Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for December 19/12
Iran’s Khamenei “likes” Zionist Facebook
Reports: STL Sets 2013 Budget at 59.9 Million Euros
Lebanese Pilgrims Return to Beirut after Bus Bombing in Iraq
Lebanese Opposition Studies Proposal by Berri for March 14 MPs to Stay at Hotel Near Parliament
Miqati, Mustaqbal Bloc Engage in Verbal Spat over Tripoli Statements
U.S. Govt. Denies Claims it is Seeking to Build Telecom Network in Lebanon
Lebanese Judge, Abu Ghida Receives File on Complete Identity of Mamlouk
Assad’s deadly agenda: First, chemicals, next, Iskander 9K720
Russia eyes Syria evacuation as rebels take Damascus district
Syrian troops battle rebels in Damascus suburbs
Syria's Palestinians sleep rough in wintry Damascus
Makdissi not at Beirut embassy: U.K.
Russia negotiates union with ex-Soviet states
Libya review slams U.S. State Department on security
Iraqi president stroke fuels succession talk
Time names Obama person of the year for second time
Egyptian Islamists plan mass protest ahead of constitution vote
Poll: Hamas enjoys greater support than the Fatah Movement
Palestinians Seek Refuge in Lebanon from Syria Battles
Syrian Interior Minister Admitted to Beirut Hospital
Turkish FM: End of Syria Regime 'Matter of Time'

Reports: STL Sets 2013 Budget at 59.9 Million Euros
Naharnet /The U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, set to try ex-Premier Rafik Hariri's suspected assassins, has set its annual budget for 2013 at 59.9 million euros, al-Joumhouria daily quoted well informed sources as saying on Wednesday. The STL, which is headquartered in the Dutch town of Leidschendam, informed Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on the budget. The sources pointed out on condition of anonymity that Ban is expected to inform the Lebanese government, in a message through the Lebanese mission in NY, of the due amount to finance its share that stands at 49 percent of funding the STL. The Lebanese government has paid Lebanon’s 2012 share which amounted to 26,927,270 euros. Lebanon’s 2011 contribution for the tribunal was paid from the budget of the state-run Higher Relief Council, which operates under the prime minister’s office. While the 2010 share was donated by Lebanese banks. The STL was established in 2007 to try the perpetrators of Hariri's 2005 assassination.

Lebanese Opposition Studies Proposal by Berri for March 14 MPs to Stay at Hotel Near Parliament
Naharnet/Speaker Nabih Berri has suggested that March 14 opposition lawmakers, many of whom have received death threats, reside at a hotel near parliament to attend the meetings of a parliamentary subcommittee after they said they were fearing for their lives. March 14 MP Marwan Hamadeh, who held a telephone conversation with Berri, told As Safir daily published on Wednesday that the speaker suggested that the lawmakers reside at the hotel and hold the meetings in parliament after guaranteeing enough security protection to them. Hamadeh said the opposition decided to study Berri's proposal. “We insist on holding the parliamentary elections on time and on approving a new electoral draft-law,” he told As Safir. According to An Nahar newspaper, a similar phone conversation was made between Berri and opposition MP Butros Harb to discuss the arrangements for reviving the work of the subcommittee tasked with reviewing the electoral system, and the size and number of districts. Earlier in the month, the March 14 coalition said it made an exception by ending its boycott of the subcommittee but insisted on holding the meetings at the houses of opposition MPs, who have confined themselves to their homes and offices following death threats. But their proposal reached a dead end when several officials from the March 8 majority coalition rejected it. Following a meeting held between March 14 alliance leaders on Tuesday night, a high-ranking source told An Nahar that the opposition will continue to coordinate with Berri on ways to approve a new electoral law “despite attempts by some (parties) to annul the elections over fears from the results.”The coalition's demands to change the government haven't changed, the source said, adding March 14 “insists on holding the elections on their constitutional time along with the discussion of a new electoral law.”Lebanon plunged in a political crisis following the Oct. 19 assassination of Internal Security Forces Intelligence Bureau chief Wissam al-Hasan when March 14 boycotted the government and all parliamentary activity linked to it.It also called for the cabinet's resignation and said only a salvation government could oversee the 2013 parliamentary polls.

