LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 16/12

Bible Quotation for today/Jesus the Real Vine
John 15/01-17: " I am the real vine, and my Father is the gardener. He breaks off every branch in me that does not bear fruit, and he prunes every branch that does bear fruit, so that it will be clean and bear more fruit. You have been made clean already by the teaching I have given you. Remain united to me, and I will remain united to you. A branch cannot bear fruit by itself; it can do so only if it remains in the vine. In the same way you cannot bear fruit unless you remain in me. I am the vine, and you are the branches. Those who remain in me, and I in them, will bear much fruit; for you can do nothing without me. Those who do not remain in me are thrown out like a branch and dry up; such branches are gathered up and thrown into the fire, where they are burned. If you remain in me and my words remain in you, then you will ask for anything you wish, and you shall have it. My Father's glory is shown by your bearing much fruit; and in this way you become my disciples. I love you just as the Father loves me; remain in my love. If you obey my commands, you will remain in my love, just as I have obeyed my Father's commands and remain in his love. I have told you this so that my joy may be in you and that your joy may be complete. My commandment is this: love one another, just as I love you. The greatest love you can have for your friends is to give your life for them. And you are my friends if you do what I command you. I do not call you servants any longer, because servants do not know what their master is doing. Instead, I call you friends, because I have told you everything I heard from my Father. You did not choose me; I chose you and appointed you to go and bear much fruit, the kind of fruit that endures. And so the Father will give you whatever you ask of him in my name. This, then, is what I command you: love one another.

Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources
Why are the Russians still supporting al-Assad/By Tariq Alhomayed/Asharq Al-Awsat/June 15/12
Expelling the Russians from Jeddah/By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashid/Asharq Alawsat/June 15/12
Ghassan Tueni takes our reinvented past/By Michael Young/The Daily Star/June 15/12

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June 15/12
Court ruling tests Egypt democracy
Egypt's Shocking Legal Judgments
Cairo in turmoil: Generals assume legislative powers. Parliament dissolved]
Clinton: U.S. expects Egypt military to fully carry out democratic transition
Iran's dreams for influence stymied in Egypt
Syrian town deserted, burnt after clashes
U.S.: Russian helicopters delivered to Syria are refurbished, not new
Syria overruns rebellious village, violence spikes
Suicide blast at Shiite shrine near Damascus wounds 14
Bombs target pilgrims in Iraq, killing scores
Pope still plans to visit Lebanon despite violence in Syria
Defense argues STL illegally established
France Gives Top Honor to Franco-Lebanese Writer Maalouf
Watkins Calls from Arsal for Demarcation of Lebanese-Syrian Border
Lebanese Infant Beaten to Death
Foreign Ministry to Set up Hotline for Lebanese Expats
Mansour Says Glimpse of Hope for Release of Interpreter Held in Libya
Clinton’s Deputy Urges Govt. to Address Needs of Displaced Syrians in Lebanon
U.S. voices support for Lebanon’s Syria policy: minister
U.S. praises Lebanon's government, army
Beirut becoming less affordable for expats
Lebanese baby girl apparently beaten to death by parents
Lebanon: Protection of women: A matter of dispute
U.S. refugee official visits Lebanon
Accused Israel collaborator claims he was framed by Hezbollah
Druze spiritual leader calls for calm
Amin Gemayel supports Karam for Koura by-elections

Pope still plans to visit Lebanon despite violence in Syria
June 15, 2012 12:37 AM (Last updated: June 15, 2012/By Daily Star Staff
BEIRUT: Preparations for Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to Lebanon in September are going ahead despite the escalating violence in Syria, the Vatican said Thursday, dismissing earlier reports about a possible cancellation of the trip because of the crisis next door.
“There is no uncertainty about the preparations,” Benedict’s spokesman Federico Lombardi told a news conference at the Vatican.
“The Holy See is doing everything to make sure the trip takes place as planned” on Sept. 14-16, he said.
But he cautioned that “the future is not in our hands.”
The Vatican Insider website said the Holy See’s “reticence at giving precise details of the voyage is telling of a desire to move slowly in a regional situation that is becoming more explosive daily.”
I.MEDIA, an agency specializing in Vatican news, had said Wednesday that the 15-month-old turmoil in Syria and its impact on Lebanon had put Benedict’s visit in doubt. It “could be canceled at the last minute,” the agency said, quoting unnamed sources.
There are fears at the Vatican that the uprising, which activists say has claimed more than 14,400 lives since the Syrian regime began cracking down on protests in March last year, could spill over into northern Lebanon. A series of security incidents on the Lebanese-Syrian border and deadly clashes between supporters and opponents of Syrian
President Bashar Assad in Tripoli recently have heightened fears of a spillover of the Syrian conflict into Lebanon.
Top U.N. officials have described the situation in Syria as a full-scale civil war.
Alberto Gasbarri, who is in charge of the logistics of the pope’s travels, will visit Beirut by the end of June to prepare for the trip.
The trip will mark the second to the region for Benedict, who was in Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian territories in 2009.
In November, Prime Minister Najib Mikati communicated to Benedict an official invitation on behalf of President Michel Sleiman and the Lebanese people. During his visit to Lebanon, the pope will meet top Lebanese officials, including Sleiman.
A statement from Sleiman’s office said in April that the visit would affirm the depth of the “historical relations that bind Lebanon with the [Vatican] and will form an occasion to focus on Lebanon’s position, message and role as a witness of freedom and coexistence.”
Lombardi had announced at the time that during his visit to Lebanon, the pope would present Middle Eastern bishops an apostolic exhortation. Leaders of Catholic churches across the Middle East and many believers are expected to travel to Lebanon to take part in the pope’s visit.

Defense argues STL illegally established
June 15, 2012 01:52 AM By Willow Osgood The Daily Star
BEIRUT: The defense teams of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon argued Thursday that the U.N. Security Council abused its powers when it illegally established the court, urging the judges to find that the tribunal has no jurisdiction in the 2005 attack that killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
On the second day of hearings on defense motions challenging the court’s jurisdiction, Antoine Korkmaz, attorney for Mustafa Baddredine, one of the four Hezbollah members indicted by the Netherlands-based STL, cited a number of “legal oddities” in Security Council Resolution 1757, which established the court.
Korkmaz charged that the 2005 attack was not one of three recognized international crimes – war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide – arguing that the crime should have therefore been handled domestically.
“These oddities have created more of a disturbance to security in Lebanon than the threat the Security Council said it was trying to solve,” he continued.
The defense asked the judges to decline jurisdiction in the case over what they described as the Security Council’s abuse of power and the resolution’s violation of international law.
They maintain that it was clear by 2007 that the bombing was not a threat to international peace and that the Security Council invoked Chapter VII only in order to bypass political obstacles blocking the ratification of an agreement between Lebanon and the U.N. to create a court. Action under Chapter VII must be in response to threats to international peace and security.
But prosecutor Norman Farrell argued that it was not the court’s job to determine whether the bombing posed a threat to international peace.
“[The defense] is asking you to substitute your view for that of the Security Council ... With respect, the court doesn’t have jurisdiction to do that,” he said, adding “you don’t get to decide whether it was actually a threat or not.”
He argued that the court could only decide whether the attack was within the “species or class” of acts that constitute such a threat.
Emile Aoun, attorney for defendant Salim Ayyash, countered the prosecutor’s argument that Lebanon’s cooperation with the court, by paying its dues and compiling a list of Lebanese judges to serve in the court, indicated that its sovereignty had not been violated.
“Our previous government headed by Saad Hariri refused to take a position vis-à-vis the Special Tribunal; this is why it resigned and a new one was established,” Aoun said.
“Some said that acquiescence is a kind of approval, but silence doesn’t have any meaning in international law; it does not mean consent,” he added.
The defense maintains that that resolution imposed an international treaty on Lebanon, in violation of its Constitution and sovereignty.
Thursday’s hearing also saw the first appearance in a public session of the attorneys appointed to represent victims of the attack. The attorneys argue in their observations that court is necessary to uphold the rights of the victims.
In their filing, they said that “any claim to Lebanese sovereignty over the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for the atrocities of February 14, 2005 is disingenuous.”
They continued their observations by echoing the prosecution’s argument that the Security Council has wide powers and that Lebanon as a member state had agreed to Chapter VII resolutions.
The victims “seek the truth, expiation, redress and justice and they have applied to this tribunal to give effect to the rights which nobody seriously challenges that they have,” said attorney Peter Haynes, addressing the court.
A date for the ruling on the pretrial motions has yet to be set, but it could come before the judges go on recess in late July, according to STL spokesman Marten Youssef.
In closing the hearing, Judge Roth granted a defense request for documents that were used for the February decision to move to trial in absentia.
That hearing was not attended by the defense attorneys, who were officially assigned to represent the accused men, Baddredine, Ayyash, Hussein Oneissi and Assad Sabra, the following day.
The defense is requesting that the court reconsider that decision.

