LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
May 18/08

Bible Reading of the day.
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Mark 9,2-13.
After six days Jesus took Peter, James, and John and led them up a high mountain apart by themselves. And he was transfigured before them, and his clothes became dazzling white, such as no fuller on earth could bleach them. Then Elijah appeared to them along with Moses, and they were conversing with Jesus. Then Peter said to Jesus in reply, "Rabbi, it is good that we are here! Let us make three tents: one for you, one for Moses, and one for Elijah." He hardly knew what to say, they were so terrified. Then a cloud came, casting a shadow over them; then from the cloud came a voice, "This is my beloved Son. Listen to him."Suddenly, looking around, they no longer saw anyone but Jesus alone with them. As they were coming down from the mountain, he charged them not to relate what they had seen to anyone, except when the Son of Man had risen from the dead. So they kept the matter to themselves, questioning what rising from the dead meant.  Then they asked him, "Why do the scribes say that Elijah must come first?" He told them, "Elijah will indeed come first and restore all things, yet how is it written regarding the Son of Man that he must suffer greatly and be treated with contempt? But I tell you that Elijah has come and they did to him whatever they pleased, as it is written of him."

Free Opinions, Releases, letters & Special Reports
Lebanon's Battles in Light of the Struggle for Regional Domination-Dar Al-Hayat17/05/08
Did Hezbollah Thwart a Bush/Olmert Attack on Beirut?CounterPunch 17/05/08
The betrayal of Lebanon.By: Melanie Phillips RSS 17/05/08
Bashir Gemayel and Hassan Nasrallah-Abdullah Iskandar 17/05/08
Lebanon's Future. By: Michael J. Totten 17/05/08
Lebanon isn’ta spectator-By: Giora Eiland -Ynetnews - 17/05/08
Skirting the precipice. By:Ayman El-Amir 17/05/08
Questions for the Opposition. By: Ghassan Charbel 17/05/08
Iran's tool fights America's stooge-Economist 17/05/08

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for May 17/08
First Round of Inter-Lebanese Talks in Doha Ends-Naharnet
Geagea to Hizbullah: Don't Expect Too Much-Naharnet
Aoun for Interim Government if Doha Talks Failed-Naharnet
FACTBOX - Issues on the table at Lebanon crisis talks-Reuters
TIMELINE - Political impasse and fighting in Lebanon-Reuters
Doha Talks to Tackle 3 Issues: New Government, Elections Law, Hizbullah Arms-Naharnet
Jumblat: Political Differences Cannot be Settled by Weapons-Naharnet
Saudi Supports Saniora Government, Taif and Constitution-Naharnet
Gemayel: Spreading State Authority is Key to Settlement-Naharnet
Arab Force to Protect Beirut if Opposition Threats Continue!-Naharnet
Jumblat Breaks Clemenceau Siege, Tours Mountains-Naharnet
Hizbullah Arms, Suleiman's Election Issue Almost Torpedoed Deal-Naharnet
U.S.: Lebanon Won't Resolve Difficulties in the Course of a Week-Naharnet
Ex-IAF Chief: Israel likely to be hit with thousands of rockets in ...-Ha'aretz
Lebanese Government, Hezbollah Seek End to Political Stalemate-Bloomberg
US watches Doha talks fearing Hezbollah may reap political gains-AFP
Hezbollah in dangerous territory-BBC News
Lebanon PM cancels Egypt talks with Bush - W.House-Reuters
Lebanese Factions To Renew Talks After Fierce Fighting-Voice of America
Lebanon's old passions and new fears-BBC News
From The Economist print edition-Economist
Lebanon Sunnis bitter in Lebanon power shift toward Shiite Hezbollah-International Herald Tribune
Christians marginalised in Lebanon crisis-Reuters
Lebanon's Leaders Arrive in Doha-Naharnet
U.S.: Lebanon Won't Resolve Difficulties in the Course of a Week-Naharnet
Bush: Al-Qaida, Hizbullah and Hamas Will Be Defeated-Naharnet
Jumblat: Political Differences Cannot be Settled by Weapons-Naharnet
Saudi Supports Saniora Government, Taif and Constitution-Naharnet
Gemayel: Spreading State Authority is Key to Settlement-Naharnet
Arab Force to Protect Beirut if Opposition Threats Continue!-Naharnet
Jumblat Breaks Clemenceau Siege, Tours Mountains-Naharnet
Jumblatt meets with Arslan, stresses talks over conflict-Daily Star -Naharnet
Qatari emir welcomes delegates to dialogue aimed at saving Lebanon-Daily Star-Naharnet
Qatar increases stature by hosting Lebanese dialogue-AFP
Fadlallah welcomes leaders' return to negotiations-Daily Star
Syria 'absolutely' backs talks in Doha-Daily Star
Hizbullah's arms should be finessed (again)-Daily Star
Oil prices surge on weaker dollar, demand concerns-Daily Star
Resumption of dialogue breathes life back into BSE-Daily Star
MEA boss shrugs off losses inflicted by recent closure-Daily Star
At least five Nepalis missing in Lebanon after recent clashes-Daily Star
Hip-hop duo wants to cash in on Jewish-Lebanese heritage-AFP
Bush arrives in Riyadh to press for higher oil output-AFP

First Round of Inter-Lebanese Talks in Doha Ends
Naharnet/Arab-sponsored inter-Lebanese dialogue opened in Qatar Saturday in a bid to end the long-running political crisis that drove the country to the brink of a new civil war after pro- and anti-government supporters fought bloody gunbattles that left at least 65 people killed in nearly a week.
After the fighting, Prime Minister Fouad Saniora's government and the Hizbullah-led opposition agreed to a national dialogue aimed at electing a president and forming a unity government.The first round of talks in Doha, which began at 11 am, ended 90 minutes later with the formation of a four-member committee to tackle the topics of the new government and the elections law. No new date, however, has been set for the next session.
Earlier, sources with the ruling March 14 coalition said that all they expected from the Doha talks was a "long-term truce." Other sources, however, said March 14 leaders were tilted toward focusing on the issue of restoring confidence among the feuding camps.
But sources close to opposition leaders taking part in the Doha talks said dialogue was likely to end with the creation of a follow-up committee in the event that the warring sides failed to reach agreement on the formation of a new government and an electoral law.
In Doha on Friday, the feuding political leaders gathered in a luxury hotel for an opening session chaired by Qatar's Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who then adjourned the meeting until the first round of talks proper on Saturday at 0730 GMT (10:30 am).
As U.S. President George Bush visited neighboring Saudi Arabia, Washington expressed its support for the Doha talks and vowed not to interfere.
"We are pleased that there is now a process, that the fighting in the streets have stopped," a senior U.S. State Department official, who requested anonymity, told reporters."What we are doing is making it clear first of all that we do support this process because there are a lot of people who would like to say that we don't," he said. "We are in touch with Lebanese from across the political spectrum... to note that we are supporting this process, that we will be helpful but not interfering with this process." In a brief address to the politicians, Qatar's emir stressed the need to preserve Lebanon's unity and said he hoped the rivals would reach an agreement. The two sides in the simmering political conflict met after Saniora and parliament majority leader Saad Hariri flew into Qatar on a private plane.
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, former President Amin Gemayel and Druze leader Walid Jumblat of the ruling March 14 coalition arrived separately on a Qatari aircraft that also brought opposition member and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and his ally Free Patriotic Movement chief Gen. Michel Aoun.
Hizbullah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah did not travel to Qatar, apparently for security reasons, and was represented by Hizbullah MP Mohammed Raad instead."These are early days. It's just the first meeting," Geagea told reporters after the adjournment.
Aoun called for the formation of an interim government to lead the nation if the Doha talks failed to achieve a settlement.
The feuding politicians agreed on Thursday to launch a dialogue as part of a six-point plan, following Arab League mediation led by Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani.
Under the deal the rivals undertook "to shore up the authority of the Lebanese state throughout the country," to refrain from using weapons to further political aims and to remove militants from the streets. It also urged them to refrain from using language that could incite violence. Life began returning to normal in Beirut on Friday as the port, businesses and many schools reopened. The daily An-Nahar called the deal "an achievement bordering on a miracle" while the pro-opposition Al-Akhbar said: "Those going to Doha today carry an immense patriotic duty in their hands." A group of disabled people, some wounded in Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, gathered on the Beirut airport road bearing signs for the departing political leaders: "If you don't agree, don't come back."
In the biggest challenge yet to Saniora, gunmen from the Syria- and Iran-backed opposition rose up against pro-government forces last week, taking over swathes of west Beirut in the worst sectarian violence since the civil war. Hopes of a deal rose on Wednesday after the government cancelled measures against Hizbullah that had triggered the unrest. It rescinded plans to probe a private Hizbullah telecommunications network and reassign the head of airport security over allegations he was close to the group, moves Nasrallah branded a declaration of war.
Parliament in Beirut is due to convene on June 10 for a 20th attempt to elect a president. Damascus protégé Emile Lahoud stepped down at the end of his term in November, exacerbating a crisis that began in late 2006 when six pro-Syrian ministers quit the cabinet.
Both sides agree on army chief Gen. Michel Suleiman as Lahoud's successor, but they remain at odds over the details of a proposed unity government and a new electoral law for parliamentary polls due next year.(AFP-Naharnet) Beirut, 17 May 08, 07:03

Geagea to Hizbullah: Don't Expect Too Much
Naharnet/Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has warned Hizbullah not to expect too much during inter-Lebanese talks in Doha. "I advise Hizbullah not to have high expectations because we will not take the military balance of power into consideration during the dialogue," Geagea told reporters at Beirut airport Friday before boarding the plane to Doha. Violence erupted last Thursday after Prime Minister Fouad Saniora's government said it would investigate a Hizbullah telecommunications network and remove airport security chief Brig. Gen. Wafiq Shoqeir over his alleged links to Hizbullah. The move, which angered Hizbullah, triggered six days of gunbattles across Lebanon in which at least 65 people were killed and 200 wounded. Beirut, 17 May 08, 07:31

Aoun for Interim Government if Doha Talks Failed
Naharnet/Free Patriotic Movement leader Gen. Michel Aoun has said he had proposed to the Arab delegation the formation of an interim government if the Doha talks failed to reach an agreement. Aoun denied media reports that he had rejected naming army commander Gen. Michel Suleiman as a consensus president.
"I was not opposed to mentioning the name of Gen. Suleiman as a consensus president," Aoun told reporters at Beirut airport Friday before boarding the plane that took the feuding political leaders to Doha. "But I also proposed mentioning that a transitional government should be formed if the talks fail," Aoun added.
Aoun acknowledged that the various political parties were in favor of adopting a Qada-based election law for the next parliamentary elections.
"There are many formulas in hand, but all are similar and based on the Qada as an electoral constituency," Aoun said. Beirut, 17 May 08, 07:13

