LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 09/12

Bible Quotation for today/Children and Parents
Ephesians 06/01-11: "Children, it is your Christian duty to obey your parents, for this is the right thing to do. Respect your father and mother is the first commandment that has a promise added: so that all may go well with you, and you may live a long time in the land.  Parents, do not treat your children in such a way as to make them angry. Instead, raise them with Christian discipline and instruction. Slaves, obey your human masters with fear and trembling; and do it with a sincere heart, as though you were serving Christ. Do this not only when they are watching you, because you want to gain their approval; but with all your heart do what God wants, as slaves of Christ. Do your work as slaves cheerfully, as though you served the Lord, and not merely human beings. Remember that the Lord will reward each of us, whether slave or free, for the good work we do. Masters, behave in the same way toward your slaves and stop using threats. Remember that you and your slaves belong to the same Master in heaven, who judges everyone by the same standard.

Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources
U.S. Options for Syria: Action vs. Inaction/By: Michael Singh /Washington Institute/June 08/12
In defense of Hosni Mubarak/By Michael Young/The Daily Star/June 08/12
Daily Star/Interview with Lebanese Batroun MP Butros Harb/June 08/12
A message to Misbah al-Ahdab/By: Hazem al-Amin/Now Lebanon/June 08/12
Assad’s sectarian strategy/By: Tony Badran/Now Lebanon/June 08/12

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June 08/12
Iran thwarts Syrian “contact group” plan over US conditions for nuclear talks
Lebanon’s veteran journalist Ghassan Tueni dies at 86
March 14 prepare memo, Future to attend dialogue
Lebanon's Arabic press digest - June 8, 2012 June 08, The Daily Star
Hezbollah role clouds Tripoli battleground
Germany says very concerned over Lebanon's stability
Relatives of Lebanese Shiite hostages block airport road over government inaction
France condemns Syrian incursion into Lebanese territories
Tripoli mufti meets Alawites in peace push
Habib: March 14 will participate in national dialogue
Syrian forces release municipality chief of Lebanese town
Asiri Meets Suleiman, Renews Support to National Dialogue
Condolences of Politicians, Tweeters and Facebook Users Pour in after Tueni’s Death
Miqati Calls on Opposition to be ‘Constructive’
Glowing Objects, Fiery Meteors Appear in Sky above Lebanon
Russia vows to block UN mandate for Syria intervention  
White House condemns “outrageous” Syria violence
France backs new Syria “Contact Group,” says Foreign Ministry
Deadly blast rocks Damascus as 10 die in Syria, activists say
Worsening Syria war drives civilians from homes
Annan: Syria solution requires Iran
Annan: Syria crisis will spiral out of control
Report: Unidentified gas used in Syria

Iran thwarts Syrian “contact group” plan over US conditions for nuclear talks
DEBKAfile Special Report June 7, 2012/Iran stalled the US Secretary and UN-Arab League Envoy Kofi Annan’s plan to present the world body’s special session Thursday, June 7, with a plan for a contract group based on five permanent Security Council members and Iran to handle the Syrian impasse. Tehran refused to join the group as long as it faces nuclear conditions, after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in Istanbul that Iran must come to the nuclear talks in Moscow “ready to take concrete steps” to curb its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent purity.
Discussion of the plan was therefore abandoned in the hall and confined to UN corridors. By forcing the pace at the special general assembly crisis session, Tehran once again demonstrated its refusal to play ball with the international community until its major power status in the Middle East is recognized.
Iranian sources have insisted in recent days that the six power talks with Iran were not just about its nuclear program but affected a wider spectrum, because the nuclear issue could be settled at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Tehran has made it clear that the continuation of nuclear diplomacy is contingent on the general recognition of Iran’s major power status.
The situation in Syria meanwhile continues to deteriorate disastrously amid conflicting claims about another massacre at the Hama village of Mazraat al-Qubeir: Opposition activists have disseminated video footage illustrating the slaughter of up to 70 people, including women and children, by Assad’s security forces and militiamen less than two weeks after the Houla massacre. This is denied by official sources in Damascus who say no more than nine people died at the hands of “terrorists.”
No independent testimony was available on the episode from the UN monitors, who set out for the Hama village. The UN Secretary said they turned back after they were fired on by small arms and would set out again Friday.
Kofi Annan warned that if nothing changes in Syria, the future holds all-out civil war. His words attested to the helplessness of the world body to put a stop of the bloodshed in Syria, combined with the Obama administration’s refusal to intervene in the crisis in the expectation that Russia and Iran would step up. That expectation has faded.
debkafile reported Wednesday, June 6: Israel remains dormant despite the serious consequences to its strategic and security situation threatened by the new proposal the UN-Arab League envoy for Syria Kofi Annan is to present to the UN Thursday, June 7, for saving his peace plan. The nub of his proposal, debkafile’s sources disclose, is the creation of a “contact group” for handling the hot Syrian potato. It is to be composed of the five permanent Security Council members (US, UK, France, Russia and China) plus Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
The proposal has won the blessing of the Obama administration, meaning its consent to letting the two powers that will dominate the contact group, Russia and Iran, determine the course and outcome of the Syrian crisis.
Washington believes that only they have the clout in the Syrian army for bringing about Bashar Assad’s removal and his replacement in Damascus by a provisional military regime.
Washington also hopes, according to our sources, that this gesture will give Moscow a strong incentive to lean hard on Tehran for concessions at the next round of its talk with the six world powers on June 13.
Neither Iran nor Moscow have promised the US anything of the sort, but the administration hopes Iran will start being forthcoming on its nuclear program after being permitted to assume a central role in Damascus.
There is less optimism outside administration circles and in Israel. They expect from Tehran nothing more at the next round of talks than token nuclear concessions, and none at all toward curtailing its work on a nuclear weapon.
However the Obama administration appears to have opted for this course, even though it is the first time since the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in December 2010 that the United States is willing to let go of a major Middle East crisis and allow its foremost Middle East rivals, Moscow and Tehran, to take charge.
debkafile reported exclusively on May 31, that President Barack Obama had proposed to President Vladimir Putin the creation of a large force of 5,000 international monitors for Syria, most of them Russians, to safeguard Assad’s stock of biological and chemical weapons against falling into the hands of al Qaeda or Syrian rebels. This team consisting of thousands of Russian troops would be the operational arm of the future “contact group.”
As far as Israel is concerned, the plan has disastrous connotations. Instead of containing the spread of hostile Iranian influence in the region, as Obama promised Israel, he is opening for the door for Iran to extend its nfluence squarely in the countries neighboring on – and still at war with – Israel, while at the same time moving back from a focused effort to draw the sting of Iran’s nuclear bomb program.
Israel’s political and security tacticians never took into account that a consequence of the Syrian revolt would be the establishment of full-blown Iranian sway over Damascus in partnership with Russia. Indeed, for 15 months, they insisted that the Syrian uprising was proof of America’s success in breaking up the dangerous Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah axis.