Accused Israel collaborator claims he was framed by Hezbollah
June 15, 2012/By Youssef Diab/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Sheikh Hasan Mshaimesh, who was charged last October with collaborating with Israel, accused Hezbollah during a trial session Thursday of being present when he had been interrogated by the Internal Security Forces and said he was being framed because of his dispute with the party. The Military Tribunal, headed by Brig. Gen. Khalil Ibrahim, was questioning Mshaimesh on charges of collaboration by contacting Israeli agents and providing them with information on Hezbollah in return for money. During the session, Mshaimesh argued that he had been arrested and framed because of a political and ideological dispute with Hezbollah, “which fights against anyone who goes against its political or religious views and its ideology linked to Wilayat al-Fakih [clerical rule].”Mshaimesh stressed that Hezbollah opposes even high-ranking Shiite scholars and clerics who disagree with it. “The attack against the home of the late Shiite cleric Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah was at the hand of Hezbollah’s military commander Mustafa Badreddine,” he said. Mshaimesh said he had been “tortured in a way that no one could endure” by Syrian intelligence when he was arrested in Damascus, at the Lebanese Defense Ministry and the Internal Security Forces’ Information branch. He added that two Hezbollah officials had been present while he was being investigated by the ISF. When warned by Ibrahim that he was offending a security institution, he replied “in Lebanon, anything can happen.” Separately, the Military Tribunal also continued its questioning of Col. Antoine Abu Jawdeh, who was also charged last year of collaborating with Israel. During the session, Abu Jawdeh claimed he had been threatened by a Mossad agent he met abroad and had only supplied publicly available information. The defendant also claimed he suffered from an anxiety disorder.

U.S.: Russian helicopters delivered to Syria are refurbished, not new
By The Associated Press and Natasha Mozgovaya | Jun.14, 2012/Whether new or not, U.S. State Department says it is still concerned that the helicopters will be used by Assad’s forces to kill civilians.
U.S. State Department is acknowledging that the Russian helicopters Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said represented an escalation in the Syrian conflict were actually returning to Syria after being refurbished and are not new tools against Syrian opposition groups. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland says the U.S.¬ is nevertheless concerned that the helicopters will be used by President Bashar Assad's regime to kill civilians. "Whether they are new or whether they are refurbished, the concern remains that they will be used for the exact same purpose that the current helicopters in Syria are being used and that is to kill civilians,” Nuland said. She says three helicopters are on the way to Syria after being out of commission for at least six months. And she says that's "three more that can be used to kill civilians." Clinton accused Russia earlier of escalating the crisis by sending helicopters, but didn't say they were refurbished. Nuland on Thursday declined to say why the State Department didn't divulge that detail earlier.

Clinton: U.S. expects Egypt military to fully carry out democratic transition
By Reuters | Jun.14, 2012
Secretary of State says there is no going back on transfer of power to democratically-elected civilian government; Muslim Brotherhood candidate says he respects an Egypt court ruling that declared the recent parliamentary election unconstitutional.The United States expects Egypt's military authorities to fully transfer power to a democratically elected civilian government, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Thursday.
"There can be no going back on the democratic transition called for by the Egyptian people," Clinton told reporters, declining specific comment on an Egyptian court ruling to dissolve the country's newly-elected Islamist-led parliament.
On Thursday, Egypt's Constitutional Court ruled that the whole of the lower house of Egypt's parliament will be dissolved and a new election will have to be held, saying that the law upon which the recent elections were held is contrary to the rules of Egypt's constitution.
The court also gave Ahmed Shafik, Hosni Mubarak's last prime minister, a green light to continue his bid for Egypt’s presidency, when it ruled against a law that would have thrown him out of the race.
A presidential run-off vote between Shafik and the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsy takes place on Saturday and Sunday.
Morsy said Thursday that he respected the court ruling that declared as unconstitutional the rules under which Egypt's Islamist-dominated parliament was elected.
Mohamed Morsy said in a television interview that he also respected the Supreme Constitutional Court's decision to allow his rival in the presidential election, former prime minister Ahmed Shafik, to stay in the race - though he said the ruling was "unsatisfactory".
"The ruling must be respected," Morsy told the privately-owned Dream TV in reference to the ruling on parliament, an assembly in which the Brotherhood has the biggest bloc.
"This ruling does not dissolve parliament," he added, saying that it only applied to a third of the members of the assembly.
However, the head of the constitutional court had earlier told Reuters that the ruling would mean parliament would be dissolved and new elections held.
Shafik welcomed court rulings that void a parliamentary vote and allow him to contest the country's leadership, saying an "era of political score settling" was over.
Outside the court by the Nile, protesters threw rocks at hundreds of troops and state security conscripts who were guarding the building, which was sealed off by rolls of barbed wire. Some of the security forces began unloading dozens of boxes of tear gas canisters.
The court threw out a law passed by the Islamist-dominated parliament in April that denied political rights to anyone who held a senior post in government or ruling party in the last decade of Mubarak's rule.
The legal wrangling adds to the suspense around an election that is supposed to seal a transition to democracy after Mubarak was toppled in an Arab Spring uprising last year, but has laid bare deep divisions over how Egypt should be governed.

Iran's dreams for influence stymied in Egypt
CAIRO (AP) — Iran once saw the Arab Spring uprisings as a prime opportunity, hoping it would open the door for it to spread its influence in countries whose autocratic leaders long shunned Tehran's ruling clerics. But it is finding the new order no more welcoming. Egypt is a prime example.
Egypt has sporadically looked more friendly toward Iran since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak 16 months ago, and the rise of the Islamists here fueled the expectations of Tehran's clerical regime that it could make inroads.
Instead, it has been met with the deep mistrust felt by many in mainly Sunni Muslim Egypt toward non-Arab, Shiite-dominated Iran — as well as Cairo's reluctance to sacrifice good relations with Iran's rivals, the United States and the oil-rich Arab nations of the Gulf.
In a sign of the mistrust, Egyptian security and religious authorities have raised an alarm in recent weeks that Iran was trying to promote Shiism in the country.
That brought warnings from the Sunni Islamists that Iran had hoped would be friendly to their religious-based leadership.
"Iran must realize that if it wants good relations with an Egypt that will soon regain its strength, it must bear in mind that Egypt holds high the banner of the Sunni faith," said Mohammed el-Sagheer, a lawmaker from the hard-line Gamaa Islamiya.
"Spreading Shiism in Egypt is not an issue of sectarian conflict, it is a question of national security."
Iran has also invited families of nearly 900 protesters killed during last year's uprising to honor them in Tehran, but most relatives declined the offer, with only a group of 27 agreeing to make the trip. They flew to Iran last week.
In a wider context, the new order in the Arab world is not going Tehran's way and it could even erode its influence and leave it more isolated.
"Arab Spring revolts have been a disaster for Iran," said Michael W. Hanna, a Middle East expert from New York's Century Foundation. "It wants to ride those revolts as an extension of its own revolution back in 1979, but it is not happening."
Instead, Iran has been losing its allure as an alternative model to authoritarian Arab regimes that fell victim to popular uprisings like Mubarak's, Moammar Gadhafi's in Libya or Yemen's Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Ominously for Iran, it faces the possibility of the fall of its top Arab ally, the Syrian regime of President Bashar Assad, and its replacement by Sunni rule.
The Assad dynasty — which belongs to the Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiism — has maintained close ties with Tehran for more than 30 years. But it is now struggling to contain an uprising dominated by Syria's Sunni majority.
The fall of Syrian President Bashar Assad, who succeeded his father in 2000, would almost certainly weaken Hezbollah, Tehran's chief ally in Lebanon and a sworn enemy of Israel.
Iran has already seen one friend distance itself over the Syria turmoil. The leadership of the Palestinian militant Hamas group left its Damascus headquarters and relocated to Qatar which, together with Saudi Arabia, is calling for the arming of Syrian rebels.
For the past decade, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been the cornerstones of the anti-Iran faction in the Middle East, trying to roll back its rising fortunes, which peaked with the ascent to power by Iraq's Shiites in 2003 and Hezbollah's 2006 war against Israel, a fight that elevated the Shiite group and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, to heroic status in the mostly Sunni Arab world.
Relations between Cairo and Tehran were tense throughout the 29-year rule of Mubarak, whose regime accused Iran of supporting homegrown militant Islamist groups and involvement in a 1995 assassination attempt against the ousted leader.
More recently, the two regional powerhouses quarreled publicly over Iran's alleged meddling in Iraq and over its support for Hezbollah and Hamas.
Moreover, Egypt traditionally sees itself as the guardian of Islam's dominant Sunni branch and as a protector of Arab culture against foreign influence, including that of Persian Iran.
Relations, however, appeared to be heading for a major breakthrough following Mubarak's ouster on Feb. 11, 2011, with Cairo approving an Iranian request for two naval ships to transit the Suez Canal on their way to Syria. The two vessels sailed through the canal in late February 2011, the first ones to do so since the Islamic Revolution.
In the following month, Egypt's then-Foreign Minister Nabil Elarabi declared Iran was no longer an "enemy state," a comment the Iranians seized on to express their wish to see closer relations with Egypt.
The signs of a rapprochement worried the United States and Saudi Arabia, allied nations whose largesse and goodwill have for decades been at the heart of Egypt's foreign policy goals.
Iranian public statements did not ease their concerns.
"A new Middle East is emerging based on Islam ... based on religious democracy," a hardline cleric, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, said last year during a Friday prayer sermon.
Many Iranian clerics and top officials described Arab Spring uprisings as an indication that "an Islamic Middle East is taking shape" and that Egypt's own revolt was a replay of Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution that toppled a pro-Western monarch and brought Islamists to power, much like what has happened in Egypt.
But even as Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and others have gained a stronger political role in Egypt with their domination of parliament, they have proven little more sympathetic to Iran. And Egypt's military rulers — all veterans of the Mubarak era and close friends of the U.S. military establishment — show little sign of changing their traditional wariness of Tehran.
Last month, Egyptian security forces raided the Cairo offices of Iran's Arabic-language state television channel, Al-Alam, seizing equipment and closing it down. Police said the station did not have a license. A Cairo-based Iranian diplomat was detained and expelled in May last year on suspicion that he tried to set up spy rings in Egypt and the Gulf countries.
That was followed by a flurry of media reports that Shiite places of worship known as Husseinyahs were springing up across the country.
The leader of Al-Azhar, the world's foremost seat of Sunni learning, responded sharply.
Grand Imam Sheik Ahmed al-Tayeb said that while Al-Azhar is not an enemy of any Muslim nation, "it declares its categorical and decisive rejection of all attempts to build places of worship that are not simply called mosques that will incite sectarianism."
Al-Tayeb summoned Iran's top diplomat in Cairo to complain about the Husseinyahs in an intensely publicized meeting. Photographs of a grim-faced al-Tayeb made front pages the next day along with reports that the diplomat gave him assurances that his country had nothing to do with the construction of the Husseinyahs.
Security officials said authorities were investigating a plan to spread "Iranian Shiism" by 350 Shiite activists who have been able to convert thousands of Sunnis to their faith. They said two Husseiniyahs were already operational, one in the Nile Delta town of Tanta and the other in the October 6 district west of Cairo.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.
The Sunni-Shiite divide explains in part Egypt's resistance. But there are key strategic issues as well.
With a struggling economy, Egypt is in dire need of financial help from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab nations whose relations with Tehran are fraught with tensions over its disputed nuclear program, its perceived support for the majority Shiites in Sunni-ruled Bahrain and occupation of three Gulf islands claimed by the United Arab Emirates.
Egypt is also the recipient of some $1.5 billion in annual U.S. military and economic aid and is dependent on Washington's support to secure loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Egypt and Iran "are competitors and rivals in the region," said Middle East expert Samer S. Shehata of Georgetown University. "The natural state of affairs is not for Iran and Egypt to be allies. Egypt's strategic interests are different from Iran's."

Why are the Russians still supporting al-Assad?
By Tariq Alhomayed/Asharq Al-Awsat
It appears that the Russians are increasing their embrace of Bashar al-Assad today, more than at any time than before. Evidence of this can be seen in what Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during the press conference with his Iranian counterpart in Tehran, namely that Moscow is prepared to hold the special conference on Syria outside of Russia, indeed the Russians are prepared to hold this conference anywhere that the parties who will take part in this want!
This in itself represents an indication that Moscow is not just committed to holding this conference, but in fact that the Russians are now more desperate than ever to do so. Otherwise how can we explain Moscow calling for a special conference on Syria without putting a “price” on this, and then even agreeing that this conference could take place anywhere else [outside of Russia]? This is truly suspicious, particularly as the objection is not on the location of the conference, but rather who will participate in this, especially as Iran is the true partner – along with Russia – in supporting the tyrant of Damascus. Therefore Lavrov’s statements about his country’s preparedness to hold a conference on Syria anywhere is nothing more than a sign of the embarrassing situation that Moscow currently finds itself in, particularly as the situation on the ground in Syria indicates that al-Assad is beginning to lose control, and it is a practical certainty that he will not be able to regain this control, not to mention restore the situation to what it was before the revolution. All signs indicate that al-Assad’s ouster is inevitable, and the only question that remains is: how and when? Will this be by a coup, or a sudden collapse of his regime? This is something that will represent a severe blow to Russia, whether it happens today or in the future, particularly as Moscow has proposed negotiations over the future of al-Assad whilst time has passed without any “buyer” coming forward, all the while Moscow’s influence in Syria is waning, particularly as the situation on the ground is not in al-Assad’s interests, and this is something that we previously made reference to. In this case, al-Assad’s ouster in a sudden and surprising manner or the complete destruction of the situation in Syria will both see Russia losing an important playing card. At this point, Moscow will be unable to secure its interests in the country, and therefore its words will be worthless. From here, perhaps we can understand Moscow’s desire to invite Iran to the special conference on Syria, as Russia wants to trade with Iran in the game of negotiations over the future of al-Assad. This is because Tehran holds the direct pressure card against al-Assad, and it could be in Iran’s interests to put forward an alternative to al-Assad who will serve their interests in Syria. As for Moscow, the only card it possesses today is the UN Security Council veto which it can brandish as an opponent, whether this is against the international community or al-Assad and Iran. Therefore Moscow’s strength today is its UN Security Council veto; however the signs on the ground place Moscow in an extremely embarrassing position and may deprive Russia of the “price” of toppling al-Assad. From here, Russia’s cards are under threat, and Moscow may not be able to benefit from them, particularly as time goes by, and following the failure of the Annan mission. Therefore we can understand Lavrov’s statements regarding the possibility of holding the Syrian conference outside of Russia as part of Moscow sensing the seriousness of the situation of the ground, rather than evidence of Russia’s political flexibility or pragmatism. Moscow today is pushing – as strongly as possible – for this conference on Syria, in order to thereby ensure that Russia guarantees its present and future interests.

Egypt's Shocking Legal Judgments
David Schenker and Eric Trager
June 14, 2012 /Washington Institute
New unrest in prospect after high-court rulings appear to back military council.
Today, Egypt's Constitutional Court made two key rulings, confirming that former prime minister and air force chief Ahmed Shafiq is allowed to run in this weekend's presidential runoff and invalidating one-third of the seats in the Islamist-controlled legislature. The surprise move throws the country's political transition into further upheaval.
There may have been some legal basis for the decision to nullify election results for 166 legislators -- party-affiliated candidates won seats that should have been allocated to "independents." In the wake of the ruling, the military has announced that it is dissolving the legislature and assuming law-making powers in its place. Indeed, the timing of the court's decision -- just two days before the final round of the presidential election -- has many observers casting it as a soft coup that will allow the military to remain the key power center. In short, the rulings undermine the credibility of this weekend's balloting, further jeopardize the reputation of Egypt's traditionally respected judiciary, and raise the specter of a new round of mass demonstrations.
The biggest loser in these decisions is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which controlled 47 percent of the parliament. Its presidential candidate, Muhammad Morsi, will face off against Shafiq, a retired general who is widely seen to be aligned with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Since March, when it first nominated Morsi, the MB has warned that the SCAF would engineer electoral fraud in favor of a former regime official. Today's court decisions seemingly validate these concerns.
The Brotherhood's initial reaction has been mixed. On one hand, spokesman Muhammad Ghazlan indicated that the MB would accept the decision on Shafiq: "It's a reality now, and we must deal with it as such." At the same time, however, the organization signaled its rejection of the legislature's dissolution, a move that MB parliamentary leader Essam al-Erian warned would take Egypt into "a dark tunnel."
No doubt, the rulings will result in some Egyptians taking to the streets. The key question, though, is how the Brotherhood -- Egypt's most potent and well-organized political force -- responds. Although the MB might demonstrate in significant numbers on Friday as it has done routinely for the past several weeks, it might also choose a less confrontational posture with the SCAF. According to Egyptian press reports, senior Brotherhood officials have been meeting with top SCAF generals, including discussions earlier this week between MB deputy supreme guide Khairat al-Shater and armed forces chief of staff Sami Enan. This suggests a deal could be in the works, perhaps securing an MB premiership under a Shafiq presidency.
Even absent a deal, the Brotherhood has other reasons to act with caution. On Wednesday', the SCAF-appointed Ministry of Justice essentially ignored the recent repeal of the much-hated Emergency Law by decreeing that military intelligence officers and military police were authorized to arrest civilians. And earlier this week, Egyptian daily al-Masry al-Youm published a picture of the military police formations in new riot-control gear. Should the MB come out in force against the judicial decisions and challenge the SCAF, violence could ensue. Even without the MB, some clashes between liberal protestors and the military may be inevitable. To date, however, military leaders have not shown a consistent willingness to order deadly force against demonstrators -- perhaps because such orders might not be followed.
More likely, should sustained mass protests ensue, the military will back down, as it has done in almost every confrontation with the Brotherhood to date. Perhaps the two best examples of such concessions are April 2011, when the SCAF relented in the face of large demonstrations and arrested former president Hosni Mubarak, and November 2011, when large rallies compelled the council to produce a timeline for its formal withdrawal from power.
For Washington, the prospect of an unstable Egypt is deeply troubling. Even worse is the extent to which developments surrounding the presidential election are seemingly undermining 'the country's political institutions and the legitimacy of 'its leadership at this pivotal moment. Taken together, the judicial rulings will further exacerbate growing domestic insecurity and economic problems, ensuring that Egypt's turbulent transition will continue for the foreseeable future.
*David Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute. Eric Trager is the Institute's Next Generation fellow.

Cairo in turmoil: Generals assume legislative powers. Parliament dissolved
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report June 14, 2012/Egypt’s transitional military government assumed legislative powers after the supreme constitutional court Thursday, June 14, declared invalid rules governing the parliamentary elections earlier this year which handed control to the two Islamist parties. Because one-third of the seats were elected illegally, the entire chamber is illegal and must dissolve. Egyptians therefore found they faced a new general election for all 498 seats in parliament two days before they vote in the presidential runoff. The Muslim Brotherhood announced it accepts the court’s ruling although it represents a major setback to its political aspirations.
The highest court in Egypt also overturned a Muslim Brotherhood-initiated law that would have disqualified former Mubarak prime minister Ahmed Shafiq from running against the MB’s Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi in the presidential runoff Saturday and Sunday. Shafiq therefore stays in the race.
debkafile: Because the parliamentary constitutional assembly is prevented from writing a new charter to determine the extent of the new president’s powers, the powers of the winner of the presidential election, whether Shafiq or Morsi, remains undefined.
The constitution court’s two decisions send the democratic process back to square one and delay the transition of government from the SCAF military council to civilian hands until new elections are held.
debkafile reported Wednesday:
Egypt’s constitutional court Thursday, June 14, declared invalid rules governing the parliamentary elections earlier this year which handed control to the two Islamist parties. Egyptian TV has just announced that after one-third of the seats were voided, parliament is to be dissolved and a new election is to be held.
The court also declared unconstitutional a Muslim Brotherhood-initiated law that would have disqualified former Mubarak prime minister Ahmed Shafiq from running against the MB’s Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi in the presidential runoff Saturday and Sunday.
debkafile: Because the parliamentary constitutional assembly is prevented from writing a new charter to determine the extent of the new president’s powers, the powers of the winner of the presidential election, whether Shafiq or Morsi, remain undefined.
The constitution court’s two decisions Thursday are a major setback for the Muslim Brotherhood. They also send the democratic process back to square one and delay the transition of government from the SCAF military council to civilian hands until new elections are held.
Contesting the television broadcast, lawyers who heard the court rulings are not clear about the next stage of the crisis. Some question the need for a new general election and argue that only the one-third of the seats were voided and only they should be put up for re-election.
debkafile reported Wednesday:
The Obama administration is girding up for the shock of Egypt becoming the first Arab country, and the most populous, to be ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood. The last of three secret polls US intelligence conducted in Egypt assigned the MB contender Muhammad Morsi a 70 percent win of the presidential election runoff, Saturday-Sunday, June 16-17, against former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq’s 30 percent, according to debkafile’s exclusive sources.
Although such polls often miss the mark, the US, Israel and the Middle East appear to be facing this fast-approaching prospect.
Egypt’s transitional government the Supreme Military Council (SCAF) has publicly pledged to transfer power to civilian control on July 1 whomsoever wins the election. There are signs of preparations for this game-changer in Washington, though not in Jerusalem – unless they are taking place in secret – although Israel’s strategic and regional situation faces radical change.
At the same time, as high-placed American sources monitoring events in Egypt point out, the incoming president’s powers are still undefined and the SCAF may hold off transferring authority until they are.
Defining the extent of presidential authority is one of the tasks up to the 100-member Egyptian Constitutional Assembly, which only began work Wednesday, June 13. It is impossible to predict the content of its final document, although the body has a Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi Nour majority.
Furthermore, a judicial body, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, is due to hand down critical rulings Thursday, June 14, just two days before the presidential election. They promise major repercussions for voting patterns and the status of the two contenders and their parties.
One SCC recommendation is to abolish as unconstitutional the law passed by the Islamist-dominated parliament in April barring senior Mubarak-era officials (such as Ahmed Shafiq) from running for president. The SCC may also throw out the electoral laws under which The Brotherhood and the Salafist party gained 75 percent of seats in parliament, order it its dissollution and call a new general election.
If confirmed, these rulings could produce a Brotherhood president without constitutional powers or parliamentary backing. In these circumstances, Muhammad Morsi would be too weak to govern, or even become a figurehead, and the SCAF would stay in power.
All this is of course speculative, debkafile's sources report. No one can tell for sure how Egypt’s first venture into full democracy will turn out.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s violent campaign tactics have meanwhile had some unforeseen consequences and created unexpected bedfellows.
Gangs of Islamist thugs have gone about burning Shafiq’s campaign branches, breaking up his public rallies and attacking the homes of his supporters and families. They turn up with loudspeaker cars on the fringes of pro-Shafiq rallies and shout slogans saying he should be hanged after the ousted ruler Hosni Mubarak was sentenced to life in prison for lesser crimes.
Those tactics have absurdly sent some of the democratic and liberal forces which staged the Tahir Square revolution for toppling Mubarak rallying behind his last prime minister and adherent, as the lesser evil.
However, those tactics have a more sinister side.
debkafile’s intelligence sources report that local gangs of Islamist thugs are linking up into a nationwide organization, for which the Brotherhood is setting up regional headquarters. In Cairo this week, a central headquarters began coordinating their activities with a fleet of vehicles ferrying squads between districts for creating mayhem.
The Brotherhood’s gangs are acquiring a hierarchical structure resembling the embryonic paramilitary militias which surfaced in the early years of Iran’s Shiite revolution in the late 1970s and early 1980s and evolved into Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps.This manifestation will not disappear after elections are over but will be there to stay as part of Egypt’s political and street landscape, whoever is elected president. That is further cause for trepidation in the US and Israel.

Expelling the Russians from Jeddah
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashid/Asharq Alawsat
An airplane loaded with businessmen from some of Russia’s largest companies in vital sectors, including the oil, construction, rail, tourism, food and agriculture sectors, arrived in Jeddah from Moscow.
However the news of the Russian businessmen’s visit angered Saudi citizens, who see Russian warships docking in the Syrian port of Tartus in order to provide the al-Assad regime with everything that it needs to kill the Syrian people, at the same time that representatives of Russia’s largest companies are landing at Jeddah airport in order to reap contracts worth billions of dollars.
Due to the overwhelming public anger in Saudi Arabia, not a single trader dared to go to the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce to meet with the Russian businessmen. Saudi businessmen simply sent a receptionist to inform the Russian delegation that the meeting was cancelled because the members and businessmen [of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce] could not meet with them. After these Russian businessmen returned to their hotel, the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce – which was to be their next destination – telephoned them and informed them that their meeting was also cancelled.
This represents the expected response to the Russian stance on Syria, which is full of impudence, to the point that Moscow no longer even cares about the discourse it is using to describe the situation in Syria or its unashamed role in the killing of the Syrian people. This demonstrates the manner in which the short – but until now improving – relationship between the “new Russia” and the Arab world has decayed, after the doors of the Gulf States and the Arab world in general had been opened to the Russians. Following the end of the Cold War, Moscow – as well as certain Chinese companies – were granted preferential deals and allowed to become involved in large oil, gas and construction projects and even arms deals, after they had been prevented from being involved in such deals during the Soviet Union era. Russia’s annual trade with Saudi Arabia alone is today valued at $3.5 billion; whilst this may not seem like a huge amount of money, it represents an important positive shift in Saudi’s relations with Russia.
Today, the general popular mood in Arab states – not to mention official stances – are largely hostile to the policies of Vladimir Putin, who has chosen to stand with the Syrian regime in a long, bloody and ugly confrontation that has been filled with lies and deceit. We do not know who is in charge of the Syrian file in Moscow…is this the presidency, the foreign ministry, or the intelligence service? Who is so insistent on Moscow’s support for Bashar al-Assad, even though this represents a political blunder in terms of handling crises? It seems that this is the result of a combination between Russia’s old conflict with the West and the reality today, particularly regarding what is represented by the new order in the Arab world. We believe that Moscow under Putin today is different to the Moscow of the Bolsheviks, particularly as a pragmatic reading of the situation requires the Russians to realize and accept the impossibility of securing the survival of al-Assad or his regime by way of an unpopular war. The vast majority of Syrians are now firmly against al-Assad, not to mention the possibility of him not being held accountable for his crimes.
We have been contemplating justifications of Russia’s stance on Syria for more than a year. In the beginning, we said the Russians are supporting al-Assad because they are betting on the survival of the regime and so they want ensure that they are on the winning side. Following the emergence of vast pockets of resistance against the al-Assad regime forces and the continuation of protests, we thought that perhaps the Russians are trying to implement regime change from within, whether in terms of securing a change of behavior or leadership, in order to guarantee their presence and influence in Damascus in one way or another. When the Russians took the decision to utilize their Security Council veto, and in light of the continuation of wide-scale bombardment and violence targeting unarmed Syrian civilians, we said perhaps the Russians are engaged in broader negotiations with the West. However now that it is beginning to look like the revolutionaries and protesters will be victorious, and the regime is failing in every corner of Syria, such arguments and pretexts have run out, and we no longer have any doubt that the Russians are playing an old game in a new and different era, and they are unable to think outside of the box of their old views. They continue to support Iran, which has been experiencing internal conflict over the past three years and which is internationally besieged. Whilst prior to this, they supported Gaddafi, and when he lost, they lost with him, and this represented a scandalous defeat for the Russians.
What is driving Russia to support an evil regime that is nearing its final days? Is this part of conflict amongst the Russian old-guard and dreams of returning Moscow to the international forefront? Is this part of Russia holding out for mutual concessions, such as regarding the NATO missile shield or the Iranian nuclear program? However despite this, there is also a historic conflict between Russia and Iran, and President Ahmadinejad previously attacked Putin during a public speech, accusing him of seeking to dominate the Caspian Sea. Ahmadinejad attacked Putin, reminding him of Russian attacks on Iran since the mid-19th century during the era of Tsar Nicholas I. Ahmadinejad also mentioned the Bolshevik attacks on Iran and Tehran being denied its rights to the Caspian Sea, where it was unjustly granted the least rights of all countries bordering the Caspian Sea, making reference to the complex conflict that may arise from anew regarding fishing and oil rights to the Caspian Sea.
This is why we fail to understand the Russian policy that is supporting a weak and failing regime, which is now being besieged on all sides. Can anyone draw us a map to understand the Russian mentality?

Spies in Egypt
By Diana Moukalled/Asharq Alawsat
I’m never going to a café again”
“I met a spy today, dressed like a taxi driver. He kept asking me where he should take me, and I never told him, of course! But I was late for work”.
Many Egyptian activists on social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook mocked, laughed, and were enraged by the “spy commercial” that was broadcasted on Egyptian television, with channels quickly pulling the advertisement shortly afterwards. Even after the commercial was withdrawn, the activists created a “hashtag” on Twitter and the word “really” began trending, because this was the sole English word used by the spy in the advert. It seems that the witty criticisms and jokes directed at the commercial have succeeded in preventing Egypt from descending into a senseless campaign of incitement against foreigners.
“Every word comes with a price. A word can save a nation”. The commercial seemed both naïve and flagrantly racist through its suggestion that foreigners visiting Egypt, and mingling with its residents in coffee shops and public places, are spies. Egyptian television channel officials justified the production of the commercial under the pretext that Egypt today is being infiltrated by a large number of foreigners under the banners of civil society and the media, and that Egyptians are “generous” in their speech; they will provide free information about their country.
Consequently, we are led to believe that there are those who visit Egypt and rush to mingle with its residents and hear about their conditions, which they can already find out about through the media and the internet, but then they quickly rein in their inquiries so as not to aggravate the Egyptians, on the grounds that curiosity is the hallmark of the spy.
Sources in Egyptian television told news agencies that “state entities” were behind the commercial, which casts a worrying light over one of the most important properties of the Egyptian revolution; the expression of opinion.
The fact that “state entities” are behind the propaganda video, with its inflammatory discourse that is unacceptable on a professional, moral or humanitarian level, prompts us towards further questioning and uncertainty about whether the system of government that the Egyptians rebelled against actually still remains. During the commercial, a young woman can be seen wearing a scarf around her neck with a poster in the background stating “bread, freedom and social justice”, one of the most prominent slogans of Egypt’s revolution.
The implication therefore is that among the revolutionary youth there are those leaking the nation’s secrets to spies.
It is true that the commercial has been withdrawn, but we must think carefully about the meanings that stood behind the original broadcast. The idea that every tourist or visitor who feels curious about the country and its people is somehow strange and a spy who you must be wary of shows a large decay in the “state bodies” that produced this work. In Egypt there seem to be those who still believe that the official media is the source of truth and that the Egyptians must accept what it says. In other words, Egypt’s famous cafes are not for talking about politics, they are for light-hearted chats about plays and films. Beware of telling it how it really is, for “the walls have ears”.
Fortunately, the “state entities” in Egypt have lost a battle that could have been catastrophic for the Egyptians.

Ghassan Tueni takes our reinvented past
June 14, 2012/By Michael Young/The Daily Star
It’s not easy to write something fresh about the late Ghassan Tueni. The prerogative of men like him, who have filled up large, invigorating spaces in Lebanon’s modern history, is to have their complicated lives grounded down to more manageable and mundane generality. Yet what was most unnerving about Tueni’s death was that he took with him a large fragment of our idealized past.
I would wager that it was the photographs of Tueni that caught the rapt attention, and envy, of most readers as they read his obituaries. Here were celluloid windows into a Lebanon of another time, one which we are reminded has been lost forever, peopled by the founding generation of our unsettled republic – Tueni, Raymond Edde, Bishara al-Khoury, Camille Chamoun, Kamal Jumblatt, Fouad Chehab, Saeb Salam and many others – all men of the world, a cigarette or cigar in hand, for whom power seemed to bring especial vigor, standing in lustrous black and white contrast to the degraded grays of today.
How real is this image? Lebanon’s old political class was a more interesting collection than what we now have. But there is also much exaggeration. When even Tueni’s photos from the Civil War years elicit tremors of nostalgia, we can assume that this says more about our present frame of mind than about the existence of any golden age.
Ghassan Tueni lived a life of hyperreality. In him the differences between fact and representation were frequently blurred. His personal suffering became an absolute representation of suffering; his passion for journalism and politics became the unconditional form for such passion; and his myriad ambiguities and contradictions became the essence of ambiguity and contradiction, pointless to disentangle.
In trying to draw a straight line through Tueni’s life, many commentators missed the point. Yes, he was a man of visceral liberty, but could also be an autocratic father to his newspaper. He was a believer in God, and yet his fierce struggle for life, when all those around him were dying, revealed underlying doubts about what came afterward. He was the most ecumenical of men, and yet his affirmation as a Greek Orthodox could be overpowering. And Tueni was a man of genuine integrity, but also someone drawn to the roguishness and hardness of politics and politicians – to that other side of himself that proved so essential in preparing for the political, professional and personal trials that he faced for decades on end.
There was great substance to Tueni, but no assessment would be complete without an allusion to style. It is to his style that the Lebanese tended to react most intensely, in the same way that so many non-Lebanese admirers did. For Ghassan Tueni, style became a part of his aura, therefore a vital component of his influence. There may have been an element of vanity in his splendidly cut suits, his striped ties, the golden ring on his little finger, and the leonine hair, but it really was far more than that; these were the natural complements of a man who best embodied the refinement and worldliness we have come to project onto our earlier generations.
My first real contact with Tueni came at a day-long conference in 1993 organized by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies for the 50th anniversary of Lebanon’s Independence. The conference brought together authors who had written papers for a magazine that I then edited, The Beirut Review. No one expected Tueni to stay for more than the 15 minutes necessary to present his text. Instead, he spent the entire day, and it was a hot day, shedding his jacket, rolling up his sleeves, and briskly commenting on his colleagues’ manuscripts.
Style aside, this was plainly someone who was moved, above all, by ideas, by the energies that interaction released. Nothing is more tedious than people who dislike other people, or more heartening than those who are the contrary. Tueni was always a valuable guide into Lebanon’s past, whether factual or imagined, precisely because (though he practiced an often solitary profession) he needed to circulate among people and thrived in a life watered by society.
Some deaths take with them an era, and that was true of Ghassan Tueni’s. Many prominent Lebanese have died in recent years, among them Tueni’s son Gebran. Ghassan himself had been ill for years, his body bent in half, his liveliness slowly fading, and his consciousness not nearly as quickly. Yet at this moment in our national history, his death sounds a note of terrible finality, stirs up an ominous sense that Lebanon is on its own as it heads into an indefinite future.
In their darkest hours, the Lebanese could always fall back on their romanticized past for fortification. But that undervalued exercise only works when those embodying the past are still among us. Ghassan Tueni is no longer. As one of the last to go, he leaves us hanging in a netherworld of sorts, striving to find a part of ourselves in old photographs.
**Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR. He tweets @BeirutCalling.

The Rhetoric of Nonsense, Fabricating Palestinian History
by Alexander H. Joffe
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2012, pp. 15-22 (view PDF)
http://www.meforum.org/3262/palestinian-history-nonsense
For nearly two decades the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been denying Israel's right to exist, and a recent "Nakba Day" was no exception. In a Gaza speech on behalf of Mahmoud Abbas, his personal representative made the following statement:
National reconciliation [between Hamas and Fatah] is required in order to face Israel and Netanyahu. We say to him [Netanyahu], when he claims that they [Jews] have a historical right dating back to 3000 years B.C.E.—we say that the nation of Palestine upon the land of Canaan had a 7,000-year history B.C.E. This is the truth, which must be understood, and we have to note it, in order to say: "Netanyahu, you are incidental in history. We are the people of history. We are the owners of history."[1]
This remarkable assertion has been almost completely ignored by the Western media. Yet it bears a thorough examination: not only as an indication of unwavering Palestinian rejection of Israel's right to exist but as an insightful glimpse into the psyche of their willfully duped Western champions.
Unpacking Abbas's Speech
Archaeologists have only the dimmest notion of prevailing ethnic concepts in 7000 B.C.E. There may have been tribes and clans of some sort, and villages may have had names and a sense of collective or local identity, but their nature is completely unknown. Even with the elaborate symbolism of the period, as seen in figurines, and other data such as the styles of stone tools and house plans, nothing whatsoever is known regarding the content of the makers' identities. Writing would not be invented for almost another 4,000 years and would only reach the Levant a thousand years after that, bringing with it the ability to record a society's own identity concepts.
There were no Jews or Arabs, Canaanites, Israelites, or Egyptians. There were only Neolithic farmers and herders. In fact, none of the concepts that Abbas used developed until vastly later. The Plst—a Mediterranean group known to the Egyptians as one of the "Sea Peoples" and who gave their name to the biblical Philistines—arrived around 1200 B.C.E. Arabs are known in Mesopotamian texts as residents of the Arabian Peninsula from around 900 B.C.E. The concept of a "nation" emerged with the kingdoms of Israel and Judah and their neighbors sometime after 900 B.C.E. The Romans renamed the Kingdom of Judea "Palestina" after the biblically attested Philistines, the hated enemy of the Israelites, following the defeat of the Bar Kochba revolt in 135 C.E. The ethnic identity called "Palestinian," denoting the local Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the region south of Lebanon and West of the Jordan River, tenuously developed as an elite concept at the end of the Ottoman era and did not propagate to the grassroots until the 1920s and 1930s.[2]
Is there perhaps genetic continuity between modern Palestinians and Neolithic farmers and herders? Perhaps, but that is not what Abbas claimed. Is there cultural continuity, a nation with a name? Hardly.
Types of Palestinian Rhetoric
Why then should Abbas make such an incredible fabrication? And why lie in such a ludicrous and extravagant fashion? Part of the answer is that for Abbas, as it was for PLO leader Yasser Arafat before him, there is a reflex that simply and absolutely cannot accept the antiquity of Jews. Arafat famously told then-U.S. president Bill Clinton that there was no Jewish temple in Jerusalem, causing the usually unflappable Clinton to nearly explode.[3] Denials regarding the Jewish historical connection to the Land of Israel generally and categorical denials that Jews constitute a nation are all frequently heard from Palestinian leaders, intellectuals, and others.
A useful avenue of investigation is to consider Abbas's words as a type of rhetoric with a form and underlying philosophy. When viewed in this way, Abbas's spokesman was not lying as such but doing something else.
As philosopher Harry Frankfurt put it
The fact about himself that the bullshitter hides … is that the truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him; what we are not to understand is that his intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it … A person who lies is thereby responding to the truth, and he is to that extent respectful of it … For the bullshitter, however, all these bets are off: He is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false. His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and of the liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.[4]

As Frankfurt describes it, such nonsensical rhetoric is constructed impulsively and without thought—entirely out of whole cloth. It is unconcerned with truth and so, unlike a lie, has license to be panoramic, unconcerned with context. The user is endeavoring to bluff, and the desire for effect is paramount. Whereas lying is austere and rigorous because it must triangulate against truth, nonsense loses, and loosens, the grasp on reality. In that sense, its effect is corrosive, a matter not discussed by Frankfurt.
Stating nonsense to suit one's purpose is only one of three obvious Palestinian rhetorical strategies. Lying, knowingly distorting the truth, is another. A paradigmatic example of this is "Pallywood," the staging of scenes for news cameras. These have ranged from orchestrated street scenes and rioting, which sometimes include fake casualties who leap off of stretchers when out of sight, to destroyed structures and grieving families, to manipulated photographs. Above all there was the so-called Jenin massacre of 2002 and the Muhammad al-Dura case in 2000. In the former, Palestinians accused Israelis of having killed hundreds or thousands of civilians and bulldozing their bodies into mass graves, deliberate lies that were then repeated by human rights organizations. In fact, some fifty-two Palestinian gunmen and twenty-three Israeli soldiers were killed in brutal house to house fighting.[5]
Stating nonsense to suit one's purpose is only one Palestinian rhetorical strategy. Knowingly distorting the truth is another. An example of this is "Pallywood," the staging of scenes for news cameras. This photograph was widely distributed with the observers cropped out and promoted as a picture of an Israel Defense Forces soldier stomping on a Palestinian child. The uniform is not an IDF uniform; the boots are not IDF boots, and the weapon is not one used by the IDF.
In the Dura case, a Palestinian stringer for French television purported to have observed a Palestinian father and son caught in a firefight in Gaza, during the course of which the boy appeared to have been killed. The iconic martyrdom and funeral of the boy became an international symbol of Israeli brutality. But examination of withheld footage showed other Palestinian "wounded" getting up and walking around and contained no death throes of the Dura boy. In fact, grave doubts exist whether a boy died at all in the exchange and whether his father was injured. A series of lawsuits have not resolved the situation, but the impact of what is at least in large part a fabrication is clear.[6] As French journalist Catherine Nay wrote with satisfaction, Dura's supposed death "cancels, erases that of the Jewish child, his hands in the air before the SS in the Warsaw Ghetto."[7] This statement holds the key to understanding the reception of Palestinian rhetoric in Europe. It is a means to erode historical and moral realities regarding the European treatment of the Jews, and it is eagerly embraced in some quarters.
The third Palestinian approach is to propagandize through the lens of pure ideology, specifically Islam. Thus, for example, the former Jerusalem mufti and chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council in Jerusalem, Ekrima Sabri, was recently quoted as saying "after twenty-five years of digging, archaeologists are unanimous that not a single stone has been found related to Jerusalem's alleged Jewish history." This statement is patently false, but the orientation of the religious lens is obvious, indeed, he goes on to state clearly: "We do not recognize any change to the status of Jerusalem, and we reserve our religious, historic, geographic, and cultural heritage in the city, no matter how long or how many generations succeed."[8] Islamic doctrine as it has evolved today simply cannot accept the reality of the Jewish connection to Jerusalem precisely on religious grounds. Sabri is, therefore, neither lying nor fabricating reality to suit his purposes but rather expressing what he regards as a true religious belief. This works in concert with lies and nonsense.
Swallowing Palestinian Rhetoric
Palestinian efforts to minimize or expunge Jews from history go back several decades but have intensified in recent years. Palestinian intellectuals make their own important contributions: Hayel Sanduqa recently claimed that the expression in Psalm 137:5, "If I forget thee, oh Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its skill" was authored by a Crusader king and stolen by "Zionists."[9]
Palestinian denial of any Jewish connections to Israel and allegations that Israel is "Judaizing" Jerusalem are so routine as to be unheard by Israelis, accustomed as they are to Palestinian leaders blustering, lying, and simply making things up, from trivial allegations regarding Israeli "libido-increasing chewing gum" distributed in Gaza[10] to heinous allegations of all manner of war crimes. This is unfortunate since such claims of "Judaization," largely by means of archaeological excavations and infrastructure modernization, featured for decades in international forums such as UNESCO,[11] are central to the global efforts to delegitimize Israel by elevating the Islamic status of Jerusalem.[12]
By and large, the lack of Arab media attention suggests that they also take Palestinian claims with a heaping teaspoon of salt. In the absence of open warfare between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab media today appear preoccupied with more important events in Syria, Egypt, Iran, and elsewhere. Even so, why has there been so little attention to Abbas's statement?
The Palestinian reception of rhetoric such as Abbas's is a critical question. Palestinian nationalist rhetoric since the early 1920s was characterized by what even Palestinian-American historian Rashid Khalidi has called "overheated prose."[13] From the beginning, it was also suffused with local, pan-Arab and Islamic themes that were sometimes complementary but often in tension with one another. In general, Palestinian rhetoric today takes place in an environment that has been progressively Islamized over the past two decades by Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in part through competition with Hamas and other Islamist and jihadist movements.[14] Islamic themes and imagery have helped frame and elaborate political discourse and in turn have intensified the Islamic dimension of Palestinian collective identity.[15]
While a full study of language and cognition in Palestinian culture is beyond the scope of this article, it is useful to bear in mind the analysis of Arab societies as "high context" cultures. In such cultures, the domination of in-groups with similar experiences and expectations requires fewer but more carefully selected words that convey complex messages using inferences supplied by the listener. By contrast, communications in "low context" cultures are not aimed at in-groups and, therefore, tend to be more explicit.[16]
Seen in this light, Palestinian political statements regarding their Neolithic origins and continuity, which can be regarded in historical, rhetorical, and philosophical terms as completely fictional, might be understood as simply innovative shorthand communications to an in-group. On the one hand, it nominally cites Western scientific frameworks, which demonstrates a sort of modernist orientation. But on the other, the emotive power and real intention is largely supplied by the listener, who hears in effect that Palestinians have existed forever, along with the implication that this fact is supported by history or even science.
Together with lies and ideological speech, fictional nonsense helps shape Palestinian culture, beliefs, and political behavior. To say that this is at odds with objective reality as recovered by science is to miss the point. To some unknowable but large degree, this is Palestinian reality. What from the outside appears to be disjointed and nonsensical bits in reality are seamless parts of a larger Palestinian whole, beliefs about the history, the world, culture, and the self. The question then becomes the relationship of that reality to others. And here the matter of media as a conduit and interpreter becomes paramount.
The problem is that in-group statements and the reality they create are never restricted to the in-group. Western reception of rhetorical nonsense varies widely. Western media have been silent about the Neolithic Palestinian nation, and this is most instructive. The simplest explanation why Abbas's comments were not mentioned in Western press accounts is that literal nonsense from Palestinians simply does not register. Although it is not acknowledged, to some extent Palestinian nonsense is likely recognized as such by Western media and filtered out, at least semiconsciously, as "overheated prose." Ironically, of course, objections to such cultural stereotyping are characteristic of the Orientalist critique although they are rarely made when such analyses come from Arab sources.
Willing Infidels
What Israelis regard as incitement—rhetoric designed to inflame populations and move them to hatred and violence—thus seems to register as mere epiphenomena to other Western audiences, who appear to seek a simple, moralistic tale with materialist underpinnings. By and large, Western media in particular, abetted by intellectuals, have created a singular distortion zone around "Israel/Palestine"—turning it into a clear-cut morality tale of colonial white people with F-16s oppressing indigenous brown people with stones and the odd suicide bomber.
A recent study of how the Arab-Israeli conflict is treated by the Reuters news agency noted the pervasive use of appeals to pity and to poverty, innuendo, euphemisms and loaded words, multiple standards and asymmetrical definitions, card-stacking, symbolic fictions, and atrocity propaganda, along with non-sequiturs and red herrings. The study concludes that "Reuters engages in systematically biased storytelling in favor of the Arabs/Palestinians and is able to influence audience affective behavior and motivate direct action along the same trajectory."[17]
For most journalists engaged with the moralistic narrative, fantastic stories about Palestinians having existed 9,000 years ago do not even rise to the level of cognitive dissonance; it is, for now, nonsense discourse and anti-realism. But another factor for the lack of Western attention to such statements is found in Frankfurt's discourse on nonsensical rhetoric; the sincerity of the user cannot be challenged since to do so would require making fundamental judgments. To preserve the fiction of rational interlocutors, sincerity must be accepted as a token of trustworthiness even as the simple words of the statement contradict such claims.
Three other factors also play a role: the postmodern downgrading of objectivity and the idea of a single shared reality; the elevation of multiple narratives as being equally valid, and the valuation of feelings over facts. Challenging rhetorical nonsense, in addition to potentially compromising journalistic access, could hurt interlocutors' feelings.
There is more than a little condescension at work in the Western reception of these strategies if not actual contempt. For one thing, Palestinians lies and nonsense are rarely challenged by the media or other interpreters besides those termed Israel advocates, something that has itself been transformed into a negative semantic and social category. It is almost as if Palestinians are expected simply to make things up as they go along, which then may or may not be accepted by the West according to how well they fit the Palestinian narrative.
Ideological religious statements are similarly ignored but in all likelihood for different reasons. Non-religious Western observers simply have no intellectual framework to interpret such strong statements outside materialist constructs that regard religion generally as epiphenomenal or false consciousness. For these reasons, the Islamic rather than nationalistic basis for the Arab-Israeli conflict has been systematically downplayed from the 1930s. Even the Hamas charter—which is nothing but forthright regarding its religious basis, theological anti-Semitism, and calls for genocide—is largely excluded from journalistic and even academic analyses because it makes no sense within the context of frameworks that are exclusively nationalistic and materialist in nature.
But the eagerness with which certain lies are accepted, such as talk of Israeli war crimes, and the flimsy nature of Western journalistic investigations strongly shows that at least two additional levels of bias are at work. At one level, the narrative of the oppressed underdog is so strong that there is little inclination to press for truths that would undermine that narrative, embarrass the Palestinians, and in doing so, incur their wrath and limit the media access they give to their territories, sources, and stories. At the deeper level, as perfectly illustrated by the quote from Catherine Nay above, there is a deep need to find Israelis guilty in order to relieve Holocaust guilt (and, one might argue cynically, to get back to old-fashioned anti-Semitism) particularly among European descendents of its perpetrators. The satisfaction of making this so is palpable.
These factors also illustrate how the Palestinian narrative, even with ludicrous bits thrown in and others excluded, is arguably not by or even about the Palestinians. It is propelled largely by Western needs to see the world through the post-colonial lens of noble indigenes and evil Western colonists. The Palestinians may in fact have lost exclusive control of the narrative decades ago, perhaps as far back as the 1920s or 1930s, when their cause was taken over by the Arab states and the Muslim world. A more comprehensive view of the Palestinian narrative would see them as secondary contributors to a process propelled by Arab and Muslim states and refracted through Western media and universities, ultimately minor subjects in a far larger discussion between Islam and the West.
The problem is that, thanks to mindless parroting by journalists and human rights organizations of Palestinian lies and nonsense, hatred, anti-Semitism, and ceaseless incitement are gradually overwhelming the filters against anti-realism, particularly in Europe where there are powerful cultural incentives to think ill of Jews and wish ill for Israelis. The effects of this process are seen even more clearly throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds where, though free of Jews, anti-Semitism is all-pervasive.
Conclusion
An example of the erosion of Western critical filters was the unchallenged appearance of an opinion piece in The Washington Post in December 2011 that effectively repeated some of Abbas's absurd statements regarding the antiquity of the Palestinians. Maen Rashid Areikat, the PLO representative to the United Nations, stated that Palestinians had "lived under the rule of a plethora of empires: the Canaanites, Egyptians, Philistines, Israelites, Persians, Greeks, Crusaders, Mongols, Ottomans, and finally, the British." Throwing history out the window, he added
we are Arabs with black, brown, and white skin, dark- and light-colored eyes, and the whole gamut of hair types. Like Americans, we are a hybrid of peoples defined by one overarching identity. Many in the United States forget that Palestinians are Muslims and Christians. They ignore the fact that Palestinian Christians are the descendants of Jesus and guardians of the cradle of Christianity.[18]
Palestinians can simultaneously be Arabs, who arrived in the Levant in the seventh century C.E., and be more ancient than the Canaanites. At the same time, the empires they endured and that infused them include everyone except Arab ones, notably the Umayyad and Abbasid, which brought Arabs and Islam to the region in the first place. The fact-checkers of The Washington Post editorial page fall mute and shared reality is eroded further. Unfortunately this sort of rhetorical nonsense resonates deeply, especially with some Christian supersessionists committed to anti-Zionism.[19] History no longer matters.
It is often stated that peace can only come when Israelis and Palestinians recognize one another's narratives. Claims regarding the Neolithic Palestinian nation indicate this unlikely to occur either in the future or in the past. In the meantime, anti-reality continues to spread.
Alex Joffe is a New York-based writer on history and international affairs. His web site is www.alexanderjoffe.net
[1] Palestinian TV (Fatah), May 14, 2011.
[2] Louis H. Feldman, "Some Observations on the Name of Palestine," Hebrew Union College Annual, 61 (1990): 1-23.
[3] "Camp David and After: An Exchange, An Interview with Ehud Barak," The New York Review of Books, June 13, 2001.
[4] Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 56.
[5] See the essays in Hersh Goodman and Jonathan Cummings, eds., The Battle of Jenin: A Case Study in Israel's Communications Strategy (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2003).
[6] Philippe Karsenty, "We Need to Expose the Muhammad al-Dura Hoax," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2008, pp. 57-65; Nidra Poller, "The Muhammad al-Dura Hoax and Other Myths Revived," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2011, pp. 71-8.
[7] Ivan Rioufol, "Les médias, pouvoir intouchable?" Le Figaro (Paris), June 13, 2008.
[8] Ahlul Bayt News Agency (Qom, Iran), June 23, 2011.
[9] Palestinian TV (Fatah), June 2, 2011, at Palestinian Media Watch, accessed Mar. 1, 2012.
[10] YNet News (Tel Aviv), July 13, 2009.
[11] See, for example, the summary in Craig Larkin and Michael Dumper, "UNESCO and Jerusalem: Constraints, Challenges and Opportunities," Jerusalem Quarterly, Autumn 2009, pp. 16-28.
[12] Yitzhak Reiter, Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 70-149.
[13] Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 258, n. 76.
[14] Hillel Frisch, "Nationalizing a Universal Text: The Quran in Arafat's Rhetoric," Middle Eastern Studies, May 2005, pp. 321-36.
[15] Mahmoud Mi'ari, "Transformation of Collective Identity in Palestine," Journal of Asian and African Studies, Dec. 2009, pp. 579-98.
[16] Rhonda S. Zaharna, "Understanding Cultural Preferences of Arab Communications Patterns," Public Relations Review, 21 (1995): 241-55.
[17] Henry I. Silverman, "Reuters: Principles of Trust or Propaganda?" Journal of Applied Business Research, Nov./Dec. 2011, pp. 93-116.
[18] Maen Rashid Areikat, "Palestine, a history rich and deep," The Washington Post, Dec. 27, 2011.
[19] David Wenkel, "Palestinians, Jebusites, and Evangelicals," Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2007, pp. 49-56.