LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
August 25/12

Bible Quotation for today/
Sirach/Chapter 3/1-16/: "Children, pay heed to a father's right; do so that you may live. For the LORD sets a father in honor over his children; a mother's authority he confirms over her sons. He who honors his father atones for sins; he stores up riches who reveres his mother. He who honors his father is gladdened by children, and when he prays he is heard. He who reveres his father will live a long life; he obeys the LORD who brings comfort to his mother. He who fears the LORD honors his father, and serves his parents as rulers. In word and deed honor your father that his blessing may come upon you; For a father's blessing gives a family firm roots, but a mother's curse uproots the growing plant. Glory not in your father's shame, for his shame is no glory to you! His father's honor is a man's glory; disgrace for her children, a mother's shame. My son, take care of your father when he is old; grieve him not as long as he lives. Even if his mind fail, be considerate with him; revile him not in the fullness of your strength. For kindness to a father will not be forgotten, it will serve as a sin offering--it will take lasting root. In time of tribulation it will be recalled to your advantage, like warmth upon frost it will melt away your sins.

Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources
Sheik Bachir: Lebanon Will Always Remember You/By: Elias Bejjani/August 24/12
Lebanon's Shiite-Maronite Alliance of Hypocrisy/By Hilal Khashan/Middle East Quarterly/August 24/12
Turkey's Syria Split/By: Soner Cagaptay/Washington Institute/August 24/12
Egypt's Outreach to China and Iran Is Troubling for U.S. Policy/By: David Schenker and Christina Lin /Los Angeles Times/August 24/12

Sheik Bachir: Lebanon Will Always Remember You
By: Elias Bejjani
August 24/12
John13/15: "The greatest love you can have for your friends is to give your life for them".
Lebanon and its free patriotic citizens, all over the world remembered on Thursday 23/12 with pride, honour and pain Sheik Bachir's 30th anniversary presidential day. The "Dream" leader Sheik Bachir Gemayel was elected president for Lebanon on 23 August/1982.
Sadly Sheik Bachir was assassinated by Syrian agents before he was able to assume his presidential responsibilities because these stone age terrorists feared his honesty, nationalism, devotion, determination, courage and strong will.
Sheik Bachir who successfully led the Lebanese Christian resistance against the PLO and the Arab dictatorships, fanatic regimes and their terrorist organizations is seen as a unique national and patriotic hero in many Lebanese eyes. He is still considered to be a remarkable leader that they love, adore and cherish. God bless his soul.
Sheik Bachir was extremely faithful, devoted to Lebanon's cause of freedom, committed to the Lebanese rights and dignity, never compromised on his solid and transparent national stances or cajoled or appeased on the account of his Lebanese holy cause.
With strong self confidence, self respect, dignity and fear of Almighty God he continuously witnessed for the truth no matter what and openly and loudly uttered what must be said. He loved both his people and his country and accepted with no fear or hesitation to be a sacrifice on their alter.
Thirty years after his departure his dream, vision, and leadership role model are still vivid and alive in the souls hears and minds of many Lebanese in Lebanon and all over the world.
The Syrian Bathist assassins who are now killing and murdering their own people, were able to kill his body, but definitely failed to kill his dream in a sovereign, free and independent Lebanon.
Thirty years passed and the free Lebanese still strongly believe in Bachir's dream and are struggling with courage and faith to make it happen and become a reality. By God's will and blessings they will achieve this goal no matter what the sacrifices will be.
Sadly the majority of the current corrupted and deviated Lebanese officials, religious and political leaders are dead in the eyes of the many free Lebanese, while in reality these leaders are still alive and breathing.
Meanwhile Bachir who was assassinated 3o years ago is still alive in the hearts and minds of many patriotic Lebanese.
Those criminals and terrorists who killed Bachir, killed only his ash body, but failed to kill his dream or his the deeply rooted love in the hearts of the Lebanese
Every Free and Patriotic Lebanese is Bachir, and that's why Bachir is still alive as well as his dream.
Long Live Freedom

Beirut MP Nadim Gemayel: Syria revolt a battle for Lebanese and Syrians
August 24, 2012/The Daily Star /BEIRUT: The Syrian uprising against the regime of President Bashar Assad is a battle of both Lebanon and Syria against tyranny, Beirut MP Nadim Gemayel said Thursday. “Today, Syrians have taken the lead in the battle and they have decided to win their freedoms through this battle of the two peoples [Lebanese and Syrians] in two countries against the tyrant and the killer,” said Gemayel. Speaking on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of his father Bashir Gemayel’s election as president, Gemayel said that Lebanon had won after 30 years. “All of them have returned to Bashir’s beliefs, all Lebanese have returned to the 10,452 square kilometers,” said Gemayel. Bashir’s presidential campaign slogan in 1982 was 10,452 square kilometers. But Bashir was assassinated three weeks after his election. During a ceremony in Beirut’s Ashrafieh, Nadim Gemayel said that all Lebanese should be equal before the law and everyone should feel secure in this country. “We want a Lebanon in which a guard and the president’s son are equal, we want a Lebanon that does not ban theater simply because General Security does not understand it.”

March 14 Criticizes Calls to Lift Merehbi’s Immunity as Berri Set to Study Request
Naharnet /24 August 2012/Speaker Nabih Berri revealed that he will study an official request to strip MP Moeen al-Merehbi of his parliamentary immunity as the March 14 opposition alliance lashed out at Justice Minister Shakib Qortbawi threatening to resort to article 39 of constitution.
“I will study the matter before sending the request to the parliament's bureau and the administrative committee,” Berri told An Nahar newspaper on Friday.
He said in comment published in As Safir newspaper that the parliament will discuss the issue to take the right decision according to norms.
On July 31, the Army Command announced that it had “launched measures aimed at prosecuting Merehbi” after he “insisted on attacking the military institution and insulting its leadership.”
Earlier that day, Merehbi slammed Army Commander General Jean Qahwaji as an “unsuccessful person,” accusing him of being “responsible for all the mistakes and seditions.”
The lawmaker also said the army commander is “an employee who should do his job,” accusing him of “exploiting the (military) institution in order to become the next president of the republic.”
Merehbi has been locked in a war of words with the military institution ever since the shooting death in May of Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Wahed at an army checkpoint in Akkar.
The March 14 alliance threatened to resort to article 39 of the constitution, which states that “no member of the Chamber may be prosecuted because of ideas and opinions expressed during the period of his mandate.” However, article 40 states that “no member of the Chamber may, during the sessions, be prosecuted or arrested for a criminal offense without the permission of the Chamber, except when caught in the act.”March 14 MP Marwan Hamadeh, who is a member of the parliament’s bureau, slammed Qortbawi, describing the request as “unconstitutional.”
He hoped that Berri wouldn’t approve the Justice Minister’s request, stressing that it will not pass through the parliament’s bureau and the administrative committee’s meeting.
For his part, Qortbawi told As Safir daily that he based his request on article 91 of the parliament’s by-laws, noting that he received a memorandum from acting General Prosecutor Samir Hammoud specifying the accusations against Merehbi. “I am obliged to refer the request and I have no right to interfere in it,” Qortbawi said.
March 14 General Secretariat Fares Soaid also slammed the Justice Minister, arguing that his action is “unacceptable and unconstitutional.”
According to the parliament’s by-laws, the Speaker has to call on the parliament’s bureau and the administrative committee for a joint session if there was a request to lift the immunity off an MP.

