Minister Ehud Barak, would become the largest
opposition party with 21 seats, up from its current 19. According to the second
poll, published in the daily Yediot Aharonot, 30 percent of Israelis asked said
they wanted Netanyahu to be prime minister, while 18 percent would prefer to see
Olmert stay in the post.
Before Wednesday's publication of the full Winograd Commission report on the
2006 war against Lebanon's Shiite Hizbullah militia, just eight percent
expressed support for Olmert. The report placed most blame for the conflict's
failures on the military, and said Olmert himself had acted in good faith.
Israel's next general elections are not scheduled to be held until autumn 2010.
Both polls, carried out by independent research groups and surveying 500 people,
had a margin of error of 4.5 percentage points.(AFP-Naharnet) Beirut, 01 Feb 08,
17:01
Power Plant Working on Problem after Snow Storm had
Passed
Electricite du Liban on Friday announced that it will work aggressively to
restore power as quickly as possibly after the snow storm had subsided.
It said restoration crews were dispatched to damaged areas to assess the damage
and start repairs promptly. "We hope that our dear citizens would understand the
difficult situation that resulted from bad weather conditions and we pledge to
ensure that power is restored to pre-storm status as quickly as possible," a
statement by Electricite du Liban said. Beirut, 01 Feb 08, 19:48
Jumblat: Winograd Report Denies Charges of Collaboration with the Enemy
Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat said Thursday the Winograd
report contradicts charges made by Hizbullah to majority factions of alleged
collaboration with Israel during the war in the summer of 2006. Jumblat, in
remarks distributed by the state-run National News Agency, said the report
"drops all previous charges about alleged collaboration between Lebanese parties
and the Israeli enemy during the war."However, he criticized Hizbullah's
domestic political performance after the victory against Israel. He accused
Hizbullah "and the remaining opposition factions" of "programmed blocking of all
institutions, targeting the constitution and prolonging presidential void." The
"logic of blocking," in Jumblat's words, was tantamount to a war of "attrition"
against the army and resulted in "deepening the political divide and escalating
tension.""How can they praise the victory against Israel's aggression and
refrain from confronting organized assassinations carried out by the Syrian
regime?" Jumblat asked. Beirut, 01 Feb 08, 16:40
Fadlallah calls on media 'not to pour fuel on fire'
regarding riots
Influential cleric touts winograd report as rallying point
Daily Star staff-Saturday, February 02, 2008
BEIRUT: Senior Shiite cleric Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah urged media
outlets on Friday to seek the truth while covering last Sunday's protests,
saying an unjust attack on any Lebanese party "is an attack all of us in one way
or another." In his weekly Friday sermon from the Imam Hassanayn Mosque in Haret
Hreik, Fadlallah called on the media not to "pour fuel on the fire," because
this "will burn the entire country and not one party." "We want media outlets to
be the voice of justice and truth and to seek accuracy and objectivity,"
Fadlallah said. "We want the media to practice self-monitoring and not to be a
mouthpiece for those who play with people's security and trade in their
sufferings." According to Fadlallah, Lebanon's problem is that it was and still
is an arena for international and regional intelligence services which, he said,
"use some local parties and sectarian figures to achieve their projects."The
sheikh criticized the shooting that took place during last Sunday's protests.
"Peaceful demonstrations are allowed all over the world to protest against
governments' policies, while resorting to means that preserve demonstrators'
lives [is required], should the need arise," he said.
Last Sunday, a protest against electricity rationing in the southern suburbs of
Beirut turned violent. At least eight protesters were killed and about two dozen
wounded when someone - investigators are trying to determine who - opened fire
on the crowd. Following Israel's recognition of failures in its 2006 war with
Lebanon, as stated in the final report of the state-appointed Winograd
Commission, Fadlallah called on Lebanese of all political stands to consider
this a victory.
"Let this occasion be the starting point to restoring internal unity in this
small country that could defeat the most powerful force in the Middle East,"
Fadlallah said.