Doha Talks to Tackle 3 Issues: New Government, Elections Law, Hizbullah Arms
Naharnet/The daily An Nahar on Saturday said the Qatari emir shuttled between the rival Lebanese leaders overnight, stressing that discussions should focus on three topics: a government of national unity, an electoral law and the use of Hizbullah arms domestically. It said both the majority and the opposition agreed to come out after the first round of talks on Saturday with the formation of sub committees. One of the committees under Qatar's prime minister would group four leaders – two from the opposition and two from the majority – with the task of examining the techniques of an elections law and amendments proposed by former cabinet minister Fouad Butors. On the formation of a government of national unity, an Arab ministerial committee will subsequently sponsor talks in Beirut.
Future TV channel, meanwhile, quoted government sources as saying that Prime Minister Fouad Saniora is to propose during the Doha talks a cabinet formula based on 13+10+7. Regarding the issue of Hizbullah arms, it will certainly be tackled in Doha, according to An Nahar, provided that it would be further discussed in the framework of a "defense policy" after implementation of the Arab initiative. Beirut, 17 May 08, 12:07

Jumblat: Political Differences Cannot be Settled by Weapons
Naharnet/Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat said Friday that weapons are not the means to settle political differences. Jumblat made the remark in an address to supporters in the mountain resort of Aley. He said both the majority and opposition should make concessions to facilitate the rise of the state.
"But concessions would not be made at the expense of the essence of our principles" he added. Jumblat said the inter-Lebanese dialogue in Qatar would tackle the differences and "we hope to reach a settlement." Beirut, 16 May 08, 21:01

Lebanon's Leaders Arrive in Doha
Naharnet/Lebanon's feuding political leaders arrived in Doha for Arab-Sponsored talks aimed at ending the ongoing crisis that has driven the nation to the brinks of civil war.Mustaqbal Movement leader Saad Hariri and Premier Fouad Saniora had left Beirut Airport aboard an executive jet, while leaders of both the opposition and majority boarded a Qatari jetliner. Ex-President Amin Gemayel, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, Progressive Socialist Party Leader Walid Jumblat and MP Ghassan Tueni boarded the plane along with opposition member and parliament speaker Nabih Berri and his ally Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun.
Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa also left for Doha along with the Lebanese leaders. Geagea, talking to reporters prior to boarding the plane, said Hizbullah should "lower the level of its expectations because the field facts would not be reflected on the dialogue."Aoun proposed the formation of an interim national unity cabinet to lead the nation of the Doha talks failed in reaching a settlement. Hizbullah was represented by head of its parliamentary bloc MP Mohammed Raad.  Qatar's Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani was due to open the talks in a Doha hotel at 9:00 pm (1800 GMT).
The feuding Lebanese politicians agreed on Thursday to launch a dialogue as part of a six-point plan, following Arab League mediation led by Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani. Under the deal the rivals undertook "to shore up the authority of the Lebanese state throughout the country," to refrain from using weapons to further political aims and to remove militants from the streets. It also called for the removal of roadblocks that paralyzed air traffic and closed major highways, and for the rivals to refrain from using language that could incite violence. Life began returning to normal in Beirut on Friday as the port, businesses and many schools reopened. A group of disabled people, some bearing injuries from Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil war, gathered on the Beirut airport road bearing signs for the leaders: "If you don't agree, don't come back."(Naharnet-AFP) Beirut, 16 May 08, 19:55

Jumblat: Political Differences Cannot be Settled by Weapons
Naharnet/Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat said Friday that weapons are not the means to settle political differences.  Jumblat made the remark in an address to supporters in the mountain resort of Aley. He said both the majority and opposition should make concessions to facilitate the rise of the state.
"But concessions would not be made at the expense of the essence of our principles" he added. Jumblat said the inter-Lebanese dialogue in Qatar would tackle the differences and "we hope to reach a settlement." Beirut, 16 May 08, 21:01

Saudi Supports Saniora Government, Taif and Constitution
Naharnet/Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said Riyadh would maintain its support of Premier Fouad Saniora's government until it is changed by elections.
Faisal was obviously referring to the election of a president after which the government presents its resignation to him in line with the constitution.
Al-Faisal stressed that Saudi Arabia was "not at the same distance from who is right and who is not." He made the remark in responding to Iranian charges that Riyadh was biased in favor of the majority. Al-Faisal stressed on the election of consensus candidate Gen. Michel Suleiman President, the formation of a national unity government and the adoption of a general election law. He praised efforts exerted by the Arab Committee and said Saudi Arabia stresses on the need to respect the Taif accord and the constitutional process in Lebanon. Beirut, 16 May 08, 20:53

Gemayel: Spreading State Authority is Key to Settlement
Naharnet/Former President Amin Gemayel said Friday that the key to any settlement is agreement based on the principle of spreading state authority.
"If we don't reach understanding over the relationship between Hizbullah and the state, we won't make any progress" in the Doha talks, Gemayel told LBC television channel. "I will raise this issue, in addition to that of Hizbullah arms, during the Doha talks," he added. Gemayel said he agreed with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea on "some points." He did not elaborate. He said, however, that he would be making contacts will other leaders in order to work out a joint concept. Beirut, 16 May 08, 14:40

Arab Force to Protect Beirut if Opposition Threats Continue!
Naharnet/The ruling March 14 coalition expressed fears that the Hizbullah-led opposition could escalate the situation that could lead to re-closure of the airport road while feuding leaders hold talks in Doha in a bid to end the long-running political crisis in Lebanon. But Arab mediators quickly calmed the majority's fears, arguing that it would not be in the interest of the opposition to block the airport highway since this passage will also be used by anti-government leaders upon return from Doha.
Then the majority leaders told the Qatari Prime Minister that opposition chiefs could use their airport since it is under their control while preventing access to the majority. It was then that the Arab delegation told the majority that in the event their return was not possible "we will all of us head to the Arab League in Cairo and suggest that it dispatches an Arab force to keep peace alongside the Lebanese army in Beirut and vital facilities." Beirut, 16 May 08, 23:36

Jumblat Breaks Clemenceau Siege, Tours Mountains
Naharnet/Druze leader Walid Jumblat has decided to make a quick tour of Shweifat, Aley and Baisour on Friday to "pacify" the mountains and express condolences to the family of victims in the latest violence that broke out May 17 and left at least 65 people killed and 200 wounded. Jumblat began his tour with a visit to rival, former cabinet minister Talal Arslan at his mansion in Khalde, south of Beirut. After the meeting Jumblat told a joint news conference with Arslan that "we will not benefit from (using) arms.""Khalde is our home and Mukhtara is home for Emir Talal Arslan," Jumblat said. "Together we assert that coexistence (is possible) with our Shiite brethren in the mountains," he added. Arslan, for his part, thanked Jumblat for authorizing him to negotiate on his behalf during last week's fighting.
"The mountains will always embrace the resistance," Arslan stressed. Beirut, 16 May 08, 10:24

Hizbullah Arms, Suleiman's Election Issue Almost Torpedoed Deal
Naharnet/The first draft agreement to end the Lebanon crisis came to light around 4:30 am Thursday at the hotel suite of the Qatari prime minister after nearly four hours of separate talks with a delegation from the majority and another from the Hizbullah-led opposition. The pan-Arab daily Al-Hayat said Friday that Qatari Prime Minister Sheik Hamad Bin Jassem al-Thani was supposed to have announced the agreement Thursday morning. Postponement of the deal was made for several reasons, Al Hayat said. One of the reasons was that opposition negotiators – Speaker Nabih Berri's aide MP Ali Hassan Khalil and Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's political assistant Hussein Khalil – requested the Arab delegation's patience until they receive a "final stance" from Free Patriotic Movement leader Gen. Michel Aoun, al-Hayat wrote, knowing that both Khalils represented the opposition at talks with Arab mediators. Al-Hayat said the opposition pleaded with Jassem to postpone announcement of the deal which was approved by Prime Minister Fouad Saniora and the ruling camp. Citing Arab sources, al-Hayat said that head of the Arab delegation was surprised by the opposition move and asked the two Khalils "aren't you authorized to speak for the opposition?" Meanwhile, al-Hayat said that FPM official Gebran Bassil was in constant contact with the Hizbullah leadership to convey Aoun's "remarks." Jassem has reportedly called up Aoun, telling him: "This is the settlement reached between both the majority and the opposition. You either approve it or each side will have to bear the responsibility before the (Arab) committee and the Lebanese." Al-Hayat said Aoun rejected naming army commander Gen. Michel Suleiman as a consensus president. It also said Aoun insisted on adopting the 1960 electoral law. Beirut, 16 May 08, 10:08

U.S.: Lebanon Won't Resolve Difficulties in the Course of a Week
Naharnet/U.S. State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack has said bickering Lebanese politicians will not resolve their differences "in the course of a week" after a deal was announced between the pro- and anti-government camp. "Lebanon is not going to resolve its myriad difficulties and idiosyncrasies of its political system in the course of a week or one set of discussions," McCormack said Thursday. Hizbullah "is going to be a continuing issue for Lebanese democrats to deal with over the course of time," he said. His comments came after Arab mediators in Beirut announced a deal aimed at ending a standoff between the government and the Hizbullah-led opposition. "Hizbullah continues to pose a challenge to the future of the Lebanese people in terms of realizing a broad-based, deep democracy that benefits all of the Lebanese people," McCormack said in a press briefing.
He accused the Shiite group of willing to kill Lebanese to reach its objective. "We have seen over the past several days that Hizbullah is willing to kill Lebanese in the interest of their political agenda, which seems to have really no basis other than to try to expand their political power," McCormack told reporters.
Last week, scores were killed in clashes between pro- and anti-government gunmen in Beirut and several other regions. McCormack said it was the duty of the United States to stand by Premier Fouad Saniora's government. "We are going to continue to do what we can to strengthen this Lebanese government that is democratically elected, that seeks only to govern on behalf of all the Lebanese people, to expand – extend its sovereignty over all of Lebanon, and to broaden and deepen Lebanese democracy, and to fiercely guard Lebanon's sovereignty," he said.
When asked about discussions for a U.N. action, McCormack said: "Ongoing discussions up in New York, consultations among Security Council colleagues. As always, I will not put a timeline on action by the Security Council." "I think there is a determination, certainly among the interlocutors that we're working with, to do something within the Security Council on Lebanon," he said.
Asked why the U.S. would not construe the Lebanese government backing down to Hizbullah's demands as appeasement, McCormack said: "Sitting back here in Washington in sort of the comforts of our own democracy, secure in our rights and freedoms, I don't think it's appropriate to start second-guessing those people who are making decisions that, literally, will determine the future of democracy in Lebanon."A top American general visited Beirut earlier this week to find out how Washington can better support Lebanon's armed forces during the current crisis, McCormack said. Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, the interim commander of Central Command, "talked to the Lebanese government about some of what they might need, what it is that we can provide," he said. State Department and Pentagon officials said the visit took place Wednesday, when Washington announced it was speeding up deliveries of aid to the army previously agreed under an existing military assistance program. Beirut, 16 May 08, 09:52