Aoun says Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey “threaten our existence”
August 24, 2012 /Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun said on Friday that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar “threatened [Lebanon’s] existence” since they were intrinsically linked to the Western political intervention in the Middle East, the National News Agency reported on Friday.
“Those [who want to incite strife in Lebanon] count on the United States and Europe as they think that they might help them to win the internal battle. But these countries are only concerned about the welfare of Israel… Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar are linked to this Western policy which means that these countries threaten our existence,” Aoun said during a ceremony to commemorate the first anniversary of the establishment of a fundraising group for the FPM.He added that the threat was emphasized following the establishment of a new political regime in Tunisia after which it “spread to invade Syria, Akkar and then Tripoli.” “Lebanon is in danger,” the FPM leader also warned.
Lebanon's political scene is split between supporters of the embattled regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, led by Hezbollah, and the pro-Western March 14 coalition.
Fighting linked to the troubles in Syria broke out late Monday night between pro- and anti-Syrian regime gunmen from Sunni and Alawite groups, whose rival district—Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen respectively—are divided by a thoroughfare called Syria Street.
-NOW Lebanon

Sheikh killed in North Lebanon’s Tripoli
August 24, 2012 /A young Sunni sheikh was killed in the North Lebanon’s Tripoli early Friday as new clashes erupted between pro- and anti-Syrian factions dashing a tenuous truce.
Sheikh Khaled al-Baradei, 28, was killed when fierce fighting broke out at dawn between residents of the anti-Syrian Sunni Muslim Qobbeh district and the neighboring pro-Damascus Alawite district of Jabal Mohsen, the correspondent said. The exchanges of rocket-propelled grenade and rocket fire sparked large fires in the two neighborhoods in the east of the Mediterranean port city, Lebanon's second largest. The sheikh's death brought to 12 the number of people killed in clashes in the city over the past five days, stoking fears of a major spillover of violence from neighboring Syria.
A further 86 people have been wounded. Meanwhile, the National News Agency reported that “some masked gunmen” were roaming Tripoli’s streets, setting fire to a number of stores.
Several families displaced by the fighting had returned to the districts on Thursday afternoon to inspect the damage to their homes, as the truce had appeared to take hold.
Hundreds of soldiers with tanks and military vehicles were deployed on the aptly named Syria Street – which acts both as the dividing line between the two districts and as the frontline when fighting erupts.
A wave of kidnappings preceded the latest round of fighting and rattled the already fragile security situation in Lebanon, which lived under three decades of Syrian domination.
Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Miqati, a native of Tripoli, on Wednesday raised fresh concern over "efforts to drag Lebanon more and more into the conflict in Syria when what is required is for leaders to cooperate ... to protect Lebanon from the danger." The authorities have instructed the army and security forces "to bring the situation under control, to prohibit any armed presence and to arrest those implicated" in the violence, he said in a statement.-AFP

Tripoli’s fighters
Ana Maria Luca/Now Lebanon/ August 24, 2012
Lebanese army tanks were deployed last night on several main streets of Tripoli after two days of fierce fighting between Sunnis and Alawites in their neighboring enclaves of Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen that killed 12 people and left scores injured. The boost in security came as Prime Minister Najib Miqati held a security meeting in his hometown with state and local figures to lay out a plan for Tripoli’s political leaders to provide full support to the army, which is getting ready to deploy in 20 locations in Jabal Mohsen and in another 10 locations in Bab al-Tabbaneh. “The situation in Tripoli is relatively stable,” Miqati said after the meeting at his residence. “We are making [all possible efforts] to prevent [the situation in] Tripoli and all of Lebanon [from exploding].”
The situation was stable indeed in Bab al-Tabbaneh around 5 p.m. on Thursday, while the fighters held their own meeting in an office in Zahrieh, an area near Bab al-Tabbaneh. The young men, all in their early 20s, sat and drank pineapple juice, exchanged impressions about the day’s fighting and discussed the current political situation in Lebanon and next-door Syria, where the regime is battling an armed rebellion that is spreading into Lebanon.
Abu Omar, a well-built 24-year-old who sells cell phones for a living, wore a white T-shirt and jeans on his break, though an hour earlier he was equipped with military gear and was shooting his M16 toward Jabal Mohsen. Abu Omar has been taking part in skirmishes with Jabal Mohsen fighters since he was 15. At first he and his friends would shoot at the area just to have fun, but then he started to understand the cause, he said.
“We are Sunnis and they are Alawites. We could hear them saying bad words about us and our religion on their walkie-talkies. Yes, it’s all sectarian. We have to defend our land. We are all fighting there together, people like me who are not religious Salafists or Islamists. It’s our home,” he said. Abou Omar is usually positioned in Souq al-Qameh with 13 other young men from the neighborhood.
The current battle started on the second day of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr. According to locals, a few children were playing on Syria Street, which divides Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh. “They shot at the kids from Jabal Mohsen. We retaliated,” Abu Omar said. He is convinced that it was a provocation ordered by well-trained pro-Syrian factions in Tripoli, namely Hezbollah. “There are Hezbollah snipers in there. I know for a fact. I tested them,” he said. “I was in Souq al-Qameh, and I put a small teddy bear in a cart and pushed it. The bullet hit the teddy bear. There is no way somebody can shoot that well without training. The guys in Jabal are like us, not trained. But this guy knew what he was doing.”
He says he and his comrades won’t stop fighting, no matter how destructive it is for both sides. Now it is not just between Sunnis and Shiites, but also about the Syrian uprising. Bab al-Tabbaneh is hosting an estimated 20,000 Syrian refugees and anti-Assad regime activists. Jabal Mohsen residents tend to side with the Syrian government.
“They are our friends and we need to protect them,” Abou Mustafa, another young man from the neighborhood, said of the Syrians taking refuge in Bab al-Tabbaneh. “They don’t fight with us. There are no Syrians fighting in Tabbaneh. If they want to fight they go to fight the Assad regime in Syria. But we protect our friends and their families while they are here.”
Abou Omar agrees. “What I tell you now is what any man fighting in this neighborhood will tell you. This is far from over. It has been happening for years and years. Every now and then we shoot at each other, us and the guys from Jabal Mohsen. But this time it’s different. It’s going to get worse.” In addition, the Shiite Moqdad clan, which kidnapped scores of Syrians in Lebanon in retaliation for a member of the tribe being taken by rebels in Damascus, said Friday is the deadline for the rebels to release their relative. “Tomorrow all hell will break loose,” Abu Omar said before leaving to retake his position in Souk al-Qameh.
Thursday night Salafist Sheikh Khaled al-Baradei was killed during the clashes. Intermittent gun battles could be heard from Bab al-Tabbaneh and Jabal Mohsen in the morning. By 8 a.m., masked gunmen were roaming Tripoli’s streets, burning shops in Nour Square, and business owners were closing their shops and offices.