Meanwhile, the vice president of the Higher Shiite Council, Sheikh Abdel-Amir
Qabalan, reiterated his call for a "quick but not hasty" investigation into
Sunday's riots. "The injustice that we have witnessed on Sunday is
unforgivable," Qabalan said in his weekly Friday sermon. "We want to preserve
our institutions, particularly the army," he added. "We do not accept that the
military institution be broken." Qabalan said the Lebanese are not "anarchist,"
nor do they "import" orders. "We only take orders from God and our religious
tenets," he said. Qabalan received telegrams of condolences on Friday from
several religious, political and social figures who paid respect for those who
died on Sunday. Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir urged the Lebanese on
Friday to stand united, saying they are the only ones to save their country. "We
have to walk hand in hand in order for us to rescue our country," Sfeir said
before a delegation from the March 14 Forces dentists. "We do not have to rely
on others because people in general seek their own interests rather than
others.'" Sfeir said "we can only distinguish between one Lebanese and another
in terms of their loyalty to their country.""We hope that we are all loyal to
our country," he added. Sfeir met Friday with MP Robert Ghanem for talks on the
latest developments in the country. "We believe that the army and judiciary will
uncover the truth behind Sunday's riots in a transparent and serious way,"
Ghanem said after the meeting. Ghanem voiced hope that the solution to the
current political standoff will start by putting an end to the presidential
vacuum so constitutional institutions can recover their role and missions. "It
is necessary to return to dialogue regardless of the high ceiling to which
political speeches have arrived," the legislator said. - The Daily Star
Clashes Over Posters Erection Leave 3 Injured
Two people were injured and an Internal Security Forces vehicle was damaged
during clashes between youths over the erection of posters in Beirut's Corniche
Mazraa district, Beirut media reported Friday. The National News Agency said the
two were injured from stone-throwing protestors at dawn Friday and a third was
emotionally shocked. Voice of Lebanon Radio station said the clashes started
over the erection of posters. The media reports did not provide further details.
Last month, Al-Mustaqbal Movement partisans and Hizbullah members clashed in the
densely-populated Basta district over the re-erection of a poster of ex-Premier
Rafik Hariri. Friday's incident came as further army positions were subjected a
day earlier to grenade and concussion bomb attacks in Beirut's Galerie Semaan
area and for the second time in two days in the Saint Therese-Hadath
neighborhood. Media reports have said that unknown assailants tossed four
concussion bombs on army posts in Ein el-Rummaneh, Tayyouneh, Shatilla and the
Mazda area overnight Monday. They said four hand grenades were also thrown at
dawn Tuesday on a military position in the Saint Therese-Hadath neighborhood,
one of which failed to explode. A military Land Rover was damaged in the attack,
but no soldiers were wounded, according to the reports. Another concussion bomb
was hurled on a military post in Beirut's Talet al-Khayat district before
daybreak Wednesday. Beirut, 01 Feb 08, 08:34
A Shiia Alternative to Hezbollah, Liberal Shia from
Lebanon Ahmad El-Assaad, Spoke at FDD event in DC
A Lebanese liberal politician from the Shia community made a strong presentation
at an Foundation for Defense of Democracies forum in Washington. He was
introduced by Professor Walid Phares. The audience was made of media, think tank
representatives and analysts. It was sponsored by the Future of Terrorism
Project at FDD.
Mr. Ahmad El Assaad, son of the former speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and
leader of a new Shia liberal Party in Lebanon gave a presentation on January 30,
2008, to introduce the audience to the current issues that Lebanon is facing in
relation to Hezbollah and the steps to be taken to solve that problem. He argued
that the best option for Pluralism among Shia in Lebanon must begin with an
alternative Shiia political party- the Lebanese Option Gathering (LOG)
Mr. El Assaad focused on three major points in his presentation: first the
misconception behind the support of Hezbollah, second the distorted image of
Shiism that Hezbollah represents and third Shiism and the west.
In the analysis of Mr El Assaad, "it is important to have a direct Shiia rival
to Hezbollah; it is essential for the spread of democracy and freedom in Lebanon
and the Middle East. Ahmad El-Assaad comes from a very prominent political
family in the Shiite community. He is the son of Kamal el Assaad, (longest ever
serving speaker of the Parliament (18 Years). The Syrians replaced him because
he would not bend and accept their orders
Mr. El-Assaad's shared his unique perspective as a Lebanese Shiite leader,
critical of Hezbollah and the support it receives from Iran. Ahmad El-Assaad
Seeks the return of democracy and peaceful governance. He also represents an
effort to end the Iran-sponsored control of the Lebanese Shiite community.