Post-Assad Iran once again
By Tariq Alhomayed/Asharq Al-Awsat
In August I wrote an article entitled “Post-Assad Iran” and I am returning now to write about post-Assad Iran once again. This is because the situation on the ground in Syria has begun to move incredibly quickly, and also because of the assurances I heard from three sources, Arab and European, about Iran planning for the post-Assad phase.
Before I begin we must consider Hassan Nasrallah’s latest statement, or warning, in which he said that the situation in Syria is becoming increasingly complex, but those who think that the armed opposition will be able to resolve the situation on the ground are “very, very mistaken”. Nasrallah’s words are important because they reflect the Iranian stance of course, and Nasrallah here is not talking about al-Assad being victorious, rather he is talking about the difficulty of the rebels succeeding, and there is a big difference. Up until recently, Hezbolah used to think that al-Assad would win, and some leaders of the party even warned against burning any playing cards with al-Assad in view of the fact that his hour of victory was imminent. What I heard from my three sources, two of whom have previously met with al-Assad and know him well, is that the Iranian strategy - which utilizes Hezbollah in Syria - is based on three main objectives. The first is to desperately defend al-Assad with money, men and weapons, and for this reason, according to the sources, Qassem Soleimani is something of a semi-resident in Damascus. Yet this strategy has failed, and Tehran is now convinced of that. The second objective is to create a separate Alawite state, connected to Hezbollah via its borders. Much work has been done in this regard; Sunni cities and villages have been cleared for this purpose, but the plan has also failed. The third aspect of the Iranian strategy, and this is what is being worked on now, is that in the event of the fall of al-Assad, Iran and its allies will seek to ensure the failure of the subsequent political system, or state, in Syria, at any cost. This will be achieved through spreading chaos, violence, instability and whatever else it takes. This, of course, is where Hezbollah truly comes into play, not to mention the information I obtained from intelligence sources suggesting that al-Assad himself intends to carry out insane acts if he feels he is nearing his final moments in power.
Therefore, Nasrallah’s statement that “the situation in Syria is getting more complicated - but anyone who thinks the armed opposition can settle the situation on the ground is very, very mistaken” is very important and must be taken seriously. It means that Nasrallah and Iran are convinced of al-Assad’s end, and are now planning to set Syria alight. The Syrian President’s allies have said publicly that there will be no Syria after al-Assad, and Iran and Hezbollah are aware that any alternative to al-Assad, especially if it comes about via a military victory, will not be hospitable to them. Thus they are trying to destabilize Syria through Iraq and Lebanon, for Iran and Hezbollah realize that the fall of al-Assad would be a major strategic defeat for them. Therefore, as I have written many times before, it is not enough to simply estimate the moment at which al-Assad may fall, we must accelerate this as much as possible and have a clear strategy for the whole post-Assad phase, not merely the days in the aftermath. This is in order to thwart Iran and Hezbollah’s attempts, and to protect Syria as a whole.

Lebanese Pilgrims Return to Beirut after Bus Bombing in Iraq
Naharnet /Around twenty-eight Lebanese pilgrims whose bus was targeted by a bomb blast in Iraq returned to Beirut on Wednesday aboard an Iraqi plane, the National News Agency reported.
NNA said flight number 139 from Najaf landed at Rafik Hariri International Airport at noon carrying 145 passengers on board, including two pilgrims who were injured in Monday's bombing in Samarra, 125 kilometers north of Baghdad. A Lebanese man, Hussein Nahle, was killed in the bombing. NNA said he was buried in Iraq. TV footage showed hundreds of family members and friends welcoming the pilgrims at the airport. They began pushing through the crowds when they saw their loved ones, prompting security forces to restore calm and order.The health minister's adviser, Hassan Jaafar, told LBCI's reporter at the airport that three people were injured in the blast. But only two returned on Wednesday and the third will be flown to Beirut later.He said the health ministry will cover the expenses of their treatment

Miqati, Mustaqbal Bloc Engage in Verbal Spat over Tripoli Statements
Naharnet /Prime Minister Najib Miqati and al-Mustaqbal parliamentary bloc were involved in a verbal duel over statements issued by the premier regarding the recent clashes in the northern city of Tripoli.