Lebanon’s veteran journalist Ghassan Tueni dies at 86
June 08, 2012/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Veteran politician, journalist and diplomat Ghassan Tueni died Friday at the age of 86.
His passing marks the end of a long and storied career as politician and newspaper man, playing a pivotal role in both the formative years of Lebanon and its post Civil War period.
Born in Beirut in 1926, Ghassan Tueni inherited the power of his family’s dynasty and embarked on his sweeping journey at a young age.
After getting degrees from American University of Beirut and Harvard University the 22-year-old Tueni took the reins of An-Nahar newspaper after his father died in 1948.
Under Tueni’s aegis An-Nahar became what many say was the most influential and widely read newspaper in the country. He led the paper as editor and publisher from 1948 until 1999 and again from 2005 until 2010, penning thousands of editorials through almost the entire history of the young nation.
He was a fierce advocate of press freedoms and was jailed several times in the years before the 1975-90 Civil War for his media rights advocacy and was known for opening An-Nahar’s editorial page up to a broad range of opinions.
But Tueni was more than just a giant of the newspaper business.
He was involved in some of the most seminal moments of the country’s history as a diplomat and politician and cemented an unusual and controversial tradition of trying to value political participation at his newspaper along with journalistic objectivity.
In 1951 Tueni became a 25-year-old MP. By 1953 he was deputy speaker of the house. He would go on to become deputy prime minister as well as the ambassador to Greece and later to the United Nations. He handled all his political duties while also running his newspaper that attempted to be objective. Tueni’s son Gebran and granddaughter Nayla, who now runs the newspaper, carried on his politics and journalism tradition.
After a short-lived stint as a member of the Social Syrian Nationalist Party, Tueni was a lifelong advocate of national independence and sovereignty.
His call at the United Nations Security Council to “let my people live, let my people live” was the emotional force behind the 1978 U.N. resolution to establish the UNIFIL peacekeeping force in south Lebanon. As a March 14 coalition MP in 2006 Tueni delivered the petition for pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud’s resignation after the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.
His newspaper leaned heavily against the Syrian occupation and his son Gebran and An-Nahar columnist Samir Kassir were killed for their stances against that occupation.
Later in his life Tueni was also very involved in Lebanon’s university system.
He was a founding president of the University of Balamand and on the AUB Board of Trustees where he received a doctorate for his achievements.
Tueni’s wife died from cancer in 1983. His son Makram was killed in a car crash in 1987.
In 2009, Tunei received the Lebanese Order of Merit from President Michel Sleiman for his life’s work.

Future bloc MP Khodr Habib: March 14 will participate in national dialogue
June 8, 2012 /Future bloc MP Khodr Habib said on Friday that the March 14 coalition would participate in the national dialogue “although it will not lead to anything.”“The security situation in Lebanon is bad, and the Syrian regime is trying to move its crisis to Lebanon. We will join the national dialogue to stop any internal or external parties from destabilizing Lebanon, but I would like to confirm that the dialogue will not have any results,” Habib said following his meeting with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. Habibi also commented on the cabinet’s decision to allocate money for launching a number of development projects in the northern city of Tripoli. “We will examine the spending of this amount because we fear it might be used for electoral purposes,” he said. Last week, President Michel Sleiman sent invitations to the members of the national dialogue committee calling on them to convene on June 11 at the Baabda Presidential Palace to discuss various issues, including Hezbollah’s arms.However, some members of the Western-backed March 14 coalition said they reject taking part in the national dialogue session unless Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s cabinet resigns.-NOW Lebanon