Moussa Hopeful Suleiman Will be Elected 'Within Days'
Naharnet/Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa expressed hope on Friday that army commander Gen. Michel Suleiman will be elected president very soon.
"Agreement has been reached to elect Gen. Suleiman president and we should promptly take action toward electing him immediately," Moussa told LBC television. "I hope this will take place within the coming days." In response to a question on the formation of a national unity government, Moussa said: "The Arab League does not go into details of the government (set up) or picking ministers, a responsibility that falls solely on the President. "Moussa said the Doha talks would be a "complete success" if all 14 leaders from both sides did well with "defusing mistrust." Beirut, 16 May 08, 13:29

Sfeir from New York Calls for Efforts to Help Lebanon
Naharnet/Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir has told the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council that Lebanon is in dire need of a president and stressed the necessity of non-interference in the country's internal affairs. "All our constitutional institutions should be active and efficient. The election of a president is a pressing need and has to remain a top priority," Sfeir said Thursday in the New York residence of Lebanon's U.N. ambassador Nawaf Salam.
"Parliament should open its doors…Cabinet is suffering from the boycott of a major sect because this sect feels that its voice hasn't been heard," the Patriarch read from a memorandum that he delivered to the ambassadors. In an indirect reference to Syria and Iran, which the pro-government camp accuses of meddling in Lebanon's internal affairs, Sfeir expressed hope that the world body would urge "its members to facilitate the work of the Lebanese government."
"We have to be reassured that neighboring countries would not attack Lebanon, invade it or violate its sovereignty," Sfeir said. He also said Israel should end its violation of Lebanese airspace. Sfeir said the issue of the Shabaa farms area should be solved, the Lebanese-Syrian border demarcated, and diplomatic relations set up between Beirut and Damascus. He urged the implementation of all Security Council resolutions on Lebanon. The cleric arrived in New York from South Africa where he made an eight-day visit. He also met with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in the presence of special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen at the U.N. headquarters. Beirut, 16 May 08, 09:10

Bush: Al-Qaida, Hizbullah and Hamas Will Be Defeated
Naharnet/U.S. President George Bush has criticized the tactics of groups like al-Qaida, Hizbullah and Hamas and said he looks toward the day when Muslims "recognize the emptiness of the terrorists' vision."In a speech prepared for delivery to the Knesset, Bush pledged Thursday that the United States has an unbreakable bond with Israel. "Some people suggest that if the United States would just break ties with Israel, all our problems in the Middle East would go away," Bush said. "This is a tired argument that buys into the propaganda of our enemies, and America rejects it utterly. Israel's population may be just over 7 million. But when you confront terror and evil, you are 307 million strong, because America stands with you."
"America stands with you in breaking up terrorist networks and denying the extremists sanctuary," Bush told the Israeli parliament. He was loudly applauded during his address marking the 60 years since the creation of Israel, an event Palestinians commemorate as a "catastrophe." "From Cairo and Riyadh to Baghdad and Beirut, people will live in free and independent societies, where a desire for peace is reinforced by ties of diplomacy, tourism, and trade. Iran and Syria will be peaceful nations, where today's oppression is a distant memory and people are free to speak their minds and develop their talents. And al-Qaida, Hizbullah and Hamas will be defeated, as Muslims across the region recognize the emptiness of the terrorists' vision and the injustice of their cause," said Bush, on a five-day tour of the region that will also take him to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bush said that those who carry out violent acts are serving only their own desire for power.
"They accept no God before themselves. And they reserve a special hatred for the most ardent defenders of liberty, including Americans and Israelis," Bush said. "That is why the founding charter of Hamas calls for the `elimination' of Israel. That is why the followers of Hizbullah chant `Death to Israel, Death to America!' That is why Osama bin Laden teaches that `the killing of Jews and Americans is one of the biggest duties.' And that is why the president of Iran dreams of returning the Middle East to the Middle Ages and calls for Israel to be wiped off the map."Bush warned that allowing arch-foe Iran to obtain nuclear weapons would be "an unforgivable betrayal of future generations."(AP-AFP-Naharnet) Beirut, 16 May 08, 08:26

One Person Killed in Quarrel about Politics in East Lebanon
Naharnet/One person was killed and another wounded late Thursday in a dispute in east Lebanon between government supporters and backers of the Hizbullah-led opposition, security officials said. A quarrel about politics in Fakiha village 40 kilometers (25 miles) north of Baalbek turned violent, and a supporter of the opposition pulled a pistol on a member of ruling majority Saad Hariri's Future Movement, shooting him dead.
Another member of the Western-backed majority was wounded, the sources said. No further details were available about the incident, which highlighted simmering tensions in Lebanon following a week of deadly violence and ahead of an Arab League-brokered dialogue set to begin in Qatar on Friday in a bid to heal long-running political divisions.(AFP) Beirut, 16 May 08, 06:12

Lebanon's Future
Michael J. Totten
Lebanon will not become the next Gaza.
Commenters both inside and outside the country compared Hezbollah's invasion of West Beirut last week to the Hamas takeover of Gaza last year, which is perhaps understandable: that's what it looked like. If Lebanon's mainstream Sunni-dominated party--Saad Hariri's Future Movement--has a militia that is able and willing to fight, it didn't make much of an appearance. Hezbollah seized the western half of the city in a walk. Most journalists focused on this portion of the conflict because West Beirut is where almost every journalist in Lebanon lives and where almost every hotel for visiting journalists is located.
Far less attention has been paid to Hezbollah's military and strategic failure in the Chouf mountains southeast of Beirut where Lebanon's Druze community lives. Hezbollah picked a major fight there and lost. After three days of pitched battles, its gunmen were unable to conquer a single village--even when they brought out mortars and heavy artillery.
The Druze are among the fiercest of warriors, and everyone in Lebanon knows it. They are well-known in Israel, too, where they often serve in elite units of the Israel Defense Forces and suffer lower-than-average casualty rates in battles with Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups. Most of Israel's Sunni Arabs abstain from military service, but Druze Arabs are as loyal to the Israeli state, and are as willing and able to fight for it, as their Lebanese counterparts are in their own country. There's a reason two of the Middle East's religious minorities--Maronite Christians and Druze--live in Lebanon's mountains in significant numbers: attempts to invade and subjugate them are ill-advised, very likely to fail, and therefore rarely attempted by even large armies.
It's debatable whether or not Lebanon's Sunnis are organized and well-armed or not. Certainly they are not compared to Hezbollah. No one in Lebanon is. But Druze chief Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party proved they have no shortage of weapons, and they fought off Hezbollah's invasion even though he told them not to. A tiny percentage of Druze are partially loyal to Talal Arslan, Hezbollah's only Druze ally, but they defected in large numbers when Hezbollah launched its attack. They fought on the same side as the rest of their community. Political alliances have their limits, and Arslan's people and Hezbollah discovered theirs. It is now almost safe to say that Hezbollah has no friends at all in the mountains overlooking the dahiyeh, their “capital” and command and control center in the suburbs south of Beirut.
Lebanon's mainstream Sunnis in relatively liberal and cosmopolitan West Beirut basically threw up their hands and let Hezbollah take over, in part because they were ill-prepared to do much about it, and in part to make their Hezbollah enemies look like the aggressors and thugs that they are. Don't expect that dynamic to last very long if the violence resumes, however. The Sunnis, as a community, are likely to follow the Druze example even if their leaders--Prime Minister Fouad Seniora and Future Movement MP Saad Hariri--instruct them not to. Former Prime Minister Omar Karami is one of Hezbollah's few Sunni allies. But as Lee Smith pointed out, he “told Hezbollah that if this becomes a sectarian fight, then we have two choices: to either stay home, or fight with our sect.”
Former Lebanese MP Khaled Al-Dhaher went even further. “Since the army and the security forces are incapable of defending our sons, our religion, our faith, and our liberty,” he said, “we in the Islamic Gathering have decided to launch a national-Islamic resistance, in order to protect Lebanon and defend its people, and in order to prevent the Persian enterprise from getting its clutches on an Arab capital, because the people who have occupied Beirut belong to the Persian-Iranian army.”
That sounds ominous, and it is. Most Lebanese Sunnis are willing to support liberal leaders like Siniora and Hariri only if they are not in danger. The notorious terrorist group Fatah Al Islam--or whatever is left of it after its drubbing last year by the Lebanese Army --just issued a statement and said they will stand by Lebanon's Sunnis if they are attacked. The last thing Lebanon needs are Sunni and Shia terrorists slugging it out in the streets, but that's where the country is headed.
Lebanon's Christians have so far sat out the fighting. They might continue to do so for a short while if they are not attacked, but they also might not. Most are aligned with the Sunni and Druze parties against Hezbollah. Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun has been hemorrhaging Maronite Christian supporters thanks to his unpopular and cynical alliance with Hezbollah, and he will likely lose almost all of them if Christian cities or neighborhoods are invaded. Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah knows this very well, which is so far why all Christian areas have been spared from fighting.
Nasrallah has far more enemies than friends in Lebanon, but that doesn't mean he can be defeated. The Israel Defense Force is the toughest and most sophisticated military force in the region, yet its soldiers were not able to crush Hezbollah in the July War of 2006, nor during their occupation of South Lebanon that lasted throughout the 1990’s. Hezbollah's Lebanese enemies are the weakest in the region. No one should expect them to fare better than the Israelis.
Still, Hezbollah is a guerrilla army, not an occupation force. Counterinsurgency is not in its toolbox. Hassan Nasrallah will have a rude awakening if he tries to emulate Hamas in Gaza and seize the whole country. “No victor, no vanquished” is the rule Lebanese live by in both politics and war, and every faction that has ever tried to dominate Lebanon has learned it the hard way. Whether Nasrallah has learned this near-iron law from the mistakes of others isn't yet clear, but the stiff resistance his men faced in the Chouf, and the recent ominous threats from radical Sunnis, should give him pause at the least. Fifteen years of civil war (1975 to 1990) proved that no one in Lebanon is strong enough to hold the country together or utterly defeat their enemies.
Nasrallah can bully the Lebanese government and render it effectively obsolete, at least on foreign policy questions, but he cannot conquer and administer the entire country himself. Unless the Syrian military returns in full force, Lebanon's future will not be one of dictatorship. Its future most likely will resemble its past--a grim stalemate of schism and internal war.
**Michael J. Totten is a freelance writer and blogger who has reported from Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Cyprus, Turkey, and Israel. His work has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Reason, and numerous other publications.
© 2008 Commentary Inc.