Al-Mustaqbal bloc lashed out on Tuesday in a statement after the MPs' weekly meeting at the Center House at Miqati's comments on Tripoli's events, saying that his remarks are a “political scandal serving the Syrian regime.”
Sources close to Miqati snapped back at the bloc, accusing it of taking his statements out of context in an attempt to influence the public opinion. “Miqati's statements on Tripoli were clarified but some sides insist on targeting the premier with a campaign based on exploiting every word he says and taking his statements out of context,” the sources told As Safir newspaper published on Wednesday.
Miqati had said that if it weren't for his intervention and for calling upon the army forces to enter the northern city, Tripoli could have turned into an Islamist “Emirate.”
"They (Miqati's comments) suggest that the north is a hub for extremists and terrorists,” the bloc said. The lawmakers accused the PM of tarnishing the image of Tripoli and its residents by “telling the international community that he is the one protecting society from Tripoli's fundamentalists”.
Sources close to the premier told al-Joumhouria newspaper that the Lebanese realize that there is an attempt to target him and tarnish his image. “When the PM said his comments he was frank about the situation... He hails from the northern city,” the sources added.

Assad’s deadly agenda: First, chemicals, next, Iskander 9K720
DEBKAfile Video December 19, 2012/On Dec. 5, the first American, Dutch and German Patriot missiles landed in Turkey. Within hours, three Russian warships had put into Syria’s Tartus port – the Novocherkassk and Saratov landing craft and the MB-304 supply vessel. Aboard were 300 marines. And not only fighting men. They also delivered a fearsome weapon for Assad’s army and a game changer in the Syrian conflict: 24 Iskander 9K720 (NATO codenamed SS-26 Stone) cruise missile systems, designed for theater level conflicts. While NATO unpacked the Patriots in Turkey, a dozen mobile batteries, each carrying a pair of Iskander missiles, were fixed into position opposite Turkey, and another dozen, opposite Jordan and Israel. At all their stations, the Russian missiles pointed at US military targets. So while the West was gripped with alarm over Assad’s poison sarin gas shells and bombs and gearing up for missile attacks on Turkey, the Russians were injecting into the Syrian war field the most sophisticated weapon of death thus far. The West and Israel have no answer for the Iskander’s hypersonic speed of more than 1.3 miles per second with a 280 mile-range and a 1,500-pound warhead which destroys targets with pinpoint accuracy. It is also nuclear-capable. Russian President Vladimir Putin promised two US presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, not to let the Iskander reach the hands of Syria or Iran. Moscow has no illusions that once in Syria, the lethal cruise missile will pretty soon reach Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Saturday, Dec. 15, Iran’s chief of staff Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi warned that the Patriot missiles in Turkey portended world war. He was referring to the missile-versus-missile face-off in Syria .
By giving Assad the Iskanders, Moscow has plumped itself squarely in the Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah camp, whereas President Obama is carefully holding back from an unreserved commitment to the Syrian insurgency.
Some Western circles see Russia’s military intervention in the Syrian conflict as presaging Bashar Assad’s early downfall. The reality, according to debkafile’s sources, is that before he falls, the Syria ruler is getting ready for desperate measures – first by unleashing chemical warfare and, after that, using the deadly Iskanders for a last throw against his enemies.

The Economic Cost of a Nuclear Iran
Charles Robb, Dennis Ross, and Michael Makovsky/Washington Institute
December 17, 2012
Sanctions and U.S. military force carry risks, but Tehran with a bomb would wreak havoc on global markets.