March 14 prepare memo, Future to attend dialogue
June 08, 2012/By Hussein Dakroub/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: The parliamentary Future bloc of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri will attend next week’s National Dialogue session, Future MP Nuhad Mashnouq said Thursday, as the opposition March 14 parties were working to draft a political memo outlining their stance on the all-party talks.
“The Future bloc will participate in National Dialogue in line with the March 14 memo to be presented to President Michel Sleiman,” Mashnouq told The Daily Star.
Asked to elaborate on the March 14 coalition’s political memo to be presented to Sleiman by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora Saturday, he said: “The memo will stress national security rules and call for the formation of a neutral salvation government.”
He said that the memo did not put any conditions by the March 14 coalition to attend a new session of National Dialogue called for by Sleiman for Monday at Baabda Palace.
Mashnouq added that the Future bloc and its March 14 allies are demanding the formation of “a neutral salvation government” to supervise next year’s parliamentary elections.
With Hariri living out of Lebanon mainly for security reasons, Siniora, the head of the Future bloc, will represent the bloc at the National Dialogue conference, Mashnouq said.
The March 14 memo will be made public by Siniora after delivering a copy of it to Sleiman at Baabda Palace.
Political sources told The Daily Star that senior March 14 politicians are working to draft the final version of the memo in which they will outline the coalition’s position on the planned dialogue and other key contentious issues such as the problem of non-state arms following a series of deadly clashes in the north. Among other things, the memo will stress the commitment by the Lebanese people to state institutions, the Taif Accord and the Constitution in the face of last week’s call by Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah for the creation of a constituent assembly aimed at building a strong state.
The memo will emphasize that the government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati has become part of the problem and therefore it must leave and be replaced by a neutral salvation government to follow up the dialogue and oversee the 2013 elections, the sources said.
The memo demands completion of National Dialogue on all non-state arms in Lebanon, including Hezbollah’s arms, Palestinian arms inside and outside the refugee camps in Lebanon and the proliferation of arms in cities and towns, the sources said.
Hezbollah and March 8 have supported Sleiman’s call for resuming National Dialogue, stalled since November 2010, saying they will attend without conditions.
While the Kataeb (Phalange) Party has also said it will attend the National Dialogue, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has dismissed the all-party talks as a waste of time.
“The aim of the other side [March 8 parties] from the National Dialogue is to divert attention from the economic, living, security and sovereignty problems facing the country,” Geagea told reporters after meeting with envoys from the European Union at his residence in Maarab.
“Dialogue in this delicate stage is a big distraction while Lebanon is constantly bleeding at the security, economic and sovereignty levels,” Geagea said.
“This dialogue will not produce any result,” he added.
A statement issued by the EU envoys after the meeting said they welcomed Sleiman’s decision to revive the National Dialogue, expressing hope that all Lebanese political leaders would attend.
For her part, EU Ambassador to Lebanon Angelina Eichhorst welcomed calls and efforts “made in Lebanon to maintain calm and stability because the country is living a very delicate stage, especially following the security incidents that happened in Tripoli, Beirut, Akkar, namely on the Lebanese-Syrian border.”
A Lebanese man was killed and two others were wounded Wednesday, triggering a series of clashes between the Syrian Army and Lebanese gunmen along the increasingly tense border area in the Bekaa Valley. In his invitation for the rival factions, Sleiman said that the all-party talks are aimed at ending political divisions and protecting Lebanon from the reverberations of the 15-month-old turmoil in Syria following deadly clashes between armed supporters and opponents of Syrian President Bashar Assad in both Tripoli and Beirut.
Sleiman has gained support for his National Dialogue call from four Arab Gulf states he had visited – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
The dialogue call has also won support from Western countries, including France, whose Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said his country encouraged all Lebanese political parties to attend the planned dialogue. The visit of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, who held talks with Lebanese leaders Thursday, and upcoming visits to Beirut by the foreign ministers of Sweden, Poland and Bulgaria were designed to show support for Lebanon’s stability amid threats of the probable spillover of the Syrian unrest into the country.
Meanwhile, Kataeb Party leader Amin Gemayel reiterated his support for National Dialogue, saying a meeting of rival leaders would reassure the people.
“We were the first to encourage attending this dialogue. I think our position was very clear. If there are remarks or objections, they should be raised at the dialogue table,” Gemayel told reporters after meeting Maronite Patriarch Beshara Rai in Bkirki, north of Beirut.
“I think when leaders meet, this will reassure the people and create a minimum of stability that helps tackle security incidents that are happening in areas from the north to the south, Beirut and the Bekaa,” he said. “I think as political leaders we are duty-bound to look at these matters from this angle in particular,” he added. Apparently referring to the contentious issue of Hezbollah’s arms, Gemayel said: “We fully realize that there are issues that cannot be solved quickly because they are difficult at present. But there are other issues which we can study. We can take some initiatives that benefit the citizen who is in dire need for a minimum of stability.”

Hezbollah role clouds Tripoli battleground
 June 08, 2012/The Daily Star
TRIPOLI, Lebanon: Deceit, ambiguity and shifting allegiances are epithets of internecine fighting. The recurrent clashes in the vastly underprivileged neighborhoods of Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh in the north Lebanon city of Tripoli are no exception. Theories abound regarding the nature of the conflict in Tripoli – from a power struggle between rival Lebanese intelligence apparatuses to purely sectarian hostility – but they all seem to be missing a key piece of the puzzle. Hezbollah and supporters of Prime Minister Najib Mikati in the city are arming and financing groups that are taking an active part in clashes with the pro-Bashar Assad fighters from Jabal Mohsen, residents, fighters and security sources told The Daily Star. While some say this shows that Hezbollah wants the situation in north Lebanon to ignite in a bid to shift the pressure away from the embattled Assad, others say the sectarian rift in the city overshadows any political alliances.
Tensions between the Sunni Bab al-Tabbaneh and the majority Alawite Jabal Mohsen date back to the 1970s, and much blood has since been spilled with no reconciliation taking place. Intense clashes renewed between the two neighborhoods in mid-May, claiming the lives of scores of people.
The fighting, the heaviest in recent years, has raised fears that the 15-month unrest in Syria has spilled into Lebanon.
Abdul-Latif Saleh, the spokesman for Jabal Mohsen’s Arab Democratic Party, bluntly accuses groups in Bab al-Tabbaneh ordinarily affiliated with his party’s major ally Hezbollah of turning against the ADP.
He says those groups are fighting alongside Bab al-Tabbaneh gunmen. “It’s an honor for us to be allies with Hezbollah,” adds Saleh.  “But they should know that their people in Bab al-Tabbaneh have gone sectarian and turned against them.”Saleh is also bitter at what he dubs the “negligent behavior” recently displayed by Hezbollah. “Our shops were burned and they didn’t even condemn it,” he said, in reference to the wave of attacks this week on Alawite businesses in the area.
Saleh adds that Mikati and former Prime Minister Omar Karami, both Hezbollah allies, also did not issue condemnations. “We are terribly upset.”
Asked whether his anger stemmed from the fact that Hezbollah had not so far assisted the ADP in the clasheswith Bab al-Tabbaneh, Saleh is categorical. “We don’t need them,” he says. “We’re able to manage brilliantly on our own.”
A fighter from Bab al-Tabbaneh, who wished to remain anonymous, argues that no one in Bab al-Tabbaneh “dares to side with Jabal Mohsen.”
“Anyone in Bab al-Tabbaneh who has arms and does not take part in the fighting [against Jabal Mohsen] is scorned,” he says.
Several photos of Khodr al-Jalkh, a Sunni who fought alongside the ADP and was killed in the fighting in May, are plastered across Bab al-Tabbaneh’s streets. The photos bear the inscription: “This is the fate of every traitor.”
The Bab al-Tabbaneh fighter says the groups Saleh refers to have “strictly financial ties” with Hezbollah. “They take money and weapons from them,” he says.
“They shift alliances according to their interests,” the bearded man continues. “They are fighting with us against Jabal Mohsen.”
Mahmoud al-Aswad, the leader of one of the groups in Bab al-Tabbaneh believed to be affiliated with Hezbollah, blames the clashes on the Future Movement led by Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri.
Imad al-Rez is another leader of a Bab al-Tabbaneh armed squad said to have ties to Mikati’s Azm Association.
Mikati has strongly denied any links to armed factions in Tripoli.
Sitting in his smoke shop in Bab al-Tabbaneh, Aswad, who spent 12 years in Syrian prisons, makes it clear early on that he is a staunch supporter of resistance against Israel and against its agents in Lebanon. “I support Hezbollah as a [resistance group],” he says. “But I will not back the party when they point their gun at me.”
Indeed, talk of guns and armament in Jabal Mohsen and Babal-Tabbaneh will likely engender more confusion.
While the ADP is open about its weapons supplier, the situation in Jabal Mohsen is even more complicated.
“May God protect the Syrian regime,” Saleh says in response to a question about the source of the ADP’s arms, and accuses Saudi Arabia and Qatar of arming his rivals.
Aswad, for his part, says it is clear to everyone that Syria and Hezbollah provide the ADP with supplies of weapons, yet he adds that there are “a hundred people” arming the Bab al-Tabbaneh fighters.
He claims that two Future Movement MPs are among those who “channel the weapons to Bab al-Tabbaneh.”
Saleh adds that although the Lebanese Army seized in April a Sierra Leone-registered ship and confiscated a large consignment of arms and ammunition it was carrying to rebels in Syria, “five ships loaded with arms made their way to Syria before the last one was busted.”
Meanwhile, veteran Bab al-Tabbaneh fighter Walid al-Zoabi says all the weapons used in the fighting between the two Tripoli neighborhoods come from “Hezbollah warehouses.”
He maintains that all the weapons in Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh bore serial numbers that prove they were manufactured in Iran.
“We get them through several mediators,” he explains. “We’re sold the box of bullets for LL50,000 ($33) but Jabal Mohsen gets special treatment, and is sold the box for LL5,000.”
Saleh is skeptical. “If the Bab al-Tabbaneh people are getting their arms from Hezbollah and Iran then we are getting ours from the Future Movement,” he quips.
Yet despite pronounced sectarian feelings and heavy armament, the Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh foes agree that the Lebanese Army is the only guarantor of security and stability in the area. “We are comforted by their presence,” says Zoabi.
Saleh calls on the military to be “stricter in imposing law and order.”
“The army needs to tighten its grip,” he adds. “We need radical solutions.”
But the enigmatic Aswad offers a less flowery reading of the situation in the restive neighborhoods.
Although he denies the participation of members from the Free Syrian Army in the Tripoli warfare, Aswad says events in Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tabbaneh aim at ousting the Lebanese Army from north Lebanon, so that it can turn into a safe haven for the FSA.
“Do you think the area can accommodate all those numbers?” he asks. “We are going to become poorer and hungrier.”

Lebanon's Arabic press digest - June 8, 2012 June 08, 2012 10:13 AM The Daily Star
Arabic press digest.
Following are summaries of some of the main stories in a selection of Lebanese newspapers Friday. The Daily Star cannot vouch for the accuracy of these reports.
Al-Mustaqbal
March 14 delegation headed by Siniora will present memo to Sleiman [Saturday]
Spending resolved: Hezbollah hero, citizens victims
Remarkably, the interests of the various government members came together [Thursday] on the financial issue during a "harmonious [Cabinet] meeting” after months of division.
After realizing the urgent need to finance their election campaigns, Cabinet ministers suddenly reconciled Thursday, approving an additional LL 10.394 trillion fund without providing a detailed explanation to the Lebanese.
Economic sources, speaking to Al-Mustaqbal, described as “shocking” what happened at Thursday’s Cabinet meeting.
What happened was clear evidence that the current government does not want to approve the 2012 draft budget, the sources said.
Meanwhile, Al-Mustaqbal has learned that former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora will visit Baabda Palace at the head of a March 14 delegation Saturday to present a memo to President Michel Sleiman outlining their stance on national dialogue.
As-Safir
March 14 to attend dialogue without Lebanese Forces ... in line with national security rules
Government rebirth with LL 11 trillion
The “majority agreement” managed to extend the life of the government after resolving the funding crisis that has dragged on for several months.
The significance of the “majority agreement” – which saw its first signs at the Cabinet meeting Thursday – is that in it represents the rebirth of the government – the fourth since its formation.
Meanwhile, a delegation from the March 14 coalition headed by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora is expected to visit Baabda Palace Saturday to hand Sleiman a copy of the “salvation initiative” [memo] which until this day is still being finalized.
Siniora is likely to hold a news conference to announce the initiative after he hands over the memo to Sleiman.
An-Nahar
Government floats in money until end of year
Lebanese Forces boycott dialogue, Jumblatt criticizes
Following months of dispute within the government, Cabinet approved Thursday the spending of LL10.934 trillion.
It also allocated LL 150 billion for the implementation of development projects in the northern city of Tripoli.
March 14 parliamentary sources told An-Nahar that this step looked to be more like allocating funds “for elections, not for developmental projects.”
Ministers from MP Walid Jumblatt’s National Struggle Front were said to have criticized the formula that was agreed upon.
Regarding National Dialogue, Jumblatt told An-Nahar that “I no longer understand March 14 and the way it’s dealing with the issue of dialogue."
Ad-Diyar
Finally ... ministers “happy” with LL 10 trillion
Finally, Cabinet ministers are now “happy” with LL 10 trillion after a severe 18-month deadlock while Lebanese citizens mulled over how the “difficult” crisis was resolved, and therefore those responsible for the country’s paralysis during that period.

Relatives of Lebanese Shiite hostages block airport road over government inaction
June 08, 2012/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Relatives of 11 pilgrims who were recently kidnapped in Syria briefly blocked the airport road Thursday afternoon, demanding action and information from the government.
On May 22, 11 male pilgrims were kidnapped in the Syrian province of Aleppo shortly after crossing the border from Turkey. The women and elderly men were set free and returned to Lebanon soon after the abduction. Around 75 relatives blocked the road leading to Rafik Hariri International Airport, near the headquarters of the Higher Islamic Council in Beirut, for a few hours, while security personnel and members of “local political parties” worked to re-open the road, according to the National News Agency.
An unknown Syrian rebel group claimed the abduction of the Lebanese pilgrims and said that releasing them was contingent on Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah apologizing for his support of Syria.
In response to the rebel group’s demands, Nasrallah said last week the kidnappers should separate the humanitarian aspect of the case from political disagreements they may have with him or the resistance group. He also urged them to release the 11 men.
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said last week his country would continue “intensive efforts” to secure the release of the hostages.
Turkey’s ambassador to Lebanon, Inan Ozyildiz, said Thursday his country was “following up” on the case. After meeting with the vice president of the Higher Shiite Council, Sheikh Abdel-Amir Qabalan, Ozyildiz also said there was no negative news about the pilgrims’ condition.
 

In defense of Hosni Mubarak
June 07, 2012/By Michael Young/The Daily Star
Now that I’ve caught your attention, let me hasten to add that I have no intention of defending Egypt’s former president. The old despot was corrupt and thoroughly deplorable. For decades, Mubarak turned his security services against his own population. His legacy, in most respects, was one prolonged serving of national cretinism.
And yet, when we compare Mubarak or his equally sinister onetime counterpart from Tunisia, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, with the likes of Bashar Assad and Moammar Gadhafi, there are differences. It may be useful to examine these differences more closely to see if they can be of benefit as Arab societies strive to reimpose civil structures on what had been (and in some cases still are) authoritarian orders.
Mubarak and Ben Ali were thugs, but they were not mass murderers. The Egyptian president stepped down before unleashing – or more likely because he was incapable of unleashing – the army against protesters in January 2011. Ben Ali took to the clouds, his stolen goods firmly in hand. Both were undeniably responsible for the deaths of innocents, and Mubarak’s conviction last week was nothing if not fair; but they did not butcher their populations and provoke civil wars to stay in office in the same way that Gadhafi did and Assad is doing.
Why is that? Most probably because of the fact that Egypt and Tunisia are traditionally countries of institutions, where the structures of state and society, for all their myriad shortcomings, extend beyond the supreme leader and his clan. Many of these institutions were co-opted by Mubarak and Ben Ali, discredited, intimidated and manipulated; but they also had a prior life of their own, an institutional memory, that the persecutor in chief could never entirely overcome.
When Mubarak sought to install his son Gamal as his successor, something in the Egyptian psyche snapped. This was an ambition too far, reckless hubris by a man who, ultimately, was a mere byproduct of the system, yet who somehow imagined that his 30-year reign entitled him to bend Egypt to his personal preferences.
As protesters took to the streets, Mubarak became a liability to the corporate interests of the military, which had much to lose by protecting the president. It was the army that gave Mubarak the final push, to preserve its stake in the system. There was nothing altruistic about this, even as Egypt’s complex institutional edifice meant that a full-scale massacre was never in the cards. Mubarak was expendable.
If we imagine a continuum of authoritarian systems, they tend to be defined by two extremities. At one extremity are systems where the absolute reference when it comes to the law, or what passes for law, is the leader. At the other are systems built on a scaffolding of regulations and state bodies lending legitimacy to repression. Most authoritarian leaderships combine the two: There are domains controlled by the leader, but there are also those where a judicial veneer is in place to stifle dissent, but also to avoid the inevitable resort to force.
For a long time Syria was such a place. In order to perpetuate his own rule and that of his minority Alawite community, the late Hafez Assad adopted multiple layers of behavior, bureaucracy and ideology to bolster his regime. Arab nationalism, in the guise of Baathism, was there partly to detract from the minority status of the leadership, and to act as an instrument to co-opt large swathes of Syrian society. The conflict with Israel bought the Syrian president Arab credibility and funding, while Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon earned it regional leverage. Syrian prisons were full, but when offered a choice between violence and negotiations to resolve his problems, Assad usually preferred the latter – albeit negotiations destined to assert his will.
And yet there was never any doubt who was the final arbiter on most issues. Syrian institutions had no latitude to question Assad. The army and security apparatus was there to defend the Assads and their political-military clique, not Syrian society. Outside the reach of the ruling family there was virtually no autonomous political space.
Bashar Assad’s mistake was to make this increasingly apparent over the years, even as he alienated his young and impoverished society in other ways. The worst thing a despot can do is to highlight the absoluteness of his supremacy over humiliated subjects. For instance, in Deraa, rather than seek a peaceful solution occasioned by his cousin Atef Najib’s arrest of protesting children, Assad went for his guns. Moammar Gadhafi, similarly, transformed Libya into an extension, a plaything, of his demented, kleptocratic family. When Benghazi rose, his reflex was to threaten carnage. For Gadhafi and Assad, anything short of total submission was existentially dangerous.
Does this tell us something useful about places such as Egypt or Tunisia? To an extent yes, because it affirms that even in degraded political systems, it is yet beneficial to have time-tested institutions in place that can mediate between society and the leadership. Mubarak’s control over the army and judiciary often seemed unlimited, but in retrospect the reality was more complicated. When he departed, both had to face pressures and dynamics imposed on them by society, to which they simply could not respond with unqualified suppression.
The struggle against authoritarianism will be a long one, but civil societies in the Arab world must focus on creating spaces of institutional independence in order to safeguard their liberty. That’s easier said than done, but revolutionary moments allow for such aspirations. There is nothing to regret in Mubarak and Ben Ali. However, they left behind systems easier to reform than Libya’s and Syria’s, and enough survivors for this to happen more serenely.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of The Daily Star. He tweets @BeirutCalling.


Harb not invited to new round of National Dialogue
June 08, 2012/By Antoine Ghattas Saab/ The Daily Star
HAZMIEH, Lebanon: Batroun MP Butros Harb won’t be taking part in next week’s scheduled National Dialogue, having been dropped from the list of invitees after taking part in earlier rounds.
In an interview with The Daily Star at his home in Hazmieh, Harb discussed the tense political standoff in Lebanon between the March 14 and March 8 camps. He noted that he was now obliged to temporarily stay away from his office in Beirut in the wake of the April assassination attempt against fellow March 14 politician Samir Geagea, the head of the Lebanese Forces.
Harb recalled how he took part in earlier dialogue sessions, “when I represented a bloc of independent MPs – Jawad Boulos, Nayla Tueni and Samir Franjieh – but after the [2009] elections, I was the only one left in this bloc.”
“The president decided – why I don’t know – that I don’t represent anyone except myself ... meanwhile, there are people who don’t represent blocs, such as Mohammad Safadi, who used to represent a bloc of two MPs [and took part],” Harb said.
The veteran lawmaker, a lawyer by profession, said he didn’t blame President Michel Sleiman for not inviting him, since dialogue has become “a waste of time – it’s all about philosophizing, and artificial smiles.”
“We hear cursing [between rival camps] in the media, and at the same time, they all salute each other inside” the dialogue hall, he said. “I wish them luck ... the dialogue is no longer useful, since there’s no will to settle the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons.”
March 14 politicians are leaning toward attending the dialogue session, but without Geagea or former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, and the coalition is split on the issue.
“When it comes to dialogue, there are two groups,” Harb said. “One group thinks it isn’t useful, because none of the earlier agreed-upon items was [implemented], so it believes the other side is headed for dialogue in order to impose its conditions, relying on the force of arms.”
The second group believes that dialogue is useful, aimed at finding solutions to divisive issues, and reducing the “tension on the street,” he said.
The March 8 camp, Harb said, has indicated its lack of respect for dialogue, by opposing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and giving refuge to four Hezbollah members who have been indicted in the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
A key plank of a memorandum that March 14 will send to Sleiman involves the demand that March 8 groups commit to earlier decisions reached during national dialogue, “so that they prove they’re serious, and aren’t interested in merely maneuvering.”
“There is no point in dialogue under the current government, because what is taking place on the ground contradicts the process of cooling things down [politically],” Harb said.
March 14 has demanded in previous statements a neutral Cabinet to be in place for both the dialogue process and the parliamentary elections scheduled for next year.
Asked about March 14’s position if Sleiman declines to endorse the formation of a neutral government, Harb said “then we’ll see.”
“The basic thing is that this government, which acts hostilely toward half of the Lebanese people, cannot continue. If there is an insistence on its staying in office, we’ll respond, based on democratic methods,” he said.
Asked if a decision by March 14 to attend national dialogue would contravene the support expressed by King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz of Saudi Arabia for the Baabda Palace meeting, Harb said March 14 was entitled to its own opinion.
“Everyone in March 14 has great affection for the king, but in the end, we have our own stance, and express it, without relying on anyone, even if that person is close to us.”
As for the internal developments within March 14, which is currently engaged in a process of evaluating its internal structure, Harb said the process was a healthy one.
“Disputes are a positive aspect within a political team – it indicates that there is a sense of democracy,” he said, adding that the members of March 14 agreed on core issues.
Harb, who has run for president in the past, said he should not be considered under the “current conditions,” with Sleiman’s tenure ending in 2014.
“The criteria for selecting the president aren’t in line with my convictions,” he said. “They want the president of Lebanon to have no opinions.”

U.S. Options for Syria: Action vs. Inaction
Michael Singh /Washington Institute
June 7, 2012
The Obama administration should take actions to overcome the obstacles to, and mitigate the risks of, bolder international action in Syria.
With the failure of the Annan plan and the increasing civilian toll of fighting in Syria, the Obama administration is reportedly considering more proactive steps to compel Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to step aside. While most options carry risks, so does inaction. To achieve its policy objectives in Syria and increase the available options, the Obama administration should take actions to overcome the obstacles to, and mitigate the risks of, bolder international action.
Policy Objectives
For the United States, the Syrian uprising represents not only a humanitarian crisis to be addressed but a strategic opportunity to be seized. The Assad regime -- Iran's sole ally in the Middle East -- has aided terrorist groups and foreign fighters and has sought to destabilize Lebanon. While a successor regime may still oppose U.S. interests in some areas, it would unlikely prove a close ally to Tehran or Iranian proxy groups such as Hizballah.
For these reasons, President Obama more than a year ago called upon Assad to resign. Since doing so, however, the United States has proven unable or unwilling to compel Assad to actually step aside; furthermore, Washington appears to have stepped back from this policy objective, for example by endorsing the so-called Annan plan, which does not explicitly call for Assad's resignation. Washington's inability or unwillingness to compel Assad's departure from Syria, as well as its shifting objectives, poses a threat to American credibility and the perception of American power in the region.
The Obstacles
For all that might be gained by successfully achieving Assad's downfall in Syria, a more proactive U.S. approach also entails risks:
First, the Obama administration worries about exacerbating the violence and instability in Syria, which could continue even after Assad's fall and could also spill over into neighboring countries.
Second, U.S. officials are concerned about the fragmented state of the Syrian opposition and its implications for a post-Assad government. Unlike Libya's Transitional National Council, which based itself inside Libya after the liberation of Benghazi and achieved a common agenda and remarkable consistency of message until the fall of Qadhafi, the Syrian opposition has been forced to base itself abroad, failing to unite around a single platform or leadership. As for the Free Syrian Army and other armed opposition elements, understandable concern exists that their ultimate aims and interests may differ considerably from Washington's, that arms provided to them may be poorly controlled, and that militias may be reluctant to disarm and cede power to civilians if Assad is ultimately toppled. The pre-Assad history of Syria was characterized by rapid-fire revolutions carried out by military figures, and avoiding a return to such a scenario is vital for Syria's future.
Third, Washington is concerned about international support for more proactive steps in Syria. Like in Libya, the Obama administration has preferred not to lead international efforts on Syria, but to await international consensus and defer to the leadership of regional or international partners. Unlike in Libya, however, such consensus has been elusive. While much attention has been focused on Russia's effective veto of UN Security Council sanctions, not to mention military intervention, Moscow is not the only obstacle to a bolder approach. French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who played a pivotal role in marshaling support for the Libya intervention, is no longer in office, and the European Union is mired in an economic crisis, leaving no one other than the Syrians themselves to champion greater Western involvement in dethroning Assad.
While these risks are not trivial, inaction also carries with it consequences. Rather than cutting Assad off from Iran and Hizballah, the fighting has drawn in both parties more deeply, risking the regionalization of the conflict. Also, one of the very risks Washington has been seeking to avoid -- spillover of the conflict into neighboring states -- is already occurring, with clashes occurring in both Lebanon and Turkey. And patient U.S. efforts to convince Russia to support international sanctions have borne little fruit while expending valuable time.
Policy Options
Looking forward, the Obama administration should recommit firmly to its original objective of compelling Assad to step down. A clear stance on this point will ensure that those in Syria and the region who support Assad will face up to the consequences of this support and not count on a diplomatic deal that protects their privileges and prerogatives. To begin making progress toward accomplishing this objective, the United States should work to diminish the obstacles to bolder and more effective action:
1.Continue to increase diplomatic and economic pressure. While not abandoning efforts to secure UN Security Council sanctions, Washington should not dilute its policy objectives or provide lifelines to the Assad regime solely for the sake of garnering Russian support. Realistically, Moscow is unlikely at this stage to make a strategic shift in its approach to Syria, which it sees as one of the few remaining bastions of Russian influence in a key region. Washington should therefore emphasize its diplomatic efforts on ratcheting up non-UN sanctions to the greatest possible extent, as Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner urged at a recent meeting in Istanbul. Sanctions, however, must be just one element of a broader effort to pressure Assad, as history demonstrates the ability of determined regimes to resist even comprehensive diplomatic and economic pressure.
2.Throw U.S. support behind Assad opponents in Syria. Washington should take steps to bolster the Syrian opposition and overcome doubts about its reliability, concentrating these efforts in two areas: First, the civilian opposition should be urged -- even required, as a condition for international aid -- to unify behind a common leadership and platform that is pluralistic and provides for civil liberties, and should be provided with whatever international assistance is required. Second, the disparate elements that make up the armed opposition should be thoroughly vetted, including through greater contact with Western officials, and those found most trustworthy should be provided not just with arms but with intelligence, training in command and control, and equipment. This assistance should be conditioned on the militias subordinating themselves to the civilian opposition.
3.Lead consultations on international intervention. With Russia and China able to block UN Security Council authorization for intervention in Syria and with regional allies looking to Washington for leadership, the United States will need to lead discussions among allies on preparing for the possibility of military intervention in Syria should other measures fail to sway the Assad regime. Military intervention in Syria must have two objectives: first, to establish buffer or "safe" zones along Syria's borders to protect displaced persons and prevent further spillover of violence into neighboring countries, thus preventing the Syrian crisis from becoming a regional conflagration; and second, to deprive Assad of his most lethal resources and to support indigenous Syrian opposition forces by imposing no-fly, no-drive, and/or naval quarantine areas. While such intervention may ultimately be unnecessary, planning now for such actions and building international support for them will ensure that viable military options are available to Washington should they be required. In addition, such planning -- including the end of categorical U.S. and NATO statements that no intervention is being contemplated -- may influence the calculus of Assad and his supporters in Syria, as well as Russia, which may find supporting international sanctions preferable to the alternative of international intervention.

A message to Misbah al-Ahdab
Hazem al-Amin, June 8, 2012 /Now Lebanon
Against a backdrop of the bloody events in the poverty-ridden neighborhoods of Tripoli, a group of male and female activists in the city organized a genuinely noteworthy campaign they dubbed as “Tripoli, a weapons-free city.” Indeed, the Tripoli activists said that they want Tripoli to be “a weapons-free city” and did not link disarmament in their city to disarmament in other Lebanese areas. This denotes a local sense that is lacking among the city’s political forces, which call for disarmament, albeit linking it to the spread of weapons throughout Lebanon, especially Hezbollah’s weapons.
Hezbollah’s weapons are undoubtedly the Lebanese people’s top problem, but the weapons in Tripoli are the problem of Tripoli’s inhabitants first and foremost. Therefore, launching the campaign “Tripoli, a weapons-free city” entails a sound civic sense, as the activists said: “The weapons in our city target us before even being the weapons of our community against those of another community.”
Accordingly, it is necessary to take the weapons out of the surrounding political context. Weapons have become exclusively a killing instrument, rather than a self-defense means as those carrying them claim, and Tripoli can really do that. Yes, the “Sunni Tripoli” can be a weapons-free city and, as such, have no fear of the “Alawi weapons,” which is invoked by armed groups as a reason to justify their own armament. Hundreds of thousands will not be scared by a few hundred armed men, whereas the losses resulting from the equation of “weapons vs. weapons” will be felt by the majority before they even hit the minority.
During the latest round of clashes, 14 people were killed, 30 others were wounded and dozens of homes were burnt. Sales in local shops fell by 40%, as the North’s inhabitants deserted Tripoli’s souks and expatriates decided not to return to the city for the summer while schools remained closed with the end of the school year in sight. 95% of these negative indicators affected Tripoli’s inhabitants, whom armed men are claiming to defend with their weapons.
However, one would be remiss, while commenting the “Tripoli, a weapons-free city” campaign, not to mention that the activists’ campaign monopolized Tripoli’s image, thus falling into another trap, especially since they argue that their campaign aims to ban weapons without seeking to monopolize the city. The activists actually distributed ads with pictures of townsfolk aiming to reflect the street mood as opposed to that of burgeoning militias. However, these faces failed to reflect the other side of Tripoli, one that is a partner – and even a pioneer – in tragedy.
The faces on the ads belong to men and women who are obviously not part of the city’s poverty belt where the clashes are occurring. People in those areas are supposed to be the most harmed by weapons. The markets of the city’s middle and upper class may have been harmed by the weapons, but the spirits of the inhabitants in these poverty belts have been violated.
Tripoli’s ads show a man complaining about “our jobs” or a young woman being “heartbroken” over the quality of living … How fitting would it have been had the ads also displayed a woman from Bab al-Tabbaneh saying: “We have lost our children.”
This takes us to a debate that politics in our country have failed to reach so far, one regarding the costs that are supposed to be shared by communities that have gathered in states and cities where they live with one another. Europe, as a continent, has decided to do that and being a French citizen entails paying a tax that supports one’s fellow Spanish citizen.
What if being a Tripoli inhabitant entailed seeking to bring Bab al-Tabbaneh out of its poverty? This would greatly facilitate disarmament and block the attempts to take advantage of the inhabitants’ poverty in political crises.
This article is a translation of the original, which appeared on the NOW Arabic site on Friday June 8, 2012

Deadly blast rocks Damascus as 10 die in Syria, activists say
June 8, 2012
A deadly blast rocked a Damascus suburb, killing two security forces members, among 10 people killed across Syria on Friday, said the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
The bloodshed came as people took to the streets to demonstrate against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad following weekly Muslim prayers, the main day of protests in the 15-month uprising.
An AFP photographer said the blast in the capital's Qudssaya neighborhood tore a car to shreds and damaged a military bus—the reported target—as well as some nearby residential buildings.
Elsewhere, an explosion in front of a police station in the northwestern city of Edleb killed five people, including another two more members of the security forces, said the Britain-based Observatory.
"It was a powerful explosion that destroyed the facade of the building," said the watchdog, which also reported that a civilian was shot dead at Kfar Nebbol in the same province.
In other violence, troops battled to take back the rebel bastion of Khaldiyeh in the central city of Homs, shelling the district, the Observatory said.
Khaldiyeh in the north of the city has been pounded intermittently since Friday morning "at a rate of five shells a minute," the Observatory said.
In the southern province of Daraa, cradle of the uprising, the head of a rebel "brigade" was killed at Basr al-Sham and a sniper shot dead a civilian in Mahajja, said the Observatory.
At least 58 people were killed on Thursday across Syria, where the crisis may "spiral out of control," UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan told the UN Security Council, unless more pressure is put on Assad.
Anti-regime activists had called for fresh demonstrations on Friday, under the slogan "Revolutionaries and traders, hand in hand until victory," in an attempt to convince the middle classes in Damascus and the northern city of Aleppo to join the uprising that erupted in mid-March 2011.
People emerged from mosques to demonstrate in Kfar Zita, in the central Hama province, chanting: "We don't want peace. We want bullets and Kalashnikovs!"
A convoy of UN monitors trying to reach the central village of Al-Kubeir on Thursday to investigate the slaughter of at least 55 civilians in the small Sunni farming area was shot at, the Observatory said.
-AFP/NOW Lebanon

Assad’s sectarian strategy
Tony Badran , June 7, 2012/Now Lebanon
The Houla massacre was simply the most egregious installment in a pattern of deliberate sectarian killings by regime forces in Syria. (AFP photo)
While the massacre of women and children in Houla last month has been rightly denounced by outsiders as a horrific act of brutality, few fully appreciate the cold-blooded calculus of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad that gives rise to recent sectarian murders in Sunni villages.
Predictably, regime sympathizers were quick to cast doubt on whether in fact Assad was responsible for the atrocity, intimating that it must have been perpetrated by the opposition in order to invite outside intervention. Others suggested it was the work of “rogue” shabiha paramilitaries from Assad’s minority Alawite sect, but not an officially sanctioned attack. After all, the attack was seemingly irrational, serving only to further alienate the Syrian people and outrage the international community.
In fact, the killing was simply the most egregious installment in a pattern of deliberate sectarian killings (most recently in the town of al-Qubayr yesterday), the product of cold deliberation by Assad. The Syrian dictator is seeking to irredeemably tie the fate of the Alawites to his own, in a message aimed both at his sectarian community as well as at the international community.
To better understand Assad’s thinking, it’s important to situate these attacks in the larger context of the regime’s operations and the logic that’s been driving them. Like al-Qubayr, Houla possesses two important characteristics. On the one hand, it is adjacent to Alawite villages, from which the attacks were launched. On the other hand, these villages (and one could add Kfar Zayta to the list) straddle the eastern edge of the traditional region of Alawite concentration, along the north-south meridian that runs from Jisr al-Shughour in the north to Tel Kalakh in the south.
Those who have lived through or studied Lebanon’s 1975-1990 civil war will immediately recognize what’s going on. The early stages of the war witnessed mass killings in towns like Nabaa-Tel az-Zaatar, Quarantina and Damour as the rival camps began fortifying their sectarian cantons, clearing out enemy outposts and securing strategic routes and points of access—a sign that they were in it for the long haul.
As noted by Michael Young, the Assad regime has been pursuing something “suspiciously similar” to ethnic cleansing along the northern and southern tips of the Alawite ancestral stronghold (and within it, as we saw yesterday in Haffeh, near Lattakia). While it’s hard to say whether the Syrian regime is preparing a fallback plan of an Alawite mini-state, it’s clear that Assad is pursuing a policy of Alawite inner consolidation.
The Assad regime’s Alawite-dominated forces are already little more than a sectarian militia. By arming Alawite villages and using them as launching pads for attacks against Sunnis, as he did in Houla and al-Qubayr (and possibly Haffeh), Assad is hardening the sectarian boundaries and implicating the entire Alawite community in the murder of Sunnis, further bonding its fate to his. If the Sunnis retaliate, as he surely must have counted they would, all the better.
Some commentators have speculated that by perpetrating these massacres, Assad was trying to reinstate fear in the hearts of his opponents. However, at this point in the game, we are well past that. This is no longer about putting the Sunni genie back in the bottle. Rather, this is about sealing Alawite solidarity and widening the target of Sunni animosity.
By covering the collective hands of the Alawite community with Sunni blood, Assad is creating total identity between his family and the broader sect, while simultaneously heightening its existential fears and feeding its primordial hatreds. “It is natural,” one Alawite woman told a reporter from The Telegraph recently, “[T]hey have to defend their sect.” “We have no future, at least not one that is worth looking forward to,” explained an insightful Alawite blogger known as Karfan in 2005. That is exactly what Assad sought to enshrine with the Houla massacre.
The killings are also a message to the outside world. When Assad hears daily consternation from Washington about the horrible specter of sectarian civil war in Syria, he recognizes that accentuating these anxieties is likely to deter, not trigger, international action. Indeed, judging from the underwhelming international reaction to the Houla killing, his reading was vindicated. This is why the pattern is now being repeated in other villages.
*Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.