Lebanon isn’t a spectator
Israel must make it clear that war with Hizbullah will lead to Lebanon’s destruction
Giora Eiland
Published: 05.16.08,
Israel Opinion
The latest events in Lebanon are a result of an internal power struggle. Israeli’s ability to influence them is small to non-existent. However, we must realize that the latest developments, which prove that Hizbullah is back to being Lebanon’s strongest military and political power, are a result of two Israeli mistakes among other things – errors that neither the Winograd Commission nor other elements paid enough attention to.
The first mistake was made in the years 2004-2005. The government of Israel adopted the recommendation of then-Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, who espoused the campaign to push the Syrians out of Lebanon. Syria’s removal from Lebanon was mostly the result of an American-French-Saudi short-term interest that contradicted the Israeli interest.
The result (which could have been expected back then already) was as follows: The partial vacuum that emerged in the wake of Syria’s departure was filled by Iran rather than by moderate elements; when the Syrians left Lebanon we lost a “return address” that we could deter effectively; and the Syrians, who up to that point made an effort to hold on to Lebanon, shifted their political focus back to the Golan Heights.
The second mistake was made at the start of the Second Lebanon War. Israel defined Hizbullah only as the enemy, thereby losing the opportunity to win the war. It is impossible to defeat a terror group that operates out of a neighboring country while this country (Lebanon) is immune to any military or diplomatic pressure.
Israel should have, either before the war or right at its outset, brought the international community to a situation whereby it would have turned to the Lebanese government with the following message: “Dear government of Lebanon, you only have two options. If you continue to allow Hizbullah to be the most important military power in the country, and if Hizbullah rather than the government controls the border with Israel, and if Hizbullah is the element which in practice takes strategic decisions in the country, then you are a Hizbullah state, an Iranian satellite, and as you are such state, we have no problem with Israel destroying you. On the other hand, if you want to be a real country that assumes responsibility for what goes on within its territory, we, members of the international community, will not only assist it, we would also force Israel to end its strikes immediately.”
Creating real deterrence
Yet as we know, this did not happen. Instead of taking advantage of this opportunity, Hizbullah was given two precious years to regain its military and political capabilities. The two quiet years along the Israel-Lebanon border resulted from Hizbullah’s preference to deal with restoring its domestic status in Lebanon.
The price paid by Hizbullah during the war was not the loss of weapons – those were re-supplied already. The price was also not the fighters who were killed, as after all we’re talking about an organization that sanctifies suicide for the sake of the overriding goal. The only meaningful price paid by Hizbullah was a certain blow to its legitimacy as result of the (very limited) destruction brought by the war.
There is one lesson here for Israel. We must explain to the international community now already that another war on the northern border will not pit Israel against Hizbullah alone, with the Lebanese state playing the role of spectator. Such war, should it break out, would bring about Lebanon’s destruction, and this is something even Hizbullah doesn’t want to see happen. This is the almost only way to create deterrence vis-à-vis an organization that attaches such great importance to its domestic Lebanese legitimacy.

Christians marginalised in Lebanon crisis
Thu May 15, 2008
Hezbollah stand off in Beirut
By Khaled Yacoub Oweis
BEIRUT, May 15 (Reuters) - At an upmarket jeweller's in east Beirut's Ashrafieh district, wealthy Lebanese Christians shop for gold and diamonds, far removed from the upheaval that has sidelined their once-dominant community.
Last week's fighting, in which at least 81 people were killed, pitted the opposition Shi'ite Muslim group Hezbollah against pro-government Sunni Muslim and Druze factions. But no major Christian group took part in the fighting or played a role in ending the violence. "Times change. Once we ruled militarily, and now it is Hezbollah," said 80-year-old George Aoun. Unlike the rest of the Arab World, Christians have traditionally been leading players in Lebanon. At an estimated one-third of the population, they far outweigh the proportion of Christians in any other Arab country. But the Christians became divided over loyalties to rival leaders, leaving them marginalised during the latest crisis. Lebanese political scientist As'ad Abu Khalil said the community now had "no significant role" in Lebanese politics.
The presidency, a post reserved for them under Lebanon's sectarian political system, has been vacant since November, depriving them of a platform to exercise influence, Christian politicians say. Members of the community, which is still dominant in business and finance, hope that shunning violence during the latest upheaval will preserve the Christians of Lebanon in the long run.
"The Christians will keep thriving by adopting non-violence. Hezbollah has been exposed as a force ready to kill fellow Lebanese. Why doesn't it wait for elections if it wants more power?" said Selim Mouzannar in his Ashrafieh jewellery shop. Aoun, who lost 11 members of his family during an attack by Palestinian guerrillas on the town of Damur south of Beirut during the 15-year civil war, said the latest violence would drive more Christians to leave Lebanon.
"If I was younger I would emigrate myself. Hezbollah has the numerical superiority and the Christians are too divided. But the Christians can still advance by not making an enemy of the Shi'ites," said Aoun, who owns a restaurant in Ashrafieh. During the civil war, Christian Maronites were at one stage allied to Syria, but then switched allegiance to Israel. When the war ended in 1990, Christians emerged with diminished political powers.
Inter-communal divisions deepened after former army commander Michel Aoun allied with Hezbollah in 2006 in opposition to the governing coalition which is composed of Druze, Sunni and Christian politicians, with a few Shi'ites. In the Christian Gemaizeh district, life returned largely to normal on Thursday.
"Lebanon is the Gate of the East because of its Christians, but it is time to realise Shi'ite ascendancy. They have the numerical superiority," said Francois Bassil, owner of Le Chef restaurant. "We better not repeat mistakes of the civil war and ally with foreign powers," he said. "By the time foreign help comes we will be under the knife." (Editing by Giles Elgood)

Skirting the precipice
Ayman El-Amir
Al-Ahram Weekly- May 16/05/08
Last week, Lebanon marched briskly to the brink of civil war and then stepped back. The powerless government of Prime Minister Fouad Al-Siniora, backed by its Western allies and Arab moderates, attempted to de-claw the multi-sectarian coalition of Hizbullah but the coalition pushed back. It was more than a test of wills; rather a grim reminder of the 15-year long civil war of 1975-1990, of which no one wanted a replay. At the cost of several dozen victims in various sections of Beirut and Tripoli, Mount Lebanon and Al-Shoaf, the skirmishes may provide a breakthrough in the political stalemate that has gripped Lebanon for almost a year now. The Lebanese army is poised to play the role of powerbroker.
It would seem that the crisis began when pro-West Druze leader Walid Jumblatt tipped off the Siniora government about a private fixed-line telecommunications network run by Hizbullah as part of its military defence system. Security cameras were also set up outside the airport to monitor traffic in a secure landing and take-off area of the airport. In addition, it was pointed out that the director of Beirut International Airport security, Wafik Shukair, was a Shia. The telecommunications network was in place before the Israeli offensive on Lebanon in July-August 2006. It played a key role in throwing back the invasion and has since become instrumental to the military capacity of Hizbullah. The impotent Siniora government suddenly "discovered" the existence of the network, the prime minister considered it a threat to state security and even went as far as stating that "Lebanon is an occupied country" by the same Hizbullah that defended Lebanon against the Israeli invasion two years ago.
To the foreign intelligence community operating in the Middle East, often in collaboration with allied regimes, it is no secret that Israel has developed the technological capacity to monitor all telecommunication exchanges in the region and listen in on some targeted ones. Hizbullah's network has proved to be largely impenetrable, which is a source of frustration for both the Israelis and the US. So for Jumblatt and the Siniora government to raise alarm about the network of Hizbullah and to fire the director of Beirut International Airport security on sectarian grounds can only be interpreted in the context of the escalating US-Israeli campaign against Syria and Iran. Potential military action against Iran or Syria would require the neutralisation, if not the destruction, of Hizbullah. Should Prime Minister Siniora have succeeded in taking over the telecommunications network of Hizbullah, even in collaboration with the Lebanese army, it would not be difficult to guess where the codes and operating manuals of the network would have ended up 48 hours later. The timing of unfolding the issue is, to say the least, suspicious. That is why Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah labelled the prime minister's decrees regarding the network and the firing of the director of airport security "a declaration of war" against the organisation, vowing that its arms would only be used to defend itself.
When the Lebanese army was thrust in the middle of the Siniora-engineered power conflict, its prudent commander, Lieutenant-General Michel Suleiman, refused to act in any divisive way to support the miscalculated decision of Siniora and his supporters, Saad Al-Hariri of the Future Movement and Jumblatt of the Progressive Socialist Party. They wanted him to throw the weight of the army against Hizbullah in an all- out war. By holding back, Suleiman not only demonstrated that the army is capable of being the non-partisan saviour of the nation when adventurous politicians want to play Russian roulette with it, but also added to his presidential credentials. This was matched by Hizbullah's decision to withdraw its fighters from the streets of West Beirut and Al-Hamra district, effectively imposing a ceasefire, despite the temporary flare- up in Jebel Halba and Mount Lebanon ignited by the followers of majority loyalists (Hariri/ Jumblatt) against supporters of the Hizbullah coalition. Hizbullah's restraint, the army commander's prudence and the failure of Hariri's make- believe initiative have left the Siniora government isolated. Its position is not improved by the usual encouragement and statements of support coming from the White House, or the loitering of the USS Cole off the coast of Lebanon. The Siniora will eventually bear the brunt of the national crisis it has triggered by miscalculation, and ineptly failed to contain. As the Lebanese army began its deployment in flash points and the situation calmed down, the majority leader Saad Al-Hariri stoked the rhetoric by accusing Syria and Iran of prodding Hizbullah to incite a Shia-Sunni sedition and ignite a civil war. In a press conference on Tuesday, Al-Hariri accused the organisation of staging a coup d'état which, he said, could not have been executed without an Israeli cover. How could a coalition of Iran-Syria-Israel-Hizbullah have connived to stage the so-called coup defies any rational analysis.
The confrontation may prove a blessing in disguise if only the Lebanese could free themselves from the imposition of Arab politics and initiatives that are largely mixed with Western political interests. The US-Arab moderates' coalition oversimplifies the conflict in Lebanon. To this US-driven coalition, it is the struggle between a radical Iranian-Syrian-Hizbullah alliance that opposes US-Israeli domination of the Middle East and the atrophied forces of a status-quo before which the dynamics of history should be frozen in time until doomsday. The brief crisis in Lebanon has proven, once again, that sectarian political balances cannot survive in a modern political context of liberal, free democracy. Lebanon has been pawned for too long to regional and foreign interests. In the aftermath of the failed Israeli incursion into Lebanon and the havoc it wreaked on Beirut, Saudi Arabia decided to deposit an endowment of $1 billion in the Lebanese Central Bank and a loan of $500 million to shore up the Lebanese lira and, by extension, the Saudi business investment run by the Hariri family. The international community -- that is, the Western alliance -- pledged $7 billion for the reconstruction of Lebanon. For those who know the politics of the region, there is no free lunch in the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon.
Now that the fighting has tapered off to an intermittent ceasefire, Lebanese factions are sorting out the implications and future options. A recent poll indicated that 63 per cent of the Lebanese blame the Siniora government for the eruption that has left approximately 100 people dead and many more injured. Some 27 per cent blamed it on Hizbullah. There is a near consensus, shared by both the opposition and the army, that the government should withdraw its two controversial decisions, or resign. Prime Minister Al-Siniora backed off a little by stating that, "the decisions have been adopted but not issued" as executive orders.
As would be expected, the Arab League's foreign ministers met in an emergency session and decided to send a ministerial delegation, which arrived in Beirut Wednesday to address the situation. This is not necessarily good news. Prior to that emergency meeting, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and the ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad Ben Khalifa Al Thani, had met and agreed that the matter was an internal Lebanese affair. During the Arab foreign ministers' meeting in Cairo, media reports indicated there was a "sharp exchange" between the Saudi foreign minister and the permanent representative of Syria over developments in Lebanon. Should this be true, it would mean that Arab foreign ministers, who are as polarised as the Lebanese factions they back, including the so-called majority government, could make matters worse, not better. To achieve any measure of success, they will have to discard the perception of a Shia- Sunni conflict, an Iranian-Syrian- Hizbullah coalition against the pro- Western sages of the Hariri- Jumblatt-Siniora moderation majority, blessed by the US and Israel.
The saving factor that should guide the Arab foreign ministers' conciliation delegation, together with the Arab initiative on Lebanon, is the emerging consensus on a package agreement for the formation of a government of national unity, election of a president, amendment of the election law and the holding of new elections. This is not entirely inconsistent with the Arab initiative. However, the real challenge is the provisions of the 1990 Taif Accords for dismantling the system of political sectarianism and internal arrangements for disarming and absorbing militias.
The trouble with Lebanon is that because of its long history of sectarian violence, politicians have manipulated their constituencies into believing that their very survival depends not so much on the rule of law in an egalitarian state system as on huddling together under the protection of a sectarian umbrella defended by armed militias. In this paradigm, every Lebanese believes that sectarian protection, not the law of the land, is the best guarantee of his interests and privileges. This will be the primary challenge the would-be new president of Lebanon will face: how to create a new consensus that would replace the feudal system of warlords and historical privileges. The Hizbullah coalition and nationalist forces could lend the new president the power he needs to change that centuries-old paradigm.
* The writer is former Al-Ahram correspondent in Washington, DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New
© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved

Bashir Gemayel and Hassan Nasrallah
Abdullah Iskandar
Al-Hayat - 14/05/08//
There is something in common between the political projects for Lebanon that the late President Bashir Gemayel previously tried to accomplish and Hezbollah's Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah is currently attempting to undertake. While the objectives of the state were completely different, the similarity between the two cases was in the perception of the state, its role, the means of constructing it, and its structure.
Both projects were based on the assumption that the nation was under occupation, Palestinian and Syrian according to the former, and Israeli according to the latter. Both considered the state and its army were unable to confront this occupation, and consequently, military forces had to be established in place of the state military to fight the occupation and to launch the resistance movement dubbed the "Lebanese Resistance" by Gemayel and the "Islamic Resistance" by Nasrallah.
To carry out the required missions against the occupation, the need was for a military organization that possessed solid structure, powerful weapons, capable security, and reliable protection for its members. The security apparatus in both cases was one of the basic components of the resistance, along with all the systematic encroachment on the role of the state and its military and security apparatuses. Naturally, such a new reality (de facto forces) had to clash with parties injured by the retreating role of the state and by the new revolutionary project. To consolidate positions and express loyalty to the sacrifices of martyrs, the resistance arms had to be united first. In other words, the resistance had to be turned into the sole speaker in the name of its public which in its majority belonged to the same sect, and transformed into a representative of the interests and aspirations of this public. From thereon, the aim of the resistance was to expand at the expense of the different apparatuses of the state while at the same time establishing social and economic infrastructures in the name of caring for its public and organizing domestic affairs in its areas (security squares) in a manner that excluded any role for the state.
The next step was to expand into the state and its institutions, at times in the name of the sectarian share, and under the pretext of the existence of conflicts with the interests of the resistance at other times. This was followed by the attempt to acquire national legitimacy that went beyond narrow communal demands in an effort to establish a new state. In the meantime, the role of the state and its institutions failed and the game of democracy, consensus, and bargains became acceptable and welcomed in as much as it was in line with the resistance project. Alternatively, this role was unacceptable, unequivocally rejected, and confronted by the force of arms as a conspiracy against the resistance and its sacrifices, and as service to the enemy when it contradicted the resistance project.
In other words, both projects started from the attempt to establish "a state within a state" that speaks in the name of its sectarian public, and once they reinforced the pillars of their "states" as de facto realities that the Lebanese state could neither contain or terminate, the next step was to move to the nationally "unifying state" established and led by the resistance.
Both Bashir Gemayel back then and Nasrallah at present elaborated in describing the characteristics of this unifying state that is strong and just but only as long as it rested on the legacy of the resistance. Both leaders were generous in offering assurances that this state would treat all Lebanese, regardless of their sectarian affiliation, equally in front of the law. The guarantee in all cases was the foundational nature of this state. Bashir Gemayel, for example, always asserted that Lebanon would be home to Christians but not a Christian nation. This meant that coexistence with other sects would be based on the dominance of the political colors of the Christians whom he believed he represented along with the representatives of other sects that belonged to the same political color. Likewise, Nasrallah highlights that the strong state is the state of his "resistance" and not a Shiite state. In other words, he has no intentions to transform the regime in Lebanon into an Islamic Republic similar to the Iranian model, but rather, he wants a state that is founded on political Shiism from which it derives its inspiration and whose grand political strategies it defends.
On top of all this, another commonality between the two projects is that at one time or another, they both attracted Michel Aoun, the indulging general who tolerates playing with the structure of the state and its institutions.
Bachir Gemayel was elected president as he took advantage of the military defeat of his opponents at the hands of the Israeli invasion and occupation. However, his project received a fatal blow when he was assassinated before he officially assumed office, and more than a decade had to pass before the domestic balances were overturned. It was during this period that Nasrallah's resistance which emerged as a result of this occupation obtained recognition and started a phase of domestic expansion all the way to military confrontation with its local opponents

Questions for the Opposition
Ghassan Charbel
Al-Hayat - 15/05/08//
Let us assume that a prominent Lebanese opposition leader agreed to receive a neutral journalist. Let us assume that the journalist wants to help his readers understand the background and outcomes of what was a fatal week for the Lebanese, a week which - by the way - revived the memories of previous wars and some of their most horrific atrocities. The questions he would ask would be as follows:
If the Lebanese government was said, in light of the two decisions it took, to have erred in assessing the sensitiveness of the issue and the gravity of the timing, then can't it be said that the opposition, with the first shot it fired in the streets of Beirut, has poorly assessed Lebanon's sensitive structure, a mistake tantamount to a fatal sin?
Was the decision to clamp down on West Beirut taken by consensus? What were the stances of Speaker Nabih Berri and General Michel Aoun?
Was the decision to clamp down on Beirut the only choice available for the opposition? Why did the opposition not resort to a million-strong demonstration and to armless pressure, especially that the government is in no position to implement the majority of its decisions, particularly when the matter has to do with a sensitive issue described by the resistance as directly related to its arms and the security of its officials?
Did the opposition believe it could besiege Saad Hariri in Kraitem without triggering a feeling of siege among the Sunnis? Did it believe it could besiege Walid Jumblatt in Clemenceau without sparkling a similar feeling among the Druze? Does it think that it can besiege Samir Geagea in Meerab without making the Maronites feel their community is besieged with him despite our appreciation for "our friend in need," General Aoun?
Did the opposition believe it could break the will of the majority leaders without breaking the will of communities and regions? Did it postpone the zero hour to move on to Meerab for fear such move would instigate sensitivities or undermine Aoun's popularity, as the community in the area would believe Aoun covered up such a move, something that he cannot tolerate?
Does the opposition believe that Hariri's popularity has suffered after a week of fatal disturbances? Or does it deem the operation counterproductive? The same questions can be raised with respect to Jumblatt.
How does the opposition explain the evident embarrassment sensed in the statements of Salim Hoss, Omar Karami and Talal Arslan among other figures known for supporting the resistance?
Was the decision to expand the operation to the mountain wise or did it practically constitute a gift to Jumblatt and the March 14 camp since it made it clear that the attempt to break the balance and wills would drown the whole country in a full-scale war and that communities and regions have an exceptional ability to resist even though they lack the basic arsenal to lead a long strife?
How does the opposition assess this week's repercussions on the image of the resistance outside the Shiite community? Was it necessary to pit the resistance's image against that of Rafic Hariri on the Lebanese and Arab fronts?
Can we say that the opposition is willing to go as far as deposing Prime Minister Siniora by force, disintegrating the Lebanese army and driving the international forces out of the South? Can it confront the danger of declaring Lebanon a failed country prey to Arab and international isolation?
Was the timing of the first shot based on domestic calculations or equally linked to the weakness of the American administration as it prepares to leave? Does the clamp down operation in Beirut underline the atmosphere of escalating confrontation between the camps of defiance and moderation in the region?
Could it be said that what happened was nothing but a rehearsal of the knockout scenario that could be applied in a coming round and at a more appropriate timing? Can Lebanon tolerate knockouts and what about former experiences in this respect?
These are just questions that a journalist dreams of asking as a favor to his readers. I believe that only Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah can answer them. Can we claim that he answered when he spoke of a new phase in his last appearance? Speaker Nabih Berri can offer answers with his eloquence and ability to devise formulas and postpone parliamentary sessions. General Michel Aoun can risk answering, he who has a history of taking risks

Iran's tool fights America's stooge
May 15th 2008 | BEIRUT
From The Economist print edition
A delicate balance between Christians, Druze, Sunnis and Shias has broken down. Reassembly will be hard
EPA
IT LOOKED disturbingly like a sequel to Lebanon's bloody civil war of 1975-90: gun battles in city streets, kidnappings, execution-style slayings and tearful vows of vengeance. With at least 81 people killed so far, the violence of past days represents the most serious internal strife since those years. And it is unclear who can stop it.
The most striking scene was the invasion of the capital, Beirut, mounted by opponents of the government. This was not exactly a conquest of the city, but rather the takeover of one part, Sunni-dominated West Beirut, by another, the dense, gritty and largely Shia-populated southern suburbs. This act quickly rippled across the mountainous country's sectarian patchwork, setting off clashes to the north and south. Because of Lebanon's position as a cockpit for regional power struggles, it also reverberated further afield, from Washington to the Iranian capital, Tehran.
It was natural that this latest turmoil should carry echoes of the civil war. That contest was only fudgingly resolved, and the country has struggled to recover. Small triumphs have been notched up here and there. One was the physical revival of Beirut from a bomb-scarred wreck to a gleaming magnet for tourism; another the brave popular uprising of 2005, which forced neighbouring Syria to pull out its long-overstayed “peacekeeping” troops. For many Lebanese, too, the hounding of Israel by the guerrillas of Hizbullah, the Shia party-cum-militia, leading to the Israeli army's withdrawal in 2000 after 22 years occupying the southern borderlands, and its humiliation in the 33-day war of 2006, were epic victories.
Syria's role
Yet none of those achievements was solidly shared by all. Reconstruction generated corruption and a giant pile of debt. Syria's removal alienated its many allies inside Lebanon and prompted it to sponsor what looks like a campaign of sabotage, including assassinations. The Sunni-led, anti-Syrian factions that gained power through the 2005 uprising failed to accommodate dangerous rivals, and suffered by close association with America.
Meanwhile, Hizbullah's lock-step allegiance to Shia Iran frightened not just Lebanese nationalists, but also the predominantly Sunni Arab world and Western powers. The UN Security Council resolved in 2004 that all Lebanon's militias must be disarmed, but Hizbullah insisted its noble cause was resistance to Israel, despite the Jewish state's abandonment of all but a tiny corner of Lebanon. The party continued to receive a supply of heavy weapons from Syria and Iran. In the end, the fight with Israel that Hizbullah provoked in 2006 brought massive and needless ruin.
Such strains would have tested any country, let alone a small one with a violent history, a population made up of 18 jealous religious minorities and a weak central state built on power-sharing between them. The wonder may be that Lebanon has held together at all, and even maintained a veneer of democracy. But this veneer has grown steadily thinner since the end of the 2006 war, which, aside from leaving 1,200 Lebanese dead and 100,000 homeless, also widened the central fissure in Lebanese politics.
This division is often defined, for simplicity's sake, as a split between Hizbullah, backed by Syria and Iran in the interest of confronting Israel and blocking American influence, against the Western-backed, democratically elected government of Fuad Siniora, the Sunni prime minister. The reality is more complicated.
Mr Siniora's coalition of Sunni Muslims, right-wing Christian parties, liberals, and the main Druze faction led by Walid Jumblatt, did indeed win 72 of the Lebanese parliament's 128 seats in the spring of 2005, riding on sympathy generated by the assassination of Mr Siniora's patron Rafik Hariri, a billionaire and five-term prime minister. But the election was run under rules drafted during Syrian control, before Mr Hariri's fatal falling-out with the Syrian regime. Many Lebanese Christians, who had been the core of opposition to Syria, felt these rules diluted their influence.
Moreover, the winning coalition, which adopted the name of “March 14th” after the date of a large anti-Syrian rally, secured some districts through an electoral alliance with Hizbullah. The Shia party was rewarded with seats in Mr Siniora's cabinet, but also believed there was tacit agreement to provide political cover for its massive rocket arsenal—perhaps, at some distant point, by incorporating its guerrilla force into the Lebanese army.
This alliance quickly unravelled, as Mr Siniora's Western backers pushed him to contain what they regarded as a terrorist group, and Hizbullah responded by forging a growing opposition coalition. This came to include not only its rival Shia party Amal, but also some pro-Syrian Christian, Sunni and Druze factions that had flourished, many with vigorous armed wings, under Syrian tutelage. Surprisingly, it was also joined by the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), the Christian party of Michel Aoun, a maverick former general who had led a rising against Syria at the close of the civil war.
Mr Aoun bore several grudges against March 14th. As a battle-hardened foe of Syria, he felt entitled to a leading role after Syria's hasty withdrawal. He wanted to replace Emile Lahoud, the garishly pro-Syrian president whose term was due to expire in November 2007. (By custom, Lebanon's president must be a Maronite Christian, its prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shia.) The FPM far outpolled the Christian parties inside Mr Siniora's coalition, reflecting wide distrust of the older, right-wing Christian parties who had gained a reputation for thuggery during the civil war.
In Hizbullah's embrace
Mr Aoun's abrasiveness, and March 14th's unwillingness to give him the presidency, ensured that the FPM remained in opposition. It was widely assumed that with his anti-Syrian credentials and largely pro-Western Christian constituency, the general would avoid Hizbullah, yet the two parties made an alliance in February 2006. Mr Aoun lost some Christian support over this, but then came the war with Israel.
Most Christians blamed Hizbullah for the fighting. Yet many also credited the FPM, which mobilised aid for thousands of Shias displaced by the war, with healing a historic rift between the traditionally dominant but dwindling Christians and the long-disenfranchised but now formidable Shias. In Hizbullah's view, the alliance with Mr Aoun allowed it to clothe its Iranian-tinted Islamist militancy in Lebanese nationalist colours.
Hizbullah emerged from the war with its prestige enhanced, and speedily boosted it further with a big and efficient Iranian-financed reconstruction programme. By contrast, Mr Siniora's government, reduced during the war to issuing vain pleas to its Western friends to fend off the Israeli onslaught, looked vulnerable. It was given little credit for helping secure the eventual ceasefire, and even less for winning massive pledges of aid from Sunni Gulf countries. Privately, supporters of March 14th believed Hizbullah had recklessly exposed Lebanon to disaster. Yet the trauma of the war, and the sight of Israel, for the first time, being mauled by an Arab force, kept them quiet.
Soon after the war's end, in November 2006, the opposition moved to cash in their political gains by demanding a national unity government, in which their members would have enough cabinet seats to block its decisions. Mr Siniora refused, suspecting a Syrian-inspired plot. The opposition responded by withdrawing the cabinet's six Shia members. This, they said, rendered the government illegal, since it was constitutionally required to represent all the main sects. The Shia speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, leader of Hizbullah's sister party Amal, refused to convene the legislature. Over subsequent months the opposition increased its demands, including a revision of electoral laws to address Mr Aoun's concerns that Christians were being cheated.
As the lame-duck presidency of Mr Lahoud came to an end in November last year, the opposition stalled talks over the successor to be elected by parliament. Agreeing at last on Michel Suleiman, who commands the non-sectarian army, it insisted that its other conditions be fulfilled before Mr Berri summoned parliament.
So, to the frustration of ordinary Lebanese, the factions have produced an 18-month stalemate. Hizbullah and its allies call the government an American stooge; March 14th blasts the opposition as a tool of Iran and a cat's-paw for Syria. Mediators, including Amr Moussa, chief of the Arab League, have come and despaired.
The galvanising moment
March 14th has naturally tried to drive a wedge between Hizbullah and its Christian allies. Earlier this month, citing alleged evidence of suspicious traffic monitoring at Beirut airport, it reassigned the pro-Hizbullah head of airport security. It also declared illegal the party's communications network. If this was intended to highlight to Christians and Western powers Hizbullah's rogue status, it backfired. On May 8th Hizbullah's carefully-spoken leader, Hassan Nasrallah, described the government's moves as “treachery”, and said the time had come to defend the arms of the “resistance”.
Within minutes, a combined force of Hizbullah, Amal and allied fighters blasted their way into Beirut's Sunni quarter, eventually surrounding the residences of Mr Hariri's son and political heir, Saad, and of his Druze ally Mr Jumblatt. By May 10th fighting moved to outlying areas, affecting Mr Jumblatt's stronghold in the Chouf mountains south-east of Beirut and the Sunni-dominated north, as Mr Hariri's allies exacted revenge on pockets of opposition fighters. In other tit-for-tat action, Hizbullah blocked access to Beirut airport, while Sunni militiamen sealed the road to Syria's capital, Damascus.
The opposition stopped short of overthrowing the government, though it probably could have done so. It also promptly handed over control of most areas it invaded to the Lebanese army, ushering in a nervous calm after five days of fighting. But the 70,000-man army, which is wary of being infected itself by sectarianism, is scarcely a match for Hizbollah's trained and hardened guerrillas.
Government leaders have declared they will not be cowed by force of arms. Yet they have already backed down on the immediate issues that angered Hizbullah. Other concessions are likely to follow, if the Arab League, which has sent in a hurried diplomatic mission, can find a face-saving formula. This might include swift passage of electoral reform, the installation of Mr Suleiman as president and the formation of a “technocratic” transitional government before fresh elections.
This may all prove a tall order, however. The sense of injury among non-Shias is powerful, as is the urge for March 14th to exploit for political advantage Hizbullah's breaking of a long-standing pledge never to use its arms in internal squabbles. Should the government refuse to bend, the chances are that its opponents will push back even harder. Such a result, tipping Lebanon back into full-scale conflict, would suit no one.

