Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June 27/12
Egypt: Muslims force Christians out of church during prayer, police advise priest to comply
Members of Resistance Brigades behind Beirut chaos
British forces in Syria, Assad presidential compound said under attack
Report: Turkey deploys tanks on Syrian border; Assad says country in a 'real state of war'
Egyptian president moves into Mubarak's old office
Syria in shadow of Turkish wrath
Syria’s nonconventional arms could be up for grabs as crisis rages
Cyprus seeks amicable solution for maritime border zone
U.S. Says Signs Growing Assad Losing Control of Syria
Assad: Syria in Real War, Policies Focused on Securing Victory
Free Syria Army: Hezbollah present on the battlefield
Interior Ministry to discuss Lassa
Future Bloc accuses Hezbollah of using pretexts to retain arms
Sleiman visit to Bahrain sees opposition calls for support
Baalbek criminals turn to lucrative kidnapping
Aoun Accuses Officials of Inciting Security Unrest: We Will No Longer Respond to Jumblat’s Insults
Asir Accuses Syria, Allies of Launching Campaign against him
Explosive Devices Discovered Near Jounieh Hospital
Connelly Meets Rifi, Expresses U.S. Dedication to Assisting ISF in Lebanon
Mustaqbal Blames al-Jadeed Attack on 'Hizbullah-Sponsored Illegal Arms'
Lebanon ripe for growth, says FAP chief
Khalil vows support for drug user rehabilitation

الأقباط والأضطهاد
إلى متى اضطهاد الأقباط في مصر؟ ما يجري لا يرضي الله ولا يجعل من المعتدين إلا جماعة من القرون الحجرية بعيدة عن الإنسانية والإيمان وشرعة حقوق الإنسان وأعمالهم هذه لن تربحهم غير قصاص الخالق سبحانه تعالى يوم الحساب الأخير. فلنصلي من أجل كل المضطهدين في كل دول العالم

Egypt: Muslims force Christians out of church during prayer, police advise priest to comply
http://www.raymondibrahim.com/2012/06/egypt-muslims-force-christians-out-of-church
by Raymond Ibrahim • Jun 26, 2012 at 1:35
Cross-posted from Jihad Watch
According to a story in yesterday's Mideast Christian News, Muslims in the village of Basra in Alexandria, Egypt, surrounded the local Coptic church, St. Lyons, during divine liturgy, "demanding that visiting Copts leave the church before the completion of prayers, and threatening to burn down the church if their demand was not met." The priest, Father Severus, hurriedly contacted police by phone asking for aid only to be told to comply with their demands, "and do not let buses with visitors to come to the church anymore." In face of such threats, Christian worshippers exited the church halfway through liturgy to jeers outside. As they drove away, Muslims hurled stones at their buses, and the priest was warned by "salafis and extremists" never again to allow visitors to the church, otherwise they would "destroy it.

Interior Ministry to discuss Lassa
June 27, 2012/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: Attention is focused on a meeting to be held at the Interior Ministry Wednesday to decide on a yearlong land dispute in the Jbeil town of Lassa involving local Shiite residents and the Maronite diocese. The dispute reignited Monday when local residents attempted to resume construction on disputed property in violation of a decision by Mount Lebanon’s general prosecutor.
MP Walid Khoury from MP Michel Aoun’s parliamentary Change and Reform bloc expressed regret over the violation of an agreement reached between Bkirki, the seat of the Maronite patriarchate, and Hezbollah to wait for a judicial decision on the dispute. “The case is a legal one par excellence,” Khoury told the Central News Agency. He said that contacts were ongoing between the Maronite Patriarchate, Lassa’s residents, Hezbollah and influential parties in the town to reach a settlement for the dispute.
Last summer, locals from predominantly Shiite Lassa accosted a delegation from the Maronite Patriarchate, accompanied by topographical professionals, who were surveying Lot 42 belonging to Jounieh’s Maronite diocese, in line with a judicial order. Father Chamoun Aoun, in charge of the Maronite diocese’s endowment in Lassa, accused the town’s mayor, Issam Miqdad, of ordering workers to resume construction on the land. Talal Miqdad, one of Lassa’s notables, told the Central News Agency Tuesday that he had filed a judicial lawsuit against Miqdad demanding that immunity be lifted from him after he violated the agreement reached by Bkirki, Hezbollah, the Interior Ministry and the real estate judiciary. He demanded his prosecution for “his actions threaten to cause a strife which we do not need.”
He added that Hezbollah had lifted political cover from any lawbreaker in Lassa.

Members of Resistance Brigades behind Beirut chaos
June 27, 2012/By Hussein Dakroub/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: The attackers of Al-Jadeed TV station and the masked men who subsequently blocked several Beirut roads Monday night are connected to the Hezbollah-linked Resistance Brigades, security sources told The Daily Star Tuesday. The sources added that three men attempted to raid the headquarters of the Future TV station in the west Beirut area of Spears the same night. The Lebanese Army arrested one of the men who was planning the attack. Following the arrest of Wissam Alaaeddine, suspected of involvement in the attack on Al-Jadeed, groups of masked men closed several main Beirut roads with burning tires. The sources said the closing of roads was done in a systematic manner after media reports that the Army would conduct raids in the Beirut areas of Khandaq al-Ghamiq and Zqaq al-Blat, where the attackers on Al-Jadeed are believed to have taken refuge. The masked men closed all the roads that led to the two areas in a bid to prevent the Army from entering, the sources added.
According to the sources, the same car, a Jeep Cherokee, which transported the men who attacked the Al-Jadeed premises, also transported the men who set tires ablaze in Verdun.
The issue of security is set to top the agenda of a Cabinet meeting Wednesday following the Beirut violence.
The situation posed particular a challenge for Interior Minister Marwan Charbel, who was planning to launch a monthlong campaign to bolster security in the country starting Wednesday.
Prime Minister Najib Mikati discussed the security incidents and the government’s plan to beef up safety measures during a meeting with Speaker Nabih Berri at the latter’s residence in Ain al-Tineh.
The plan calls for the Army and Internal Security Forces personnel to man checkpoints on main roads, increase their patrols day and night and carry out raids in search of wanted people.
“Some call it a security month, but security is not a seasonal matter. Security should be durable. Therefore, this month will be a test for us to follow at all times,” Mikati said.The attack on Al-Jadeed TV came a day after the station hosted Sidon-based controversial preacher Sheikh Ahmad Assir who harshly criticized Berri and Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, warning them that he would “not let them sleep for now on,” because of the injustice inflicted on the country’s Sunnis. Assir’s remarks prompted the station to apologize for the interview after it had been aired.
Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri condemned the attack on Al-Jadeed. “What happened [Monday] shows that the only solution lies in the rule of law,” he said in a statement on Twitter.
Hariri’s parliamentary Future bloc also condemned the attack on Al-Jadeed as “a cowardly act” and blamed Hezbollah’s arms for insecurity in Beirut.
“The causes of what happened in Beirut’s streets are clear. It is a phenomenon of the proliferation of illegitimate arms which is being sponsored, protected and supervised by Hezbollah’s arms,” the bloc said in a statement following its weekly meeting Tuesday. In what appeared to be an indirect criticism of Assir’s sectarian tone, the bloc said: “The use of sectarian and confessional language and terms by any party is rejected and condemned. “Our country needs a calm and uniting language rather than [one that] attacks, slanders, provokes and incites.”Judicial sources told The Daily Star that the ISF’s Information Branch was conducting investigations into the attack under the supervision of the Public Prosecution and added that Public Prosecutor Saeed Mirza was directly following up on the probe.