Lebanon's Arabic press digest - Aug 24, 2012/The Daily Star
Lebanon's Arabic press digest.
An-Nahar
Renewed cover for the Army
Sleiman retracts decision to go on vacation
Amid the shaky truce in Tripoli following the ceasefire announced Wednesday night and the heavy Army presence to guarantee it, developments in the capital of the north prompted a change in agendas due to a diplomatic and political alert regarding the consequences.
As a result, two Cabinet sessions were scheduled, one for the 29th [of Aug.] at the Grand Serail and another for Sept. 5 at Baabda Palace. The decision to set the dates for the sessions was made after it became clear that postponing [the matter] would bring about a political crisis inside the Cabinet and between its components.
An-Nahar has obtained information that President Michel Sleiman postponed a vacation with his family to Italy to resolve outstanding issues in the country.
As-Safir
Tripoli-the victim: The calm of the tanks ... doubles the fear
Tripoli is relatively calm but afraid, due to the proliferation of arms that are subject to no political authority, as the Army deploys following "dialogue" while politicians withdraw from the equation despite their noisy rhetoric.
The scene in Tripoli began scaring the city's figures with [the threat of] imminent danger while the international community voiced its fear that the Syrian fire might reach all of Lebanon, which is what French Foreign Affairs Minister Laurent Fabius said.
He said: "There are groups in Syria and Lebanon working to transfer the Syrian contagion to Lebanon and we should prevent that."
Al-Akhbar
Mikati: I will not resign, and Saudi is with me
Even though the prime minister desires to quit, he will not do so for fear of creating a vacuum, and has pointed out that Saudi Arabia agrees with him. With regard to security matters, sniping has replaced clashes in Tripoli, leading to more deaths and injuries in the absence of an effective solution to the crisis -- other than the lifting of cover from transgressors.
Al-Joumhouria
Belated government intervention in Tripoli and warrants for the pursuit of the kidnappers to be issued today
Despite the accumulation of incidents and the multiplication of political [matters], the security situation in Lebanon remained the focus of international and local attention. And while the axes of fighting witnessed a tentative ceasefire and cautious calm interrupted occasionally by sniper fire, political attempts at finding a solution continued. After several days of fighting, Prime Minister Mikati headed to his hometown [of Tripoli] to monitor the security situation in the area, after having called on the Cabinet to meet on Wednesday, Aug. 29 at the Grand Serail [in Beirut].

Israeli PM: Iran accelerating nuclear work
Attila Somfalvi Published: 08.24.12/Ynetnews
Netanyahu says new reports of increased uranium enrichment at Fordo prove Tehran flouting international demands
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Friday that the reports suggesting that Iran has installed new centrifuges in its Fordo facility are proof that it is pursuing nuclear weapons and has, in fact, accelerated its nuclear work.Iran's actions, he added, are "In utter disregard of international demands."Netanyahu's remarks were made during a meeting with Congressman Mike Rogers (R-MI), who is visiting Israel.
On Thursday, US diplomatic sources reported that the Islamic Republic has installed new uranium enrichment centrifuges in an underground bunker in its Fordo facility, which is harbored inside a mountain near Qom. One diplomatic source said Thursday that Iran has installed up to 100 new centrifuges in the facility, whose location is one particularly immune to aerial strikes.
A detailed account of Iran's believed activity in Fordo is expected to be included in the next IAEA report on Tehran's nuclear endeavors

