LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
ِApril 10/2010

Bible Of the Day
Proverbs 24:1 Don’t be envious of evil men;  neither desire to be with them: 24:2 for their hearts plot violence, and their lips talk about mischief. 24:3 Through wisdom a house is built; by understanding it is established; 24:4 by knowledge the rooms are filled with all rare and beautiful treasure. 24:5 A wise man has great power; and a knowledgeable man increases strength; 24:6 for by wise guidance you wage your war; and victory is in many advisors. 24:7 Wisdom is too high for a fool: he doesn’t open his mouth in the gate. 24:8 One who plots to do evil will be called a schemer. 24:9 The schemes of folly are sin. The mocker is detested by men. 24:10 If you falter in the time of trouble, your strength is small. 24:11 Rescue those who are being led away to death! Indeed, hold back those who are staggering to the slaughter! 24:12 If you say, “Behold, we didn’t know this”; doesn’t he who weighs the hearts consider it? He who keeps your soul, doesn’t he know it? Shall he not render to every man according to his work?

Free Opinions, Releases, letters, Interviews & Special Reports
Jihadism's War on Democracies/By Walid Phares/April 09/10
A Lebanese directory of the dead/Michael Young/April 09/10
The emperor’s clothes/Now Lebanon/April 09/10
Oyoun Orgosh/Hazem al-Amin/April 09/10

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for April 09/10
Booby-Trapped Grenade Detonated in Chtaura, Another Defused in Tyre/Naharnet
Family Defends Lebanese Psychic Jailed in Saudi/New York Times
Lebanon: Obama must force Mideast peace deal on Israel/Ha'aretz
Hariri warns Israel weapons, destruction 'only incite hatred/Daily Star
Health minister reveals forged prescriptions racket/Daily Star
Members of Palestinian faction clash in Bekaa/AFP
Rival parties in blame game over shelved reforms/Daily Star
Prosecutor issues warrants against Oyoun Orgosh suspects/Daily Star
Mirza calls for death penalty in Behsas case/Daily Star  
Shteinitz: Syria No Less a Threat Than Iran & N. Korea/Yeshiva World News
Jumblat Met Nasrallah to Thank Him/Naharnet
Harb calls armed Palestinian presence unacceptable/Now Lebanon
LBCI: Calm in Central Bekaa following Thursday clash/Now Lebanon
Damascus Willing to Help Solve Palestinian Camps Issue if Officially Asked/Naharnet
Gunmen Kidnap Lebanese, 3 Syrians in Nigeria/Naharnet
Williams Hopes for Safe Polls, Welcomes Amal-Hizbullah Statement/Naharnet
Split inside PFLP-GC: Shaaban Refused to Quit So he Encircled Ain Bayda/Naharnet
Hizbullah Officers Arrested over PFLP-GC Violence, Police Deny Involvement/Naharnet
Jumblat for Stopping Debate on Hizbullah Arms/Naharnet
Baroud Frustrated with Municipal Draft Law: I'm Just Disappointed/Naharnet
Berri Stresses Alliance with Hizbullah/Naharnet
Polls on Time Based on Current Law, Makari in Paris and No New Committee Sessions/Naharnet
Sfeir: Elections are Vital for Democratic Lebanon/Naharnet
Amal, FPM Mend Fences Under Hizbullah Sponsorship/Naharnet
Suspected Israel Spy Arrested in Tyre/Naharnet
Raja: ISF's Intelligence Bureau behind Qousaya's Clashes, Abu Ramez: Individual Internal Dispute/Naharnet
Hout Says Lebanon Planning to Partially Privatize MEA/Naharnet
Sami Gemayel Warns Palestinian Arms May Lead to 'New War', Urges Government to Extend Authority over Camps/Naharnet
Berri: AMAL-Hizbullah Alliance Unbreakable since It Represents Development, Liberation Path/Naharnet
Hariri from Madrid: Spain's Role Important in Region's Peace Process/Naharnet
Arrest Warrants against Oyoun Orgosh Suspects/Naharnet

Lebanon: U.S. must force Mideast peace on Israel
By DPA /Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri on Friday called for a "world leadership" to force all the parties to the Middle East conflict to negotiate, describing U.S. President Barack Obama as the "ideal person" to head the effort. Israel does not have an "authentic interest" in reaching a "wide- ranging and fair" peace arrangement with the Arab world, Hariri claimed at an economic forum on the second day of his official visit to Spain. The Obama administration has a sincere commitment to promote peace, Hariri said, also stressing the importance of the Spanish European Union presidency. He urged the international community to pressure Israel with measures such as "cutting off some aid" to the country.
Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero on Thursday joined Hariri in urging Israel to help create the conditions for peace.
Hariri's statement came after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reportedly told close aides Wednesday that Israel would not accept a Middle East peace agreement that is forced on it by external forces. Netanyahu said an external arrangement "won't work and it won't be acceptable if a settlement is forced on us," stressing the need to ensure proper security arrangements as part of any future peace deal. For that end, the PM reportedly said, Israel would have to retain a military presence along its eastern border with Jordan, adding that any agreement that doesn't allow for those measure will not be accepted. Netanyahu's comments came as the Washington Post quoted senior U.S. officials as saying earlier Wednesday that President Barack Obama was weighing the possibility of submitting a new American Middle East peace plan by this fall

Shteinitz: Syria No Less a Threat Than Iran & N. Korea
April 8, 2010 During a Thursday morning visit to the Golan Heights by Finance Minister Dr. Yuval Shteinitz, the senior official released a statement that Syria is no less a threat and fanatic than Iran and North Korea. “We are dealing with a nation that encourages terror and develops weapons of mass destruction” he added. He warned that the relationship between Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas and Iran endangers the entire world, adding “the misconception surrounding Syria reminds one of the situation that prevailed throughout Europe prior to WWII”.(Yechiel Spira – YWN Israel)

Gunmen Kidnap Lebanese, 3 Syrians in Nigeria
Naharnet/Armed men have kidnapped three Syrians and a Lebanese working in the construction sector in Nigeria's oil-rich southern region, killing a policeman in the attack, police said on Friday. "About 10 or more kidnappers, all armed with automatic weapons, fired many rounds. The hoodlums kidnapped four expatriate workers -- three Syrians and one Lebanese," said police spokeswoman Rita Abbey. "They were working on a construction site in Rivers State," said Abbey, adding that the kidnappings took place on Thursday. "One of our policemen attached to the company was killed by the hoodlums," she added. The assailants escaped into nearby Abia State territory, she said. No group or individual has yet claimed responsibility for the kidnap and no ransom has been demanded so far, Abbey said. Nigerian gunmen had on March 31 kidnapped a local employee of French oil group Total on his way to work in the country's oil hub of Port Harcourt. Hundreds of mostly foreign and local oil workers have been kidnapped in the Niger Delta since 2006. Many have been released unharmed, and some were freed only after ransom payments. Both Rivers and Abia are states in the volatile oil-rich Niger Delta region, where most kidnappings have taken place in recent years. Initially, oil workers in the region were targeted for kidnapping but local politicians and their relatives have been increasingly targeted.(AFP) Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 16:17

Hizbullah Officers Arrested over PFLP-GC Violence, Police Deny Involvement
Naharnet/Internal Security Forces said police arrested four people, including Hizbullah officers, over Thursday's violence between members of the Syrian-backed PFLP-GC in east Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. ISF identified those arrested as Lebanese citizen Ali Qassem Araji "a prominent cadre in the Resistance Brigade in the Bekaa" and Rajeh Saleh, a Palestinian, also a member in the Resistance Brigade. The others were identified as Khaled Ali Araji and Mahmoud Alyan, both PFLP-GC cadres. ISF said the four detainees have close ties with the PFLP-GC officer in charge of the mutiny, Doreid Shaaban, who turned himself in to the Lebanese army intelligence in the Bekaa. The statement said four other PFLP-GC members also turned themselves in to the army intelligence. It said the fight broke out when an officer was brought in from Syria to replace a number of PFLP-GC members.
ISF denied involvement in the clashes. PFLP-GC media officer Anwar Raja on Thursday accused Col. Wissam al-Hasan, head of ISF's Intelligence Bureau, of being behind the gunbattles that erupted in eastern Lebanon. In a phone interview with al-Jadeed television, Raja claimed that the four detainees were Intelligence Bureau members, among them Khalil Araji.
ISF hit back at Raja. "It would have been better for him, given that he is a media officer, to look into the truth behind what happened and is happening inside his organization before making accusations," the statement said. Meanwhile, head of the PFLP-GC in Lebanon Ramiz Mustafa denied Raja's claims, saying a PFLP-GC member had "some problems with his comrades and tried to solve it the wrong way." Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 08:38

Raja: ISF's Intelligence Bureau behind Qousaya's Clashes, Abu Ramez: Individual Internal Dispute
Anwar Raja, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command's Media Officer, on Thursday accused Col. Wissam al-Hasan, Head of the Intelligence Bureau of the Internal Security Forces, and another intelligence member of being behind the armed clashes that erupted in Eastern Lebanon. In a phone interview with al-Jadeed television, Raja revealed that four Intelligence Bureau members were arrested, "among them Khalil Araji, who is a well-known Intelligence Bureau member."Raja "totally" denied the occurrence of "any gunfight or internal clashes among PFLP-GC's members," adding that "what was reported by the media is inaccurate and these media leaks are deceptive." "The truth behind this matter is that a group from the Intelligence Bureau, headed by Wissam al-Hasan, tried to undermine the agreement on the principle of dialogue regarding Palestinian arms outside the camps by trying to destabilize one of our bases in Kfar Zabad, and we consider this as a realization of the Israeli demand in disarming the PFLP-GC," Raja added.
He stressed that everyone knows that "the position is heavily fortified and that the Israeli enemy was not able to breach it despite the bombardment in the July (2006) war, and they are trying to accomplish this mission today."

On the other hand, Abu Ramez Imad Mustafa, PFLP-GC's top official,
Naharnet/contradicted Raja's remarks by saying that "one of PFLP-GC's members, who has personal problems with his comrades that he tried to solve in a wrong manner, came with a number of his non-PFLP-GC relatives to Kfar Zabad's base, where the clashes took place." He stressed that there is no rebellion inside the PFLP-GC in Lebanon, but rather "one of the subversive members attacked the guards of one of the bases and tried making forced entry." However, Abu Ramez confirmed that "the PFLP-GC was able to arrest four members of this soldier's family and the investigation is underway." Heavy gunbattles broke out Thursday between fellow members of Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC in the highlands of east Lebanon.
While Future News called it a "rebellion" among PFLP-GC members in the military base of Qousaya, other local media said clashes pitted Jibril's men in Qousaya and fellow members stationed on the nearby Ain Bayda hill close to Kfar Zabad. LBC satellite channel said at midday that the PFLP-GC military outpost in Ain Baida was coming under shell fire from Qousaya.
"Fierce clashes are taking place among Palestinian factions at Qousaya camp," OTV reported. The Voice of Lebanon radio station said in a news flash at 2:20pm that PFLP-GC rebels in Kfar Zabad turned themselves in to the Lebanese army. "Preliminary information indicates that the fight was a result of an internal disagreement," an army spokesman told Agence France Presse, speaking on condition of anonymity. A Palestinian official said automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades were fired during the clashes, which broke out at the PFLP-GC's Ain al-Bayda base near the town of Kfar Zabad in the Bekaa Valley. One person was injured in the clashes which quickly died down, the Palestinian official added.
"The situation is calm now," the army spokesman said Thursday afternoon, adding that an officer and three other members of the PFLP-GC had turned themselves in to the army.
The PFLP-GC, led by Jibril, was founded with Syrian backing during the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war. Along with Palestinian group Fatah al-Intifada, Jibril's movement has bases in the Bekaa near the Syrian border. The PFLP-GC also has a base in Nehmeh, south of the capital Beirut. The two movements' arsenal remains a thorny issue between Lebanon and Syria.
In January a leader of Fatah al-Intifada said his group would not disarm outside of the camps but was willing to discuss where in Lebanon it holds its arms. The Lebanese government has called for Palestinian groups outside refugee camps to disarm, saying the issue was not up for negotiation.(Naharnet-AFP) Beirut, 08 Apr 10, 17:08