In His opening comments Dr Walid Phares director of the Future of Terrorism
Project opened the discussion to the audience by introducing Mr. El Assaad and
the mission behind his group LOG (Lebanese Option Group). According to Mr. El
Assaad there is no clash of civilizations (eastern vs. western civilizations)
there is a clash between a "bunch of people that high jacked their civilization,
Islam, and forged their history. He stressed that all communities in Lebanon
need to move forward to reach social development. He said that when he and his
people hear "Death to America," they interpret it as "death to Islam" because
true moderate Muslims, as he said, "have the same values as America."
He said the Iranian regime falsified Shiism. His claimed that Shiia by nature
are open minded. "It is a misconception that Hezbollah represents the shiia
majority in Lebanon; "they are only loyal to Hezbollah because it is the hand
that feeds them." The slogans that Hezbollah chant like death to America
implies the death to democracy, free thought and the death to Islam. The main
problem in the region, he said, "is that the Iranian regime has falsified Islam.
" He argued that "those that are independent from Hezbollah are not represented
politically, and there is no way to move forward in Lebanon unless all Lebanese
are represented and move forward."
There is a large number of Shia in Lebanon that have no political representation
he continued. "Shiism never had problems with the West; Hezbollah is the
obstacle from building that bridge with the West, because of its pure Syrio-Iranian
agenda. Lebanese are realizing this and are separating from Hezbollah. It is
afact he continued that Hezbollah's power is based on money. After the 2006 war
on Lebanon many Shiia families independent of Hezbollah began looking for an
alternative. These people are looking for stability and development, Hezbollah
denies them that freedom, their situation can be compared to the Soviet Union
era. Mr. Assaad likened Hezbollah today to the PLO when they ruled Lebanon.
Money talked then with the PLO and when that changed the PLO was rejected by the
people. Hezbollah survives because Iranian petro dollars are being distributed
to 37,000 family households per month – 60-70 million US Dollars.
But Iranian money is limited, he said, so there is a large population of Shiia
in Lebanon that are not benefiting from this, combine this with those that
suffered from 2006 war, and oppose Hezbollah dictatorship policies and you have
a growing number of Shiia in Lebanon that are searching for an alternative to
Hezbollah. Those Shiia which are looking for an alternative to Hezbollah will
not be courageous enough until that alternative is viable, solid that they can
depend on with follow through.
He said that the History of Shiism from the Imam Ali and Hussain is that the
Shia is open for other people's opinion. Their history in Najaf, Iraq was that
they had many different schools - representing differing schools of thought all
within Islam and Shiism, they were all Shiia, but with diversity and the Imam
demanded respect for all schools of differing teachings.
So, they promote diversity, different teachings amongst the groups, and then the
groups must respect each other. This is contrary to Iranian/Hezbollah diktat
and is being realized by other Shia in Lebanon today. People in this community
are tired of being the fuel for the new Persian Empire in the east, and they
want to return to the teachings of their roots.
Finally, Mr. El Assaad called for proportionality in parliamentary elections,
the candidate will get representation in the parliament depending on the
percentage that candidate individual gets in the elections
Lessons from Lebanon Mark Silverberg
01 Feb 2008
Mark Silverberg
On February 1st, the Winograd Commission issued its long-awaited report in the
Second Lebanon War. The Report Summary notes that “the unclassified Report does
not include the many facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the
state's security and foreign affairs”, yet much analysis over the classified
aspects of the Report have since leaked out over the past year and a half. While
the Report attacked the mismanagement of the War from both the political and
military perspectives, it does not detail the disclosures that could represent
an embarrassment to both the Olmert administration and Bush administrations were
they to be delineated. In the end, the Commission noted that “the 2nd Lebanon
war as a serious missed opportunity” and that “this outcome was primarily caused
by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war had not been conducted on the
basis of deep understanding of the theatre of operations, of the IDF's readiness
and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve
political and diplomatic goals.” The only consolation is that significant
military, political and scientific changes and advances have been undertaken in
the time that has passed. Should another such confrontation take place in the
near future, it can be fairly assumed that both Hezbollah and Hamas will be
vanquished.
Israel's war against the Middle East's first true terrorist army has now
provided the West with some significant military, strategic and
intelligence-gathering insights for future wars that will be waged in the
post-modern era. For the first time since the birth of the State of Israel, the
Israeli war machine had been challenged by a small, fanatic, well-funded,
well-prepared and well-trained radical Islamic army that lived to tell the story
when the final bell tolled. Hezbollah’s survival, however, was due as much to
mismanagement of the war effort (on the part of Israel and America) as to
Hezbollah’s cunning.
At the beginning of the conflict, it appeared that all the cards were in
Israel's corner. On July 12th, Hezbollah's cross-border raid and kidnapping of
two Israeli soldiers were broadly condemned across much of the Sunni Arab and
Western worlds as being both reckless and irresponsible. Israel's anticipated
use of massive force enjoyed broad political support. Even the Bush
administration seemed to be giving the Israeli government the time it needed to
finish Hezbollah's “state-within-a-state” status once and for all, and there was
every reason to expect that Israel would complete the job in short order and
that Lebanon would soon be in a position to carry out its international
obligation requiring it to assume control of the south of the country and disarm
the Hezbollah militia.
But it didn't quite work out that way. To the world's surprise and to the West's
chagrin, Hezbollah (which had secretly been converted into the Special Forces
unit of Iran - unlike a ragtag gang like Hamas and the PLO) - managed to snap
victory from the jaws of defeat simply by surviving. Israel should have made
these distinctions at the beginning of the war, but it failed to do so - neither
to the world, nor to itself. That failure may well haunt American efforts to
“make the Middle East safe for democracy” for decades to come and Israel’s hopes
for Middle East stability. As Raanan Gissin of the Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs wrote recently: “The conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon is a testing
ground - like Spain in 1936 - for weapons, tactics, and doctrine of how Iran is
going to fight the war against the West" in future.
So what went wrong?
Air Power and the Media Debacle
From the war’s inception, Israeli planners placed overwhelming reliance on air
power, firepower and hi-tech weaponry for combating terror. For reasons
discussed below, Israel sought to fight a short, virtually casualty-free war on
the cheap resulting in a clear failure to achieve its strategic objectives -
freeing its kidnapped soldiers, forcing the Lebanese army to take control of
southern Lebanon, disarming Hezbollah and restoring the credibility of Israeli
deterrence after the Lebanese withdrawal in 2000 and the Gaza withdrawal in
2005. This error in judgment eventually required a revision to the plan leading
to a last minute ground invasion to the Litani River - a decision that came too
late.
Israel’s reliance on overwhelming air power should not have come as a surprise
given that the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Lt.-Gen Dan
Halutz was the first air force general ever to command the Israeli Defense
Forces. His strategy, based on his own extensive experience, promised that air
power alone could destroy Hezbollah's terror infrastructures and command and
control centers both north and south of the Litani, but in so doing, the need to
prepare for a ground war and a major land offensive was neglected. Also
neglected was the calculation that continual massive aerial bombardments might
allow Hezbollah and the Lebanese government to score major propaganda victories.
While it is true that superb intelligence allowed the Israeli Air Force to
destroy an estimated 80% of Hezbollah's medium and long-range missile launchers
in the first two days of the conflict, Hezbollah's use of the Lebanese civilian
population as human shields provided a boon for the media - Geneva Accords be
damned. In the years to come, such flagrant exploitation of innocent civilians
for propaganda purposes will have to be addressed by the West if it ever intends
to defeat future enemies whose value system and culture differs widely from our
own. In Lebanon, Israel wasted its initial ability to get moderate Arab
government support against Hezbollah by over-escalating its air assault and, in
the end it was unable to convince the world it was controlling collateral damage
and civilian suffering.
It appears that our enemies have learned the important relationship between the
uses to which propaganda can be put and their long-term strategic war doctrine.
We apparently have not. As Anthony Cordesman notes: “Civilians are the natural
equivalent of armor in asymmetric warfare and the U.S. must get used to the fact
that (future)opponents will steadily improve their ability to use them to hide
to deter attack, exploit the political impact of air strikes and exaggerate
damage and killings…" By forcing Israel to minimize civilian casualties or to
avoid them entirely, our own laws governing warfare have now become a weapon
being used against us. In post-modern warfare, civilians have become cultural,
religious and ideological weapons that will be used against us if and when we
find ourselves at war with different cultures.
Israel should have learned from the experiences of Vietnam, Somalia and Iraq
that massive air power alone cannot be a substitute for boots on the ground and
human and real time tactical intelligence. Just as the U.S. military learned
painful lessons about technology’s limits in Iraq, so the IDF received an
education in the Second Lebanon War – that wars cannot be won nor terrorists
defeated from the air. As Ralph Peters has written: "A policy of casualty
aversion - in Israel or in the United States - results in more casualties in the
end" and reduces our ability to wage existential conflicts.
Because the IDF was not permitted to carry out a massive land invasion together
with overwhelming air power in support of land operations from Day 1 (for
reasons noted below), Hezbollah missiles continued to rain down on Israeli
cities even as Hezbollah was winning the propaganda war. By relying at the
outset almost exclusively on air power, the IDF ignored the most basic military
principles of surprise and overwhelming force. Instead of aiming a death blow at
Hezbollah by proceeding by land north to the Litani, cutting off Hezbollah's
means of rearming and finishing it off, the IDF dissipated its power by engaging
in "wack-a-mole" techniques - striking targets scattered throughout Lebanon -
while failing to strike any of them decisively. In the struggle for a handful of
border villages, it added troops gradually and allowed Hezbollah a degree of
flexibility that permitted it to determine the manner, time and place of battle.
As Bret Stephens wrote in the Wall Street Journal: "Israelis have compounded
(their) mistakes with an airpower-based strategy that, whatever its virtues in
keeping Israeli troops out of harm's way, was never going to evict Hezbollah
from southern Lebanon, just as airpower alone did not evict Saddam from Kuwait
in 1991".
Olmert's reasoning, in many ways, stemmed from that of his predecessor and
mentor Ariel Sharon whose eighteen year experience in Lebanon ended with a
humiliating Israeli withdrawal in 2000. The Lebanon experience was a reminder to
Olmert that occupying another country to conduct “counter-insurgency operations”
was both unbearable (in terms of casualties) and unnecessary (since a separation
wall - so he thought - could accomplish the same ends over the long run), even
in the absence of a political settlement. In his mind, as well as that of
Sharon, Israelis were prepared to accept a high level of casualties in a “war of
national survival”, but they would not accept low-level casualties in extended
“insurgency operations” that did not directly involve Israel's survival. In
effect, Olmert failed to recognize that what was evolving in southern Lebanon
was not simply an insurgency, but a conventional post-modern guerilla war with
existential implications.
To Olmert, defeating Hezbollah by an invasion and occupying southern Lebanon was
not worth the casualties - even if Israel was required to endure the occasional
missile attack on its northern communities. Therefore, his solution was to
empower his air force to accomplish what he believed a ground invasion could
also accomplish but without the casualties. However, a lack of tactical
intelligence taken together with Hezbollah’s massive, sophisticated bunker
network effectively blunted the Israeli air attack. As Israeli troops marched
forward across the Lebanese border, they encountered a well-prepared enemy that
was weakened but not destroyed by the air campaign. Even though Olmert realized
that Hezbollah had to be destroyed, he was simply not prepared to commit his
forces and accept the casualties such a war would involve. What he failed to
consider were the political and psychological consequences of leaving Hezbollah
intact on the battlefield.
Command and Control Problems
In the wake of the conflict, charges have now arisen against the top military
and political echelons of the IDF concerning the delay in starting the ground
offensive, mobilizing the reserves, the absence of a clear plan for victory, and
the general lack of logistical preparedness including the absence of emergency
evacuation procedures from the north of Israel. Israeli commanders have
complained that the armored forces did not have a clearly defined mission and
were shuffled in and out of Lebanon to the point that they could not explain to
their own officers what was happening. Reservists in the elite Alexandroni
Brigade complained about the lack of food, water and basic support equipment
just a few miles inside Lebanon. One reservist Special Forces unit had been
provided with guns they had never trained on and were rushed through training
under conditions unlike those they faced in Lebanon. In some cases, evacuation
forces never came and soldiers were required to carry the dead and wounded large
distances in order to return to Israeli lines. Unachievable missions were given
with impossible time lines. Daytime missions were often ordered when darkness
missions would have been far safer and more effective….all of which suggests a
major crisis in the leadership of the IDF.