Israel's most unsecured border
Yoav Zitun Published: 08.24.12/Ynetnews
Sinai smugglers face crackdown around Egyptian border but may soon find an alternative route via Jordan, where border area is alarmingly exposed. Residents fear this will be source of next terror attack
Gabi Green, a lifelong farmer, crosses his giant melon field that separates the houses of Kibbutz Lotan and the Jordanian border. Just 50 km (31 miles) north of Eilat, the peace and serenity in kibbutz Lotan is evident. Children playing and splashing in the kibbutz pool can be heard from afar on a hot summer day. As Green drives across his field, he stops and points at a low barbed-wire fence that could easily be penetrated. Green then points at a small sign posted on the fence and reads: "This is the kingdom of Jordan. Next to the official sign, another broken and dusty sign hangs on the fence, declaring that this is the border set during the Israel–Jordan Treaty of Peace in 1994. Over the fence, one can see a Jordanian military outpost in the distance.
This is the "border" that separates Israel from one of the only countries that has yet to endure the consequences of the Arab Spring: Some 260 km (161 miles) of open land with a dilapidated barbed-wire fence. Any one can cross the border, go in, go out, by car or by foot, at daytime or nighttime. The State of Israel invests billions of shekels in restoring and building the fence in the more volatile borders. It can even find a way around the budgetary constraints when it comes to building the fence in those areas. While on the western side of the southern Negev, the efforts to complete building the fence are well underway, Ynet learned this week that on the other side, the situation is not looking so good.
According to the Defense establishment, the border with Jordan – the safest of Israel's borders – is generally divided into two: the Arava sector and the Jordan Valley sector. The Jordan Valley sector is the more sensitive of the two not only because of its hilly terrain but rather because of the "corridor" which surrounds the Jordan Valley Road that separates Jordan from the West Bank, Palestinian territories and settlements. In this sector, which stretches upon 100 km (62 miles), a security fence exists. However, only several parts of it have been significantly upgraded over the past few months. The IDF is preparing to reorganize the radar and observation layout, in effort to increase its control on the area. In the Arava sector, the fence appears to be even more dilapidated than the fence Israel had on the border with Egypt, prior to building a new one.
During Ynet's investigation in the area, we found that certain sections of the fence that are near to Kibbutzim, are easily penetrable. Near Kibbutz Lotan for instance, we could in broad daylight stand on Jordanian territory uninterrupted for quite a while. Army patrols in the area are limited due to faulty roads, tall shrubs and generally tough terrain which leave the area more exposed to terror attacks.
This area is part of a new terror smuggling route which may serve terrorists in the near future – from Gaza to south Sinai, from Sinai to Jordan via the sea and from Jordan to Israel. IDF officials fear that as the Egyptian border becomes more secure, Sinai smugglers will start to relocate their efforts and use the Jordan route.
Infiltrators, illegal migrants and terrorists can expect to run into a more prepared and qualified force than the several scattered Egyptian policemen who patrol the western border. The Jordanian soldiers are well prepared and well equipped with weapons from the US. However, the vast open space and the run down fence can easily be harnessed by potential infiltrators.
"Last weekend, five Turkish infiltrators entered Israel through the Arava sector, and four Pakistanis also attempted to enter the country but were arrested. We haven't seen many African infiltrators but there are signs indicating that it is not too far ahead," the IDF's Jordan Valley Division Commander Nochi Mendel said.
"It is obvious that if Jordan is weakened that we will eventually find Iranians on the fence," he added.
"The Jordanian soldiers keep looking over at Jordan," a reserve soldier on a break from a patrol said. "We don't talk to them. When I was here on active duty it was the same. Once we got here we were told, drive slowly no matter what. There will be no chases."
Yoni Roth, the IDF security officer for Kibbutz Ketura, which is less than 3 kilometers from the border, has more concerns. Yoni and his friends at the Kibbutz's emergency squad will have just a few short-barrel M-16 rifles at their disposal to use against any terrorists before soldiers arrive at the scene. "Personally, it really stresses me out because we're a very secluded community," he says. "There are hardly any forces between Eilat and Ein Yahav. It's not reassuring knowing that the army patrol comes by once every few hours when what stands between me and the other side is one sand dune. Once every three weeks when I get a new reserve outfit, the first thing I ask them: 'When there's a real alert, get here fast." Roth describes a quiet routine where the most dramatic event is migrant infiltrations. "We don't have Gaza to deal with, but based on what's going on around us, I would say the threat is getting nearer." Asked about his Jordanian neighbors, Roth says that "to the best of my knowledge they are pushing for a fence to be installed and are doing their job well. But I'm not waiting for the day when we'll be forced to learn that things aren't so calm here after all."
Green, the farmer who accompanied us at Kibbutz Lotan is even less optimistic. "Sometimes I work in the fields at night. Who will know if I'm kidnapped? Terrorists can enter the kibbutz easily and access communities west of the Arava Highway within 15 minutes, spray bullets at kindergartens or open fire at the pool. I guess things will only get moving once there is a terrorist attack."
The IDF Spokesperson's Unit said in response, "The IDF is constantly monitoring the changes along the borders and working to face the challenges in order to protect Israel and its residents. A year ago the IDF set up the Arava Territorial Brigade which controls the eastern border area, from the Dead Sea to north Eilat. The creation of the brigade is part of a reassessment of the IDF's defense readiness."
Addressing the migrant infiltration problem, the IDF said: "There is ongoing operational activity including foot and vehicle patrols as well as the thwarting of infiltration attempts by forces on the ground."
IDF sources added that "The Jordan peace deal is a strategic asset both for Israel and Jordan and it's in both sides' interest to maintain it."
The prime minister's bureau said that work is being done to promote the construction of a barrier on the eastern border. "There are no infiltrations on the Jordanian border which is secure but the issue of the fence is being handled based on the recognition that shutting the border with Egypt will result in infiltrations through Jordan."

Turkey's Syria Split
By: Soner Cagaptay
CNN Global Public Square/Washington Institute
August 22, 2012
Turkey is divided on what course to pursue in Syria, and the AKP's ability to sell a more muscular policy is by no means guaranteed.
Following this week's suicide bombing in the Turkish city of Gaziantep, Turkey's government has hinted at Syrian complicity in the attacks, with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu noting, for example, parallels between the bombing and the Syrian regime's tactics.
Such a mindset brings Turkey a step closer to taking action against Damascus. Yet despite such comments, the country is far from united around a policy for taking down Bashar al-Assad's regime anytime soon. These domestic differences have some interesting echoes from almost a decade ago, when Turkey was torn over involvement in another conflict -- the Iraq war.
In 2003, Turkey's recently elected Justice and Development Party (AKP) government supported U.S. efforts in the Iraq war despite significant domestic opposition. In doing so, the Islamist-rooted organization was apparently keen to enamor itself with Washington, thereby gaining leverage against the then powerful Turkish military.
Given how polarized the Turkish political landscape is between the AKP and its secularist opponents, the party's support for U.S. foreign policy resulted in an interesting twist: secularist Turks and their pro-Western military opposed the war in Iraq, while the Islamist-rooted AKP supported it.
Almost a decade later, Turkish politics are still polarized -- in last year's elections, the country was split down the middle, with almost exactly half of voters opting for the ruling party. Ankara's position over al-Assad's regime has led to a 2003-like scenario all over again: the AKP stands with Washington on Syria, while its domestic opponents take issue with the idea of Ankara confronting al-Assad.
For over a year, the main opposition, the secular Republican People's Party, has refused to support the AKP's Syria policy, although the leftist party has edged a little closer to the government's position, proposing an international conference to tackle the crisis.
Meanwhile, having been defanged by the AKP over the past decade, the Turkish military now shies away from clearly voicing opposition to the government's policies, though in private the military is known to be urging the government to ease up over Syria lest Turkey risk being left to confront Syria -- without U.S. backing.
But nationalist Turks, including those under the AKP's big right-wing tent as well as those in the opposition Nationalist Action Party (MHP), have started to more openly criticize Ankara's Syria policy. Such concerns are no doubt exacerbated by recent media reports that Turkey not only hosts the Syrian opposition, including the Syrian National Council (SNC), but might also be providing arms to the rebels.
Opponents of this policy believe that Ankara's policies could usher in a dramatic collapse of the al-Assad regime that could be taken advantage of by Syrian Kurdish groups pushing for an independent Kurdish state. Such groups also fear that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a group that has waged a violent campaign against Turkey for decades, could take advantage of the post-al-Assad vacuum to establish itself firmly inside Syria.
But even some core AKP members seem to disagree with policies that could precipitate al-Assad's downfall. Take, for instance, the small group of pro-Tehran AKP politicians who are known to have sympathies for Iran. This group certainly doesn't relish the prospect of Ankara becoming embroiled in a proxy war against Iran in Syria, with Tehran standing behind the al-Assad regime and Turkey supporting the opposition.
Back in 2003, the AKP's plans to offer the U.S. assistance in Iraq were thwarted when a vote in the Turkish parliament to authorize the war failed on a technicality -- the required quorum wasn't present, despite the AKP mustering a majority of the votes (although opinion polls showed significant public opposition to the war). Fast forward almost a decade and Turkey is divided again -- and the government's chances of pushing forward a more muscular policy are by no means guaranteed.
*Soner Cagaptay is director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute.