Split inside PFLP-GC: Shaaban Refused to Quit So he Encircled Ain Bayda
Naharnet/Clashes between members of Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC in east Lebanon on Thursday were likely the result of a split inside the Syrian-backed group or a mutiny.
Local reports on Friday said the PFLP-GC officer in charge of the mutiny Doreid Shaaban was the first to object to a decision to step down so he and a group of his men encircled PFLP-GC outposts in Jbeili and Ain Bayada, triggering gunbattles with fellow members. Automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades were used in the fighting which spread to reach the PFLP-GC military base in Qousaya. At least one PFLP-GC member identified as Zaher Hammoud, better known as Abu Maher, was killed in the clashes. Several other PFLP members were wounded, al-Hayat newspaper quoted a security source as saying. Al-Akhbar daily, meanwhile, citing a security source in the Bekaa, said the mutiny inside Ain Bayda took place a few days ago. The source pointed out that when negotiations failed between the rebel group and the PFLP-GC leadership against the backdrop of financial issue, the situation "exploded" on Thursday. Shaaban and four of his men have turned themselves in to police. A statement by the Internal Security Forces said fighting broke out when an officer was brought in from Syria to replace a number of PFLP-GC members. Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 10:09

Damascus Willing to Help Solve
Palestinian Camps Issue if Officially Asked
Naharnet/Syria was reportedly willing to help solve the Palestinian camps issue if the Lebanese government officially asked for assistance following gunbattles between fellow members of the Syrian-backed PFLP-GC headed by Ahmed Jibril. The daily As-Liwa on Friday said Syria has informed Lebanese authorities of its willingness to assist in dealing with the Palestinian camps issue if the Lebanese government officially asked for help in accordance with a Cabinet decision. Clashes in east Lebanon over a dispute between members of Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command escalated into violence, the army said. According to preliminary information, the clashes with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades between the PFLP-GC military base in Qusaya and Ain al-Bayda base near Kfar Zabad were the result of an "internal disagreement," according to an army source.
One person was injured in the fighting which started before midday Thursday and escalated at noon before dying down soon afterwards. Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 07:36

Sami Gemayel Warns Palestinian Arms May Lead to 'New War', Urges Government to Extend Authority over Camps
Naharnet/Phalange Party Central Committee Coordinator MP Sami Gemayel said Thursday that "the Lebanese find themselves every time before military battles imposed on them by the armed Palestinian groups in Qousaya that launch bombs and terrorize the Lebanese and Palestinians, killing them over power-sharing disputes." Gemayel criticized how all of this is happening on Lebanese territory "in a blatant violation of the legitimate authority," urging the Lebanese State "to take an immediate and decisive decision that gives the Lebanese Army the green light for immediate intervention in order to control the situation and collect the weapons of these outlaw groups." "We demand the government to take a courageous historical decision that entails entering the camps and extending State's authority over them, especially after Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas reiterated several times that the Palestinians do not need to bear arms on Lebanese territory," Gemayel said in a statement he issued. Gemayel warned that "postponing a solution to the issue of Palestinian arms in Lebanon may lead to a new 'Nahr al-Bared' that becomes the wick of igniting a new war." Fatah al-Islam, an obscure al-Qaida inspired group, fought deadly battles against the Lebanese Army in the summer of 2007 in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared near Tripoli. The fighting killed 400 people, including 168 soldiers, and displaced some 30,000 refugees from the camp, which was leveled in the fighting won by the Lebanese Army. Beirut, 08 Apr 10, 22:30

Booby-Trapped Grenade Detonated in Chtaura, Another Defused in Tyre
Naharnet/Lebanese army experts on Friday detonated a booby-trapped hand-grenade that was ready to go off in Chtaura in east Lebanon and another in the southern port city of Tyre.
In Beirut, meanwhile, a drug dealer was wounded in a shootout with police. A Lebanese army communiqué said the grenade was found before midday Friday opposite Zoghbi Center in Chtaura. Five containers filled with gasoline lay beside the grenade, the statement added. It said army explosive experts detonated the device in place.
The army opened an investigation into the incident, the communiqué said. The Voice of Lebanon radio station said the grenade was found inside a black bag opposite the office of "Zahle in the Heart" MP Assem Araji. After midday, the state-run National News Agency said Lebanese army experts also defused a hand-grenade that was planted on the main al-Hawsh-Ain Baal road in Tyre. It said the grenade, which was tied to a wire, was set to explode. Separately, a shootout took place in Kafa'at in Beirut's southern suburbs between an anti-drug police patrol and drug dealers. Local media said Fadi al-Shawish and Abbas Abdallah opened fire on the patrol, prompting policemen to return fire. Abdallah was wounded it the shootout. Police managed to arrest Shawish. Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 11:12

Jumblat Met Nasrallah to Thank Him
Naharnet/Druze leader Walid Jumblat has met Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah and thanked him for his efforts to reconcile him with Syrian President Bashar Assad. A statement issued by Hizbullah on Friday said the two leaders assessed Jumblat's visit to Damascus March 31. Hizbullah, however, did not say when the meeting took place. It said Jumblat and Nasrallah also discussed the "economic situation and expressed common interest to support the Lebanese citizen rights to decent living."The statement said the meeting touched on the issue of relations between Hizbullah and the PSP where the two sides stressed the need to "enhance cooperation between them in order to consolidate coexistence and national unity." Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 13:09

Jumblat for Stopping Debate on Hizbullah Arms
Naharnet/Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblat has said he won't hesitate to ask national dialogue leaders to stop debate on the resistance arms issue
The Druze leader told As Safir daily in remarks published Friday that he would focus in the next stage on calling for the end of discussion on Hizbullah's weapons. Jumblat also criticized turning the issue into daily verbal clashes between politicians. Jumblat reiterated that coordination between the Lebanese army and the resistance should be strengthened. Before discussing anything else, let dialogue participants "work on strengthening the state to confront the Israeli enemy." "We can then discuss about the issue of arms," the Druze leader told the newspaper. On relations with Syria and his latest visit to Damascus, Jumblat said he expects his ties with Syrian President Bashar Assad to become "warmer." "We decided to turn the page on the past and look to the future with a positive spirit. Consequently, relations between us will be upgraded gradually," he told As Safir "The most important thing is that the road (to Damascus) was opened," the PSP chief added. Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 08:37

Williams Hopes for Safe Polls, Welcomes Amal-Hizbullah Statement
Naharnet/U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams hoped the municipal elections will be held in a democratic and safe atmosphere and welcomed the cooperation and coordination between Amal and Hizbullah in the polls "I welcomed the recent statement between the Amal Movement and Hizbullah, looking forward to those elections," Williams said following talks with Speaker Nabih Berri.  "We hope the process will take place in a democratic, free and safe atmosphere," he said. Williams also told reporters he was "pleased" that in their last meeting at Baabda palace, National Dialogue participants "reaffirmed the commitment of Lebanese leaders to stability and calm rhetoric as the municipal elections draw near."
"The U.N. stands ready to lend its technical assistance for these elections if requested," he stressed. Berri and Williams discussed several other issues, including U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 and ways "to free Lebanon of all cluster bombs and land mines." "Lebanon has already signed the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, which will enter into force on 1 August 2010, and it is taking the necessary steps to ratify it shortly. "We hope similar steps will be taken to sign the Ottawa Treaty that bans the use of landmines. Given its tragic experience and its current membership of the Security Council, we believe it would be helpful to ratify both treaties on cluster munitions and land mines," Williams added. Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 14:21

Baroud Frustrated with Municipal Draft Law: I'm Just Disappointed
Naharnet/Interior Minister Ziad Baroud, commenting on municipal elections reforms, said: "I'm not mad, just disappointed."As-Safir newspaper said Baroud seemed frustrated with the draft law on municipal elections. Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 10:32

Berri Stresses Alliance with Hizbullah
Naharnet/Speaker Nabih Berri has stressed on the Amal-Hizbullah alliance in the municipal polls, saying such an alliance symbolizes the policy of development and liberation.
While heading the meeting of Amal's election campaign members, Berri said efforts will get underway to help the participation of families and allied parties in forming municipal councils.
The speaker also encouraged women to heavily participate in the elections without abiding by a certain quota. Finally, Berri called for holding the polls in an atmosphere of "transparency and trust." Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 12:36

Sfeir: Elections are Vital for Democratic Lebanon
Naharnet/Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir reiterated the importance of holding municipal elections on time and wondered why some factions called for postponing the polls.
In remarks to al-Mustaqbal daily, the prelate "rejected tampering with democratic" elections "in a democratic country characterized by rotation of powers."Sfeir told the newspaper that President Michel Suleiman and Prime Minister Saad Hariri have on several occasions stressed the need to hold the polls on time. "They are right because elections are vital for the country," the patriarch added. Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 11:20

Suspected Israel Spy Arrested in Tyre
Naharnet/Internal Security Forces have arrested a Lebanese man suspected of spying for the Israeli Mossad in the area of Tyre, al-Akhbar newspaper reported Friday.
The man, who was only identified as M.Ch., was taken to the ISF intelligence bureau headquarters in Beirut where, according to a high-level security source, he admitted to working with the Mossad for the past two years. The man also reportedly told investigators that he had visited the Palestinian territories more than once. The suspect hails from the town of Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa and works in a company that provides the Italian contingent of UNIFIL with food supplies. Another security official told al-Akhbar that the suspected spy was receiving phone calls from a number used by Israeli officers to give orders to their agents in Lebanon, including Hassan Shehab who was arrested in Ghaziyeh in mid-2009. However, the man got rid of his mobile phone on which he received calls from Israel, the official added. Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 09:14

Hout Says Lebanon Planning to Partially Privatize MEA
Naharnet/Lebanon plans to begin partially privatizing its national carrier this year, the company's chairman said, as carrier pushes ahead with plans to rebuild its image as one of the region's top airlines following years of civil war and the global financial crisis. After a two-year delay caused by the world's worst recession in over six decades, officials will begin the process for an initial public offering this year and Middle East Airlines' shares will be listed on the Beirut stock exchange in 2011, MEA chairman Mohammed Hout said. The carrier, which before 1975 was ranked among the Middle East's best airlines, has been majority owned by the Central Bank of Lebanon after its rescue from bankruptcy 14 years ago. MEA fell on hard times between 1975 and 1990 because of Lebanon's civil war.
Hout told The Associated Press in an interview he believed that the central bank's governor "will take a decision to start (the IPO process) in 2010 and the process will be finished in 2011."
Riad Salameh, the bank's governor, had said in January that Lebanon plans to raise some $250 million from the 25 percent sale of MEA this year.
MEA, which was founded in 1945, has 13 planes in operation and serves 29 destinations. Two more planes will be received by the company next month, Hout said.
The company faces an uphill struggle to rebuild its image and fleet, which were hard hit by the civil war. The conflict devastated tourism in the country, forced repeated airport closures in the Mediterranean nation and left several MEA planes destroyed by shelling as Lebanon's rival factions battled for control of the country. MEA now faces stiff competition from other regional carriers based in countries flush with oil wealth, like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Economist Louis Hobeika said selling part of MEA will be a good step adding that the whole company should be sold eventually. He said such a step will lead to more competition, reduction of prices and absorb some of the high liquidity in the country.
"This is for the good of the company and for the good of Lebanon," Hobeika said. "Private companies in Lebanon are better run than public companies."
MEA's privatization push is part of Lebanon's broader effort to surface from under the rubble of a 15-year civil war and years of subsequent political instability that hammered the economy of a nation once dubbed the Switzerland of the Middle East for its lush mountain backdrop. Lebanon's strict banking laws helped shield the country's financial institutions there from the worst of the global economic crisis that battered the West and other parts of the world. Even so, it has been hard pressed to sustain growth rates, in large part because it lacks the oil wealth enjoyed by many other Arab countries. In 2002, MEA managed to reverse 26 years of losses to profitability and since then profits have been on the rise.
Hout said MEA's net profits are projected to drop 40 percent this year, from $100 billion in fiscal 2009, largely due to what he claimed was unfair competition from other carriers benefiting from Lebanon's open-air policy. MEA recorded its best year in 2009 when the company made more than $100 million in net profit, thanks to a drop in world oil prices and growing security and political stability in Lebanon, Hout said. Hout said the company strongly supports the open-air policy, but stressed there should be "no capacity dumping and no price dumping."
MEA officials complain that some countries unfairly limit the number of flights by the Lebanese carrier to their airports, or provide them with late-night time slots that dissuade travelers.(AP) Beirut, 09 Apr 10, 08:56