After the looming fiscal cliff, the next major challenge facing the United States will be preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Living with a nuclear Iran is strategically untenable. Like the fiscal cliff, this is a matter of both economic and national security. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons carries various risks, but inaction has its costs, too -- especially to the price of oil and, in turn, to the U.S. economy.
International sanctions against Iran have already restricted its oil exports, reducing global supply and putting upward pressure on oil prices. But a military strike against the Islamic Republic could disrupt the flow of oil in the region, as Iran might retaliate against the West by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world's oil supplies pass.
The disruption of oil flows would have significant economic repercussions. Yet failure to stop Iran's nuclear-weapons program also would have myriad direct and indirect consequences. We led a Bipartisan Policy Center task force -- including former elected officials, military leaders, diplomats, energy analysts and economists -- that examined the energy-related costs of inaction.
Energy markets respond both to actual supply disruptions and to expected changes in supply and demand. A nuclear Iran would raise the likelihood of instability, nuclear proliferation, terrorism and war -- and could thus drive oil prices up without disrupting the flow of oil.
To quantify this price impact, we identified five scenarios that an Iran with nuclear weapons would make more likely: domestic instability in Saudi Arabia, the destruction of Saudi energy facilities, an Iran-Saudi nuclear exchange, an Iran-Israel nuclear exchange, and the lapse of sanctions against Iran.
To isolate the worst-case scenario for the oil market -- a Saudi-Iran nuclear exchange -- we assessed that the probability of such an event would change from zero today (when neither country has nuclear weapons) to 5% within a year. This could lead to the disruption of 12 million barrels per day, or 13% of current global supply, due to the cessation of exports through those two countries for one year and a partial cessation from their neighbors.
Accounting for this scenario and the others, we calculated the total additional risk premium that an informed oil market might reflect after Iran has crossed the nuclear threshold -- that is, the amount added onto the price of oil due to the possibility of supply disruption. We concluded that even if none of the above scenarios actually came to pass, the collective risk that they could occur would cause significant economic harm:
Oil prices could rise by 10% to 25% in the first year (or $11 to $27 more per barrel). As instability and tensions remain high, so will prices, even rising as much as 30% to 50% ($30 to $55 per barrel) within three years.
Consequently, gasoline prices could jump 10% to 20% in the first year. Within three years, the cost of gas could rise more than 30% (or more than $1.40 per gallon). Such sustained price increases would have a pronounced negative impact on the U.S. economy.
U.S. gross domestic product could fall by about 0.6% in the first year -- costing the economy some $90 billion -- and by up to 2.5% (or $360 billion) by the third year. This is enough, at current growth rates, to send the country into recession. The unemployment rate could also rise by 0.3 percentage points in the first year and by nearly 1% two years later, resulting in some 1.5 million more Americans becoming jobless.
This economic pain could result even if the oil supply is never disrupted. Should Iranian-Saudi, Iranian-Israeli or other tension cause an actual disruption, the resulting economic dislocations could be dramatically worse. They could involve a doubling in the price of oil, gasoline soaring by as much as $2.75 more per gallon, U.S. GDP plummeting by 8% in one year, and five million Americans losing their jobs. To be sure, such analysis, no matter how carefully done, involves as much art as science. Its value is in illustrating the range of impacts that could occur, not in predicting any precise outcome.
As American and other policy makers contemplate what it will take to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions, they must not dwell exclusively on the potential short-term impacts of economic pressure or military action. Over the medium and long term, the economic costs of a nuclear Iran may be no less real and far more enduring.
**Charles Robb is a former Democratic senator from Virginia. Dennis Ross is counselor at The Washington Institute and a former special advisor to President Obama. Michael Makovsky is foreign policy director of the Bipartisan Policy Center. All were members of the center's Iran Task Force, which recently issued the report The Price of Inaction.

Iran’s Khamenei “likes” Zionist Facebook
By Asharq Al-Awsat/London, Asharq Al-Awsat – The huge social media network Facebook, which was banned in Iran after anti-regime activists utilized it to help organize the 2009 protests, has an unexpected new member, namely Iranian Supreme Guide Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. On Friday, a new Facebook page entitled “Khamenei.ir” was launched, displaying photographs of the 73-year old cleric alongside speeches and pronouncements of the man who wields absolute power in Iran. Although there are a number of Facebook pages claiming to represent the Iranian Supreme Guide, “Khamenei.ir” appears to be the Grand Ayatollah’s official Facebook account. The Facebook page had 9,694 “likes” at the time of publication, whilst the page was promoted via a Twitter account also purporting to be tied to the Iranian Supreme Guide. Many experts in Iranian affairs believe that this is truly Ayatollah Khamenei’s official page and is being run by staff in Khamenei’s office. The two US-based social media sites, Facebook and Twitter, are officially blocked by Iran; however they are still commonly utilized by millions of Iranians who use special software to get around official government censorship. Facebook and Twitter played a huge role in the 2009 protests against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s re-election, being utilized to help organize demonstrations and street protests of a scale that had not been seen in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. These protests, commonly called the Green Revolution, were severely suppressed by government forces and ended with opposition leadership being placed under house arrest.
Whilst in 2010, Iran’s state-run TV news channel denounced Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg as a “Zionist”, claiming that he financially rewarded Israelis who killed Palestinians.
The Khamenei Facebook page shared a picture of young Khamenei alongside founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei, taken in the early 1960s. The Facebook page reportedly shares a similar tone, style and content with other social network accounts devoted to disseminating Khamenei’s message, including Twitter and Instagram accounts, as well as an official “Khamenei.ir” website that is published in 13 languages.
Experts on Iranian affairs have stressed that despite the official Iranian ban on social media networks, Tehran is keen to use them to spread their message and world view to a global audience.
For his part, Afshon Ostovar, a Middle East analyst at CNA, a US-based research organization, told Reuters “social media gives the regime leadership another medium of communication, one that can share their message with a younger and far more international demographic.”
Iran has been locked in a decade-long dispute with the West over its nuclear program. Washington and Europe suspect Tehran is seeking to develop a nuclear bomb, something that the Iranian government has repeatedly denied. The Syrian crisis is also another issue of contention between Iran and the West, as well as between Tehran and its neighboring Arab states.
Iranian authorities have also claimed to be seeking to build a national intranet; something skeptics believe is a way to further control the Iranian people’s access to the internet for fear that this could be employed once more to help organize mass protests and demonstrations in the same manner as the 2009 experience.

The Brotherhood and the constitution: A losing battle
By Osman Mirghani/Asharq Alawsat
The battle for Egypt’s new draft constitution is a losing one by any standard, regardless of the outcome of the referendum. The constitution has pushed Egypt towards a serious division, and has fuelled an atmosphere of tension and polarization meaning that the coming days are susceptible to further confrontations and clashes that may be more severe than those we have witnessed in the past days and weeks. Amid such an atmosphere it is difficult to understand the insistence of the president, and behind him the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies from other Islamic groups, to proceed with the draft constitution and referendum. It was noticeable during the past period that spokespeople for the Brotherhood and their leaders have appeared more than President Mursi, who disappeared from view and rumors even began circulating on the internet that he had been “kidnapped”. Even some members of the Brotherhood took part in these rumors, one of which suggested that ElBaradei, Amr Musa and Dahi Khalfan (the Dubai police chief) had planned to kidnap Mursi and smuggle him out of Egypt! Such talk is inconceivable, but it has often been repeated in this atmosphere where we don’t know whether to laugh or cry.
Mursi’s absence and the conspicuous appearance of Brotherhood leaders was a source of many questions, especially as those speaking on behalf of the group, including General Guide Mohammed Badie and his deputy Khairat el-Shater, spoke as if they were the decision makers, declaring their insistence to go ahead with the referendum and accusing other parties of being involved in a conspiracy against legitimacy, saying that they will not allow the revolution to be hijacked once again. Indeed, Dr. Essam el-Erian, vice chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party and a prominent leader within the Muslim Brotherhood, said that even if the draft constitution was not approved by the referendum this would not change anything, because the next constituent assembly to be established would be the same as the current one. Such words confirm the Brotherhood’s insistence on imposing their view upon the constitution and their unwillingness to listen to the opposition voices on the street, or to engage in a serious dialogue with other parties. Yet the constitution must be an expression of consensus among various components of society so as to achieve stability for the country and lay the foundations for the ruling system to be the guarantor of rights and freedoms, regulating the work of state institutions, regardless of changes in government and personnel.
The Brotherhood have dropped their masks and the arguments they were hiding behind, about how they would not interfere in the work of the president and his decisions. Every time Mursi issued a constitutional declaration or took a controversial decision the Brotherhood behaved as if they knew about it already, releasing statements and gathering their supporters to demonstrate even before the president had announced his steps. With regards to the constitution, the Brotherhood took the helm completely, bypassing the president and the Freedom and Justice party. The group’s leaders spoke as if the constitution was their document and their own battle. They organized demonstrations at specific locations raising certain slogans, and held press conferences to defend the draft constitution and attack its opponents, promoting talk of a conspiracy or a coup against legitimacy. They then used this as an excuse to send their supporters to confront those protesting against the constitution and Mursi’s latest decrees, leading to several deaths and many wounded. In light of the extensive presence of Brotherhood leaders and the virtual absence of Mursi from the scene, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi also appeared calling on Egyptians to vote “yes” to the draft constitution so as not to lose out on the US$20 billion promised by Qatar through investing in Egypt. This prompted many on social networking websites to question the relationship between Qatari funds, the referendum on the draft constitution and the Brotherhood’s rule, and to criticize Sheikh al-Qaradawi, whom they renamed ‘Sheikh al-Qatarawi”, for using Qatari funds in an attempt to influence the constitutional referendum. Among the critics were those who asked: What if another country proposed to invest US$ 30 billion for example, and this country was opposed to the draft constitution, would Sheikh al-Qaradawi call upon Egyptians to vote “no” in the referendum so as not to lose out on this sum?
The Brotherhood have lost a lot as a result of the manner in which they have behaved over the constitution. Likewise, President Mursi enraged the sentiments of the street with his constitutional declarations granting him powers beyond those set out in March 2011, which the people had ratified in a previous referendum. In that referendum 77 percent of the electorate voted, whilst the participation figures for the first phase of the current constitutional referendum do not exceed 31 percent, according to what has been published by the Egyptian media and endorsed by human rights organizations. Even within such a low turnout, about 56 percent support the constitution whilst 43 percent oppose it, according to what the Freedom and Justice party have announced. If we consider these numbers for a moment then it means that only a quarter of the Egyptian electorate has actually voted in favor of the draft constitution, whilst the remaining percentage either voted against it or boycotted it. The constitution is supposed to represent the consensus of the people of the country, with the support of the overwhelming majority, so how can it be considered legitimate in this case?
Human rights organizations, opposition forces and many activists have reported violations during the first phase of the referendum process, and have posted many images and videos on the internet to document these violations. For example, a number of supervisors have been revealed not to be judges, but still some posed as such and then fled when they were confronted by the people. There have also been attempts to disrupt voting, especially in polling stations with a high proportion of opposition members or Copts. Elsewhere, financial rewards have been handed out to those who voted “yes”, and others have been from voting. Other video clips show pre-prepared and signed ballot cards voting in favor of the constitution. These and other violations angered the judges who participated in the first phase and prompted them to withdraw from supervising the second phase, which will only increase the extent of doubt over the referendum result.
Amidst such an atmosphere no one can celebrate the results of the referendum or claim that it will move the country towards the desired stability and the rule of state institutions. In fact the draft constitution is pushing the country towards further congestion and is setting the scene for new confrontations that may end in results contrary to what the Brotherhood have calculated. They escalated the battle in the first place by directing their arrows towards the judiciary and the media, and it seems that these two domains will form the scene of the coming confrontation.