Lebanon's Shiite-Maronite Alliance of Hypocrisy
by Hilal Khashan/Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2012, pp. 79-85
http://www.meforum.org/3310/lebanon-shiite-maronite-alliance
On February 6, 2006, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and leader of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) Michel Aoun signed a memorandum of understanding, ostensibly to build a consensual Lebanese democracy on the basis of transparency, justice, and equality.[1] However, a careful examination of the agreement shows that its real goal was the neutralization of Sunni political power, especially after the 2005 assassination of the powerful Sunni statesman and former prime minister Rafiq Hariri.
Politics makes strange bedfellows as Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah a Shiite, joins Michel Aoun, a Christian Maronite and leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, 2006. The two may detest each other personally but find it convenient to ally themselves against the Sunni Arab population of Lebanon.
The memorandum's allusion to limiting the influence of money on politics and combating business and bureaucratic corruption hinted at the Sunni leadership's vast financial and entrepreneurial assets. Conversely, its insistence on the right of Lebanese expatriates to participate in the country's elections sought to enlist the support of the mostly Christian immigrants in the Americas. Similarly, its attempt to link Lebanese national security to Hezbollah's arsenal aimed at legitimizing Shiite militarism.
Little of this had to do with Lebanon as a nation-state as much as with the attempt to preserve Shiite and Maronite power against the perceived Sunni threat. The result was a deeply unequal arrangement that has brought Hezbollah further into Lebanese politics while limiting Maronite options.
Shared Legacy of Religious Persecution
Neither Lebanon's Shiites nor Maronites felt at home under Ottoman domination, and Sunnis relegated both communities to inferior social status. Both communities found relative freedom in their mountain enclaves although they occasionally suffered from both the excesses of regional governors who burdened them with taxes and their local feudal leaders who impoverished them and denied them education, especially in the case of the Shiites. The strong Maronite church moderated some of the adverse effects of feudal leadership, mainly because it took it upon itself to contribute to the education of the community, building numerous schools as early as the eighteenth century, especially the famous La Sagesse school in 1875.[2] The church also played a crucial role in maintaining the cohesion of the community and preparing it for statehood. For example, Patriarch Elias Huwayik was instrumental in promoting the creation of Greater Lebanon, and in 1919, he travelled to the Versailles Peace Conference to pursue his objective.

The Shiites were less fortunate since they did not have their own religious establishment to take care of basic communal needs. The Sunni Ottoman state did not even recognize a separate communal status for the Shiites. Many Shiite clerics had modest education, and they generally had little impact on the affairs of the community. Shiites had to wait until 1926 to have their own religious court, thanks to the efforts of the French High Commissioner in Lebanon, Auguste Henri Ponsot, who wanted to empower them as a countervailing force to the Sunni community's growing pan-Syrian orientation. The Shiites only won their separate clerical institution in 1969 when Imam Musa Sadr established the Shiite Higher Islamic Council,[3] despite Sunni protests.

Slow Shiite Entry into Sectarian Politics
Under the French Mandate, Lebanon's Sunnis opposed the country's creation in 1920 and continued to demand reunion with Syria until after the Coastal Conference of 1936. During this period, the Maronites came to believe that they needed to foster good relations with the Shiites in order to provide "an ideological alternative to the Sunni-pan-Arab conception of Lebanon."[4] But the Shiites, who had languished under feudalism and Ottoman governors, remained quiescent.[5]

The Maronites eventually reached a settlement with the Sunnis in what became known as the National Covenant of 1943.[6] Most of the resources of the Lebanese political system were then divided between the Maronites and the Sunnis. The Shiites felt excluded and marginalized, and their sense of dispossession was articulated by Sadr upon his arrival in Lebanon in 1959 with the determination to politicize the Shiite community and to integrate it into the Lebanese political system on a par with the others. His ideas converged with the Maronites' vision for Lebanon, and they saw him as a "rising Muslim leader who readily and unconditionally identified with Lebanese nationalism."[7]

Among Sadr's contributions was the creation of the Amal movement in 1974, whose leader Nabih Berri became the speaker of the Lebanese parliament. Amal was the gateway to Shiite recruitment into the Second Republic after the signing of the Ta'if accords, a compromise brokered by Saudi Arabia and endorsed by the Syrian government, which ended the 15-year Lebanese civil war. Sadr disappeared in Libya in 1978 before he could see the full fruits of his contributions to Lebanese Shiites.

The creation of Hezbollah in 1982 with the help of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps[8] and the group's military successes against Israel also enhanced the Shiite community's political standing within Lebanon. During the later phases of the Lebanese civil war, Hezbollah allied itself with Syria and was exempted from the general disarmament negotiated under the 1989 Ta'if accords thanks to the Syrian regime's insistence on labeling it a resistance movement. For several years, Hezbollah chose not to enter fully into the Lebanese political system, but it began to slowly involve itself in local politics as early as the parliamentary elections of 1992.

Hezbollah jumped into national politics in 2005 after Hariri's assassination and the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon in April of that year. At that point, Nasrallah earnestly began to search for a major Maronite ally to help him navigate the turbulence of the country's politics.

From Sectarianism to Pan-Shiism
Southern Lebanese Shiites sought to join the Lebanese state in 1920, but a nation-state mattered little to the Shiite clans in the barren hills of the northern Bekaa Valley. Their feudal and clannish leaders regarded the idea of Lebanon as either ephemeral or secondary. This may help explain why Hezbollah—with its deep commitment to Iran's supreme leader—was born in the Bekaa and not in the south. Nasrallah is the party's first secretary-general from the south. Since his ascendancy, Hezbollah's upper echelons have been splintered along the long-standing Bekaa-southern divide despite the appearance of party cohesion. In sharp contrast to Shiites in the Bekaa, who looked outside the borders of Lebanon for identification, southern Lebanese Shiites were hardly attracted to Arab nationalism or pan-Syrianism and, instead, immersed themselves in local politics.