The betrayal of Lebanon
By: Melanie Phillips RSS
http://www.spectator.co.uk/melaniephillips/710636/the-betrayal-of-lebanon.thtml
Saturday 17 May 2008
The most important global event in the past week has been the attempted Hezbollah putsch in Lebanon. Accordingly it has received next to no coverage in Britain, where as the citizenry so insightfully informed the world in 2006: ‘We are all Hezbollah now’. Those who rant obsessively about Israel’s ‘occupation’ of the disputed territories are completely silent about Hezbollah’s invasion of Lebanon, its creeping state-within-a-state and its near-annihilation of Lebanon’s government which tried to stop the putsch and failed — despite that government being backed, as Walid Phares points out here, by an overwhelming sector of the public including most of the Sunnis, Christians and Druze plus a minority among the Shia, two thirds of the Lebanese Army, and a majority in Parliament.
What coverage there has been has presented this development as yet another round in the schismatic internal politics of Lebanon and of scant concern to us. On the contrary: it is a major development in the war being waged against the free world. Hezbollah is the irregular army of Iran and the means by which Iran intends to turn Lebanon into its proxy, pin Israel down from multiple belligerent fronts as a prelude to its annihilation, impose its domination of the region and thus win its war against the west. The counter-terrorism expert Oliver Guitta writes:
Iran's priority, as mentioned in the past few months by various leaders, is to turn Lebanon into a base from which it could attack Israel and the United States. Hezbollah has been rapidly rearming. It has now close to 45,000 rockets, more than before the onset of the summer 2006 war with Israel. Now that it is becoming clear that Hezbollah and Iran are in charge of Lebanon, what is the international community going to do about it?
What indeed. While Barry Rubin sees an analogy between Lebanon 2008 and Spain 1936:
Does anyone remember the Spanish Civil War? Briefly, a fascist revolt took place against the democratic government. The rebels were motivated by several factors, including anger that their religion had not been given enough respect and regional grievances, but essentially they sought to put their ideology and themselves into power. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy backed the rebels with money and guns. The Western democracies stood by and did nothing. Guess who won? And guess whether that outcome led to peace or world war.
The west has consistently stood by and done next to nothing about Syria and Iran. That’s why the Lebanese are in their desperate situation today (quite apart from the carnage Iran and Syria support and plan eslewhere). Following the fall of Saddam Hussein, 1.5 million brave Lebanese people took to the streets in protest against their Syrian and Iranian occupiers in the short-lived ‘Cedar Revolution’. Walid Phares has spelled out the price these Lebanese democrats paid in blood:
After the Syrian withdrawal, many leaders were assassinated because of their role in the anti-Hezbollah resistance, among them Samir Qassir, George Hawi, and Jebran Tueni, the charismatic leader of the youth and liberal MP. The areas that supported the anti-Hezbollah uprising were subjected to several bombings, leaving many citizens killed and maimed.
But in response America, Britain and the other whited sepulchres of the west did nothing to assist these people. Paying lip-service to the cause of democracy in the Middle East, they appeased its deadly enemies Iran and Syria instead. They never followed through on prosecuting Syria for the murder of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, and they never supported or put any muscle behind the popular Lebanese revolt against Syrian and Iranian meddling. America, Britain and Europe left Lebanon to swing in the terrorist wind — just as they have done to the democratic resistance in Iran itself, and to Israel, whose mortal enemies they continue to arm, finance, talk up and encourage. Having so completely betrayed both the Lebanese people and their own loudly-trumpeted principles, America, Britain and Europe now just look on in silence as Lebanese freedom threatens to go under altogether.
There is, however, a small ray of light in this darkness. For some commentators perceive that Hezbollah may have overplayed its hand in Lebanon, particularly against the Druze and the Christians. Walid Phares records the heroic stand being taken by 300 Druze who have succeeded in giving the overwhelmingly superior forces of Hezbollah a bloody nose.Lee Smith agrees that Hezbollah was actually beaten back in the area of the Shouf:
‘And so, the Party of God has achieved the 'great victory' of conquering a few Beiruti streets, terminating the credibility of the army, hastening the prospect of its disintegration, and damaging beyond repair for the foreseeable future, the Shiites' ties to the Lebanese social fabric.’ Hezbollah and its allies have won one small battle in a war that has just begun.
While Michael Young, op-ed editor of the Beirut Daily Star, is even more bullish in declaring that Hezbollah has bitten off far more than it can chew:
In 2005, once the Syrians departed, everything collapsed. The party [Hezbollah] found itself having to justify its private army against a majority of Lebanese that opposed Hezbollah’s state within a state and its lasting allegiance to the Syrian regime. In 2006, as the national dialogue prepared to address the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, Nasrallah sought to turn the tables by kidnapping Israeli soldiers and imposing his version of Hezbollah’s defense strategy on March 14. The plan backfired when Israel responded by ravaging Lebanon and the Shia in particular. And now, having fully discredited its ‘resistance’ the eyes of its countrymen, having ensured that an antagonistic population will be to its rear in the event of a new war with Israel, having weakened its non-Shia allies, Hezbollah, as both an idea and a driving force, is in its death throes. The party may yet endure, but the national resistance is finished.
Shrewd insight — or over-optimism? What is surely undeniable is the imperative need to defeat Hezbollah, and that America and Britain will either help bring that about — or will help strengthen it instead through continuing to pursue their lethally misguided strategy of appeasing Syria and Iran.

Lebanon's Battles in Light of the Struggle for Regional Domination
Raghida Dergham Al Hayat - 16/05/08//
Dubai - Hezbollah's coup in Lebanon is one of the episodes of a new regional order in the Middle East, one that is imposed by the Islamic Republic of Iran through the language of weapons pointed towards the interior to insure local domination. The suggestions made by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, calling for the major powers to "put concrete proposals on the table guaranteeing the security of Iran and ensuring Iran a worthy, equal place in talks on resolving all problems in the near and Middle East", represents another essential episode in shaping the new regional order.
The Qatar-led Arab mediation to address the developments in Lebanon, resulting from Hezbollah's use of its weapons against the Lebanese last week, is reminiscent of mediations led by Qatar's Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem following the July war two years ago, when Hezbollah launched the first round of calculated battles within the strategy of imposing a new regional order.
Israel's silence, over turning Lebanon into what is almost an Iranian base through Hezbollah's weapons, is very suspicious and has deep implications. It indicates a calculated policy to sustain the strategic truce-based relationship between Iran and Israel. This relationship, according to the ideology of the new regional order, requires the formation of a qualitatively different relationship between the United States and traditionally prominent Arab countries. This raises fundamental questions: What are the perspectives of a deal, or a confrontation, for the new regional order? Has the shaping of major agreements with Iran really begun, or is this just a page in another chapter from a book of failed attempts to impose a new regional order unilaterally?
At least two schools of thought have emerged, in the analysis of the events that took place in Lebanon last week, as Hezbollah took over Beirut airport, besieged Beirut, raided Mount Lebanon, and attempted to draw the Lebanese into a sectarian war with the pretext of protecting the weapons of the "Resistance" and the aim of overthrowing the Lebanese government.
One school claims that Hezbollah has lost no matter how victorious it may be, as it has exposed itself by using its weapons against the Lebanese interior, and as the model it is importing to Lebanon from Iran has proved a failure. This is because the Lebanese are no fertile ground for the rule of mullahs, Iranian arrogance, or the patterns that traditionally characterize Iranians, especially those who are in power today. Consequently, even if Lebanon is a mere link in an international or regional strategy, be it American, Iranian or Israeli, Hezbollah's victory will not last, because the party will be rejected by the Lebanese on the long run, as a result of the fundamental contradiction of its ideology and belief system with the Lebanese individual and environment.
The other school claims that Hezbollah's continued possession of its weapons, as well as the arrogant way in which it has kept these weapons away from the national dialogue and from the formation of the new rule it seeks to impose in Lebanon, is in itself an extraordinary victory. The simplest interpretation is that the militias have achieved victory over the state, at least in this particular battle. Similarly on the regional and international level, Hezbollah was able to score a victory par excellence for the axis of extremism that includes it along with Iran and Syria. It was also able to show contempt for UN Security Council resolutions, by relying on the US administration's weakness during its last few months in office, known as the "lame duck" phase.
Today, a new defensive strategy is being shaped resulting from Hezbollah's weapons, which come from Iran through Syria. The basis of this strategy is twofold: on one hand it involves the formulation of scenarios of agreement with Israel, and on the other it involves securing positions and preparing for bargains to reach agreements. This requires escalation here and there to improve terms. As for using Hezbollah's weapons in a direct military confrontation with Israel, it is unlikely as long as the decisions to wage new wars have not been made in Damascus and Tehran. Currently, the proposals made vis-à-vis Hezbollah's weapons represent Iran's "entry" into Lebanon without a large number troops, contrary to what Syria did when it marched its armies into Lebanon with the aim of protecting it from itself, turning the Arab force that came to Lebanon under its leadership into a force of Syrian occupation and hegemony over Lebanon.
Iran today stands at Lebanon's borders as a result of the presence of Hezbollah's weapons within Lebanon and the constant flow of weapons from Iran. Syria is the major link between Iran and Hezbollah's weapons but the strategic decisions are made by Iran's leadership while Syrian leadership can only jump the wagon. And Iran is making strategic decisions to create a new regional order.
Such a strategy may require Hezbollah to give up its weapons as a military organization or militia and to put it in the service of the Lebanese state. Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah will have to find a face-saving formula. If such a strategy is chosen, it would necessarily require the triumph of Iran, Hezbollah and Syria's vision for the model of the Lebanese state according to the trio's definition. In other words, Hezbollah's weapons would be handed in only after all guarantees are made to ensure that the Lebanese state will be in the full possession of the tripartite alliance.
There is a theory which calls for submission to such a new reality, resulting from the fundamental disturbance in the balance of domestic and foreign powers in Lebanon, both on the military and political level. Submission here is in the sense of accepting today's reality but not surrendering to it. In other words, the political and military reality in Lebanon gives the popular majority, the parliamentary majority supporting the government in parliament, and Siniora's government itself, a new label. Following the victory of the so-called "opposition", its seizing of power, and the integration of its militias in the army, today's majority may become the opposition, which can then work strategically and patiently to return to power.
This is the way of democracy, according to the proponents of this theory. The "beauty" of this theory is what may result from the integration of Hezbollah's military force in the Lebanese army, which effectively means self-disarmament by Hezbollah.
This theory reveals an interesting point of view. However, what the strategy of the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah trio is aiming at is to effectively turn the Lebanese army into an auxiliary of Hezbollah's militia. This is exactly what the three powers really wanted when Hezbollah led its military coup last week.
There is another scenario, in Tehran to be specific, suggesting an alternative explanation of the causes behind the escalation in Lebanon through Hezbollah's coup. According to a senior Arab official, with traditional insight into the thinking in Washington and Tehran, said that the most likely explanation for the events is that Iran fears American air strikes against it this summer, and that a move by Hezbollah of such intensity was therefore a preemptive one.
The communications network, which reinforces Hezbollah's infrastructure within the Lebanese state, represents a fundamental element of Iran's expansion into Lebanon, which is why it was absolutely off-limits. Hezbollah's control of the airport was also a fundamental issue within the strategies of confrontation, in case it becomes necessary, according to the Iranian line of thought. In this sense, the confrontation is American-Iranian, involving American air strikes against targets inside Iran that are countered by escalatory responses inside Lebanon to reinforce Iran's regional assets.
The proponents of the theory of confrontation between the US and Iran, both over the nuclear issue and as a result of Iran's challenges in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, believe that the worst is yet to come in the region. They claim that the Americans are frustrated by the growth of Iranian influence, and that the Arab states which oppose Iran's expansion are terrified by the triumph of its influence in Lebanon and its deepening presence there. They also claim that both the US and the Arab states are waiting for one another to take the first step.
What almost everyone agrees upon, in their analyses and available information, is that President George W. Bush will not invade Iran, land the Marines on the Lebanese coast, or bomb the fundamental link, Syria. What observers disagree about is whether Bush will stand and watch all these challenges, because he is a lame duck, or whether he is waiting to conclude his visit in the region before issuing surprising decisions from Washington.
The anticipated escalation, which may be represented by measures sponsored by Iran in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, may backfire. This in the case of a failure of the grand settlements, which Russia seeks to lead, in an effort to secure its strategic position and interests in the Middle East, and to avoid any bargains at its expense.
The Russians remember the neoconservative "geniuses" who came up with the "preemption" theory to guarantee America's unprecedented supremacy by linking oil and Israel through a Shiite belt led by Iran in the Gulf or the Middle East. These sought to insure American monopoly and came across the miserable idea of establishing a strategic relationship between Persian and Jewish nationalism to contain and dwarf the Arabs.
The Russians have no interest in fighting a war for Arab dignity or anything of the sort. They want to be part of the grand deal, especially as they have invested heavily in the past few years, especially following the war in Iraq. They have invested in the strategic relationship between Iran and Syria, having in mind the building blocks of the new regional order on the basis of truce with Israel.
If grand agreements and the ultimate deal will lead to a peace with Israel which will turn the region to concerns of human development, knowledge, and respecting others and others' choices, they are certainly welcome. In that case, let Iran wear the crown of regional leadership if this means it will shed its theocratic model. But it will not.
Since Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution some thirty years ago, Iran's leadership has sought to export its model and to dominate the region with its radical ideology. It opposes the protection of the Middle East from wars, even if it implicitly allies itself with Israel for reasons regarding the core of its desires to achieve hegemony and impose a new regional order.
Lebanon's battle is merely one battle in the grand war being waged upon the culture and the choices of the Middle East. At the level of the people and the media, the Americans lie in deep slumber as they entertain themselves with the trivialities of their presidential elections. The Israelis, at the official level and in some of the public opinion, continue to evade radical solutions to the Israeli occupation and believe that the strife between Sunnis and Shiites serves the interests of the Jewish state.
The timing of Sergey Lavrov's proposed package to seduce Iran into the grand deal has radical implications. It comes in the midst of Hezbollah's coup, not only in Lebanon, but also against international resolutions which Russia has participated in formulating. The proposal sent the message of allowing political gains to result from the use of weapons and terror, and from Iran's unequivocal refusal to implement international resolutions.
It would be acceptable if Lavrov is interested in offering security guarantees to Iran as part of a radical approach to the American-Iranian relationship. However, to say that the major powers should ensure a more prominent role for Iran in negotiations over Palestine and the future of the Middle East sends the Arab parties a simple message: it is time for you to take the backseat because Russia has decided to support the new Iran-led regional order.
What will the Arab response be? What will the US decide to do under this president or the president to-be? Even the concerned leaderships do not have an answer.
Evidently, sad is the day when the Arabs submit to Tehran's model of thought, ideology and authority, while they behold Dubai's model of openness to pluralism and the building of intellectual institutions with the ideology of moderation. Sad is the day indeed, but it is only one day in a path that will take many years. The next phase calls for the forces of moderation, both governments and leaderships, to take the steps required by a successful strategy for their values, aspirations and future, away from the decrees of Iran's mullahs for the new regional order. This is but a page, and it is a long book

Did Hezbollah Thwart a Bush/Olmert Attack on Beirut?
By FRANKLIN LAMB -CounterPunch
This week Israel's Military Intelligence Chief, Major General Amos Yadlin complained to the Israeli daily Haaretz that "Hezbollah proved that it was the strongest power in Lebanon... stronger than the Lebanese and it had wanted to take the government it could have done it," He said Hezbollah, continued to pose a "significant" threat to Israel as its rockets could reach a large part of Israeli territory."
Yadlin was putting it mildly.
But what Intelligence Chief Yadlin did not reveal to the Israeli public was just how "significant" but also "immediate" the Hezbollah threat was on May 11. Nor was he willing to divulge the fact that he received information via US and French channels that if the planned attack on Lebanon's capitol went forward that Tel Aviv was subject, in the view of the US intelligence community to "approximately 600 Hezbollah rockets in the first 24 hours in retaliation and at least that number on the following day".
The Israeli Intel Chief also declined to reveal that despite Israel's recent psyche-war camping about various claimed missile shields "the State of Israel is perfecting", that this claim is being ridiculed at the Pentagon. "Israel will not achieve an effective shield against the current generation of rockets, even assuming no technological improvements in the current rockets aimed at it, for another 20 years. And that assumes the US will continue to fund their research and development for the hoped for shields" according to Pentagon, US Senate Intelligence Committee, and very well informed Lebanese sources.
The planned attack on Beirut
According to US Senate Intelligence Committee sources, the Bush administration initially green lighted the intended May 11 Israel 'demonstration of solidarity with the pro-Bush administration militias, some with which Israel has maintained ties since the days of Bashir Gemayal and Ariel Sharon.
In the end, "the Bush administration got cold feet", a Congressional source revealed. So did Israel.
Israel was not willing to proceed with the original Bush Administration idea which was to have Bush attend the May 15 Israel anniversary celebrations following the Israeli attack meant to hit Hezbollah hard, and give Bush the credit for coming to the dangerous region. The message was to be that Bush comes to the rescue 'on horseback and leads the US Calvary charge straight out of a B western movie where the bugle would sound and flag would be unfurled and the white hat good guys would show their stuff before riding into the sunset and back to Texas, leaving the results to the likely Obama administration to sort out.
The plan involved Israeli air strikes on South and West Beirut in support of forces it was assured would be able to surprise and resist Hezbollah and sustain a powerful offensive for 48 hours.
Also presumably disturbing to Israel was the report it received that Hezbollah "had once again in all probability hacked its "secure" military intelligence communications and the fear that the information would be shared with others.
The Hezbollah rout of the militias in West Beirut plus the fear of retaliation on Tel Aviv, ruining 60th anniversary celebrations, forced cancellation of the supportive attack.
Israel limited its actions to sending two F-15's and two F-16's into as far North as Tyre, one more of literally hundreds of violations of Lebanese airspace, sovereignty and SCR 1701.
Clearly frustrated, Cabinet Minister Meir Sheetrit said Israel should not yet take any action now, but warned" those things could change if Hezbollah takes over Lebanon." a few minutes earlier he had declared that Hezbollah had done just that and had treated the Lebanese army as a doormat.
Later in the Sunday cabinet meeting, Minister Ami Ayalon called for an emergency meeting of the political-security cabinet to discuss "the ongoing crisis in Lebanon and why Israel was not assisting friendly forces."
Minister Yitzhak Cohen (Shas) said that "Israel must immediately ask the [United Nations] Security Council to hold renewed discussions over resolution 1701." The minister was referring to the resolution that stopped the Israeli actions against Lebanon during the 34-day between in 2006, maintaining a fragile cease-fire.
Finally Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert informed Israeli supporters in Lebanon, through the media, and presumbly other means that" Israel was following the violence in Lebanon closely, but would refrain from intervening. Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai told Army Radio Sunday that Israel was prepared for the possibility that the situation in Lebanon will deteriorate into another civil war (meaning future opportunities for Israeli influence and interventon in Lebanon) and that the current fighting could end with a Hezbollah takeover of the government. "We need to keep our eyes peeled and be especially sensitive regarding all that is happening there," Vilnai told Army Radio.
The Bush administration, also disappointed, switched tactics and is opting for domination of the narrative of the fairly complicated events of the past week and using their media and confessional allies to launch a media blitz (minus Future TV for a few days} to flood the airways with:
· Hezbollah staged a coup d'état. Even Israel, if not the Bush administration, concedes Hezbollah has no interest in taking over the Government. (One observer, paraphrasing Winston Churchill's comment, deadpanned, "Some Hezbollah Coup! Some Hezbollah Etat!")
· Hezbollah brought it forces from the South and occupied West Beirut: Hezbollah not only did not bring their forces from the South to Beirut (rather they remained on alert for an Israel attack down South)
· Hezbollah broke its pledge not to use Resistance arms against Lebanese militias and shot up West Beirut.
The facts are very different when viewed close up on the streets here.
When the Lebanese Resistance took the decision during the early hours of Friday morning to engage in civil disobedience, it delayed its actions so as not to preempt the Labor movement strike for higher wages which it supported. When the marching Strikers were prevented from moving into West Beirut the Opposition extended its civil disobedience manifestation.
Various militias, including the smartly outfitted Hariri "Secure Plus" with its distinctive maroon tee-shirts and beige trousers, (now know locally by some as "Secure Minus") a hoped for future Blackwater operation in Lebanon disintegrated surprisingly quickly because many of its green recruits brought down from Tripoli felt misled and betrayed regarding their job description as they were handed weapons an instructed to fight Hezbollah. Snipers from anti-Opposition factions killed civilians from rooftops in Beirut trying to ignite a civil war.
Hezbollah, acting in self defense, according to various officials, quickly clamped down on the trouble makers, took control of the streets, within hours handed them over to the army, and virtually evacuated West Beirut, retaining one position near Bay Rocks manned by unarmed representatives.
Meanwhile the Hariri influence has been greatly weekend in Akkar near the Palestinian Refugee camp of Nahr al Bared and in the Tripoli area. According to some political analysts, including, Fida'a Ittani, a regular columnist for the independent pro-opposition newspaper Al-Akhbar, wrote on May 14, the Future Movement, defeated in Beirut, no longer has any serious influence in the north.
Several Salafi al Qaeda admiring movements are present in Lebanon and like Fatah Islam's declaration this week that they will fight for the Sunnis, they vary in their attitudes from silent opposition to Future leader Saad Al-Hariri to fully supporting him as the leader of the Sunnis. These groups are valued by certain 'leaders' in Lebanon because are the only ones with coherent structures at the ideological, political, technical, and field levels.
Judging from Saad Hariri's confused statements at his subsequent news conference and statements by other parties, the bitterness of promised but unforthcoming assistance was evident.
For two days following the debacle of his forces imploding the head of the Future Movement said nothing. Finally on the 14th he broke his silence. The Halba massacre, committed by Hariri's Mustakbal militiamen which brutally and barbarically murdered 11 people from the opposition did not seem worthy of discussion as he spoke. In a press conference on Tuesday, Hariri simply ignored what all the Lebanese had seen on TV from weapons, ammunition and alcohol found in Future movement offices, and instead listed a series of delusions. "We awaited an open war on Israel, and yet here is an open war on Beirut and its people" he stated. Some interpreted this rather odd statement either as a subconscious slip of the tongue on Hariri's part expressing his frustration that the Israelis help did not arrive or that his reported earlier incoherent state persisted.
Hariri's original speech was so confused that the Saudi channel al-Arabiyya stopped broadcasting it and only read excerpts from what he said, without showing his recorded speech.
When American criticism resumed, and Hezbollah fighters withdrew from the alleys surrounding his house, Hariri was urged to stand up and speak again, this time with a stronger tone, saying "This has been decided by the Iranian and Syrian regimes that wanted to play a political game in Lebanon's streets. For us nothing has changed. We will not negotiate with someone having a pistol pointed to our heads."
Anger at the Bush administration and Israel by certain warlords in Lebanon must feel much like the frustration of Secure Minus personal who rushed from Tripoli and felt misled, abandoned and cheated.
**Franklin Lamb can be reached at fplamb@gmail.com