According to DEBKA intelligence sources, both Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and
Defense Minister Amir Peretz lacked the necessary military and foreign policy
experience and skills required to manage such a war. It appears that Olmert
followed the same failed policies of his predecessor Ariel Sharon. During his
six and-a-half years as Prime Minister, Sharon shook up the top levels of the
IDF’s General Command, Military Intelligence and the Mossad (Israel’s
international spy network) and appointed officials who subscribed to his
political philosophy. As a consequence, Israel’s top military and security
echelons were chosen based upon their political outlook. Sharon "created a
monolithic establishment lacking...the motivation...for developing brilliantly
innovative methods of warfare". The result was that in six years of
counter-terror warfare against the Palestinians (whose war capability was no
where near that of Hezbollah), the IDF focused on perfecting narrowly-defined
tactics for controlling local terrorist activities (and did so successfully),
but failed to produce a strategy capable of fighting a war against terrorists
who operated like Special Forces.
This led to predictable results. The Chief of Staff, although advised in the
third week of the war by many senior officers including reserve generals to
change the Northern Command in order to restore the IDF's offensive momentum,
seemed reluctant to do so in mid-war even though such staff and strategic
changes had been made during the worst hours of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He
refused these proposed changes fearing perhaps that the Yom Kippur War analogy
might prompt questions about the preparedness of his general staff for the
Lebanon war (which subsequently occurred).
In fact, the appointments he approved in the last year and his repeated
assertion that he saw no danger of “conventional war” in the IDF’s foreseeable
future seem to have led to a false security paradigm that ultimately dominated
the consciousness of political and military decision-makers and colored his
selection of Israel's senior military commanders.
This played itself out in the first weeks of the war. Maj.-Gen. Udi Adam, who
was head of Israel's Northern Command and was a trained and talented tank
commander in classical tank warfare had never before encountered tank warfare in
Lebanon’s unique, hilly terrain against a post-modern guerilla army backed to
the hilt by Iranian and Syrian sponsors, trainers and weapons.
American Interference
Another major failure in the conduct of the War arose as a result of
circumstances that were beyond the knowledge of the Israeli field commanders.
According to DEBKA intelligence reports (and supported by George Friedman’s
analysis in the Geopolitical Intelligence Report): “The lack of clear decisions
was manifested…in the failure to act, the non-implementation of operational
plans, and the cancellation (in the midst of combat) of missions assigned to the
unit. The result was that the unit was deployed too long in hostile country
without any operational purpose…and (was) held back from making contact with the
enemy.” The effect of this has now created a perception of weakness and
vulnerability in the minds of Arab nations that had long since sharpened their
knives waiting for an opportunity to pounce.
Much of this operational confusion seems to have stemmed from the inordinately
large role played in the war by the U.S. Administration. Washington had been
looking for an excuse to bring down Hezbollah since the 1983 Beirut barracks
bombing and the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers and the initial missile
attacks on northern Israel presented the opportunity for which it was waiting.
Both President Bush and Secretary of State Rice agreed to back Olmert’s air
campaign plan provided that Olmert received prior American approval for a ground
offensive – which came only after weeks had passed and only after the air war
had proven to be ineffective (and, some would argue) even counter-productive.
This explains why Israel’s land invasion was delayed for three weeks and why the
IDF was required to remain on their bases instead of engaging in battle.
When that decision finally came, it was with another stipulation that Israeli
forces were not to advance to the Litani River. Again, Washington demanded a
halt to the advance. By the time the final decision was made to carry out the
Litani operation and to vanquish Hezbollah, it was too late. The ceasefire was
effectively a foregone conclusion. DEBKA sources note: “This last disastrous
order released the welter of conflicting, incomprehensible orders which stirred
up the entire chain of command - from the heads of the IDF’s Northern Command
down to the officers in the field. Operational orders designed to meet tactical
combat situations were scrapped in mid-execution and new directives tumbled down
the chute from above. Soldiers later complained that in one day, they were
jerked into unreasoned actions by four to six contrary instructions.” The
problem with these contradictory directives was that none of the commanders at
any level (including the Chief of Staff) could explain what was happening since
they had not been privy to any of the “backroom decision-making” in the Prime
Minister’s office.
But it didn’t end there. Olmert had also promised Bush and Rice to spare
Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure and direct his air campaign to Hezbollah’s
positions and installations. As a result, Israeli forces were not initially
allowed to destroy buildings known to be occupied by Hezbollah teams firing
anti-tank missiles because it would have meant destroying Lebanese
infrastructure. This decision resulted in a dramatic increase in Israeli
casualties as the IDF was required to return again and again to cleanse
terrorist bases in Maroun a-Ras, Bint Jubeil and Atia a-Chaab.
Taking all this into account, Olmert’s absolute compliance with Rice’s
directives threw Israel’s entire war campaign into disorder. Supply trucks could
not locate various units that were left without food and water, the subject of
one of the bitterest complaints.
Underestimating the Enemy
The history of the 20th century is replete with military blunders caused by
faulty intelligence and incorrect threat assessments. Israel, it seems was no
exception in the Second Lebanon War. Despite tracking the activities of
Hezbollah for almost a quarter of a century, the recent war began with a string
of intelligence failures that included the cardinal error of underestimating
Hezbollah's preparedness, armaments, training - and their fanatical
determination to fight to the death. To put it in the words of Assistant Israeli
Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky: “The IDF was not prepared for the war in
Lebanon.” Even Israel’s eye-in-the-sky - its Ofek satellite - was out of
position during most of the Second Lebanon War suggesting a lack of coordination
between the military and political echelons.
As it happens, Hezbollah’s tacticians and their Iranian Revolutionary Guards
mentors had learned the lessons of Israel's Defensive Wall Operation against the
Palestinian terrorist stronghold of Jenin in 2002. That operation ended with
total Israeli military supremacy over the West Bank. Hezbollah studied the
strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli operation with meticulous accuracy and
using Israel's experience as their own master plan, Hezbollah invented a unique
form of guerilla warfare against an army that had not revised its own war
protocols in the intervening four years. Not only had Hezbollah devolved its
command structure to the unit level (making it impossible for Israel to conduct
a decapitation strike), but Israel was caught off-guard by the entrenched and
sophisticated tunnel and bunker network it encountered across Lebanon's southern
border - a network so extensive that did not require Hezbollah fighters to
expose themselves to Israeli air power and extended their ability to continue
combat without the need to re-supply their stocks of food.
Israeli intelligence also failed to detect the nature and extent of the new
weapons systems Iran and Syria had provided to Hezbollah over the preceding six
years - from Silkworm anti-ship missiles to longer-range Fajr and Zelzal
missiles capable of striking Tel Aviv. Nor was the IDF prepared for Hezbollah's
advanced Syrian-supplied and Soviet-built Sagger, Cornet and Fagot anti-tank
missiles that were able to penetrate Israel's state-of-the-art Mercava tanks
taking a terrible toll on the IDF Armored Corps. Having learned the lessons from
each of its previous conflicts, Israel was about to learn one more - that its
modern Mercava tank could not withstand the explosive force of these new
anti-tank missiles and, in some cases, lacked sufficient underbelly armor to
protect it from Hezbollah land mines. Worse, Hezbollah had come to understand
very quickly that these anti-tank missiles could be used in other, more lethal
ways. Aware that in close-range combat the IDF had an advantage, Hezbollah set
up positions far from Israeli forces and used the missiles against the Israeli
infantry. More than seventy IDF infantry soldiers were killed in anti-tank
missile attacks on homes they had commandeered in Lebanese villages and as they
moved throughout the Lebanese countryside. As the IDF began moving its troops by
foot, its infantry became easy prey for this newest generation of anti-tank
rocket. In short, these new tactics forced the Israelis to fight Hezbollah's
type of war, rather than the war Israel intended to fight when it entered
southern Lebanon.
Under the guidance of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah sent up drones on
reconnaissance missions, implanted listening devices along the southern Lebanese
border and set ambushes using state-of-the-art night-vision goggles. With the
financial assistance of their Iranian and overseas benefactors, Hezbollah used
global positioning devices to identify IDF movements, thermal protectors to
camouflage themselves from Israel's heat sensor equipment, advanced software for
aircraft design, gas masks, cutting-edge radio equipment, dozens of rifles,
various types of handguns, silencers, helmets, and protective vests. This was no
rag-tag guerilla force like those encountered in Gaza and the West Bank. Israel
found itself facing the Arab equivalent of the Waffen SS – a Special Forces army
that had been indoctrinated for "martyrdom operations" and were trained in the
use of the most technologically advanced equipment in the world. The IDF found
computer parts attesting to the fact Hezbollah was acting in an orderly manner
and was documenting its operations. It also uncovered a sophisticated command
structure that allowed Hezbollah to observe developments outside their bunkers
while still hiding inside. The electronic system had been installed inside the
bunker, while a special camera had been installed outside.
Newsweek noted that Hezbollah had even managed to eavesdrop successfully on
Israel's military communications as its Lebanese incursion began and its command
and control systems were state of the art, all of which heightened its advantage
as a hi-tech, well-trained guerilla force fighting on its own turf.
Many of the unanswered questions relate to the success of Iran and Hezbollah in
neutralizing Israeli wire-tapping and electronic jamming capabilities. How was
Iran able to block Israel's Barak anti-missile system resulting in the
successful Silkworm missile attack on one of its naval gunboats or was it simple
negligence on Israel’s part? Why was Israel unable to jam Hassan Nasrallah's
electronic communications emanating from his underground bunker in the Iranian
embassy in Beirut? Why was Israel unable to block Hezbollah's command and
communications links between the Lebanese command and the Syrian-based Iranian
headquarters? It appears that both U.S. and Israeli intelligence grossly
underestimated the tremendous effort Iran invested in state of the art
electronic warfare gadgetry designed to disable American military operations in
Iraq and IDF functions in Israel and Lebanon. Israel’s electronic warfare units
were taken by surprise by the sophisticated protective mechanisms attached to
Hezbollah’s communications networks, which were discovered to be connected by
optical fibers which are not susceptible to electronic jamming. Quite simply,
Hezbollah was prepared for war. Israel was not.
Implications
There is no escaping the fact that casualties are a necessary and tragic part of
war and Israel must recognize that it has just fought the world’s first
post-modern war against a new type of enemy…and failed to vanquish that enemy.
The implications are enormous. On Tuesday, August 22, thousands of supporters of
the radical Islamic group Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) called for an
Islamic caliphate in the Gaza Strip as the first stage towards establishing a
larger Islamic caliphate throughout the world to challenge the global domination
of the infidels, led by the U.S. and Israel. The Party, considered more extreme
than Hamas, has increased its popularity following what is perceived as
Hezbollah’s "strategic divine victory" over Israel. And Gaza is not alone.
Jordanian security forces recently foiled a similar attempt by the Party's
followers in the Kingdom and arrested most of their leaders. And speaking on the
religious satellite network Al-Nas, Cairo imam Safwat al-Higazi issued an edict
calling on worshippers to kill "any Zionist anywhere in wartime."
As George Friedman wrote recently: "Hezbollah has demonstrated that total Arab
defeat is not inevitable - and with this demonstration, Israel has lost its
tremendous psychological advantage." Thus, the greatest danger posed to Israel
as a result of this war has been an end to its aura of invincibility. In the
past, there were always certain boundaries that could not be crossed unless an
enemy was prepared to accept a crushing Israeli response. It has been this
perception of invincibility that has forced the nations of the Arab world to
refrain from direct confrontation with Israel since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
That premise, however, has now been challenged and Israel, at some point in the
near future, will be forced to restore that “perception of invincibility” lest
it find itself attacked on all fronts by specially equipped, trained and
indoctrinated radical Islamic guerilla armies funded by Iran and certain of
their own invincibility….and in that war, the Israelis had best come better
prepared to vanquish the enemy. As the Winograd Report states: “Israel cannot
survive in this region, and cannot live in it in peace or at least non-war,
unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings believe that Israel has
the political and military leadership, military capabilities, and social
robustness that will allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm
her, and to prevent them - if necessary through the use of military force - from
achieving their goal.” The world of jihad is real and it is here and, and for
Israel’s sake (not to mention the West in general), the lessons of post-modern
warfare waged by a post-modern enemy had best be learned quickly.
Acknowledgements:
Special thanks to DEBKAfile for its stream of intelligence reports and critiques
relating to the second Lebanon war; Anthony Cordesman, “Preliminary Lessons of
the Israeli Hezbollah War,” Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Working Draft for Outside Comment), August 17, 2006; George Friedman,
"Cease-Fire: Shaking Core Beliefs in the Middle East," Geopolitical Intelligence
Report," August 15, 2006; Kevin Peraino, Babak Dehghanpisheh and Christopher
Dickey, "Eye for an Eye," Newsweek, August 14, 2006; and Hanan Greenberg, "Hizbullah
equipment surprises IDF - Troops discover cutting-edge cameras, gas masks in
Lebanon; IDF official: There's no doubt Hizbullah was prepared," Ynet (8/11/06)
http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=1656