It was Nasrallah's personal decision to ally Hezbollah with Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement. His two predecessors, Subhi Tufaili and Abbas Musawi, both from the Bekaa, were less involved with Lebanese politics and worked primarily with Tehran and its representatives. The coming together of Nasrallah and Aoun did not signify ideological affinity or a sense of common cause: Their true perceptions of each other ranged from hostility to lack of interest. Nasrallah once described Aoun as a man "who only thinks of himself and his sect, and views members of other sects from the perspective of Maronite racism."[9] Less than six months before signing their memorandum, Aoun said he had two reservations that prevented him from collaborating with Nasrallah: "His intolerable preconditions for dialogue, and his relations with Syria and Iran."[10] Overcoming these perceptions to work together was a matter of practical politics against a common enemy. In reality, Hezbollah has given less and gotten more than the Free Patriotic Movement.

Maintaining the Shiite-Maronite alliance nominally requires concessions from both sides. For example, Hezbollah's 1985 manifesto specifically states the goal of building an Islamic state in Lebanon.[11] In view of Hezbollah's strong ideological orientation, there is no reason to assume that it has shelved the idea. But Hezbollah's domination of Lebanon was unthinkable in the 1980s when the movement's manifesto was written, and its leaders, especially Nasrallah, have learned the necessity for deemphasizing ideology in the name of politics and long-term strategy. For these reasons, Hezbollah tolerates Aoun's demands for expensive infrastructure and development plans, reform of state finances and the civil service, and the questionable biographies of some of his officials. Since the alliance with Aoun serves Hezbollah's long-term plans for Lebanon, the group also tends to downplay the involvement of Lebanese Christians in working with Israel. Thus, Hezbollah refrained from commenting on the high profile treason and espionage case of Fayez Karam, a senior official in Aoun's FPM, and influenced the military tribunal to give him a lenient sentence.[12]

Aoun is not oblivious to Hezbollah's strategy but feels his alliance with it will eventually secure the presidency for him.[13] He seems willing to tolerate Hezbollah's messianic religious ideology as long as it can help him maintain his status as the principal Maronite politician. Still, he appears uneasy about his alliance with Hezbollah; despite leading a bloc consisting of ten cabinet members and twenty-seven parliamentary deputies, Aoun realizes that failing to heed Hezbollah's dictates will cause a falling out with Lebanese Shiites and the Syrian regime.[14]

Tensions Abound
Despite their political alliance, there are clear conflicts of interest between the two partners. Hezbollah expects the alliance will eventually enable it to deconstruct the Lebanese political system and recast it in its theocratic mold, but the FPM needs to give the impression that Hezbollah is part of a national alliance and to make sure that the government does not question its military component. Hezbollah's need to operate with both Shiite and Sunni factions has led to conflicts with the FPM. For example, Hezbollah decided to join Prime Minister Najib Mikati in voting against the FPM-backed minimum wage increase which, if passed, would have created major financial burdens on Lebanon's sluggish economy. But to attenuate Aoun's fury at Hezbollah, the movement instructed its labor union activists and school representatives to participate in a one-day general strike to protest against the vote.[15]

Aoun did not seem to fully comprehend the extent of Hezbollah's commitment to keeping Mikati's government in place.[16] In fact, Hezbollah invested heavily in facilitating the formation of Mikati's cabinet and went so far as coercing the Amal Movement to give up one of its cabinet portfolios to Mikati so that he could appoint another Sunni from Tripoli, his hometown.[17] Mikati's is the first cabinet since the 1989 Ta'if accords that includes more Sunnis (seven) than Shiites (five). This was the price that Shiites had to pay in order to form an apolitical cabinet to maintain the status quo that favors Hezbollah. In contrast, the FPM seems persistently outmaneuvered.

In post-Ta'if Lebanese politics, the Syrians encouraged the extension of the term in office of the Lebanese president for three years, in addition to the regular six-year term, on the basis of a constitutional amendment on a one-time basis. The reelection of President Elias Hrawi in 1995 was uneventful, but renewing the term of President Emile Lahoud in 2004 was met with stiff opposition, and calls for his resignation mounted after the Hariri assassination and the formation of the March 14 coalition. While Lahoud could understand why Sunnis would oppose his reelection, he expressed dismay at Christian leaders in the coalition who demanded his resignation: "It is regrettable that those Christians do not appreciate the strategic importance of my alliance with Hezbollah and the Syrian regime."[18] Lahoud implied that he was allied with the Alawite leadership of Syria.

Shiites in Hezbollah and Amal have endorsed the Maronite church's proposal to enact the draft electoral law for transforming Lebanon into one electoral constituency, which would allow each community to elect its own parliamentary deputies.[19] Better known as the Boutros Commission, the draft law would, in effect, prevent the predominantly Sunni voters in Beirut, Tripoli, and Akkar from deciding which Christian candidates would win in the elections. This explains why Sunni politicians and civil society activists have fiercely denounced the draft electoral law.

Problems for Christians and Shiites
The present alliance between Nasrallah and Aoun coalesces rural Shiites and Maronites against urban Sunnis, bringing together the legacy of Shiite dispossession and Maronite incipient sense of political loss. Unlike previous Shiite-Maronite alliances, such as the one between feudal Shiite leaders and Maronite politicians (1920-58), and Sadr's rapport with the Maronite political establishment (1959-78), which were based on mutual strategic interests, the present one between the FPM and Hezbollah is an alliance of hypocrisy. Less than a year after the two sides signed their memorandum of understanding, FPM parliamentary deputy Ibrahim Kanaan told then-U.S. ambassador in Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman that Aoun was "the last person in Lebanon who wants to see Hezbollah's militia keep its arms."[20] But long-term trends suggest problems for both Christians and Shiites.