Poll: Hamas enjoys greater support than the Fatah Movement
Asharq Al-Awsat/Ramallah, Asharq Al-Awsat - The Hamas movement enjoys greater support than the Fatah Movement, according to a recent Palestinian opinion poll.
For the first time since 2006 some 40 percent of those polled said they prefer Hamas's approach in dealing with the Palestine issue, while 33 percent preferred Fatah's approach, and 27 percent had no preference.
It is worth mentioning that the percentage of those who prefer the Hamas movements approach is higher in the West Bank, and the opposite is true in the Gaza Strip as 42 percent of the people of the West Bank prefer Hamas (28 percent for Fatah) compared with 40 percent for Fatah (37 percent for Hamas) in Gaza.
The opinion poll conducted by the Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) on the 1st and 2nd of December, which covered a random sample of 1,200 people of both genders in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and with 3 percent margin of error , showed that 85 percent of the Palestinians consider the UN vote for Palestine as an observer state in the United Nations a victory for the Palestinian cause, but at the same time, 43 percent of them believe that this step will not lead to real changes on the ground.
As for the Israeli aggression on Gaza, 90 percent of those polled said that halting the aggression on Gaza through a quiet agreement is considered "a victory" for the Palestinians, and 50 percent of them believe that this "victory" will not lead to real changes on the ground.
The results also showed that the majority of those polled are more optimistic and positive after resisting the latest aggression on Gaza, as 88 percent of them said that the armed struggle is an effective means for achieving the Palestinian independence and 73 percent believe that the situation of the Palestine issue will improve, while 17 percent believe otherwise.
According to the poll, the sense of victory has led to stronger support for Palestinians reconciliation and national unity as 87 percent expressed their optimism about this issue.
The "victory" in Gaza and the "victory" at the United Nations seem to improve the viewpoints of those polled toward the Palestinian leadership as 89 percent of them said that their viewpoints on Hamas have improved or have improved to some extent, while approval of the Fatah movement was at 81 percent.
Those opposed to the negotiations have emerged stronger (49 percent) compared with 44 percent last July while the supporters of these negotiations were 45 percent and those who support them were 50 percent in the same month. As for the two state-solutions, the results showed that those opposed have the upper hand at 50 percent while the supporters are at 47 percent. At the same time, the results showed that the people of Gaza are more supportive of the two-state solution with a percentage of 51 percent compared with the people of the West Bank (44 percent).
A large majority (78 percent) supported holding the legislative elections, but the support for it was greater in Gaza (85 percent) compared with the West Bank (74 percent). As for the presidential elections, 76 percent supported holding them, and this support was greater in Gaza (85 percent) than that in the West Bank (70 percent).
In a race that may involve 12 candidates for the presidential elections, including four from Fatah, four from Hamas, three independent and leftist figures, and a representative of the Islamic Jihad, President Mahmud Abbas received the higher votes, while Hamas’s Ismail Haniya enjoyed a spike in popularity. Even in the case of a competition between the 12 figures, Abbas will get 25 percent of the votes, followed by Ismail Haniya with a rate of 18 percent, Marwan al-Barghuthi 12 percent, Khalid Mishal 6 percent, and the rest of the leaders will get 4 percent or less
However, 25 percent of those polled said that they do not want to vote or have not decided yet. In case all the votes for Fatah candidates are counted, they would collectively get 40 percent, while Hamas's candidates would get 25 percent.
Meanwhile, the results of the opinion polls showed important changes in the evaluation of the government's performance concerning the two governments in the West Bank and Gaza. For the first time since 2009, Haniya's sacked government received a better assessment than the government of Salam Fayyad, as 39 percent believed that the performance of Haniya's government is positive and 36 percent consider its performance moderate, and 16 percent consider it negative (a decline by 28 percent, i.e. from 44 percent in the opinion poll conducted in March 2011).
When those polled were asked to choose between one of the two governments to run the area in which they live, 34 percent said that they choose Haniya's government while 25 percent chose Fayyad's government, but the majority of those polled (41 percent) said that they do not prefer any of the two governments or are unsure.