Aoun says state authority is “lost”
June 26, 2012 /Change and Reform bloc leader MP Michel Aoun said on Tuesday that the state’s authority was lost. “The army and security forces are in charge of maintaining security. They are not fulfilling this role but they only watch [what is going on]. The state’s authority is lost,” Aoun said following the bloc’s weekly meeting. Aoun added that some Lebanese officials were sometimes “complicit” in security incidents, such as the blocking of roads with burning tires. “Everyone who wants to object to something, brings tires and burn them. The state [only] watches [and does not do anything],” he said.
The Change and Reform bloc leader also said that he will not respond to Progressive Socialist Party leader MP Walid Jumblatt’s insults. “Thank you, Walid Beik, continue your insults. I will not respond.”
Last week, Jumblatt lashed out at the Free Patriotic Movement and held it responsible for the electricity crisis in Lebanon. In the past month, Lebanese people have protested against the Energy Ministry, led by Aoun’s son-in-law Gebran Bassil, following constant power cuts, which have affected most areas in the country. -NOW Lebanon

Future Bloc accuses Hezbollah of using pretexts to retain arms
June 27, 2012/By Hussein Dakroub/The Daily Star
Siniora called for implementing decisions agreed upon during previous Dialogue sessions.
BEIRUT: The parliamentary Future bloc slammed Hezbollah Tuesday for refusing to place its arsenal under the state’s authority, accusing the resistance party of using various pretexts in order to retain its weapons.
Former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora briefed the bloc’s members on the results of the second round of National Dialogue where deliberations focused on the divisive issue of Hezbollah’s arms as part of a national defense strategy designed to protect Lebanon against a possible Israeli attack.
“It appeared that Hezbollah was still adamant on its stance rejecting discussion of the principle of placing its weapons under the state’s authority and command amid an insistence to maintain its arms away from the state’s authority under new pretexts,” the bloc said in a statement released after its weekly meeting chaired by Siniora at former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s residence in Downtown Beirut. Hariri’s Future bloc is headed by Siniora.
The bloc said that Hezbollah was using the issue of protecting Lebanon’s “offshore oil wealth against Israeli ambitions” as a pretext to keep its arms.
“This would turn the state, its institutions, the Lebanese Army and security forces into tools serving [Hezbollah’s] project and at the same time beyond the mission of national defense,” it added. It said it was waiting to see President Michel Sleiman’s proposal on the issue of Hezbollah’s arms and a defense strategy at the next Dialogue session set for July 24.
The bloc’s statement came a day after rival political leaders held their second round of National Dialogue at Baabda Palace. The meeting was aimed at discussing a national defense strategy and benefiting from Hezbollah’s arms based on Sleiman’s proposal.
Leaders from the Hezbollah-led March 8 bloc and the opposition March 14 coalition called on the government to set up a mechanism for disarming Palestinian groups outside refugee camps and agreed to discuss a platform for a national defense strategy to be presented by Sleiman at the next session.
In a statement issued after a nearly four-hour session chaired by Sleiman, the leaders “called on the government to continue implementing the decisions of the National Pact written in Taif and Dialogue decisions related to the Palestinians.” They also stressed the need to commit to the statement issued after the previous Dialogue session on June 11, which called for avoiding divisive speeches and rhetoric that fuels sectarian strife, supporting the Army, distancing Lebanon from international and regional conflicts and preventing it from being a base or corridor for the smuggling of arms and gunmen.
During the session, Siniora called for implementing decisions agreed upon during previous sessions and for resolving “the problem of Hezbollah’s arms.” He called for laying down “a road map and a schedule that leads to putting these arms exclusively under the authority of the Lebanese state.” He also urged the formation of a national salvation government.
Beirut Future MP Jean Ogassapian, who took part in the talks, asked whether Hezbollah was really ready to put its arms on the negotiation table.
“If a defense strategy is not discussed [at the next session], we will be revolving in a vicious circle,” he told the Voice of Lebanon radio station.
Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun, who attended Monday’s session, said Tuesday after chairing a weekly meeting of his parliamentary Change and Reform bloc that “a framework for the next session has been set. We spoke at length in general ideas.”
Lebanese Forces Batroun MP Antoine Zahra, whose party is boycotting National Dialogue, said that the time was not ripe for discussion of Hezbollah’s arms.
“The two [Dialogue] sessions have confirmed the correct LF stance that circumstances are not favorable to talk about the issue of Hezbollah’s arms and that the party is still trying to put its arms outside the framework of serious deliberations,” he told the Free Lebanon radio station.
He said the Dialogue sessions have achieved “positive’’ results for the March 8 side, but none for the country.” What has really happened is that the Dialogue table has diverted attention from the government’s total failure and its collusion on Lebanese sovereignty and stability,” Zahra added.
LF leader Samir Geagea has boycotted Dialogue, which he dismissed as “a waste of time.” He said dialogue on Hezbollah’s arms was not serious.

Free Syria Army: Hezbollah present on the battlefield
June 27, 2012/ By Misbah al-Ali /he Daily Star
BUKHSHIN, Turkey: Hezbollah fighters are on the ground in Syria, according to Riad al-Asaad, the commander of the rebel Free Syrian Army, who also told The Daily Star that the option of establishing a buffer zone on the Syrian borders is off the table.
Asaad spoke to The Daily Star from a heavily secured Turkish refugee camp, known as the Officers’ Camp, where much of the FSA’s leadership is now based. In a wide-ranging interview, the former Syrian Air Force Colonel discussed both the situation of his troops and that of the regime of embattled President Bashar Assad.
Given Hezbollah’s rhetorical support for the Syrian regime, it has long been speculated that the party might also be providing backup on the battlefield. Asaad said that “as for the involvement of Hezbollah fighters, we have confirmed that it is involved in events inside Syria, especially in Talkalakh and Homs. We have seen heavily armed [Hezbollah] convoys and several buses.”
He added that the FSA had been remiss in not highlighting this in the media earlier.
As the conflict, now in its 16th month, continues to rage and casualties increase, some have pushed for the establishment of a buffer zone between Turkey and Syria, or between Lebanon and Syria, to provide cover for Syrian refugees.
Asaad said this was no longer an option for both domestic and international reasons. “First, the situation in Syria is improving in our favor, and developments are happening quickly. This puts the issue of a buffer zone and the request behind us,” Asaad said.
As for a buffer zone on the Lebanon-Syria border, he said that “the unstable political situation prompts us to take things slowly. As long as Syrian refugees are being dealt with in a humane way, we want to strengthen the close ties [between Lebanese and Syrian people], without putting Lebanese forces in a tough spot.”
Asaad said that many army officers were abandoning their posts, calling the forces’ morale “completely collapsed.” This is in part due to “a plan being discussed by Assad’s advisers to target Sunni officers, deeming them sleeper cells.”Asaad said the FSA had evidence that a circular was issued in February urging the army to reduce the influence of Sunni officers, resulting in the imprisonment of 3,000 them. This, he said, was because the Syrian president “only trusts his sect.”
According to Asaad, the Syrian Army’s elite 4th Division, headed by Maher Assad, “has completely collapsed. They have a shortage of equipment.”
The FSA commander does not deny that his group has targeted Maher Assad or Assef Shawkat, Syria’s deputy defense minister, saying that “the FSA has a plan to target high-ranking officers and personalities in the regime ... there is conflicting information about the results of the operations that took place.”
Like the 4th division, Asaad contended that FSA is also lacking in equipment. “We don’t have modern weapons, or modern communication systems,” he said. The FSA “depends on the support of the people, the will of our fighters and simple ... weapons that we obtain from our operations against Assad’s army or the modest support that reaches us.”
Asaad denied reports that the FSA had received weapons, communications systems and satellites from foreign governments. “The U.S. support is not what it should be, and Arab support is very weak. We still haven’t received support except for in political stances. These are important and necessary, but we have a huge deficiency in everything else, and we need real logistical support.”
Despite this “deficiency,” the commander is positive. He said that the situation in Damascus and Aleppo had shifted in the uprising’s favor. In Idlib and Deir al-Zor, “there are signs that the regime’s control is nearly obsolete and perhaps in the near future we will declare them completely liberated.”
In the beleaguered city of Homs, Asaad said “the regime is trying to end the rebellion at a high cost – by killing innocents – and it says that there are 1,500 FSA fighters still in Homs. We respond that the number [of FSA fighters] might be much higher than this.”
The FSA, Asaad continued, “is confident that the situation in Syria is better than excellent on all levels.”
Of the countries that have not come out in support of the uprising, most vocally Russia and China, the commander said that without their support “the regime would have collapsed a long time ago.
“Russian support has exceeded political and diplomatic support,” he said, listing the shipments of “modern Russian weapons” recently received by regime forces, including helicopters and T-28 tanks. He added that Russian experts are providing the regime with expertise, particularly in dealing with rockets and planes.
One issue that he said caused the FSA “great embarrassment,” was the abduction of 11 Lebanese Shiite pilgrims last month in Syria. Asaad added that the kidnappers were not FSA members, despite claims to the contrary.
However, Asaad said the FSA had been in contact with the kidnappers and added that “the case will be resolved soon.” He said: “I understand some of the kidnapped will be released shortly, and the others will follow.”
As for the FSA’s stance on the recent Syrian downing of a Turkish jet, Asaad said that “in order to remain, Bashar Assad will cause as much chaos as possible in the region, because his army is decaying.”
The Syrian end-game remains to be seen, but one option not in Asaad’s sights is the division of Syria along sectarian lines. “If the regime seeks the option of an Alawite state to protect itself, we will continue fighting to preserve the unity of the Syrian people,” he said. “We will not opt for sectarian options inside Syria. Our choice is to establish a democratic state inside Syria, for all of its people.”

Sleiman visit to Bahrain sees opposition calls for support
June 27, 2012 /The Daily Star
BEIRUT: President Michel Sleiman Tuesday travelled to Bahrain where representatives of the Bahraini opposition urged him to take a stance supporting reform. During his brief visit, Sleiman met with Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa to discuss bilateral relations and the regional situation. Issued before the meeting, the opposition statement said that “the Bahraini people are waiting for Lebanese President Michel Sleiman to take a stance supportive of its just and humanitarian demands,” adding that “Lebanon, its government and its people are a place for freedom and civil coexistence.”
Citing international condemnations of the Bahraini government activities, the statement said “it is no longer acceptable for the regime to stand against popular demands calling for the implementation of democracy, justice and full citizenship.” Pro-reform protests in Bahrain last February were crushed by the government and another series of protests escalated in the runup to the Bahraini Formula One Grand Prix. Accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister Samir Mokbel, Sleiman’s visit comes several weeks after he visited Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar to discuss the travel advisories some of these countries issued following deadly clashes in Beirut and Tripoli, north Lebanon. Each of the nations Sleiman visited had warned their nationals not to visit Lebanon, urging those who were already in the country to leave because of the recent unrest. During the meeting, the leaders also discussed the situation of Lebanese citizens in Bahrain, and the need to reactivate the work of the two countries’ diplomatic missions. Sleiman returned to Beirut after a lunch held in his honor by King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa.
 

British forces in Syria, Assad presidential compound said under attack
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report June 26, 2012,
Unconfirmed first reports from British, French and Turkish sources say British special operations forces crossed from Turkey into northern Syria Tuesday, May 26, and advanced up to 10 kilometers inside the country. The same sources report heavy fighting around the Presidential Guards compound on the outskirts of Damascus.
debkafile’s military sources note that this compound exists to defend Bashar Assad’s presidential palace on Mount Qaisoun overlooking Damascus.
British and Gulf TV stations are again running interviews with dozens of Syrian soldiers taken prisoner by rebel forces and transferred to Free Syrian Army centers in South Turkey. But this time, they are being aired in conjunction with those two developments, indicating pivotal and coordinated military action inside the embattled country, or even the start of western intervention against the Assad regime.
Later Tuesday, Gulf military sources confirmed the presence of British special forces in Syria.
Our military sources estimate that the British military drive into Syria, if confirmed, is designed to establish the first safe zone along the Syrian-Turkish border, to be followed by more Western military incursions to establish additional zones of safe asylum in other parts of Syria.
This follow-up action would depend substantially on Syrian, Russian and Iranian (+ Hizballah) responses to the initial stage of the operation.
The reported British incursion, if confirmed, occurred at the tail end of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 24-hour visit to Israel Tuesday morning and would have posed a direct challenge to his repeated warning that Moscow would not tolerate Western military intervention in Syria and actively prevent it. Similar warnings have issued from Tehran.
As for the timing, the double military drive against Assad also occurred hours before a NATO “consultation” in Brussels on the shooting down of a Turkish warplane by Syria last Friday, June 22, which Ankara stated Monday “must not go unpunished.”
The two-pronged operation - the reported British incursion and major clash at the front door of Assad’s presidential palace - would appear to be designed to widen the cracks in his regime and speed its final breakup. On June 11, debkafile ran a video report on President Barack Obama’s decision to speed up limited action against Bashar Assad.

How will the Turks respond to al-Assad?
By Tariq Alhomayed/Asharq Al-Awsat
There is a degree of confusion at the reluctance of Ankara to react in any way to the al-Assad regime bringing down a Turkish military plane over its territorial waters, and there are many ways to analyze this matter. There are those who accuse Turkey of weakness, and there are those who say that Ankara talks more than it acts, especially as it is often claimed that Erdogan’s patience has its limits.
Today, after the Turks revealed - according to what was reported by the media there - that the orders to shoot down the Turkish plane had been issued by the al-Assad regime itself, on the basis of recordings obtained by the Turkish authorities, the age-old question is: why has there been no practical Turkish response? Turkey’s military strength far outweighs that of the tyrant of Damascus; in fact there is no room for a comparison between them. Besides, Ankara has many other cards in its hand with which it could respond. It has the potential to wear down the al-Assad regime across the 822 kilometer-long border between the two countries, and there is the option to plunge all of Syria into darkness by cutting off its electricity, or by at least making it more erratic, which would confuse the al-Assad regime. Turkey could prevent al-Assad’s forces from moving along the border in accordance with prior agreements signed, or it could assist the Syrian rebels in a greater capacity, providing them with quality weapons capable of burning a hundred of al-Assad’s tanks in exchange for the downing of a Turkish plane. All these and more are options available to Ankara, and therefore the confusion at the lack of a Turkish response towards the tyrant of Damascus is warranted.I say it is warranted, and especially so if we recall Turkey’s threat to Hafez al-Assad in 1998, whereby if he did not hand over Abdullah Öcalan then the Turkish army would invade Syria. At the time, Hafez al-Assad bowed to this threat, and now we find Öcalan in a Turkish prison, so how can Turkey today tolerate Bashar al-Assad’s attacks, including the downing of a Turkish plane, even if it did violate Syrian airspace? According to what the Turks have announced, around 114 violations of Turkish airspace have taken place this year alone, whether committed by Greece, Israel or other countries. Turkey did not shoot down one of these aircraft, and there was no issue in the first place especially since there are international laws and regulations governing violations of airspace between states, so why has Turkey not responded now? Of course, the Turkish response may have actually begun, and without a formal declaration, especially with reports that Turkey has received a number of dissident Syrian military officers, soldiers and their families, around 222 in total according to CNN. The arrival of these dissidents in Turkey was announced immediately, suggesting that Ankara can do a lot without explicitly declaring so, or without launching an all-out war on al-Assad.Without doubt, the behavior of the al-Assad regime will help Erdogan to make a move against the tyrant more easily. For example, the Turkish government has begun informing the Turkish opposition of the content of the recordings it has acquired, implicating the al-Assad regime in the downing of the Turkish military plane, and Ankara has begun to openly say to al-Assad: “Do not provoke the Turkish army”. Are the Turks actually moving, or will they move, even without a declaration of war, in order to accelerate the expected collapse of the tyrant of Damascus? We will see.

Report: Turkey deploys tanks on Syrian border; Assad says country in a 'real state of war'
Local media reports at least 15 tanks deployed on border following the downing of a Turkish fighter jet.
By Reuters, Haaretz | Jun 26, 2012/ Syrian President Bashar Assad said on Tuesday his country was in a real state of war and gave no sign of a softer approach towards a pro-democracy revolt by ordering his newly appointed government to direct all policies towards winning. Turkey deployed at least 15 tanks and armored vehicles on its border with Syria, local media reported, amid a row over a downed Turkish fighter jet. "We live in a real state of war from all angles," Assad told a cabinet he appointed on Tuesday. "When we are in a war, all policies and all sides and all sectors need to be directed at winning this war." Assad snubbed countries that have been calling for him to step aside, saying the West "takes and never gives and this has been proven at every stage."
Earlier on Tuesday, Russia said Syria's shooting down of a Turkish warplane should not be seen as a provocation and warned world powers against using the incident to push for stronger action against Damascus. It was Moscow's first reaction to Friday's downing of a Turkish military aircraft by Syrian air defenses, which gave a new international dimension to the worsening conflict in Syria.
Turkey's NATO allies condemned Syria's action as unacceptable but stopped short of threatening any military response. Turkey also plans to approach the U.N. Security Council.
"It is important that what happened is not viewed as a provocation or a premeditated action (by Syria)," Russia's foreign ministry said in a statement on its website. Moscow repeated its calls for restraint, warning that any political escalation would be "extremely dangerous" and threaten international efforts to salvage a moribund six-point Syrian peace plan drawn up by U.N.-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan. "Once again, we call on all sides to act exclusively in the interests of such an agenda (the peace plan) and not to take steps that go beyond its limits," the ministry said. "We believe that the best course of action is restraint and constructive interaction between the Turkish and Syrian sides in order to clarify all the circumstances of the incident." Syria provides Moscow with its firmest foothold in the Middle East, buys weapons from Russia worth billions of dollars, and hosts the Russian navy's only permanent warm water port outside the former Soviet Union.

Muslim Brotherhood Takes Presidency in Egypt,Christians Fear Islamic State
Washington, D.C. (June 25, 2012) – International Christian Concern (ICC) has learned that a Muslim Brotherhood candidate was elected the president of Egypt on Sunday, giving greater control to Islamists amidst an ongoing power struggle with the military council. Christians are concerned that Egypt may soon become an Islamic state.
The delayed results of the presidential election, which were initially scheduled to be announced on June 21, led many to believe that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) would seize the presidency by installing ally Ahmed Shafiq as the head of state. But on June 24, after a week of massive protests in Cairo denouncing the SCAF’s refusal to hand over power to a civilian leader, the electoral commission announced that Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi edged out a defeat over Shafiq by 51.7 percent of the votes versus 48.3 percent. The Brotherhood victory marks the first time an Islamist was elected head of Egypt.
The results, however, will unlikely resolve the power struggle between the SCAF and the Brotherhood. Days before the election, the SCAF dissolved the Islamist-dominated Parliament and decreed an interim Constitution that degrades the presidency to a subservient role. The move extends the SCAF’s hold on legislative power and abolishes the SCAF’s commitment to hand over power to a civilian government by the end of June. The Brotherhood has vowed to “fight in the courts and the streets to reinstate the Parliament,” The New York Times reported.
Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority, who overwhelmingly supported the defeated Shafiq, are fearful that Morsi will stifle religious freedoms and persecute non-Muslims.
“I personally will not recognize Morsi as president. Egypt deserves much better than Morsi,” Wagih Yacoub, a Coptic human rights activist, told ICC. “I will not recognize the terrorist and bloody group – the Brotherhood of Muslims. Christian people are scared, they are worried…. Last night people chanted ‘We have an Islamic State, Morsi is the president!’ The people behind Morsi elected religion, not a president. They went to vote for Islam.”
“For most Copts, it's doomsday,” Joe Fahim, a Christian in Cairo, told Reuters.
Aidan Clay, ICC Regional Manager for the Middle East, said, “Many Christians in Egypt were convinced that Ahmed Shafiq was their last hope for a peaceful existence. The Muslim Brotherhood presidential campaign demanded an immediate transition to a Sharia state and a Caliphate, leaving no room for Christians within Egyptian society. With the election of Mohammed Morsi, Christians are now looking to the military council—who refuses to hand over power to Islamists—for protection. If not for the military’s decree to dissolve Parliament on June 14, the Muslim Brotherhood would control both the Parliament and the presidency, which would likely lead to an increase of persecution and a mass immigration of Christians from Egypt. Today, Christians and all Egyptians are wondering what role the president will have. Will Morsi be stripped of most of his presidential powers by the military, making him nothing more than a figurehead? Or, will the Brotherhood and other Islamist groups embark on a campaign of armed resistance until the military steps down? The answer to these questions will inevitably determine the fate of Egypt’s ancient Christian community.”
 

Assad's Houla Propaganda - Part II
by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Phillip Smyth
Al-Ayyam/June 25, 2012
http://www.meforum.org/3271/assad-houla-propaganda-part-ii
In his response to our piece "Assad's Houla Propaganda", John Rosenthal engages in a rather hypocritical and illogical retort. He initiates his screed by accusing us of engaging in a "bait and switch" regarding our correction of the half-truths presented in his piece covering the Houla Massacre and the sources he utilized. What better way to go about establishing that we were engaged in such a practice than by going off on a tangential feat of mental gymnastics about how Al Qaeda is involved in the conflict, recycling the same disproved data, and then arguing that critiquing the sources he used was not an effective manner of criticism? While Rosenthal accuses us of engaging in conspiratorial thinking, it is actually the theory he is pushing on the massacre that requires one to believe in an outlandish conspiracy.
Rosenthal asks what we would, "make of the string of suicide bombings in Damascus, in Aleppo, and elsewhere in Syria". This line of questioning bears no relation to our piece, which dealt with the specifics of the Houla Massacre, the erroneous claims of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung(FAZ), and the very narrative that has sprouted up around conspiracy websites. Instead, this tangential line implies that Al Qaeda was involved in the massacre, which in turn is simply more narrative. What is more, we both clearly stated our assessment about the potential rise of a Sunni Islamist Syria:
"The outcome of Assad's removal, assuming that Syria or even its Sunni heartland can hold together, may well be a new Sunni Islamist regime. However, this does not excuse the regime's attempts to disseminate patent falsehoods."
Obviously, Rosenthal hasn't read our other pieces discussing sympathizers of Al Qaeda in the Free Syrian Army or the "very real fear of Sunni Islamism" held by minorities in Syria.
In the (FAZ) story Rosenthal promotes, Alawites and Sunni converts to Shiism were the victims of the Houla Massacre.
For starters, even the master propaganda spinners in Syria's official media made no mention of Alawites and Shi'a being killed during the Houla Massacre. The FAZ also stated that of those killed in the massacre, "the family of a Sunni member of the Syrian parliament who is regarded as a collaborator" was also murdered. Yet, the only corroborating source for this claim is the state-run outlet Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA).
Alex Thomson, a journalist with Britain's Channel 4, actually visited the area of Houla. Thomson can hardly be called a propagandist for the rebels and did not hesitate to point out that some rebels tried to get him killed near the city of Qusayr in order to score a propaganda victory against the Assad regime.
He also observed that the Syrian army began shelling the area as soon as left the immediate vicinity, yet those who believe the Houla massacre was perpetrated by rebels claim that there has been no evidence of shelling by the Syrian armed forces. Even the Assad regime does not deny the evidence of shelling, but instead argues it was the work of militias armed with "heavy weapons."Thomson then visited the Alawite and Shi'a villages in the area of Houla. The villagers claimed that the victims of the massacre were actually casualties from internecine strife between Sunni tribes. They do not claim that those slaughtered were Alawites or Shi'a.
The Houla massacre story forwarded by FAZ doesn't add up. Why would Sunnis carry out a burial of massacred Alawites and Shi'a and then do so in the fashion utilized by Sunnis? FAZ claims it was to trick the media. Then why was there no outcry by the Alawite or Shi'a communities? What about the children shot and stabbed—Did those wounds simply appear due to a communal stigmata brought on by their hatred of Bashar al-Assad? Indeed, Rosenthal must believe that the injuries suffered by the locals whom Thomson interviewed were part of an elaborately faked P.R. campaign.
Rosenthal then goes on to re-cite Dutch "Middle East expert" Martin Janssen. A Damascus based Arabist, Janssen portrays himself as someone whose primary concern is about the rise of Islamism. It is also clear that he has followed the liberationist line on Tunisia and Egypt, echoing Ed Husain'sclaims that what differentiated the protests in Egypt from those in Syria was that the former were crying for freedom while the latter were chanting 'Allah u Akbar' and 'jihad'. The demagogue George Galloway (another friend of the Syrian regime) parrots the same line. Since he started reporting from Syria, Janssen's long list of articles have been little more than rehashing the same old pro-regime line.
Rosenthal's illogical retort became even more disturbing when he mentioned the murder of opposition doctor Adnan Wahbi. Without a shred of evidence and lacking any connection to the original post he cited, Rosenthal absurdly declares Wahbi was killed by the opposition because he called for all sides to put down their weapons. In fact, the other article by Hermann he cites makes no such assertion, and the Syrian opposition claim Wahbi as a martyr murdered by the regime's security forces.
Adding further speciousness to his response, Rosenthal addresses the issue of Syrian nun cum Assad propagandist Mother Agnes-Miriam and 9/11 conspiracy theorist Thierry Meyssan's interview with her, by stating, "in a French media landscape as bereft of any semblance of balanced reporting on the Syria crisis as the American one, I can assure Al-Tamimi and Smyth that she will not have received many such requests [for interview]."
However, Rosenthal clearly didn't do the necessary research to prove his assertion. In 2012, Le Monde, one of France's major newspapers, uncritically cited figures presented Agnès-Mariam. France's Europe1, a major French radio station, also interviewed Agnès-Mariam in January. Agnès-Mariam was also interviewed by La Vie Magazine, where she stated that she continued to support having Bashar al-Assad as president of Syria and essentially repeated the line that unrest in Syria is all due to a Western plot, echoing the theories pushed by conspiracy theorists and pro-Assad propagandists.
Rosenthal claims he "was also aware that this ephemeral connection would provide fodder for the defenders and publicists of the rebellion to taint Mother Agnès-Mariam with guilt by association." Rosenthal's grasp of the very narrative we refute is equally disquieting. We didn't simply include conspiracy theorist Thierry Meyssan to establish a "guilt by association" implication against Mother Agnès-Mariam, but to establish the fringe atmosphere where this exact pro-Assad line originated, to whom it was marketed, and why.
Rosenthal continues his defense of Agnès-Mariam by muddying the waters, adding, "Perhaps Mother Agnès-Mariam ought, after all, to have refused Meyssan's interview."
Mother Agnès-Mariam didn't simply accept a single interview from the likes of the batty and conspiracy-minded Voltaire Network, she actively pursued them, inviting "journalists" from the group to visit her and travel around Syria in November 2011. In addition to posting articles from the Voltaire Network on her official website, she contributed a number of pieces to site.
Agnès-Mariam didn't stop with the crackpots at the Voltaire Network. On the same 2011 trip she helped organize, she also brought along Webster Griffin Tarpley. Like Meyssan, Tarpley is another renowned 9/11 conspiracy theorist frequently contributing to Iran's English language propaganda channel, Press TV. Tarpley went on to repeat the narrative the Damascus disinformation network hoped to propagate.
If anything, the connection with the conspiratorial fringe was hardly, "ephemeral". Instead, Agnès-Mariam vigorously sought out these types in the effort to attain an uncritical audience who would happily disseminate the information she and her peers presented.
Creating the image of a defenseless and objective Catholic nun who is plainly ignored by the Western press, Rosenthal attempts to place Agnès-Mariam in a protective bubble, even accusing us of exposing her in an ad hominem style.
At one point, Rosenthal asks rhetorically: "Why in the world would Catholic priests and nuns want or need to serve as 'Assad propagandists?" This is a classic example of the No True Scotsman fallacy. The Assad regime has also been able to compel praise from parents of children it has tortured to death: Why can't Catholic nuns and priests parrot the Syrian government's line or transmit disinformation that aids the regime?
For Christians of the Middle East, their fate in this time of turmoil is a complex conundrum. The threat of "Islam" has been a constant, whether real or supposed. Thus, in the minds of some Christian leaders, for communal survival, their political moves often come down to supporting what they perceive as the lesser of two evils. Nevertheless, this shouldn't be an excuse to blatantly lie and push narrative.
The fact of the matter is—and this is understood by the Assad regime—that in many Western political circles, the Iraq War and the subsequent ethnic cleansing, murders, and displacement of Christians is still fresh. While the Iraq War has provided beneficial hindsight in assessing what may become of threatened minority groups, the same sentiments created by the war have been manipulated by the Syrian regime in an attempt to establish a hyper-simplified, if not manifestly incorrect claim they are the guardians of secular order against "extremism," even as the Assad dynasty has (i) supported Hezbollah, (ii) killed thousands of Christians in Lebanon (besides debilitating their political power) and (iii) provided backing for al-Qa'ida and other Sunni Islamist groups in Iraq renowned for their brutality against civilians.
As before, Rosenthal establishes his ability to twist and ignore demonstrable facts. Rosenthal, Mother Agnès -Mariam, and others pushing the "all opposition are Al Qaeda and committing heinous crimes against minorities" message, establish their own conspiratorial explanation concerning why their speciously manufactured claims are ignored.
Emanating from the depths of Bizzaro World, these commentators attempt to establish that the innately diverse nature of Western media is actually a monolithic and biased (against them) source, whereas a dictator's media outlets and propagandists sympathetic to the regime are reporting "the truth."
If establishing the dubious nature of sources and claims made by Rosenthal was not enough to demonstrate the lack of credibility, he should also know that the FAZ piece was rife with errors. For example, Tony Badran noted:
"[T]he report stated that the supposed Alawite victims were from the 'Shomaliya' family. The confused German author—and everyone who uncritically picked up his report—didn't even bother to check his facts or his sources. There is an Alawite village by the name of al-Shumariya, near Houla, which the regime's media and its third-party amplifiers claimed was attacked by 'armed gangs.'"
For further evidence of the errors and inaccuracies of the FAZ piece, see this post by Paul Woodward, in which he notes, with confirmation from Human Rights Watch, that the Abd el-Razzaq family that comprised the majority of the victims was Sunni. This tells against the FAZ piece's claim that "those killed were almost exclusively from families belonging to Houla's Alawi and Shia minorities."
As Rosenthal notes, the pieces he quoted use unnamed "monastery sources". In fact, for Rosenthal and his ilk all roads lead back to the same monastery run by Agnes-Miriam. In any case, this establishes the need to investigate her ideological leanings and what messages she promotes.
To back up his assertions, Rosenthal discusses the experience of Belgian priest Daniel Maes, who spent time at the Monastery with Mother Agnès. For Rosenthal, Maes' testimony is confirmation that Mother Agnès' story is perfectly acceptable.
What is implied is that Maes is a completely objective Westerner critically analyzing the situation for the truth. Yet, a cursory search on Google establishes Maes' wasn't simply one of many, "other persons who have spent time at the monastery". Maes is actually a personal friend of Mother Agnès. After meeting Mother Agnès in 2004 he hosted her in Belgium where she gave speeches since 2006. He had been visiting her monastery since 2010.
But what happens to anyone—especially clergy—within the regime's grasp who "draws outside the lines"? Take the case of Father Dall'Oglio. A resident of the Mar Musa Monastery for over thirty years, the father was expelled from Syria by the Assad regime for the simple offense of stating that he felt Syria's non-violent protesting youth were, "suffering enormously to achieve their desire of freedom and dignity…There are so many young persons that are put in jail and tortured, just because they have expressed, nonviolently, their opinions." He didn't openly sympathize with the FSA –just non-violent protesters—and he was thrown out!
Neither of us is arguing for intervention and we are certainly not trying to underplay Islamism. As analysts with a deep interest in studying this turbulent section of the Levant, we are not interested in moralism or propaganda from either side, but simply want to explain what is going on and predict how events might pan out. We would hope others involved in studying and writing about the situation in Syria would endeavor to do the same.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an adjunct fellow at the Middle East Forum. Phillip Smyth is a journalist and researcher specializing in Middle Eastern affairs. He travels regularly to the region.

No pledge to US on Hezbollah militant’s release- Iraqi official
By Hamza Mustapha/Asharq Alawsat
Bagdad, Asharq- Al-Awsat - Baghdad has denied that it had pledged to the United States not to release Lebanese Hezbollah’s operative Ali Musa Daqduq, who was received by the Iraqi authorities from the Americans late last year after the US withdrawal from Iraq was completed. Baghdad’s denial contrasts with what US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said two days ago, namely that his administration has received a pledge from the Iraqis not free Daqduq. Ali al-Musawi, the media adviser to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, said in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat that "actually, what we hear [from the Americans] is strange talk because what we have always said and what we say now is that the issue of Ali Qaqduq is a judicial one, and that he was handed over to the Iraqi side to try him in Iraq. Therefore, we as Iraqis will abide by any sentence that is issued." In response to a question regarding Daqduq's acquittal issued by the Iraqi courts, and whether he will be released or not, al-Musawi said: "regardless of any other details, we respect Iraq's judiciary as an independent authority, and this is what we have said all along. If the judiciary decides to release him, then the only thing we can do is to respect the decision." He denied that the Iraqi Government "has made any commitments of any sort to the Americans concerning Daqduq or anyone else”. He added: "What binds us with them (the Americans) is a strategic framework agreement, and we are committed to it as are they." The US Defense Secretary previously said in a statement to Reuters that the US has received assurances from Iraq that Daqduq will not be freed. He said: "We've gotten a commitment from them that they would keep him incarcerated and that they would keep him in custody." He added: "We expect them to stand by that commitment."
Just before their withdrawal from Iraq at the end of last year, the US forces handed over Qaqduq to the Iraqi authorities. The US Army announced the arrest of Qaqduq in southern Iraq in July 2007. Earlier that year, in an attack in Karbala, gunmen killed a US soldier and kidnapped four others, whom they later killed, in an organized operation that the US Army attributed to al-Quds Corps, the elite unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The US forces consider Daqduq the most prominent element behind this operation. Daqduq, who the US claims arrived in Iraq to train insurgents with the help of al-Quds Corps, was the last prisoner to remain under the custody of the US forces, before they handed him over to the Iraqis after completing their withdrawal from the country.

Egypt: The 12 million losers!
By Ali Ibrahim/Asharq Alawsat
Simply following the comments of activists and observers on social networking websites during the press conference held by the head of Egypt’s electoral commission, Farouk Sultan, who was forced by law to issue a lengthy legal preamble before the election result was announced, was fun in itself. These activists, in their nervous state, posted various comments claiming that Sultan’s narrative or use of certain words meant that Shafiq would be declared the winner, only to return later to post other comments claiming that the indications now suggested that Mursi would be declared victorious! Some comments accused the head of the electoral commission of being sadistic, because he did not immediately announce the election result but instead left everyone on the edge of their seats as he reviewed the work of the electoral commission and the difficult conditions it operated under. Despite a flood of conspiracy theories, claims of voter fraud, and talk about secret understandings being reached behind closed doors, no one was sure of the name of the winning candidate until Farouk Sultan announced that Mohammed Mursi had won ahead of Ahmed Shafiq. Hence a new chapter in post-25 January Egypt has begun, and the challenges of this stage are no less difficult than the previous transitional period, which lasted for around 16 months and was full of turmoil.
There was a winner and a loser, each with a large support base who voted for them, and neither can cancel the other out. The end result was decided by a difference of less than 3 percent, or about 900 thousand votes out of a total of roughly 26 million according to the commission’s figures, including more than 800 thousand invalid votes. In the end, everyone must accept the outcome of the ballot box even if the difference is so small. There are several implications to such a small difference in the votes cast for Mursi and Shafiq, most importantly nobody can say they have an absolute popular mandate. Secondly, there seems to be an almost fifty percent split along societal divisions in the Egyptian electorate’s voting. It was a good sign that the losing candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, sent a personal note congratulating his rival and wishing him well following the announcement of the election results. Perhaps Obama’s advice to the losing candidate, namely do not withdraw from political work but benefit from the experience, will serve Shafiq well, especially considering that he was able to win so many votes. It was also a good sign that in his first statement, president-elect Mursi confirmed that he would be a president for all Egyptians, referring to all the governorates, even those that did not vote for him, especially in the Nile Delta. If we want to lay the foundations for a continual democratic experience then we must establish a tradition of the loser accepting defeat and the winner reassuring those who did not vote for him, so that no election will lead to blood and violence, as some expected, or fiery and antagonistic statements in the countdown to the electoral commission’s announcement. The reality that should be in the minds of the political players on the Egyptian scene today is that 13.2 million Egyptians voted for Mursi and won, whilst 12.3 million voted for Shafiq and lost. However, the concerns and views of the “losers” must be part of the new equation if we want to continue to move forwards, especially since there is a widespread belief that several million voted for a certain candidate purely because they hated his rival and had no other options.
The final two candidates who appeared in the Egyptian presidential run-off election, was a surprise in itself, and came contrary to the expectations of most analysts. No one expected Mursi or Shafiq to be victorious in the weeks and days leading up to the first round of elections, as other candidates were viewed as being frontrunners. However, it seemed that the public had a different opinion.

Russian democracy in Syria
By Hussein Shobokshi/Asharq Alawsat
Russia's stance towards the Syrian revolution, and its attempts to protect the Bashar al-Assad regime by all means possible, regardless of the potential cost and international pressure, is a matter - as expressed by many - that has exceeded diplomatic customs and reached unprecedented levels of impudence. Despite the irrefutable evidence of the crimes that al-Assad and his regime are committing, the Russian stance remains one of unrelenting support. The Syrian regime has been successful in "selling" the idea that Syria is a state of peaceful factions and that it is the sole secular regime in the Arab region. The al-Assad regime has promoted the image that it is facing a fierce armed terrorist campaign undertaken by radical Salafi groups seeking to repress minorities, deny their rights, and put an end to the state of peaceful coexistence between all the factions of one nation. Here al-Assad has been careful to mention the Christian factions, the majority of which adhere to the Russian Orthodox Church.
Bashar al-Assad's promotion of the Salafi fundamentalist scarecrow is an attempt to evoke a certain Russian sentiment. Vladimir Putin – who himself came from the KGB, one of the world's strongest intelligence apparatuses during the era of the Soviet Union - and other Russian intelligence and military leaders still remember the humiliating loss they encountered in Afghanistan, at the hands of radical "jihadists" and Salafis. Al-Assad’s campaign has been strengthened by the stance of Kirill I, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church itself, who stated clearly that his church is strongly opposed to foreign intervention in Syrian affairs and attempts to change the regime there, in an endeavor to "protect" the 10 percent of Syria's population that belong to the Christian minority.
Of course, such a statement goes in perfect harmony with the political desire of the Kremlin's leadership, its apparatuses and political administration. The Kremlin is using the church's stance as a means of soft power that can influence international public opinion and help Russia gain the world's understanding of its stance towards Syria. It is crucially important here to recall the perfect coordination between Putin's electoral team during the recent presidential elections in Russia, and the Russian Orthodox Church that supported him strongly in return for the promises and guarantees he offered, whereby the government would meet all the developmental needs of the places of worship and religious schools affiliated to the church.
There is an undeniable feeling that the Russia’s discourse is motived by revenge for the defeat its troops encountered in Afghanistan, and also Russia's concern about the "fundamentalist danger" threatening the stability of the regime in Syria. Russia tends to ignore the talk about the criminal violations the Syrian regime is committing against its own people, and holds both the regime and the people as jointly responsible. The Russian stance was strengthened by the visit which Patriarch Kirill I paid to Damascus recently, and the multitude of Christian citizens who were seen crowding round him expressing their "fear" and "panic". They were worried that the regime would change and a radical extremist group would seize control of the country, denying the Christians their rights and threatening their lives and freedoms. In fact, it soon became clear that this scene was prepared by the Syrian media machine, which is highly experienced in this sort of propaganda.
Russia, by adopting such a stance, is provoking a sectarian war by continuing to champion one team against another, believing that the regime is right and everyone else is wrong. If Russia can consider a ruling system that represents only 10 percent of the population as democratic, then would it allow its own territory to be ruled by one of Russia’s minorities, and still consider this to be democratic as well?

The Evils of the Muslim Brotherhood
Evidence Keeps Mounting
by Raymond Ibrahim
Investigative Project on Terrorism
June 25, 2012
http://www.meforum.org/3272/muslim-brotherhood-evils
Egypt's longtime banned Muslim Brotherhood—the parent organization of nearly every subsequent Islamist movement, including al-Qaeda—has just won the nation's presidency, in the name of its candidate, Muhammad Morsi. That apathy reigns in the international community, when once such news would have been deemed devastating, is due to the successful efforts of Muslim apologists and subversive agents in the West who portray the Brotherhood as "moderate Islamists"—irrespective that such a formulation is oxymoronic, since to be "Islamist," to be a supporter of draconian Sharia, is by definition to be immoderate.
Obama administration officials naturally took it a step further, portraying the Brotherhood as "largely secular" and "pluralistic."
Back in the real world, evidence that the Brotherhood is just another hostile Islamist group bent on achieving world domination through any means possible is overwhelming. Here are just three examples that recently surfaced, all missed by the Western media, and all exposing the Brotherhood as hostile to "infidels" (non-Muslims) in general, hostile to the Christians in their midst (the Copts) in particular, and on record calling on Muslims to lie and cheat during elections to empower Sharia:
Anti-Infidel: At a major conference supporting Muhammad Morsi—standing on a platform with a big picture of Morsi smiling behind him and with any number of leading Brotherhood figures, including Khairat el-Shater, sitting alongside—a sheikh went on a harangue, quoting Koran 9:12, a jihadi favorite, to portray all those Egyptians who do not vote for Morsi—the other half of Egypt, the secularists and Copts who voted for Shafiq—as "resisters of the Sharia of Allah," and "infidel leaders" whom true Muslims must "fight" and subjugate.
The video of this sheikh was shown on the talk show of Egyptian commentator Hala Sarhan, who proceeded to exclaim "This is unbelievable! How is this talk related to the campaign of Morsi?!" A guest on her show correctly elaborated: "Note his [the sheikh's] use of the word 'fight'—'fight the infidel leaders' [Koran 9:12]; this is open incitement to commit violence against anyone who disagrees with them…. How can such a radical sheikh speak such words, even as [Brotherhood leaders like] Khairat el-Shater just sit there?" Nor did the Brotherhood denounce or distance itself from this sheikh's calls to jihad and takfir.
Anti-Christian: It is precisely because of these sporadic outbursts of anti-infidel rhetoric that it is not farfetched to believe that Morsi himself, as some maintain, earlier boasted that he would "achieve the Islamic conquest (fath) of Egypt for the second time, and make all Christians convert to Islam, or else pay the jizya."
Speaking of the minority Christian Copts of Egypt, in an article titled "The Muslim Brotherhood Asks Why Christians Fear Them?!" secularist writer Khaled Montasser, examining the Brotherhood's own official documents and fatwas, shows exactly why. According to Montasser, in issue #56 of the Brotherhood journal The Call (al-da'wa), published in December 1980, prominent Brotherhood figure Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah al-Khatib decreed several anti-Christian measures, including the destruction of churches and the prevention of burying unclean Christian "infidels" anywhere near Muslim graves. Once again, this view was never retracted by the Brotherhood. As Montasser concludes, "After such fatwas, Dr. Morsi and his Brotherhood colleagues can ask and wonder—"Why are the Copts afraid?!"
Lying, Stealing, and Cheating to Victory: In a recent article titled "The Islamist Group's Hidden Intentions," appearing in Watani, author Youssef Sidhom exposes a document "which carries the logos of both the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party." Written by Khairat el-Shater, the Deputy to the Supreme Guide, and addressed "to all the Brotherhood branches in the governorates," the memo calls on Muslims to cheat, block votes, and "resort to any method that can change the vote" to ensure that Morsi wins, which, of course, he just did—amidst many accusations of electoral fraud. El-Shater concluded his memo by saying, "You must understand, brothers, that our interest lies wherever there is the Sharia of Allah, and this can only be by preserving the [MB] group and preserving Islam."
In short, the Muslim Brotherhood has not changed; only Western opinion of it has. As it was since its founding in 1928, the group is committed to empowering and spreading Sharia law—a law that preaches hate for non-Muslim "infidels," especially Islam's historic nemesis, Christianity, and allows anything, from lying to cheating, to make Islam supreme. Now that the Brotherhood has finally achieved power, the world can prepare to see such aspects on a grand scale.
**Raymond Ibrahim is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Congressman Calls for Hearings on 'Radicalization' of White Christian Women
by Raymond Ibrahim
FrontPageMagazine.com
June 25, 2012
http://www.meforum.org/3270/congressman-al-green
During a Homeland Security committee hearing last week on the "Radicalization of Muslim-Americans," Texas Congressman Al Green (D) criticized the hearings as biased and unfair to Muslims, suggesting that the only way to justify them is if Congress would also conduct a "hearing on the radicalization of Christians."
Though his position may seem balanced, in fact, it reveals a dangerous mix of irrationality, moral relativism, and emotionalism—all disastrous traits in a U.S. Congressman. Consider some of Green's assertions:
I don't think that most people oppose hearings on radicalization. I do not, not — N-O-T — oppose hearings on radicalization. I do oppose hearings that don't focus on the entirety of radicalization…. [W]hy not have a hearing on the radicalization of Christians?... People who see the hearings and never hear about the hearing on the radicalization of Christianity have to ask themselves, "Why is this missing?"
Fair question—"Why not have a hearing on the radicalization of Christians?" Before responding, we must acknowledge that the word "radicalization" simply means "to go to the root or origin of something," in this case, religion: a Muslim radical goes to the root teachings of Islam; a Christian radical goes to the root teachings of Christianity. Accordingly, there are certainly "Christian radicals" in America. The question is, do they pose the same risks to America as Muslim radicals?
Green and all moral relativists naturally do not want to pursue such a question, opting to pretend that any form of "radicalization"—regardless of the "root teachings"—is evil. They are certainly not interested in determining the fundamentals of Christianity and Islam, and whether they are equally prone to violence, terrorism, conquest, etc. While this is not the place to contrast modern Christianity's apolitical and largely passive nature with modern Islam's political and largely aggressive nature—a theme elaborated here—suffice it to say that, while thousands of modern-day Muslim leaders are on record quoting Islamic scriptures to justify violence and hate, one is hard pressed to find examples of modern Christian leaders preaching violence and hate—and justifying it through scripture.
The Saudi Grand Mufti, the highest religious official of Saudi Arabia, Islam's holiest nation, called on the destruction of all regional churches, quoting Islamic texts. Can Green find an example of an equally authoritative Christian leader calling for the destruction of mosques—and supporting it through the Bible?
Green went on to ask "Why don't we go to the next step and ask, how is that a blue-eyed, blonde-haired, white female in the United States of America can become radicalized to the point of wanting to do harm to this country? We don't have that type of hearing. That's the problem."
Thus, not only does the Congressman irrationally conflate the teachings of all religions together, he also conflates religion with race (and gender) implying that the only reason there are hearings on Muslim radicalization is because Muslims are not white, whereas those "equally-dangerous" blue-eyed, blond-haired female Christian "radicals" are apparently getting a free pass to terrorize America.
This logic is flawed on many levels. Islam is not a race; there are Muslims of all colors, just like there are Christians of all colors. Moreover, there are indeed "blue-eyed, blond-haired" terrorists in the world, including females—yet these, too, are overwhelmingly Muslim. It is dishonest for Green to try to take the focus off of Islamic radicalization and pin it on that all-purpose bogeyman, "racism."
Regardless, this argument of Islam as a race is popular and was, for example, used by Congresswoman Jackie Speier, who also called these hearings "racist." Likewise, a former American soldier discussing the Fort Hood shootings lamented that "When a white guy shoots up a post office, they call that going postal. But when a Muslim [namely, Nidal Hasan] does it, they call it jihad."
Notice the confusion; as if a "white guy" and a "Muslim" represent different races. Of course, if a person of any color goes on a random shooting spree, it would be racist to pin it on his race. But if a person of any color goes on a shooting spree—while waving the Koran, screaming the jihadi paean "Allahu Akbar!" or otherwise rationalizing his actions in Islamic terms, as did Nidal Hasan—then we are talking about a shooting spree motivated by a learned ideology or worldview that has nothing to do with the murderer's race.
From beginning to end, Green—like his congressman colleague Keith Ellison, whose objection to these hearings culminated in a teary-eyed breakdown—relied on emotionalism to make his point: he opened his statement by offering the Islamic greeting assalama alikum to Muslims present, dreamily observing: "Isn't it wonderful that the grandson of a Christian minister can sit on the Homeland Security Committee and say assalama alikum?"—a meaningless point that does not change the fact that in Islam, Muslims are only allowed to say "Peace upon you" to fellow Muslims, never to non-Muslim infidels, who by nature are deemed undeserving Muslim well-wishing.
Finally, Green concluded his sanctimonious attack by saying "I do know what it feels like to look like a Muslim in the minds of some people and to be demeaned in a public venue…. I look forward to the day that we'll have that hearing that deals with the radicalization of Christians in America"—again, all meaningless race-related rhetoric and moral relativism, the sole value of which is to obfuscate the issue at hand: the real threat of "radicalization of Muslim-Americans."
Raymond Ibrahim is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an Associate Fellow at the Middle East Forum.

After an Israeli Strike on Iran
by Daniel Pipes/The Washington Times
June 26, 2012
http://www.meforum.org/pipes/11528/israeli-strike-on-iran
How will Iranians respond to an Israeli strike against their nuclear infrastructure? The answers to this prediction matters greatly, affecting not just Jerusalem's decision but also how much other states work to impede an Israeli strike.
Analysts generally offer up best-case predictions for policies of deterrence and containment (some commentators even go so far as to welcome an Iranian nuclear capability) while forecasting worst-case results from a strike. They foresee Tehran doing everything possible to retaliate, such as kidnapping, terrorism, missile attacks, naval combat, and closing the Strait of Hormuz. These predictions ignore two facts: neither of Israel's prior strikes against enemy states building nuclear weapons, Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, prompted retaliation; and a review the Islamic Republic of Iran's history since 1979 points to "a more measured and less apocalyptic—if still sobering—assessment of the likely aftermath of a preventive strike."
The authors, Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy.
Those are the words of Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, who provide an excellent guide to possible scenarios in "Beyond Worst-Case Analysis: Iran's Likely Responses to an Israeli Preventive Strike." Their survey of Iranian behavior over the past three decades leads them to anticipate that three main principles would likely shape and limit Tehran's response to an Israeli strike: an insistence on reciprocity, a caution not to gratuitously make enemies, and a wish to deter further Israeli (or American) strikes.
The mullahs, in other words, face serious limits on their ability to retaliate, including military weakness and a pressing need not to make yet more external enemies. With these guidelines in place, Eisenstadt and Knights consider eight possible Iranian actions, each of which must be assessed while keeping in mind the alternative – namely, apocalyptic Islamists controlling nuclear weapons:
Terrorist attacks on Israeli, Jewish, and U.S. targets. Likely but causing limited destruction.
Kidnapping U.S. citizens, especially in Iraq. Likely, but limited in impact, as in the 1980s in Lebanon.
Attacks on Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. Very likely, especially via proxies, but causing limited destruction.
Missile strikes on Israel. Likely: a few missiles from Iran get through Israeli defenses, leading to casualties likely in the low hundreds; missiles from Hezbollah limited in number due to domestic Lebanese considerations. Unlikely: Hamas getting involved, having distanced itself from Tehran; the Syrian government, which is battling for its life against an ever-stronger opposition army and possibly also the Turkish armed forces. Overall, missile attacks are unlikely to do devastating damage.
Attacks on neighboring states. Likely: terrorism, because deniable. Unlikely: missile strikes, for Tehran does not want to make more enemies.
Clashes with the U.S. Navy. Likely: but, given the balance of power, does limited damage.
Covertly mining the Strait of Hormuz. Likely, causing a run-up in energy prices.
Attempted closing the Strait of Hormuz. Unlikely: difficult to achieve and potentially too damaging to Iranian interests, for the country needs that same strait for commerce.
The authors also consider three potential side effects of an Israeli strike. Yes, Iranians might rally to their government in the immediate aftermath of a strike, but in the longer term Tehran "could be criticized for handling the nuclear dossier in a way that led to military confrontation." The so-called Arab street is perpetually predicted to rise up in response to outside military attack, but it never does; likely unrest among the Shi'a of the Persian Gulf would be counterbalanced by the many Arabs quietly cheering the Israelis. As for leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and starting an overt crash nuclear weapons program, while "a very real possibility," the more the Iranians retaliate, the harder they will find it to obtain the parts for such a program.
The USS Enterprise – how serious is the Iranian threat against it?
In all, these dangers are unpleasant but not cataclysmic, manageable not devastating. Eisenstadt and Knights expect a short phase of high-intensity Iranian response, to be followed by a "protracted low intensity conflict that could last for months or even years" – much as already exists between Iran and Israel. An Israeli preventive strike, they conclude, while a "high-risk endeavor carrying a potential for escalation in the Levant or the Gulf, … would not be the apocalyptic event some foresee."
This analysis makes a convincing case that the danger of nuclear weapons falling into Iranian hands far exceeds the danger of a military strike to prevent that from happening.
Illustration by Linas Garsys for The Washington Times.
*Mr. Pipes (www.DanielPipes.org) is president of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. © 2012 by Daniel Pipes. All rights reserved.

 Iran Confident As Sanctions Tighten
Patrick Clawson and Mehdi Khalaji /Washington Institute
June 26, 2012
Iran sees itself in a strong position relative to the West and therefore believes it has little reason to be forthcoming in nuclear negotiations.
As tighter U.S. and EU restrictions on Iran enter into force on June 28 and July 1, respectively, the Islamic Republic's leaders are sounding remarkably confident about the nuclear impasse. Tehran believes it is in a strong position relative to the West and therefore sees little reason to be forthcoming in negotiations. On the contrary, it still finds resistance to be useful in dealing with the P5+1 (i.e., the United States, Britain, China, France, Russia, and Germany). On June 18, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated, "Victory is not possible without...taking risk. We stand [for our cause]...Our enemies...should know that obstinacy, arrogance, self-importance, and unreasonable expectations will not get them anywhere against the Iranian nation." The challenge for the United States and Europe is how to persuade Iranian leaders that they have exaggerated both their own strengths and the West's weaknesses.
IRAN SEES THE WEST AS PREOCCUPIED
Iranian leaders believe that Europe is completely preoccupied by an ongoing financial crisis that has proven its economic model to be a failure. They also see the United States as being focused on the presidential campaign and exhausted by two long, inconclusive wars in the region. In Tehran's eyes, both parties -- especially the United States -- want a deal with Iran more than Iran wants a deal with them.
Iranian leaders also see no prospect of military action any time soon, certainly not before the U.S. elections in November. Even after November, they believe Western leaders will be so worried about the potential impact a war would have on their fragile economies that they will step back from confrontation. Tehran certainly does not feel any rush to respond to the P5+1's demands -- it believes that the West is more worried about the prospect of Israeli military action than about Iranian nuclear progress.
IRAN SEES THE ARAB UPRISINGS AS GOOD FOR IT, BAD FOR THE WEST
In Iran's view, the events of the past year show that political Islam is on the march, whether in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, or Tunisia. Iranian leaders take great satisfaction from what they see as the rejection of secular leaders. As for the Syria crisis, they seem to believe that the most likely scenario is the Assad regime surviving but becoming more isolated, which would make it even more reliant on Iran. In the worst case, neither the West nor Israel would gain from Assad's fall, since Syria would be in turmoil and Islamists unfriendly to the West would become an increasingly important player.
IRAN SEES ITS ECONOMIC SITUATION AS GREATLY IMPROVED
Over the past few years, higher oil prices have flooded Iran with money. Even with their recent retreat, today's prices are "only" four times where they were in 2002. In August 2011, prior to the latest sanctions escalation, the International Monetary Fund predicted that Iran's 2012-2013 oil export revenue would be $104 billion, or four-and-a-half times the 2002-2003 receipts of $23 billion. Even if export volumes were cut in half and Iran received only $50 per barrel, its inflation-adjusted earnings would still be higher than they were a decade ago. Tehran also has substantial financial reserves; even if 70 percent of these funds are unavailable, as some suggest, Iran could still draw from more than $30 billion in foreign exchange reserves.
Iranian hardliners do not regard the country's economic situation as a top priority. That said, Iran has had higher annual growth since 2007 than the United States and Europe, feeding the regime's perception that its economy is doing better than the West's. Iranian leaders took satisfaction in removing government subsidies on various items at a time when their oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors were making massive welfare expenditures designed to forestall unrest. And although inflation obviously rose in the aftermath of quadrupled energy prices, they believe that the impact on families has been offset by the regime's increased monthly cash payouts. In short, Iranian leaders see their economic situation as quite good, especially compared to the crisis-torn West.
IRAN DOES NOT SEE SANCTIONS AS A THREAT TO THE REGIME
Ayatollah Khamenei and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are quite confident that whatever economic consequences the sanctions hold, their political ramifications will be small. They do not believe that popular resentment stemming from high inflation or unemployment pose a threat to the regime, and they see little possibility of significant political unrest in the near future.
Indeed, a lack of ideology, organization, and leadership has made Iran's democratic forces idle for now. The symbolic leaders of the 2009 opposition Green Movement -- Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi -- have been under house arrest for two years, and their supporters have been unable to generate political action that might press the regime to free them.
IRAN SEES FEW ADVANTAGES IN A DEAL WITH THE P5+1
In recent weeks, Iranian leaders have argued that the West is not serious about the nuclear negotiations -- the same accusation the West made against them for years. According to former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency Council and a noted pragmatic figure, last week's Moscow talks "showed that the West is not willing to make a deal and is not honest. They want to rely on bullying alone to meet their goals."
In Iran's view, the West would see any nuclear compromise as only a first step, demanding more transparency and inspections before fully lifting sanctions. Even complete resolution of the nuclear issue would only lead the West to emphasize other problems with Iran. As Intelligence Minister Haydar Moslehi put it on June 20, "By raising human rights, sanctions, and terrorism, America and the West are trying to tighten the screws on the Islamic Republic...The real reason behind their confrontation is none of these issues, but instead Islam and the discourse of Islamic Revolution."
Furthermore, Iranian leaders believe that cutting a deal would not stop the ongoing cyber attacks on their nuclear program, nor the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists. In their view, Israel and the West are determined to gravely damage the program whether Tehran makes a deal or not.
IMPLICATIONS
Tehran's views regarding its own strengths and the West's weaknesses have an element of truth to them, but only a small one. For instance, although EU leaders are primarily concerned about the financial crisis, that fact has not led any significant figure in Europe to propose cancelling or even postponing the ban on Iranian oil. This is true even in Greece, Iran's main European oil customer and the country most affected by the financial troubles. And while Iran's economic situation is better than a decade ago, the Iranian people remain profoundly unhappy about it, believing their circumstances could be much better if not for the international isolation brought on by the hardliners.
The challenge for the P5+1 is to change the perceptions of Iranian leaders -- a difficult task given their remarkable ignorance about the outside world, combined with self-confidence and ideological blinders that lead them to believe Iran is the rising power and the West is on the decline. Ultimately, changing this mindset may require a profound shock of some sort, be it remarkably tough sanctions, more-complete political isolation, or military action. Washington has long advocated sanctions as the key to spurring Iranian compromise, and the announcement of the latest round of financial measures certainly seemed central in getting Iran back to the negotiating table. At the end of the day, however, such measures have not persuaded Tehran to make even the minimum compromises that would be acceptable to the P5+1. Expecting the new sanctions alone to spur Iran toward a more favorable position may therefore be unrealistic -- Washington and its allies would be well advised to plan additional sanctions.
Finally, while Iran's leaders are no democrats, they are influenced by public opinion. The chances of getting through to them will therefore improve if the West is able to communicate to ordinary Iranians the realities of their country's situation. This need underlines the importance of penetrating the regime's electronic curtain, as President Obama emphasized in his March 20 address to the Iranian people.
*Patrick Clawson is director of research at The Washington Institute. Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at the Institute