Neither Nasrallah nor Aoun seem to understand the extent of Lebanese Sunni frustration and their amenability to radicalization. Sheikh Muhammad Hassan, leader of the little known Free Shiite Trend, unsuccessfully implored Hezbollah to use reason and dialogue in communicating with the Sunni mainstream.[21] Instead, the movement chose to invade Beirut in May 2008 and topple Saad Hariri's cabinet in 2011. Nevertheless, Aoun, who often makes imprudent statements to describe Sunnis, believes that "a Shiite-Maronite alliance provides the only means to confront their threat, especially after the beginning of the Syrian uprising."[22]

Similar warnings for Hezbollah are appearing from other Lebanese factions. Maverick Shiite cleric Hani Fahs warned the movement's leadership against taking advantage of the weakness of the Lebanese state to monopolize political power to the detriment of society at large, and Sunnis in particular. He urged them to "avoid letting the Shiites face the fate of the Maronites."[23] Sunni writer Abdulhamd Ahdab urged Hezbollah to "revamp itself and decide to become an integral part of the Lebanese state, instead of scheming to steal it."[24] Later, he predicted that the "Shiite awakening is bound to lead to the rise of a counter Sunni awakening that can only lead to the disintegration of the state."[25] Former Hezbollah secretary-general Subhi Tufaili disparaged Nasrallah for unnecessarily antagonizing Lebanese Sunnis. He argued that the latter's policies risked undermining Shiite achievements of the past three decades, predicting that when the Sunnis mobilized politically, "Nasrallah will find himself compelled to ally himself with Israel against the Sunnis."[26] Clashes in Tripoli between Sunni Lebanese factions supporting the Syrian opposition and Alawites aligned with the Assad regime, and the presence of Sunni Hizb ut-Tahir and other radical caliphate groups, threaten to renew wider sectarian conflict throughout Lebanon. Neither Shiite nor Sunni commentators, however, are expressing much concern for the Maronite community or for Middle Eastern Christians.

The Shiite-Maronite Nexus and the Arab Uprisings
Hezbollah's support for the Arab uprisings has been perfunctory at best. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt advanced Sunni Islamist groups to the center stage of their countries' politics. Morocco did not witness an uprising, yet its general elections clearly demonstrated the strength of the Islamist movement. The Arab uprisings have revealed the strength of Sunni religious sentiment, and a Sunni revival is not something that Hezbollah welcomes, seeing this as something bound to stimulate Lebanese Sunnis, especially if the Syrian uprising leads to the ouster of the Assad regime.

By and large, Hezbollah's comments on the uprisings, including the unrest in Syria, have been muted, but in October 2011, Nasrallah made a rare public appearance to express support for the Assad regime and its "reforms."[27] In March 2012, he issued a statement on video warning of civil war in Syria and calling for both sides to seek a political solution. These comments must be seen in the context of the alliance between Hezbollah, Damascus, and Tehran—which has been strained by the Assad regime's violent repression of the uprising—and in the context of world and Lebanese opinion. At the same time, reports that Damascus continues to transfer weapons to Hezbollah and to train its operatives in the use of advanced weaponry[28] suggest that the organization's military needs ultimately trump its concerns regarding peaceful politics within Lebanon.

Maronite reaction to the uprisings has been similarly unenthusiastic, viewing them, by and large, as an unfolding disaster for Middle East Christians. Former Lebanese president Amin Jemayyil's response to the Syrian uprising has been lukewarm, and he appeared mostly concerned about its effects on Syria's Christian minority. Maronite patriarch Bishara al-Ra'i has ridiculed the notion of the "Arab spring," preferring to name it the "Arab winter." He considered the Syrian regime "the closest Arab political system to democracy."[29]

For his part, the prominent Lebanese Christian writer Michael Young has lamented the Maronites' alliance with Hezbollah and their antipathy to the Arab uprisings. In the fall of 2011, he wrote:

Maronites have the institutions, talent, and memory to reverse their community's steady mediocrization. What they don't have is the self-assurance required to reinvent themselves in the shadow of their demographic decline … [They] have adjusted to this decline by accommodating the view that their minority has a stake in allying itself with other minorities, no matter how repressive these may be. Such is the path to communal suicide.[30]

It is indeed ironic that the Lebanese Maronites who, in the nineteenth century labored hard to plant the seeds of liberal Western values in the Arab east, chose in the second decade of the twenty-first century to digress and dissociate themselves from the Arab uprisings, especially in Syria. Columnist Jihad Zein has expressed bewilderment, asking "why those educated and suave Christians treat the region's most modernizing era in many decades with reservation, if not outright hostility?"[31]

The short answer is that Lebanese Maronites are worried about the implications of the Arab uprisings for their own fate as a minority group whereas Shiites dread the consequences the upheaval might have on their pan-Shiite project. This unease bodes ill for Lebanon as a whole.

Hilal Khashan is a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut.

[1] Memorandum of Joint Understanding between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement, Feb. 6, 2006, Mideast Monitor, trans.
[2] "Un Devéloppment Equilibré," Université La Sagesse, accessed Apr. 2, 2012.
[3] Thomas Collelo, ed., "Lebanon's Geography: Islamic Groups," Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1987.
[4] Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 91.
[5] Ibid., p. 51.
[6] BBC News, "Lebanon Profile: A Chronology of Key Events," Jan. 11, 2012.
[7] Kamal S. Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (Delmar, N.Y.: Carvan, 1976), p. 63.
[8] "Terrorism: Hezbollah," International Terrorist Symbols Database, Anti-Defamation League, New York, accessed Mar. 22, 2012.
[9] An-Nahar (Beirut), Nov. 6, 1989.
[10] Al-Balad (Beirut), Aug. 14, 2007.
[11] Hezbollah manifesto, Beirut, Feb. 16, 1985, For a Better Lebanon, trans., Feb. 18, 2008.
[12] As-Siyasa (Kuwait), Sept. 8, 2011; as-Safir (Beirut), Jan. 25, 2012.
[13] Ali Abdul'al, "Ta'haluf Aoun-Hezbollah," Az-Zawiya al-Khadra (Beirut), Feb. 9, 2006.
[14] Al-Akhbar (Beirut), Dec. 13, 2012.
[15] Ibid., Dec. 15, 2011.
[16] Ibid., Dec. 10, 2011.
[17] Naharnet (Lebanon), June 14, 2011.
[18] Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), Feb. 18, 2006.
[19] The Daily Star (Beirut), Dec. 21, 2011.
[20] Ya Libnan (Beirut), Oct. 3, 2011.
[21] Al-Mustaqbal, Mar. 7, 2007.
[22] Now Lebanon (Beirut), May 20, 2011.
[23] An-Nahar, Nov. 24, 2009.
[24] Ibid., Jan. 13, 2006.
[25] Ibid., Mar. 3, 2007.
[26] Subhim Tufaili, interview, MTV (Beirut), Jan. 30, 2012.
[27] The National (Abu Dhabi), Oct. 26, 2011.
[28] The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 23, 2012.
[29] As-Siyasa, Mar. 14, 2012.
[30] Michael Young, "Maronites Pray to a Dispiriting Trinity," The Daily Star (Beirut), Sept. 22, 2011.
[31] An-Nahar, Sept. 14, 2011.
Related Topics: Lebanon | Hilal Khashan | Summer 2012 MEQ
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Syria’s tight grip on Lebanon slips as civil war progresses
By Zeina Karam/Associated Press
BEIRUT — The Syrian civil war has spilled over into Lebanon, bringing with it sectarian street clashes, mob violence and general government paralysis.
But it was the dramatic arrest earlier this month of a former Lebanese government minister and prominent supporter of Syria’s embattled president that has suggested the conflict may be causing Lebanon to slip further away from Damascus’ long domination.
The bloodshed in Syria has drawn Lebanon deeper into the unrest — a troubling sign for a country that has gone through its own 15-year civil war and has an explosive sectarian mix as well as deep divisions between pro- and anti-Syrian factions, many of which are armed.
The chaos could give Sunni Muslim fighters in northern Lebanon more leeway to establish supply lines to the rebels inside Syria in their battle to oust President Bashar Assad.
Tensions and intermittent fighting in the northern Lebanon city of Tripoli continued Wednesday after two days of clashes between pro- and anti-Assad groups that killed at least six people and wounded more than 70. Seventeen times bigger than Lebanon and four times more populous, Syria long has had powerful allies here, including the Iran-backed militant Hezbollah group that now dominates the government. For 30 years, Lebanese have lived under Syrian military and political domination.
That made the Aug. 9 arrest of former Information Minister Michel Samaha all the more shocking.
Samaha, one of Syria’s most loyal allies in Lebanon, was plucked from his bed at dawn by special police forces who burst into his summer mountain home. Within hours, various leaks began emerging that Samaha had confessed to having personally transported explosives in his car from Syria to Lebanon with the purpose of killing Lebanese personalities at the behest of Syria.
Two days later, a military court indicted Samaha, along with Syrian Brig. Gen. Ali Mamlouk, of plotting to carry out terrorist attacks inside Lebanon.
According to a senior Lebanese police official, Samaha confessed after he was confronted with audio and video footage taken by a double agent using a camera- equipped pen.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASSOCIATED PRESS
Lebanese security forces raided the house of former Information Minister Michel Samaha and arrested him. Samaha, an ardent supporter of President Bashar Assad, was arrested and indicted on a charge of plotting terror attacks in Lebanon at Syria’s behest.