Hariri from Madrid: Spain's Role Important in Region's Peace Process
Naharnet/Prime Minister Saad Hariri on Thursday stressed that "Spain has an important role in the region's peace process," expressing his belief that "its role will be decisive."
Hariri stressed that Israel should "move ahead" towards finding a political solution with the Palestinians by privileging dialogue over "little wars."
"Israel must move ahead" because "we need to have a credible process that the Arab world can believe in," Hariri said in Madrid at a joint news conference with his Spanish counterpart Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. He accused Israel of "trying to create little wars here and there to hold up the peace process."
"The Israelis have to understand that weapons and destruction only incite hate and violence," he added. "Israel has to be told that 'you can start all the wars you want in the Middle East but in the end there can only be a political solution'," said Hariri, on the first of a two-day trip to the Spanish capital. "A political solution, with the existing consensus in Europe, the United States and the Arab world, is the only way to make progress in the region," he said. Zapatero said that Israel's announcement last month of plans for the construction of homes in occupied East Jerusalem was a "serious problem" that "put the brakes" on the possibility of indirect talks between the Israelis and Palestinians. "The current moment is historic for getting an agreement because the international community and the Arab world have a very clear position and there is a wide consensus," he stressed. Spain currently holds the European Union's rotating presidency and also is in command of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon or UNIFIL. On the other hand, press reports on Thursday said that Hariri will not visit Syria next week as planned. Reasons behind the postponement of the mid-April trip, however, remained unclear. The reports agreed that Hariri's visit, scheduled for April 13-14, was put off for some time.
But they did not agree on the reason for the delay. While some reports cited "technical reasons" for the delay, others pointed to a "crisis of confidence" between Hariri and Syria.
Al-Liwa newspaper quoted informed sources as saying the delay is likely due to what they described as a "date conflict" between Hariri and Syrian President Bashar Assad, particularly since Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed Naji al-Otari will be in Algiers on April 13.
The sources said that Hariri's Damascus visit would become clearer after his return from a visit to Rome on April 19-20. Hariri flew to Spain late Wednesday on a two-day official visit.
The daily al-Akbar, however, believed there was a "crisis of confidence" between the two sides, pointing out that Hariri has failed to meet commitments he made to Syria.
It said the "main source of tension" between Hariri and Syria came from the premier's ties with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. Al-Akhbar quoted Lebanese sources as saying Syria was "disturbed" by Geagea's statement claiming that he "visits Syria through Hariri." "Who told you that we welcome Geagea through you, or receive you if Geagea was under your wing?" the sources asked. Al-Akhbar said Saudi King's son, Prince Abdul Aziz, will visit Damascus soon to discuss the relationship between Hariri and Syria.(Naharnet-AFP)
Beirut, 08 Apr 10, 18:24

Geagea Asks State to Act in Sfeir, Hermel, Kfar Zabad as It Did in Ouyoun Orghosh
Naharnet/Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea on Thursday asked the Lebanese authorities to act regarding the latest incidents that occurred in the areas of Sfeir, al-Hermel and Kfar Zabad "the same way it acted regarding the Oyoun Orghosh incident."In a chat with reporters in Maarab, Geagea said: "Either this country belongs to everyone where everyone is treated equally, or we now have first class and second class citizens, which is unacceptable." As Geagea lauded the army's intelligence for identifying, in less then 12 hours, those who fired their weapons in the "distant" Ouyoun Orghosh, he criticized it for not arresting anyone in the other incidents that happened "meters away" from the defense ministry in Yarze. "Has anyone been arrested over the Sfeir incident? Has the army conducted raids or seized weapons? Has any security force conducted any raids in the shooting location? Have any weapons been confiscated?" Geagea wondered. On Wednesday, Geagea asked the Lebanese Army to set up permanent checkpoints in Oyoun Orghosh and the neighboring areas "where the villagers' houses have been a target for robbery several times and the villages have been the scene of many attacks.""We only trust the Lebanese Army," Geagea told reporters in Maarab.
He addressed "those who are lamenting the domestic peace now" by asking: "Where were they on May 7? Why didn't they hand over the gunmen who occupied Beirut's streets and killed dozens?""Let those who care for domestic peace seek the return of the residents of Oyoun Orghosh to their villages which they were forced to abandon such as the al-Harfoush village, and let them allow the Sukkar family to return to its village Tal Sougha." Beirut, 08 Apr 10, 19:59

The emperor’s clothes
April 8, 2010
Now Lebanon/If you tell someone something enough times, chances are they might end up believing it. And it is clearly with this adage in mind that Loyalty to the Resistance bloc MP Nawwaf Moussawi has been peddling the idea that Hezbollah is a genuine partner for unity in the current government and that any attempts to paint a picture to the contrary is, as always, the work of Israel. Hence he can distill Hezbollah’s game plan into this vote-winning line: “[Hezbollah] is as keen on fighting Israel as it is on building a platform of coexistence.”
To sell this with a straight face, any doubts over the party’s national credentials have to be erased. Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is busy handling the media when it comes to Hezbollah’s alleged involvement in the Hariri assassination and the subsequent interview requests from the STL, while Moussawi appears to have been tasked with making sure everyone is “on message” when it comes to the future of the Resistance.
On Monday he neatly positioned Hezbollah’s “glorious” days of action between May 7 and May 14, 2008 – when it used lethal force to overrun West Beirut in response to a government decision to seize its private telecom system and dismiss a Hezbollah-appointed security chief at the Beirut airport – not as an attempted coup to topple the Siniora government, but as a decisive move to snuff out yet another Zionist/international plot to destroy the Resistance. “After they had failed in the July 2006 confrontation, they resorted to other means in attempting to target the Resistance and penetrating security in Lebanon,” he said.
It was an important line to ram home, because a day earlier Moussawi had declared that Hezbollah’s raison d’être is predicated on the perpetuity of the Resistance, and that its armed struggled would – and here we have the contradiction – take priority, even over national unity. “The history of the Resistance has shown that when it comes to [its] continuity, strength, survival and progress, it will not put anything above these considerations,” he said.
Lost? Well so are we. Clearly Hezbollah wants national unity on its terms. In other words, Lebanon must be “unified” behind Hezbollah’s agenda. To erase any concerns that this might be interpreted as a potentially worrying pronouncement, he threw out another red herring, this time a call to arms to “liquidate American hegemony over Lebanon.”
He needn’t worry. “American hegemony” as he puts it, has, for all intents and purposes, been liquidated. Damascus is the new regional darling, and Hezbollah is taking advantage of this new reality, one that has effectively seen March 14’s electoral majority trampled on, by consolidating its position as the real power in Lebanon.
Clearly many Lebanese are suffering from a severe case of the emperor’s new clothes. The tailors of Damascus and Tehran have duped those who either believe that they can only find representation and security within Hezbollah’s cozy bosom or who have convinced themselves that Hezbollah is misunderstood, that its fighters will eventually, like all good revolutionaries, line up to hand in their arms when they feel their work is done, when disputed Lebanese lands are reclaimed and when the state is strong enough to take over. They refuse to see that Lebanon is hostage to a regional agenda. By declaring that the Resistance does not need national consensus to go about its business, Hezbollah is admitting that it doesn’t believe in the national dialogue process. One does not need to extrapolate any further to realize that the party’s armed profile will not go away as long as it commands such unwavering support based on such a whopping deception. The Lebanese must shake themselves from their mass torpor and recognize that a swindle of tragic proportions is being perpetrated by Hezbollah. As the 35th anniversary of the civil war approaches, we should remember the misery, pain and price Lebanon has paid for blind support. Then, we let the PLO create a state within a state. Today it appears that vacuum is well and truly filled.

A Lebanese directory of the dead
Now Lebanon/Michael Young,
April 9, 2010
Next week, on April 13, Lebanon will commemorate the 35th anniversary of the start of its civil war, and you know the event will provoke laments that the Lebanese have no collective memory. Why not do something different for a change? Praise the ability of the Lebanese to forget, but with one caveat that we will return to below.
The ability of a nation to forget is underrated. When their war ended in 1990, it was not easy for the Lebanese to reach common agreement over what their 15-year nightmare was about. We could all agree that it had been a nightmare, that we were glad it was now finished, and that we regretted the fate of all those who had been killed or who had disappeared. But who was to blame? What had started the whole mess? There was no consensus among Lebanese on the answers.
So they forgot. And their forgetting was facilitated by the two pillars sustaining Lebanon’s postwar order: Syria and the reconstruction process led by the late Rafik al-Hariri. The Syrians engineered an amnesty law in 1991 that was designed to pardon wartime crimes. However, the flip side of this arrangement, as we saw with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, was that if Syria and its Lebanese acolytes could declare people innocent, it also meant they could declare them guilty if political conditions demanded it.
The amnesty law was a whitewash, but it was a necessary one. Lebanon, and by extension Syria, could not have realistically built a postwar order by condemning the abusers in the war, since that would have meant condemning every leader tasked with ending Lebanon’s wartime mindset. It would have also meant apportioning blame, and the Lebanese could find no accord on who to blame.
Then there was the reconstruction effort. Rafik al-Hariri was not a man whose natural tendency was to wallow in the past. Nor could he afford this. His reconstruction project was a thing for the future, because that’s what investment is about, and while it could be criticized in many ways, the optimism the late prime minister sought to exude and peddle left little room for recollection of the war. Indeed it necessitated a hefty dose of amnesia, since looking brightly ahead meant avoiding at all costs looking, disconsolately, backward.
Was this so bad? Lebanon was not alone in understanding that, sometimes, you have to draw a big black X through the past to progress. In recent days, for example, the Spanish judge Baltasar Garzon was indicted for investigating crimes committed by the forces loyal to General Francisco Franco during the Spanish civil war, despite the fact that Spain passed an amnesty law in 1977. Garzon’s initiative may have been defensible morally, but legally and politically it crossed a red line the Spanish authorities could not permit, because the point of the amnesty law was to put to bed a divisive past.
But we can now throw in that caveat. If it is impossible for the Lebanese to reach unanimous agreement over what their war was about, nothing prevents them from remembering in a pluralistic way. Here we are in 2010, two decades after the end of the war – meaning a period of time five years longer than the duration of the war itself – and yet hardly a memorial to the conflict can be found anywhere.
If you drive by the Defense Ministry complex in Yarzeh, you will see the monolithic Arman sculpture Hope for Peace, which was at one time supposed to be placed in the downtown area as a memento to the folly of war. That is until someone, perhaps Hariri himself, decided (not without aesthetic justification) that it would be folly to place it in an area seeking to evoke a very different version of the past. Other than that, a brief village statue or commemorative cannon here, or an eroding plaque there is all that we have to remind us of our conflict.
Lebanon can really do a bit more at this stage. Museums, memorials, even an official day of remembrance for the dead and disappeared, are all mnemonic devices that would allow the Lebanese to remember individually what happened, and to pass this on to their children. Why not start by asking the government to print a book with the names and photos of those who died or disappeared, with no more or less than their names, date of birth, and date of death when known?
This wouldn’t cost more than what it costs to print our national phone book. It would be a directory of the dead, and it’s the least that we can do for those who didn’t make it through. This endeavor would help build a collective memory, but in a natural way, absent the strident insistence that we remember whether we like it or not. Rather, we would remember because we want to, because we feel it’s time to.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut.

Oyoun Orgosh
Hazem al-Amin, April 9, 2010
Passers-by or those sitting on café terraces sometimes overhear conversations about the division prevailing among Christians compared to the “cohesion” of other political forces and confessions. Such words are often said in bitterness, which can be attributed to a Lebanese intuition that perceives citizenship only through the lens of a confession’s coalition and internal consensus.
“We Christians are not united.” We have often heard this expression. And we have always felt that the annoyance of those saying it at the unity demonstrated by other confessions is proportional to their complaints about their own division, and that they are naïve victims of a popular street awareness.
Yet it seems that popular awareness in Lebanon is smarter and more exalted than the more complex one claiming, for instance, that the Christians – despite their divisions – are ahead of other communities that are united around a sectarian and confessional core. This so-called intelligence may well be a negative one, but it still amounts to some kind of intelligence on which other Lebanese confessions and parties rely in their competitions among one another.
The Oyoun Orgosh incident is a potent example of this wretched – albeit accurate – equation. The exchange of gunfire between village youths and a Lebanese army patrol, or between that patrol and drug smugglers, did not result in any casualties, and some non-military individuals involved in the incident were arrested. This incident became an opportunity to target not only a specific political party, but also a whole region with its families and inhabitants.
Hezbollah officials and politicians issued statements calling for looking into this “dangerous incident,” but they glossed over similar cases where people died or sustained injuries, without there being such calls. Rather, there were calls for dealing with such cases calmly and with careful consideration.
The accurate and self-evident conclusion is that the Lebanese Forces is the real target of this campaign, and that including a whole region and all families in it in the sphere of accusations and attacks is tantamount to using whatever weapons are available in the confrontation. Yet the question mark lies somewhere else, in the ease with which the LF’s popular base was targeted and the lack of immunity toward the ensuing sectarian sensitivities, which have long banned any inclination to picture a conflict in Lebanon as one with a social environment.
Unfortunately, it seems that this lack of immunity is due to “Christian divisions.” Those behind the campaign targeting the Lebanese Forces against a backdrop of the Oyoun Orgosh incident actually feel that this division allows them to do what they please without facing any sectarian cohesion that is similar to the one they rely on in the event they may have to repel similar attacks on their regions.
The author of this article does not deny anyone’s right to criticize a given group or religious confession. Yet he dreams of a day when he will enjoy this right. Still, he is too weak today to make light of the prevailing claim that the Christians’ problem lies in their division.
Based on the current social and sectarian equation, the Christians are, indeed, faced – unlike any other religious denomination – with the stalemate of their divisions. Some might say that the diversity and disparities characterizing the Christian community bear witness to the fact that it is ahead of other Lebanese communities. However, such an assumption entails a great deal of frivolity and luxury, the kind of which we cannot afford in our wretched Lebanese equation. From that angle, it seems that instinct and naivety are stronger than intelligence.
This article is a translation from the original, which appeared on the NOW Arabic site on Friday April 9

Samir Geagea
April 7, 2010
On April 7, Al-Mustaqbal newspaper carried the following report:
The head of the Lebanese Forces Executive Committee, Samir Geagea, condemned the “devious and fierce campaigns launched against the Lebanese Forces,” saying that they aimed at “subjugating the country.” He revealed that the side responsible for these campaigns was “beyond the border,” announcing there were official Lebanese security sides that leaked the information about the Ouyoun Orghosh incident instead of upholding the secrecy of the investigation. He thus stated: “The Lebanese Forces want the law to be implemented verbatim and to lift the cover off of any involved individual.” In a media chat after he presided over the meeting of the Lebanese Forces bloc in Maarab yesterday, he described the campaigns launched against the Lebanese Forces as being “devious campaigns to which the LF is being subjected, using the same methods that were seen throughout the last fifteen years. However, these campaigns have not affected and will not affect our positions,” expressing his sorrow that “some have not learned from the lessons of the past and are repeating the same mistakes.”
Geagea assured on the other hand that the goal behind these campaigns was to “subjugate the country. Nonetheless, this will not happen because history does not go backwards. As for the side responsible for these campaigns, it is beyond the border.” He called, in this context, for the “confrontation to be political, honorable and serious and not to be conducted through the devious means that are used by some in their attacks and fabrications.” Regarding the leaking of information about the Ouyoun Orghosh incident to some media outlets, he said: “Where did these outlets get their information, especially since the young men who were arrested are still being interrogated at the Lebanese Army Intelligence Directorate? This clearly exposes the attacks to which the LF is being subjected through the leaking of false information. This is a violation affecting the course of the trial and the investigations. Official Lebanese security sides are responsible for the leaking of the information instead of upholding the secrecy of the investigation.”
He then assured that he only learned about the incident through media outlets, asking: “If there were arms and drugs with certain individuals, what does the Lebanese Forces [party] have to do with the issue? Should we hold the entire party responsible for every outlaw behavior committed by an LF supporter? In case some want to retaliate against the Lebanese Forces, let them do it the right way and without fabricating futile stories. The LF supports the implementation of the law verbatim and lifts the cover off of any [implicated] individual.” He then raised several questions regarding the logic adopted by some of those making accusations, saying: “We have seen the uncovering of many networks spying for Israel in Lebanon, three or four of which were linked to people in Hezbollah. Should we immediately accuse Hezbollah of collaborating with Israel? Is Hezbollah for example responsible for the problems seen in the Sharawna neighborhood in Baalbek? If ten tons of drugs are found in Nabatiyeh for example, should we accuse all the population of the area? That would be unfair to them.”
He pointed out in this context that Deputy Strida Geagea repeatedly “asked the army command to install a permanent army post in this region in light of the skirmishes occurring between the people of Ouyoun Orghosh and their neighbors,” indicating that the army “always interferes and not just this time. It interferes whenever there is a shooting.” He announced on the other hand that the Lebanese Forces in all the different regions were ready to participate in the municipal elections, pointing out that “the alliances will be localized, i.e. depending on the specificity of each town” and that the LF was allied with the Kataeb Party throughout Lebanon and not just in Zahle. In the Mount Lebanon area however, he saw “no drastic changes except for a few elements that were introduced at the level of the alliances, considering that the municipal electoral game is primarily local [end of statements].”

Is Hezbollah Ramping Up in the US?
March 26, 2010 -
by: Ben Evansky
In the last five months U.S. federal authorities have charged several men, some U.S. citizens, of aiding Hezbollah, a State Department designated terrorist group. These arrests have terrorism analysts wondering if Hezbollah is ramping up its U.S. operations.
The first indictments were handed down in Philadelphia in November when four men were charged with conspiracy to support Hezbollah. One of the suspects - Moussa Ali Hamdan is a U.S national from Brooklyn - and all four remain at large. They were charged with conspiracy to export some 1200 colt machine guns to a port in Syria and also with conspiracy to provide material support to Hezbollah through proceeds made from the sale of fake passports and counterfeit money.
Only last month another four men were charged in Miami for illegally exporting electronics goods to a shopping center in Paraguay, which U.S. authorities say is used to funnel money to Hezbollah. According to the US Treasury Department, both the shopping center and its co-owner Muhammad Yusif Abdallah give a portion of the center's profits to Hezbollah. Abdallah is believed by the US to be a senior leader for Hezbollah in South America.
Just last summer, David Cohen, New York City's Deputy Police Commissioner on Intelligence warned that Hezbollah should not be underestimated. Cohen told a terrorism conference in Manhattan that Hezbollah "...is probably the most capable and disciplined terrorist organization in the world." Cohen said Hezbollah is closely linked, and works under the direction of the Iranian intelligence services and "poses a continuous danger to New York City."
Hezbollah's spokesman Ibrahim Mousawi, reached for comment in Beirut, asked that questions be emailed to him. Despite several emails he has not responded.
Hezbollah has been a pivotal player in Lebanon for many years and currently controls two government ministries. Created in 1982 in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah gets the majority of its funding from Iran. Since 2006 estimates say that funding has risen to one billion dollars a year, and while a lot of that money is used to support its social system, a significant amount of cash supports its terror network.
Hezbollah has targeted the United States several times in the past. In 1983 it bombed a US barracks in Beirut which killed 241 American servicemen, and in 1996, 19 more US servicemen were killed when Hezbollah blew up an apartment building in Saudi Arabia. But can it target the US mainland?
Steve Emerson is the founder and executive director of the Investigative Project on Terrorism. Emerson, who has written extensively on foreign terrorist groups operating in the US, says Hezbollah has raised "millions to say the least" in the US and believes that the recent busts in Philadelphia and Miami are the "proverbial tip of the iceberg." Emerson tells Fox News that "There are members of Hezbollah in the US who are capable of being activated to carry out terrorist attacks. However, these agents have refrained from attacking the Homeland. In the case of hostilities breaking out with Iran, all bets are off however."
Professor Omar Ashour directs the Middle Eastern studies program at Exeter University in England. Ashour says Hezbollah has sympathizers, supporters and members throughout the Americas but there are differences between them. He says outside of Lebanon they tend to focus on financial, logistical, propaganda and support activities with a few exceptions.
Ashour says its unlikely they will strike on foreign soil and says from a strategic point of view they don't need to launch attacks abroad, as they know "quite well the risks of doing so, especially after 9/11."
**Walid Phares, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and Fox News contributor on terrorism says there are different types of Hezbollah presences in the US. He says, "You have those Hezbollah supporters who would rise to strike against limited targets, tactical targets but then you have those units that are part of the central force of Hezbollah which have been inserted inside the United States...probably inside major cities of America so that when instructions will come they want to wreak havoc inside this country."
Phares tells Fox News that the US intelligence community is "pretty good about assessing Hezbollah's institutions in Lebanon", and continues to be aware of Hezbollah's potential to strike in the US. However, he says the government is failing to recognize Hezbollah's recruitment process in a timely manner and fears if and when it attacks the homeland, it will be on a national scale and not just a sporadic act of violence as seen in recent homegrown terrorist attacks.

Family Defends Lebanese Psychic Jailed in Saudi
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: April 9, 2010
AL-AIN, Lebanon (AP) -- Lebanese psychic Ali Sibat had just woken from an afternoon nap in a Saudi hotel when the telephone rang. A Saudi man asked if he could make magical talisman for his sister who had marital problems. Sibat, in the kingdom on a pilgrimage, said he'd be happy to help.
As soon as he hung up, religious police stormed into his room and arrested him for witchcraft. Now Sibat is on death row, sentenced to be beheaded.
His arrest in 2008 and sentencing the following year has devastated Sibat's family in the eastern Lebanese village of al-Ain, who have been struggling to win his release. Last week, they were hit by the news that his execution was scheduled for that Friday, April 2.
His 19-year-old son went to a violent seizure from the shock and remains in a hospital. His 15-year-old daughter was thrown into depression and could not go to school. In the end, the execution did not take place, but the family remains in fear.
''It was a shock to all of us,'' Sibat's wife, Samira Rahmoon, 46, said. ''We're all dying a slow death.''
Saudi Arabia, which enforces a strict version of Islamic law, arrests dozens of people a year on sorcery charges, and the last known execution came in 2007 with the beheading of an Egyptian pharmacist, according to human rights groups. The charges are often vague -- covering anything from fortunetelling to astrology to making charms and talismans believed to bring love, health or pregnancy. Saudi judges cite Quranic verses forbidding witchcraft, but such practices remain popular as a folk tradition.
In Sibat's case, the charges seem to center around a call-in talk show he hosted on a Lebanese satellite station where he would tell fortunes and give advice. His supporters point out that the show was aired from Lebanon, not Saudi Arabia. The Sibat family's lawyer in Lebanon, May Khansa, contends the call to Sibat's hotel room appears to have been a set-up by Saudi religious police to incriminate him.
''Islam prohibits tricking people,'' Khansa said.
Sibat, 49, a devout Shiite Muslim and father of four, was a 20-year-old tailor when he proposed to Rahmoon, a Sunni Muslim from his home village al-Ain. She said he became interested in astrology from the age of 15 and read many books on the subject.
He later worked as a truck driver until five years ago, when the Lebanese satellite channel Sheherezade hired him to do psychic readings three times a week for half an hour. In the show, titled ''The Hidden,'' he would take in calls from viewers with problems and offer spiritual solutions, as telephone numbers scrolled across the screen for viewers to call in from Australia, France, Switzerland, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.
''There is a tree at the entrance to your house,'' he told a female caller in an episode from 2007. ''Dig 30 centimeters deep at the base of the tree and you'll will find something. Pick it up and throw it in the water. Everything in your household will be fine from then on.''
To another caller from Tunisia, whose daughter was ill, he said, ''your daughter has been sick ever since she was born. Bathe her -- her body must be clean and abluted -- and then read the soura (Quranic verse) of al-Momenoon once.'' The caller says she doesn't know how to read. Anyone else will do, he responds, then lists three other souras that must be read over the daughter before her health improves.
Rahmoon seems unconvinced about her husband's powers, but insists he did nothing wrong. ''I was OK with his new job. He didn't hurt anyone.''
She stressed that he was a good Muslim, beginning his program by reading an Islamic verse that denies the powers of fortunetellers and emphasizes that ''no one knows the unknown but God.'' Without his income, the family has been left near destitute, borrowing some $10,000 to make ends meet, she said. Her older son's fiancee called off the engagement because of Sibat's imprisonment. Sibat's 5-year-old daughter Jamal, often cries asking for her father. ''I'm worried she will forget him, She was two when he was arrested,'' Rahmoon said.
Rahmoun said she has spoken to her husband only once since his arrest -- about five months ago. He told her he was innocent and cried on the phone. She saw Saudi TV footage of him as he was escorted to jail with his hands and feet chained. ''The sight of him was horrifying. He'd become thin as a stick.''
''I'm angry. He's been wronged. The whole world should get on its feet and help him get freed. The Lebanese government should demand his release,'' she said, wiping tears with the corner of her yellow headscarf.
Sibat's case has brought sporadic media attention since his arrest. The report of his imminent execution last week brought a flare of calls in the Lebanese press for his release. Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar said last week that he had urged the Saudi government not to carry out the execution.
Rahmoun said that she had talked to Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who promised to help. ''But nothing has happened,'' she said. Hariri, who holds Saudi citizenship as well as Lebanese, has close ties to Saudi Arabia's ruling family.
Khansa, the lawyer, sent an official letter to Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah asking him to pardon her client.
Sibat did not practice psychic reading while in Saudi Arabia, she argues.
''Many Christians and non-Muslims travel to Saudi Arabia -- and I've never heard the religious police there arresting them because they drank wine back home,'' said Khansa.

Prosecutor issues warrants against Oyoun Orgosh suspects
By The /Daily Star
Friday, April 09, 2010
BEIRUT: Military Prosecutor Riyad Abu Ghayda issued Thursday an arrest warrant against detainees Joseph and Habib Tawk for terrorizing citizens in the Bekaa region of Oyoun Orghosh. The perpetrators who were questioned in the presence of their attorneys were accused of possessing and opening fire on citizens from illegal arms.
Over the weekend, gunshots were fired into the air and rocket-propelled grenades were launched in Oyoun Orghosh which led Lebanese Army commando forces to raid several houses in the region and arrest four suspects. The army also found illegal arms and a ton of hashish. Meanwhile, Lebanese Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea voiced surprise that the Intelligence Directory in the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) identified sides opening fire in the remote area of Oyoun Orghosh within 12 hours, “the fact that we praise while highlighting that similar incidents in other areas closer to Beirut went unnoticed.” “Yesterday, a similar incident happened in Sfeir, was anyone arrested? Did the LAF raid any place or confiscate arms? Fire was also opened in Hermel from heavy and light weapons leaving several casualties, was any one arrested? The answer is for sure no,” said Geagea, adding that a similar incident in Kfarzabad also went uninvestigated. Geagea slammed media outlets that rushed to photograph LAF members while raiding areas in Oyoun Orghosh. He also criticized the fact that the LAF’s Guidance Command distributed such photographs to all media institutions while a media blackout was imposed on the incidents in Sfeir, Hermel and Kfarzabad.
The LF leader urged the government to step in and impose the law equally on all Lebanese “just like what happened in Oyoun Orghosh.” – The Daily Star

Hariri warns Israel weapons, destruction 'only incite hatred'
Friday, April 09, 2010/Daily Star
BEIRUT: Lebanese Premier Saad Hariri urged Israel Thursday to “move ahead” toward finding a political solution with the Palestinians by privileging dialogue over “little wars.”
“Israel must move ahead” because “we need to have a credible process that the Arab world can believe in,” the Lebanese premier said in Madrid at a joint news conference with his Spanish counterpart Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. The Lebanese premier accused Israel of “trying to create little wars here and there to hold up the peace process.”
“The Israelis have to understand that weapons and destruction only incite hate and violence,” Hariri added. “Israel has to be told that ‘you can start all the wars you want in the Middle East but in the end there can only be a political solution,’” he said, on the first of a two-day trip to the Spanis capital. “A political solution, with the existing consensus in Europe, the US and the Arab world, is the only way to make progress in the region,” he said. Hariri warned that failure to achieve progress in the Mideast peace process would lead to catastrophic consequences.
“The implications of failure will be bigger than the region can handle; extremism will grow further with a decrease in solutions for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,” he said, adding that “extremism has no boundaries.”
“I believe Spain can lead the EU to adopt a firm stance with regard to the peace process and thus rally support of other states,” he added.
Spain currently holds the European Union’s rotating presidency and is also in command of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Hariri, who praised Spain’s participation in UNIFIL, called for the promotion of Lebanese-Spanish bilateral economic ties and encouraged Spanish investments in Lebanon.
“Security and stability should not be a temporary luxury for the Lebanese people but a constant situation; my country embraces values of democracy, freedom, diversity and national coexistence,” Hariri said.
“Lebanon will only move toward a better situation through peace in the region based on the Palestinian refugees’ right of return and the rise of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital,” he added. Zapatero said that Israel’s announcement last month of plans for the construction of homes in occupied East Jerusalem was a “serious problem” that “put the brakes” on the possibility of indirect talks between the Israelis and Palestinians. “The current moment is historic for getting an agreement because the international community and the Arab world have a very clear position and there is a wide consensus,” he stressed. Zapatero also highlighted Lebanon’s pivotal role in pushing forward the peace process.
“A stable and united Lebanon capable of cooperating with its neighbors, with a new level of ties with Syria for example, could participate actively in promoting progress in the very complicated peace process,” he said. Earlier Thursday, Hariri, who was accompanied by Foreign Minister Ali Shami, held talks with Spanish King Juan Carlos, Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos and Defense Minister Carme

Obama, Medvedev sign pact to reduce nuclear arsenals
‘The entire world community has won’
Friday, April 09, 2010
Jennifer Loven and George Jahn
Associated Press
PRAGUE: Casting aside years of rancor, President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Thursday signed the biggest nuclear arms pact in a generation, lacing the moment with new warnings of sanctions for an intransigent Iran. The treaty, sealed after months of halting negotiation, is significant not just for what it does but for what it symbolizes: a fresh start for the United States and Russia, and evidence to a watching world that nuclear disarmament is more than a goal.
The pact commits their nations to slash the number of strategic nuclear warheads by a third and more than halve the number of missiles, submarines and bombers carrying them.
That still leaves the two countries with enough nuclear firepower to ensure mutual destruction several times over, but the move sets a foundation for deeper reductions, which both sides are already pursuing.
“It sends a signal around the world that the US and Russia are prepared to once again take leadership,” Obama said moments after he and Medvedev signed the treaty in a gleaming, ornate hall in the Czech Republic’s presidential castle.
“The entire world community has won,” said Medvedev.
The pact will shrink the limit of nuclear warheads to 1,550 per country over seven years, about a third less than the 2,200 currently permitted.
Looming over the celebration was Iran, which in the face of world pressure continues to assert that its enrichment program is for peaceful purposes, not weapons. Six powers – the US, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and now China – are in talks in New York about a fourth set of UN sanctions to pressure Iran into compliance.
“We cannot turn a blind eye to this,” Medvedev said, but added he was frank with Obama about how far Russia was willing to go, favoring what he called “smart” sanctions that might have hope of changing behavior. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov later elaborated by saying, for example, that Russia would not endorse a total embargo on the delivery of refined petroleum products into Iran. Such products might be targeted in other ways, or sanctions on Iran’s energy sector might be avoided altogether to avoid running into deal-breaking opposition from Russia or China, he said.
The nuclear arms pact now faces a ratification vote in the Russian legislature and the US Senate. At home, Obama’s team is struggling to get the required 67 votes, and the president himself is directly involved. He said he was confident that Democrats and Republicans would see that the treaty protects US interests – an upbeat view of bipartisanship in a town where it’s been scarce. Negotiations between the US and Russia got bogged down in disputes, including Russia’s objection to US missile-defense plans for Europe. The Kremlin is still concerned about the plan but sought to tamp down talk it would withdraw from the new treaty if there is a buildup in the missile-defense system. Russia codified its option to withdraw in a statement accompanying the treaty. Obama said the treaty itself built trust that would help in solving any differences on the issue. Responded Medvedev: “I am an optimist as well as my American colleague. I believe that we will be able to reach a compromise.” Beyond slashing nuclear arsenals, the US sees the new “START” treaty as a key part of efforts to reset ties with Russia, badly strained under the Bush administration, and engage Moscow more in dealing with global challenges, including North Korea’s nuclear arsenal Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
The new pact is only part of Obama’s new nuclear strategy. It was signed only days after the White House announced a fundamental shift in its policy on the use of nuclear weapons, calling the acquisition of atomic arms by terrorists or rogue states a worse menace than the Cold War threat of mutual annihilation.
Other US nuclear initiatives will follow the Prague signing. Leaders from more than 40 countries will gather in Washington next week to discuss improvements in securing nuclear materials.
The White House plans to lead calls for disarmament in May at the United Nations during an international conference on strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The treaty signed Thursday is the most significant nuclear disarmament pact in a generation, and Medvedev has lauded it as an important step in disarmament and arms control efforts.
Russian analysts say Russia needs the deal to ease the burden of replacing a large number of aging Soviet-built missiles. “This treaty is in Russia’s best interests,” said Sergei Rogov, the head of the USA and Canada Institute, an influential think tank. Inside the hall, the anticipated moment came as the two presidents picked up their pens, glanced at each other and grinned as they signed several documents, with aides transferring the papers back and forth so all would have both signatures. When it was done, the leaders seemed momentarily at a loss, with Medvedev flashing a smile and a shrug before they stood to shake hands. While the Russian Parliament is likely to follow the Kremlin’s lead, the ratification process in the US Senate could be troublesome. Fearing potential trouble, Moscow has said Russian lawmakers will synchronize their moves to ratify the deal with the US legislators.
Under Obama, Russian cooperation on key priorities, from helping to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran to opening supply routes for the US military into Afghanistan and agreeing to new arms reductions, has increased – though not by a huge amount

Is Israel Facing War With Hezbollah and Syria?
International News
By David Schenker for JCPA
http://www.5tjt.com/international-news/6734-is-israel-facing-war-with-hezbollah-and-syria.html
on Thursday, April 08, 2010
•Concerns about Israeli hostilities with Hizbullah are nothing new, but based on recent pronouncements from Syria, if the situation degenerates, fighting could take on a regional dimension not seen since 1973.
•On February 26, Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Damascus. Afterward, Hizbullah's online magazine Al Intiqad suggested that war with Israel was on the horizon.
•Raising tensions further are reports that Syria has provided Hizbullah with the advanced, Russian-made, shoulder-fired, Igla-S anti-aircraft missile, which could inhibit Israeli air operations over Lebanon in a future conflict. The transfer of this equipment had previously been defined by Israeli officials as a "red line."
•In the summer of 2006, Syria sat on the sidelines as Hizbullah fought Israel to a standstill. After the war, Assad, who during the fighting received public assurances from then-Prime Minister Olmert that Syria would not be targeted, took credit for the "divine victory."
•Damascus' support for "resistance" was on full display at the Arab Summit in Libya in late March 2010, where Assad urged Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to abandon U.S.-supported negotiations and "take up arms against Israel."
•After years of diplomatic isolation, Damascus has finally broken the code to Europe, and appears to be on the verge of doing so with the Obama administration as well. Currently, Syria appears to be in a position where it can cultivate its ties with the West without sacrificing its support for terrorism.
In February 2010, tensions spiked between Israel and its northern neighbors. First, Syrian and Israeli officials engaged in a war of words, complete with dueling threats of regime change and targeting civilian populations. Weeks later, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah pledged to go toe-to-toe with Israel in the next war.1 Then, toward the end of the month, Israel began military maneuvers in the north. Finally, on February 26, Syrian President Bashar Assad hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah for an unprecedented dinner meeting in Damascus.
Concerns about Israeli hostilities with Hizbullah are nothing new, but based on recent pronouncements from Damascus, if the situation degenerates, fighting could take on a regional dimension not seen since 1973. In January and February, Syrian officials indicated that, unlike during the 2006 fighting in Lebanon, Damascus would not "sit idly by" in the next war.2 While these statements may be bravado, it's not difficult to imagine Syria being drawn into the conflict.
The Israeli government has taken steps to alleviate tensions, including, most prominently, Prime Minister Netanyahu issuing a gag order forbidding his ministers to discuss Syria.3 Still, the situation in the north remains volatile. Within a three-day span in mid-March: the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fired at Israeli jets violating Lebanese airspace;4 four Lebanese nationals were charged with spying for Israel against Hizbullah;5 and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Shiite militia was "building up its forces north of the Litani (river)." Currently, according to Ashkenazi, the border was calm, "but this can change."6
It's easy to see how the situation could deteriorate. Hizbullah retaliation against Israel for the 2008 assassination of its military leader Imad Mugniyyeh could spark a war. So could Hizbullah firing missiles in retribution for an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. The transfer of sensitive Syrian technology to the Shiite militia could also prompt an Israeli strike. Regrettably, even if Israel continues to try and diffuse tensions in the north, given the central role Tehran has in determining Hizbullah policy, a third Lebanon war may be inevitable.
Martyrs Month Pronouncements
In mid-February, Hizbullah held the annual commemoration for its pantheon of heroes, a week of celebrations marking the organization's top three martyrs - founding father Ragheb Harb, Secretary General Abbas Mussawi, and military leader Imad Mugniyyeh. On February 16 - Martyred Leaders Day - Nasrallah gave a speech where he defined a new, more aggressive posture toward Israel, upping the ante in the militia's longstanding "balance of terror" strategy. Promising parity with Israeli strikes on Lebanon, Nasrallah threatened:
If you [Israel] bomb Rafik Hariri international airport in Beirut, we will bomb Ben-Gurion airport in Tel Aviv. If you bomb our docks, we will bomb your docks. If you bomb our oil refineries, we will bomb your oil refineries. If you bomb our factories, we will bomb your factories. And if you bomb our power plants, we will bomb your power plants.7
With current estimates suggesting that Hizbullah now possesses in excess of 40,000 missiles and rockets, Nasrallah's threats have some resonance. Raising tensions further are reports that Syria has provided Hizbullah with the advanced, Russian-made, shoulder-fired, Igla-S anti-aircraft missile, which could inhibit Israeli air operations over Lebanon in a future conflict.8 The transfer of this equipment had previously been defined by Israeli officials as a "red line."9 It is unclear whether such a transgression remains a casus belli.
In addition to laying out Hizbullah's new targeting strategy, Nasrallah also discussed his yet unfulfilled pledge to retaliate against Israel for the 2008 killing of Mugniyyeh. Two years ago, immediately after the assassination, Nasrallah declared an "open war" against Israel, swearing vengeance for the group's martyred leader. However, to date, the militia's attempts to strike Israeli targets - in Azerbaijan and Turkey - have failed.10 During his speech, Nasrallah reiterated Hizbullah's commitment to retaliate. "Our options are open and we have all the time in the world," he said, adding, "What we want is a revenge that rises to the level of Imad Mugniyyeh."11
The Damascus "Resistance" Summit
In recent years, meetings between Assad and Ahmadinejad have been routine occurrences. It has also been customary for senior Syrian and Iranian officials to visit their respective capitals - and to sign defense or economic agreements - immediately following meetings between the Assad regime and U.S. officials. So it came as little surprise that Ahmadinejad arrived in Damascus just days after Undersecretary of State William Burns departed the Syrian capital. The surprising part about his visit was that Hassan Nasrallah joined the presidents for dinner.
On the day before Nasrallah's visit, Assad and Ahmadinejad made great efforts to demonstrate that Washington's transparent efforts to drive a wedge between the thirty-year strategic allies had failed. In a press conference on February 25, Assad famously mocked U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and the administration's gambit to split Syria from Iran, announced the end of visa requirements for travel between the two states, and described "support for the resistance [a]s a moral and national duty in every nation, and also a [religious] legal duty."12 He also said that he discussed with his Iranian counterpart "how to confront Israeli terrorism."
While the Syria-Iran bilateral meeting and subsequent press conference was described in some detail by Assad regime insider Ibrahim Humaydi in the pan-Arab daily Al Hayat, far less is known about what Assad, Ahmadinejad, and Nasrallah discussed during their dinner meeting the next day. According to the account in Hizbullah's online magazine Al Intiqad, the meeting was about "the escalating strategic response of the axis of the confrontationist, rejectionist, and resistance states" to the U.S.-Israeli threat.13 Significantly, this article also suggested that war with Israel was on the horizon.
Resorting to the most extreme decision - that is, launching and setting a war on its path - will decide the final results. In any case, if reasonable calculations prevail, they will lead to producing comprehensive and specific [Israeli] compromises or it will lead to postponing the war which still waits for its most appropriate time for everyone.14
Based on its analysis of the trilateral summit in Damascus, this Hizbullah organ seems to be suggesting that a war, while not imminent, is inevitable.
The Weak Link
In the summer of 2006, Syria sat on the sidelines as Hizbullah fought Israel to a standstill. After the war, Assad, who during the fighting received public assurances from then-Prime Minister Olmert that Syria would not be targeted, took credit for the "divine victory."15 Since then, Syria has upgraded its rhetorical and materiel support for the Shiite militia.16 Damascus has helped Hizbullah to fully rearm, reportedly providing the militia with cutting-edge Russian weaponry from its own stocks. In this context, Syrian officials have been increasingly trumpeting their support for, and loyalty to, the resistance, so much so that the official government-controlled Syrian press now proclaims that "Syrian foreign policy depends on supporting the resistance."17
Damascus' support for "resistance" was on full display at the Arab Summit in Libya in late March 2010. According to reports, at the meeting Assad urged Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to abandon U.S.-supported negotiations and "take up arms against Israel," imparting his own experience that "the price of resistance is not higher than the price of peace."18 During his speech before his fellow Arab leaders, Assad was equally hard-line in his prescriptions. At a minimum, he said, Arab states should cut off their relations with Israel. The "maximum" - and presumably preferable - policy option, he said, would be to support the resistance.19
Despite the rhetoric, however, it's not clear that Syria is presently itching for a fight with Israel. After years of diplomatic isolation, Damascus has finally broken the code to Europe, and appears to be on the verge of doing so with the Obama administration, which recently announced the posting of a new ambassador and indicated a willingness to revise sanctions and modify U.S. economic pressures on Damascus.20 Currently, Syria appears to be in a position where it can cultivate its ties with the West without sacrificing its support for terrorism.
War would change this comfortable dynamic. In the event of an Israel-Hizbullah conflagration, pressures on Syria to participate would be intense. Furthermore, could Syria really watch an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities without responding? After so much crowing about its support for Hizbullah and its regional ilk, could Syria sit out yet another fight?
Conclusion
While it's too early to predict the timing or the trigger, on Israel's northern border there appears to be a growing sense that war is coming. Iran may have an interest in maintaining Hizbullah's arsenal until an Israeli strike. Likewise, for Hizbullah, which lately has been playing up its Lebanese identity in an effort to improve its image at home, waging war on Israel on behalf of Iran could be problematic. In any event, it is all but assured that a war on Israel's northern front will be determined, at least in part, by Tehran.
In early February, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak told the IDF: "In the absence of an arrangement with Syria, we are liable to enter a belligerent clash with it that could reach the point of an all-out, regional war."21 Regrettably, regardless of what happens between Syria and Israel in the coming months, the decision of war or peace with Hizbullah may be out of Israel's hands.
To read more go to http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=283&PID=0&IID=3647&TTL=Is_Israel_Facing_War_with_Hizbullah_and_Syria?
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Notes
* The author would like to thank his research assistant Cole Bunzel for his excellent assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. "Full Text of H.E. Sayyed Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders," http://english.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=10225&cid=214.
2. "Syria Will Back Hizbullah Against IDF," Jerusalem Post, January 6, 2010. Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem echoed this threat in February 2010; see "Al-Mouallem at Press Conference with Moratinos," SANA, February 4, 2010. http://www.sana.sy/eng/21/2010/02/04/270781.htm.
3. Attila Somfalvi, "Bibi Tells Ministers to Keep Mum on Syria," Ynet, February 4, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3844619,00.html. Netanyahu also reassured Syria that Israel remained interested in peace.
4. "Lebanese Army Fires on Israeli Warplanes," AFP, March 21, 2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/world/view/20100321-260030/Lebanese-army-fires-on-Israeli-warplanes.
5. "Lebanon Charges Four with Spying for Israel," Press TV, March 20, 2010, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=121274§ionid=351020203.
6. Amnon Meranda, "Ashkenazi: Hamas Doesn't Want a Flareup," Ynet, March 23, 2010, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3866883,00.html.
7. "Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders."
8. See, for example, Barak Ravid, "Israel Warns Hizbullah: We Won't Tolerate Arms Smuggling," Ha'aretz, October 12, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1009384.html.
9. "Report: Hizbullah Trains on Missiles," UPI, January 17, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/International/2010/01/17/Report-Hezbollah-trains-on-missiles/UPI-51221263741141/.
10. See Yossi Melman, "Hizbullah, Iran Plotted Bombing of Israeli Embassy in Azerbaijan," Ha'aretz, May 31, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1089204.html. Also Avi Isaacharoff, "Turkish Forces Foil Attack on Israeli Target," Ha'aretz, December 9, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1133747.html.
11. "Nasrallah Speech on Day of Martyred Leaders."
12. Ibrahim Humaydi, "Al Asad: Ta‘ziz al-‘alaqat bayna duwal al-mintaqa tariq wahid li-l-qarar al mustaqill," Al Hayat, February 26, 2010, http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/112984.
13. "Qimmat Nejad-Al-Asad-Nasrallah: Ayy hisabat ba‘daha?" http://www.alintiqad.com/essaydetails.php?eid=27878&cid=4.
14. Ibid.
15. "Speech of Bashar Asad at Journalist Union 4th Conference," August 15, 2006,
http://www.golan67.net/NEWS/president%20Assad%20Speech%2015-8-6.htm.
16. In addition to the Igla-S anti-aircraft missile, some unconfirmed reports indicate that Syria may have transferred some of its Scud-D missiles - capable of delivering chemical warheads - to Hizbullah.
17. "Junblatt wa-l-Tariq ila Dimashq," Al Watan, March 10, 2010, http://alwatan.sy/dindex.php?idn=75718. That support for resistance is central to Syrian foreign policy comes as little surprise: in 2009, Foreign Minister Walid Mouallem volunteered to join Hizbullah. See "Muallem Says He's Ready to Join Hizbullah," Gulf News, May 3, 2009, http://gulfnews.com/news/region/lebanon/muallem-says-ready-to-join-hezbollah-1.248887.
18. "Arab Leaders Support Peace Plan," AP, March 28, 2010, http://www.jpost.com/middleeast/article.aspx?id=171981.
19. Ziyad Haydar, "Qimmat sirte infaddat ‘ala ‘ajal...wa bila za‘al," As Safir, March 29, 2010, http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=3020&EditionId=1496&ChannelId=34736. In an interview following the summit, Syrian advisor Buthaina Sha‘ban declared victory for the Syrian position, saying that "an agreement took place among the Arab leaders in a closed session to support the resistance and reject normalization" with Israel.
20. Ibrahim Humaydi, "Washington tarfa‘ mu‘aradataha ‘udwiyat Suriya fi munazzimat al-tijara al-‘alamiya," Al Hayat, February 24, 2010,. http://international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/112646.
21. Amos Harel, "Barak: Without Peace We Could Be Headed for All-Out War," Ha'aretz, February 2, 2010, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1146731.html.

Jihadism's War on Democracies
By Walid Phares
April 09/2010
Following is a chapter titled "Jihadism's War on Democracies" published in the book Debating the War of Ideas edited by Eric D Patterson and John Gallagher (Palgrave Macmillan). The chapter summarizes the three wars of ideas waged by Salafists, Wahabis, Muslim Brotherhoods and Khomeinists against liberal democracies and offer strategic suggestions for future counter radicalization policies. I do argue that under the previous US Administration there was a failed attempt to reach out to democracy forces in the Arab and Muslim world, while under the current Administration there are efforts to partner with the Islamists and engage the Jihadists at the expense of the Muslim Democrats.
Debating the War of Ideas
The term "War of Ideas" began appearing in the years following al Qaeda terror attacks against the United States on 9/11. In the days following the massacres, the mainstream media displayed a stunning lack of determination in indentifying where aggression was coming from and why. In the hours following the bloodshed in Manhattan, Pennsylvania and Washington where about three thousand- mostly civilians- were killed, the main question raised by networks, publications, and commentators was, "Why do they hate us?" Incredibly revealing, this slogan told the world and public at home that America did not know who the "they" (i.e., the attackers, who they represent, and what they wanted) were. It also underlined another stunning revelation: that what mainstream intellectuals understood from 9/11 was that sheer "hate" was the reason, and worse, the roots for this so-called hatred were unknown. Al Qaeda's onslaught on American soil signaled the start of what was called the "War on Terror". But historical precision tells us that in reality the jihadi war on the United States and other democracies began several years earlier. The sudden post-Cold War rise of combat Salafists (al Qaeda and others) against American and western targets in the 1990's and the actions taken by Khomeinists (Iran and Hezbollah) since the early 1980's preceded America's campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq two decades later. Popular and media reactions to the 9/11 attacks in the United States revealed a dramatic reality. The public - let alone the Government did not know that the jihadists have been at war with America and other democracies for many years before the Twin Towers attacks.
During the summer of 2004, the 9/11 Commissions asked the tragic question repeatedly: "How come we were at war for years before the attacks and we did not know it? How come the U.S. government - multiple administrations - did not know it, nor did it inform the people and take action?" The Commission's hard question was warranted as al Qaeda declared war against the United States, "the infidels, Crusaders and the Jews" at least twice during the 1990's in tandem with terror attacks in 1993, 1998, and 2000. The other major question that sprung from the Commission's long and painful hearings was: How come Americans and other democracies did not know about the jihadi wars being waged for decades? These two grand lines of inquiry puzzled many citizens since 2001 as they realized that there was indeed a war waged by Jihadists and that for too long the public and most of its representatives did not realize it was happening. As a result, two types of literature expanded in the United States, and later in Europe and the West. One set of books, articles, and panels insists that terrorism is waged by segments of Arab Muslim societies frustrated with Western policies in general and U.S. foreign policy in particular (e.g., economic disenfranchisement and in some cases racism). The second type of literature links the violence performed by the terrorists directly to Islamic theology. The wedge between the two explanations was wide and has grown larger. Both literatures, though, failed to see or explain the jihadi threat as a movement with global strategies, tactics, and rational steps.
In 1979, fourteen years before Professor Samuel Huntington published his famous article (turned into a book in 1996) "The Clash of Civilizations" in Foreign Affairs (1993), I published my first book al taadudiya (Pluralism) with a second volume dedicated to the analysis of the "relationship between Civilizations," focusing in some chapters on the worldwide ramifications of historical jihad. During the 1980's I published more books and articles projecting the rise of jihadism and arguing that its ideologues were camouflaging its strategic intentions. Unluckily, perhaps, the body of my work was mainly in Arabic and went unnoticed in the West, as probably was the case with similar intellectual efforts during the Cold War. During the 1990's, this time from the United States to where I relocated, I published a few pieces, testified to and briefed Congress and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) about the rising and forthcoming threat of jihadi terror. My warnings - as were those of other intellectuals and journalists in this field - were not heeded. Most of the arguments and points I made long before the official start of the "War on Terror", but they had not impacted the debate, let alone the decision making process back then. In my later findings I established that one major reason why neither the American public was aware of basic realities in the region nor the U.S. government was acting to counter the rising threat was a full fledged campaign waged by the jihadi forces, both financial and militant, to disable American and western abilities from perceiving, understanding and eventually countering the expanding menace. In short, what allowed the jihadist campaign to strike surprisingly at Western interest provoking incoherent debates about the so-called war on terror was in fact a "War of Ideas" unleashed by the very ideological forces standing behind the jihadi militant networks and regimes. Not only were the United States and the West targeted by a jihadi war since the 1980's (Khomeinsts) and the 1990's (Salafists), but more importantly, democracies were submitted to a War of Ideas since the 1970's at the hands of a bloc of regimes and ideological circles, whose main characteristics were and continue to be sympathizing with the jihadist ideologies and practicing authoritarianism domestically.
In 2005 I wrote my first post 9/11 book, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against the West, outlining what I established as past and future strategies by the global jihadist movements. In 2007 I wrote another book titled The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracies in which I demonstrated how jihadi forces were able to win their first and second Wars of Ideas against liberal opponents. Last, I followed up with a third book, The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad, suggesting how to defeat their totalitarian ideologies and support democratic forces in the Arab and Muslim world. This chapter is an additional contribution to the discussion as to the conditions for success against radicalization. One major condition for advancement in the confrontation is for the public of liberal democracies to understand the actual equation and the essence of the so-called War of Ideas. Indeed, eight years after 9/11 and after successive attempts by the U.S. government, by most European institutions, and by NGOs on both sides of the Atlantic, the definition of this War of Ideas is still unclear, and in many cases utterly wrong.
To most architects of the Western War of Ideas waged as of 2004, the issue has been one of public relations and "American image abroad." The U.S. government's various agencies in foreign policy and defense have invested significant time and funds to develop what they deemed "strategic communications" aimed at "swaying the hearts and minds" of Arabs and Muslims. More recent efforts in the United States and Europe focused on what they coined "counter radicalization" efforts. But the essence of both Campaigns was still short of determining the actual threat in the War of Ideas: it is the ideology that produces radicalization and thus the swaying of opinions. Therefore, I have been arguing, and continue to do so, that first we need to identify the "ideology" and what constitutes a threat within the components of this ideology. Then, we must understand the strategies used by the doctrinaires and followers of this ideology across its various streams and branches, before we design the counter-strategies. Historically, the campaigns by jihadi forces to win their own battle inside the Arab and Muslim world before taking it to the West and beyond can be categorized into three "Wars of Ideas"
The First War of Ideas (1950's-1990's)
A historical observation of systematic efforts on behalf on Islamist regimes and networked to spread their ideology shows that while their attempts to expand began with their rise in the 1920's, their strategic expansion took place during the latest parts of the Cold War. The Wahhabis, not very influential in their first stages, concentrated on rooting their doctrine inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until oil revenues allowed them to begin the process of ideological export in the mid 1950's. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in the late 1920's also attempted to spread across the region with little success. The penetration by the Ikhwan of Arab societies was slow and suppressed by authoritarian regimes. Taking advantage of the East-West confrontation fro decades, global Salafists (Wahabbis, Ikhwan, and others) focused on expanding Islamist ideology inside the Arab and Muslim world. I term these efforts as the first War of Ideas engaged by the Islamists within their own societies while the West and the Soviets were waging their mutual ideological and propaganda wars at each other. In a sense, the first War of Ideas launched by the world's jihadists - first the Salafists and followed later by the Khomeinists - profited from the capitalist - Marxist clash of ideas to score advances within Muslim societies and assert the slogan often chanted "la sharqiya, la gharbiya, umma wahda Islamiya" (No East, No West, one and unique Islamic Umma). It took the Salafists and the Khomeinists the bulk of the twentieth to organize their movements and rise to influence. Sheikh Yussuf Qardawi, leading ideologue of the modern jihadist movement and top commentator on al Jazeera for more than a decade, often asserted that "Islamist awareness" was moving forward and upwards after the collapse of the Caliphate, taking advantage of the titanic clashes taking place within the infidel world (kuffar), first during World War II and then during the long Cold War. In his estimate, the spread of the Islamist ideology - at the expense of its liberal and secular competitors - was possible partly because the powers on the same side were destroying each other: fascists versus Allies then democracies versus Communists. Khomeinism had a similar assessment of the success. Ideologues such as Sheik Hassan Fadlallah, an ideological mentor of Hezbollah, often theorized that the Islamist forces were able to surge dramatically in the Muslim and Arab world because of the failure of the West to attract youth and the public to "progressive and liberal ideals."
But this global ideology of Islamism-jihadism, emerging between the two postwar giants, had its own rivalries and difficulties. Sunni-backed Salafism and Shia-rooted Khomeinism were at odds on doctrinal, theological and political levels. Wahabbis and Ikhwan framed Iran's Islamism as "unorthodox". The mullahs in turn accused the Sunni Islamists of reinstating the oppressive Muawiya Caliphate at the expense of the Shia. Jihadism's two branches did not rise to merge; that is a firm finding. But both trees developed common grounds, even though not in coordination: the culture of jihadism against all infidels, liberal and progressive Muslims, the West, Communism, Israel, India, Russia, as well as against any polytheist Asian and African cultures. Global Jihadism had more in common against the rest of humanity than differences within the ranks of the jihadists. Hence the ideological efforts by the Wahhabis, Ikhwan, Deobandis (branches of Salafism), and the Khomeinists converged into the creation of the vastest pool of indoctrinated jihadists in modern times. The radicalization within Muslim societies and its Diaspora that the international society began to discover and worry about as of 9/11 began decades ago at the hands of a long-range, patient, and relentless double network of Islamist -jihadists, backed by significant financial resources made available by oil revenues. The first War of Ideas was essentially ideological and educational. The jihadist networks concentrated most of their efforts on widening the pool of indoctrinated youth via madrassas, mosques, Hawzas, orphanage, hospitals, state propaganda, and religious policies, in addition to political movements.
The forces of radicalization differed in their strategies on confrontation with the foe. The Salafists designated Communism as their main enemy, relegating Western capitalism to the position of future enemy. Hence Wahabis and Ikhwan escalated the fight against the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes and parties, culminating in the clash in Afghanistan after 1979. For that purpose the Salafi web accepted a tactical alliance with the United States and the West to achieve the immediate goal. This attitude was explained - wrongly by western apologists - as a real long term alliance the Islamists against the Marxists. The price of such an interpretation was for America and its allies to abandon liberals, human rights activists, and minorities to the advantage of the Islamists. This abandonment was the first strategic failure of the United States to predict the future: scrambling after 9/11 to find moderates is really too late after decades of laissez-faire. However, there was another reason for this abandonment of democratic forces in the region. Indeed, the 1973 oil shock sent a strong message to Western industrialized democracies: hands off domestic affairs of the region's regimes, which also translated in forbidding the free world from assisting liberal causes under authoritarian regimes as was the case with the Kurds, Berbers, Southern Sudanese, dissidents, Arab democrats and so on. On their part, the Iranian jihadists condemned both "infidel powers" equally. Ayatollah Khomeini blasted the USSR and the United States simultaneously as "Satan" but his regime and its ally Hezbollah targeted America intensely. The slogan al mawt li amreeka (Death to America) was shouted twenty two years before the planes of the al Qaeda blasted the Twin Towers. In short, Western concessions to the Islamists during the Cold War allowed the later to expand their ideology geometrically and irreversibly.
The Second War of Ideas (1990-2001)
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the rapid democratization of central and Eastern Europe, the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the crumbling of the last militarist regimes in Latin America and with the signal sent by the Tiananmen Square protest, the earthquake produced by the explosion of democratic revolutions at he end of the Cold War shifted priorities for the global jihadist web. On the one hand, the examples of huge marches in the streets of downtowns formerly ruled by secret polices were too menacing for sister regimes in the Arab and Muslim world. Khomeinists, Wahabbis, Baathists, and other dictatorships in the region felt compelled to preempt potential democratic copycats in their own midst, costing power and wealth of the ruling elites. On the other hand, the Islamist networks, particularly those turned violent jihadists during the war in Afghanistan, realized their calling to replace the discredited authoritarian establishment in the Arab Muslim world. Hence a convergence of strategic interests came to life between traditional Islamists in power and surging Jihadists across the region. The new direction of the global wed targeted the West and its liberal democracies, but each stream had a different interest. The Wahabbis and other Islamists in power in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Sudan and other countries, the Iranian regime and the vast network of Muslim Brotherhoods with branches within Europe, North America poured sizeable funds, diplomatic influence, media and cadres into the most powerful battle of ideas in modern history. Their aim was to block the rise of awareness in the West regarding the necessity of backing the spread of democracy in the Greater Middle East and beyond. The main thrust of the second War of Ideas took place mostly in Europe's western democracies, the United States, Canada, and within other democracies. It was embodied by an immense investment of hundreds of millions of petro dollars in the educational, media, and intellectual institutions in the West specializing in foreign policy, national security, and other related academic fields. The goal was to delay the rise of a consciousness vis a vis the rise of jihadi ideologies and the severe problem of human rights in the region. After the West intervened on three continents to "back democracy," towards the end of the Cold War, many of the Muslim World's regimes feared a similar repeat in their countries. The best strategy employed by the elites was to take refuge under "religious legitimacy," and the best defense of this legitimacy was to create a barrage within the West obstructing any criticism of jihadism and its derivatives.
Accordingly, the chain of financial and lobbying moves in most influential liberal democracies was very successful. The petro dollar regimes, forming a consortium closer to cultural imperialism, targeted departments of Middle East studies, international relations, history and other political entities on American, European, and other Western campuses seizing control of setting the curriculum, determining the issues to research and teach and in many cases selecting the instructors and scholars. Oil funding practically eliminated the study of human rights, democratization, minorities, feminism, and jihadist ideologies from Western academia. Graduates of corrupted Middle East studies and its related fields populated the realms of the Foreign Service, mainstream media, and teaching. The 1990's witnessed the eradication of Western capacity to produce an independent knowledge of the region's multiple dramas and threats. The Second War of Ideas, mostly via soft power, subverted national security expertise in America and other democracies and took out its ability of lending support to civil societies south and east of the Mediterranean. While NATO intervened twice in Yugoslavia and the United States exclusively in Panama and Haiti, and East Timor was miraculously saved, the oppressed peoples of Southern Sudan and Lebanon, as well as ethnic communities in jeopardy such as in Darfur, the Kurds, the Berbers of North Africa, and many more were left to their fates. Women were abandoned to gender apartheid in Afghanistan and Iran and students and intellectuals were facing suppression across the region with little interest in Western capitals. The reason behind this general abandonment of the underdogs in the Arab and Muslim world was none other than the victories scored by authoritarian petro powers in America and Europe. Since the only "Middle East conflict" recognized by the public debate in the international arena was the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, all other "tragedies" were dismissed at interference in the region's affairs. Equally lethal to international investigation into the region's ideological debate was the more dangerous dismissal by petro lobbying of the nature of jihadism. The latter was framed as a spiritual enterprise, a theological question, and in best conditions, a mere reaction to U.S. policy and past European colonialism. The western public was deprived of a scientific - even - basic understanding of the jihadi doctrines, movements, and aims. The most efficient success of the second War of Ideas was to take out Western abilities to see the strategic expansion of the ideology at the roots of many terrorist movements and regimes.
Any investigation of either the mass human rights abused of the peoples inside the realm of the "Muslim world" or the nature of jihadism was met by a campaign of demonization and guilt imposition via concepts such as "Islamophobia," "Zionism", or "legacy of colonialism". The push by the petro regimes and their supporters during the 1990's was the shield under which pools of radicalization continued to grow in the East and public opinion was neutralized in the West. However, there were other, even more lethal, consequences of the second War of Ideas. The more radical jihadists, including al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other Salafists, and Hezbollah found the most fertile grounds in their own recruitment not only in the region but also within the West. The short ten years separating the end of the Cold war from the War on Terror were very dense in ideological warfare waged by the global jihadist web. But the latter has morphed into three large creatures, two of Salafi nature and one Khomeinist. The classical Salafi mainstream continued to include the Wahabbis, Muslim Brotherhood, and the Deobandis. Their strategy was to resume the thrust of the first War of Idea into the post-Soviet era. Their efforts doubled inside the Muslim world, creating more media networks such as al Jazeera and expanding the madrassas, and also accelerated throughout the West by widening the funding of Middle East studies and backing the apologist lobbies. The essence of this group's war plans was to delay western awareness of the ideological threat while seizing the political culture in the regions as a permanent fact. However, the classical Salafists had no intentions on clashing openly and violently with liberal democracies, but on taking it from the inside, or at least paralyzing its counter-action for a long as needed until the war was won by ideological penetration. But the second generation of Salafists, led by the rise of al Qaeda, broke away from the stealth War managed by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahabbis. Bin Laden and his ilk shattered the camouflage by issuing two major declarations of jihad in 1996 and 1998 and by disseminating the corresponding fatwas throughout the radicalized pools. Al Qaeda's priority in the 1990's and beyond was to recruit for the military war and engage in it, not to expand jihadism silently among followers within the West. Hence 9/11 the changed the equation.
The Third War of Ideas (2001-2009)
By striking hard and at the heart of American society, al Qaeda shattered the "silent strategies" of the classical Salafists. The U.S. public rose to question the existence of a threat and thus demanded to know who that "enemy" is and what it wanted? Hence the debate about the existence of a foe was wide open in America leading to a debate about what to do about it. The Western War of Ideas began as a result of the shock of 9/11 but that war was not really won in eight years. Across the Atlantic the jihadists shook off the European public opinions by striking in Madrid and London and rising in France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. The third War of Ideas was in fact triggered by sensational jihadi actions in the West prompting two schools to clash: on the one hand, scholars claiming U.S. foreign policy is the trigger of terrorism. Gradually, more citizens were convinced that there was a threat coming from the Arab and Muslim worlds that they did not know enough about but there was a debate about its nature. Some literature focused mostly on the idea of the Islamic religion attempting to link violence to theology. Other research determined that the issue had more to do with ideology rather than strict religion. That is the debate inside the West. But the most dramatic dynamics of this third War of Ideas was the explosion of dissidence inside the Arab and Muslim world. Gradually since 2001 and increasingly since the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-jihadi forces and democracy voices expanded. Profiting from western debates, seizing opportunities on the battlefield to organize their own democratic agenda, and maximizing the use of alternative media such as Internet chat rooms and blogging, Arab, Middle Eastern, and Muslim dissidents and human rights activists shattered their side of the wall by bringing the story of oppression to the international arena. Former slaves from Sudan, ex-political prisoners, reformists, opposition leaders, exiles and other figures from democracy activism in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other parts of the region entered the discussion as to the battle of ideas. The issue was not reduced to being "Extremist" in the Arab and Muslim world or not; it became about being active in the struggle for democracy or being against it. Unlike its two predecessors, the Third War of Ideas widened in multiple directions:
First, by mean of a campaign by the classical jihadi powers (backed by oil producing regimes) to suppress two narratives in the West - one that jihadism is behind terrorism, and the second that democratic dissidence in the Middle East is the response to radicalization. Wahabbi and Khoeminist funding and influence have been fiercely attempting to counter the rise of consciousness about these two issues in liberal democracies. One of the main tools used by classical jihadi lobbying is the so called charge of "Islamophobia". Any investigation of Islamism - even as an ideology - is being met by attacks accusing the counter-jihadists and the democracy dissidents as anti-Islamic.
Second, a campaign by the international jihadists, al Qaeda, and its nebulous allies to further mobilize the body of militants into terror: This campaign runs parallel to the classical jihadi efforts to block the debate about jihadism. Hence, the combat jihadis are profiting from the shield provided by their competitors. In this third War of Idea, al Qaeda and Hezbollah recruit and radicalize using a lethal ideology, while the Wahabbis, Muslim Brotherhood, and the Iranian Khomeinists secure the protection of this ideology.
Third, western governments have been deploying efforts to de-radicalize the jihadists "after" they have been indoctrinated, which presents tremendous difficulties. The results have been meager and rarely show success, for short of responding to the ideological claims and delegitimizing them, western efforts are useless and costly.
Fourth, counter-jihadist NGOs and intellectuals in the West are attempting to awaken their own societies regarding the mounting threat. They hope to provoke a mass awareness of the menace leading to strategic measures. But the community of experts, commentators, and activists is divided as to the arguments and strategies. While some narrow their focus on theological debates, others concentrate on single issues. No global strategies in the War of Ideas have been duly set up.
Finally, democratic dissidents have continued to be active, but as for the counter-jihadi community, it is very divided and often focused on particular local causes.
The State of the War of Ideas 2009-
Under the Bush administration, the War of Ideas witnessed mutations and changes. While discourse at the level of the president, his main spokespersons and Congressional leaders from both parties regarding jihadism and democracy was moving in the direction of encouraging pluralism and isolating radicalism, the trickling down within the bureaucracy was not followed through. While the directives from the top levels aimed at encouraging an intellectual confrontation with the jihadist ideology and backing the pro-democracy forces, the body of experts tasked with the mission acted against the aforementioned goals leading to the collapse of U.S. backed efforts. Most projects, including media production, funded by the American taxpayer deviated from their original aim by pressure groups sympathetic to either Salafi or Khomeinist lobbies. Eight years after 9/11, government expertise in the domain of strategic communications was unable to define the ideology behind the threat and in many cases framed it as a socio-economical or political reaction to U.S. policy, not a sui generis doctrinal construct. The Bush administration's push to wage a campaign against the radicals was not followed by its own bureaucracy. Across the layers of the executive branch and agencies, including defense, intelligence, homeland security, and diplomacy, a compromised expertise halted the process of support to democracy forces, blocked public intellectual awareness of the jihadi threat, and moved to partner with Islamist movements at the expense of Muslim democrats. But the Bush administration's declarations in support of democracy in the region encouraged many NGOs, dissidents, and democracy activists to become bolder and engage in their own struggle on the frontlines against terror and extremism. Even if the Third War of Ideas from 2001 to 2009 did not produce strategic successes due to the influence of the oil producing regimes and their influence inside the West, the most successful results were ironically achieved by non supported segments of Middle East societies. In Lebanon, the Cedar Revolution took advantage of Franco-American pressure to engage in a democracy uprising. In Iran, the Green Movement, against all expectations in Western chanceries, showed tremendous popular representation particularly among youth and women in 2009. In Sudan, the Darfur human rights activist pushed for the cause of genocide to be heard. Iraq's democratic parties, although coming second after the traditional parties in elections (in 2010 elections they actually scored the highest numbers), rose again. In Afghanistan, women made strident advances in political integration. Minorities across the region became louder in their quest for cultural rights as the Berbers, Kurds, Assyrian-Chaldeans, and Liberals at large from the Peninsula to the Maghreb organized. The War of Ideas waged by the U.S. government was stymied by the combined efforts of international jihadi lobbies and hostile bureaucratic circles within the administration. But oddly the "freed" civil society forces in the region moved up and consolidated their gains.
In response to the rise of democratic and human rights elements in the Greater Middle East, jihadists and militant Islamists in the region and the Diaspora reverted to deterrence against liberal democracies to preempt the most dangerous menace against terror ideologies: an alliance between progressive forces in international society and liberal forces in the Muslim world. Hence a multi-pronged strategy was developed by regimes affiliated with the OIC and OPEC (mainly Iran, the Wahabbis, Muslim Brotherhoods, Qatar, Syria, Sudan, etc.) to block the realization of the alliance between the West and democrats in the Muslim world. The gist of this campaign is to deter the United States and its allies from backing the liberal forces in the region under the charge of "unilateral intervention in the affairs of other countries" while simultaneously blocking the democracy forces in the Muslim world from reaching out to the international community under the accusation of "serving the interests of imperialism and colonialism." The ultimate objective of the authoritarian and jihadi forces it to preemptively break the alliance between the free world and the suppressed civil societies in the region.
Inside the Arab and Muslim Diaspora in the West, the jihadists - both Salafists and Khomeinists - have been winning the battle of political socialization, simply because governments have been seeking the expert advice of an academia sympathetic to the Islamists. Both in Europe and in North America, jihadophiles do not exceed 12 percent of the communities but they control the "microphone" and relationship with authorities. Hence the representation of the silent majority is hijacked by the radicals. While the counter-jihadists, progressives, liberals, and human rights activists reach around 15 percent, their outreach to the majority is limited because of the failed policies of western governments, themselves relying heavily on an expertise compromised by the jihadi financial power.
With the Obama administration taking over, chances for going either direction are equal. The first African American presidency should be inclined to assist minorities in jeopardy worldwide and particularly in the Arab world. In principle, an Obama presidency cannot avoid coming to the rescue of Darfur, Mauritania's slaves, Algeria's Berbers, as well as assist the Kurds, the Lebanese, women, students, and other suppressed segments of Middle Eastern societies. But the Obama administration's engagement in dialogue with the Iranian and Syrian regimes and potentially with the Taliban and other jihadists can have significant consequences on the state of democracy forces in the region. In addition, the adoption of a lexicon by the U.S. and European bureaucracies calling for a ban on the use of terms indicting the jihadists will also strengthen the influence of the radicals instead of curbing their appeal. The next few years will better show in which direction the U.S. government and the West will go in terms of the War of Ideas. Most evidence indicated that the authorities will withdraw from this ideological confrontation, leaving the arena to the jihadi lobbies. But there is evidence that democracy forces in the region, even if abandoned by the west, will continue to struggle in their own War of Ideas against the jihadists and authoritarians.
Conclusion
If the U.S. government (both the administration and Congress) would change course from engagement with the authoritarian regimes to engagement with civil societies, and if other liberal democracies would come together in shaping a joint strategy of confronting radicals by allying themselves with the democrats in the Greater Middle East, I would make the following policy recommendations to win the third War of Ideas.
First, identify the counter-jihadi and liberal activists and intellectuals within the Muslim, Arab and Middle Eastern communities in the West and empower them so that they can present an alternative to their communities in the battle of ideas and let the debate take place naturally. If given equal opportunities, the democratic will win these debates.
Second, identify the progressive, liberal and democratic forces as well as human rights activists in the Muslim and Arab world and across the Greater Middle East and extend enough help to enable them to engage in their own battle of arguments and ideas. The most powerful response to radicalization is democratization, not in terms of political progress only (election and vote) but in terms of political culture. When individuals choose democratic political culture, they opt for pluralism and the respect of human rights as recognized universally. And when they do so, they reject Salafism and Khomeinism and the latter's interpretation of conflicts and international relations.
Third, engage in mass public education and information of civil societies in the West and throughout liberal democracies about the threat of jihadism as an ideology and the challenge faced by the region's democrats. Without a full understanding of the confrontation by the public in the United States, Europe and other democracies, no international support can be sustained to win the War of Ideas.
Fourth, address the ideological roots of terror as a prelude to addressing its political grounds. One needs to remove jihadi terrorism from the equation to allow Palestinians and Israelis to reach peace, the Lebanese to reach security, and the Iranians, Syrians, Sudanese, and other societies achieve social peace.
But above all, regardless of where government policies will head and the choices to be made by leaders and politicians in the years to com, it is crucial to continue the debate and develop platforms for an ongoing discussion of the problem. The ideologically rooted threat cannot be dismissed as a side effect of politic as usual. It has and will continue to have a profound and dramatic effect on human history. The goal of any War of Ideas must be to advance freedom and equality as solid for stability and peace.
***Professor Walid Phares is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an advisor to the Counter Terrorism Caucus of the US House of Representatives. He is the author of the The War of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy
April 9, 2010 12:02 AM Print