Egypt's Outreach to China and Iran Is Troubling for U.S. Policy
David Schenker and Christina Lin /Los Angeles Times
August 24, 2012
President Morsi's upcoming visits to Beijing and Tehran indicate that Egypt's foreign policy orientation is shifting away from the West.
Next week, Egypt's Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, will visit China at the invitation of President Hu Jintao. He will seek investments there that will enable Egypt to "dispense of loans and aid," according to Morsi's party vice chairman. From China, Morsi will travel to Tehran to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit. Just two months after coming to power, Morsi is pursuing a rapprochement with Tehran and articulating a newfound ambition to jettison billions in U.S. foreign assistance dollars and financing from Western financial institutions. Taken together, these steps suggest that Morsi's Egypt may be headed for a foreign policy shift rivaling the scope of President Anwar Sadat's expulsion of the Soviets in 1972 and subsequent reorientation to the West.
Cairo's burgeoning rapprochement with Tehran is the most obvious of Morsi's foreign policy pivots. An Egyptian president hadn't visited Iran since the 1979 revolution, and the clerical regime there continues to celebrate Sadat's assassination. While the notion of a major long-standing U.S. ally self-identifying as "non-aligned" is odious, it was perhaps more tolerable for Washington during the tenure of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Given the heightened tension over Iran's nuclear program, the timing of the Morsi visit seems deliberately provocative.
More problematic for the U.S. is Egypt's outreach to China. Concerned about the effect of Egypt's new policy of intentionally downgrading -- and potentially even severing -- ties with its peace partner Israel, Morsi appears to be engaged in hedging. Much like post-revolution Iran, China could be a willing partner for an Islamist Egypt.
China has not fared particularly well in the so-called Arab Spring. In addition to losing billions of dollars in energy sector investments in Libya, Beijing's ongoing support for the Bashar Assad regime's ruthless repression of the popular uprising has engendered the animosity of millions of Syrians. Beijing's vetoes of United Nations Security Council resolutions against Syria has made burning Chinese flags a popular pastime among the anti-Assad opposition, and when the regime is finally dispatched, the Middle Kingdom's economic and political interests in Syria will suffer.
Although an Islamist Egypt beset by insecurity and a failing economy might seem of little value to the Chinese, upgraded ties with the troubled nation would provide China with a foothold on the Mediterranean, and include, hypothetically, a port. Morsi's Egypt might also be amenable to offering Chinese warships priority access to the Suez Canal, as the U.S. has traditionally been afforded. This privilege would be particularly appealing to China, which increasingly sees a need to protect its investments in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
Another potential perquisite for China would be access to American technology in Egypt. According to an August 2009 U.S. diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks, Egypt "had more potential Section 3 [Arms Export Control Act] violations than any country in the world." The leaked cable expressed specific concern with a visit that year by a Chinese military official to an Egyptian F-16 aircraft base.
And these violations occurred during the Mubarak administration, which maintained -- apart from difficulties with the Bush administration -- strong strategic relations with Washington. Absent the constraints of close ties to the U.S., it's difficult to imagine that Morsi's Egypt would be more protective of U.S. military technology.
The benefits for China of improved ties with Egypt are clear. But Morsi also sees advantages in diversifying Egypt's sources of assistance. At the most basic level, China's foreign policy is based solely on perceived national interest alone, and as such, unlike the United States, Beijing will have no qualms about Morsi's increasing limitations on press freedoms, restrictions on freedom of speech, constraints on women's rights or the ill treatment of minorities. At the same time, China is flush with cash, and Egypt will again be ripe for foreign investment when and if security is reestablished.
No doubt, Morsi's effort to recalibrate Egypt's foreign policy orientation away from the West is not without problems. Beijing is not altruistic, so investment will be more likely than loans or grants. And should Cairo need credit, it will probably have to raise it from the oil-rich Persian Gulf states, which will have onerous requirements, and will be none too pleased with Egypt's move toward Tehran.
If Morsi gets his way, improved bilateral ties to Beijing will embolden, if not enable, Cairo to downgrade Egypt's ties to Washington. Of course, with the Muslim Brotherhood at the helm -- and with increased domestic repression and unmitigated hostility toward Israel -- this trajectory was perhaps inevitable. But Egypt's shift toward China further complicates the relationship with the U.S. and U.S. policymaking in the Middle East. Alas, based on Morsi's new foreign policy tack, Cairo's transformed relations with Beijing promise to be just one of a litany of U.S. concerns with Egypt.
*David Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute. Christina Lin is a fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations.