LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
May 31/12

Bible Quotation for today/Apostles of Christ
01 Corinthians 04: " You should think of us as Christ's servants, who have been put in charge of God's secret truths. The one thing required of such servants is that they be faithful to their master. Now, I am not at all concerned about being judged by you or by any human standard; I don't even pass judgment on myself. My conscience is clear, but that does not prove that I am really innocent. The Lord is the one who passes judgment on me. So you should not pass judgment on anyone before the right time comes. Final judgment must wait until the Lord comes; he will bring to light the dark secrets and expose the hidden purposes of people's minds. And then all will receive from God the praise they deserve. For your sake, my friends, I have applied all this to Apollos and me, using the two of us as an example, so that you may learn what the saying means, Observe the proper rules. None of you should be proud of one person and despise another. Who made you superior to others? Didn't God give you everything you have? Well, then, how can you boast, as if what you have were not a gift? Do you already have everything you need? Are you already rich? Have you become kings, even though we are not? Well, I wish you really were kings, so that we could be kings together with you. For it seems to me that God has given the very last place to us apostles, like people condemned to die in public as a spectacle for the whole world of angels and of human beings. For Christ's sake we are fools; but you are wise in union with Christ! We are weak, but you are strong! We are despised, but you are honored! To this very moment we go hungry and thirsty; we are clothed in rags; we are beaten; we wander from place to place; we wear ourselves out with hard work. When we are cursed, we bless; when we are persecuted, we endure; when we are insulted, we answer back with kind words. We are no more than this world's garbage; we are the scum of the earth to this very moment!
I write this to you, not because I want to make you feel ashamed, but to instruct you as my own dear children. For even if you have ten thousand guardians in your Christian life, you have only one father. For in your life in union with Christ Jesus I have become your father by bringing the Good News to you. I beg you, then, to follow my example. For this purpose I am sending to you Timothy, who is my own dear and faithful son in the Christian life. He will remind you of the principles which I follow in the new life in union with Christ Jesus and which I teach in all the churches everywhere. Some of you have become proud because you have thought that I would not be coming to visit you. If the Lord is willing, however, I will come to you soon, and then I will find out for myself the power which these proud people have, and not just what they say. For the Kingdom of God is not a matter of words but of power. Which do you prefer? Shall I come to you with a whip, or in a spirit of love and gentleness?
 

Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources
How Tehran Is Outflanking Washington /By: Michael Singh /New York Daily News/May 30/12
Assad's Response to the Annan Plan: Violence as Usual/By: Jeffrey White /Washington Institute/May 30/12
Iraq: A satellite state of Iran/by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi/The Jerusalem Post/May 30/12
Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan/By Frederick W. Kagan, Ahmad Majidyar, Danielle Pletka, Marisa Cochrane Sullivan/irantracker.org/May 30/12/PDF

Former Liberian leader Taylor jailed for 50 years
Daily Star/May 30, 2012By Thomas Escritt, Anthony Deutsch
Former Liberian President Charles Taylor sits in the courtroom during his trial on 16 May, 2012 at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, based in Leidschendam outside The Hague, the Netherlands. (AFP PHOTO - ANP - POOL / EVERT-JAN DANIELS) /THE HAGUE: Former Liberian President Charles Taylor was jailed for 50 years on Wednesday for helping Sierra Leonean rebels commit what a court in The Hague called some of the worst war crimes in history. Taylor, 64, was the first head of state convicted by an international court since the Nazi trials after World War Two and the sentence set a precedent for the emerging system of international justice.
In an 11-year war that ended in 2002, Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front rebels murdered, raped and mutilated their way across Liberia's West African neighbor, helped by Taylor as he profited from a trade in so-called blood diamonds. "He was found responsible for aiding and abetting some of the most heinous and brutal crimes in recorded history," said the Special Court for Sierra Leone's presiding judge Richard Lussick, emphasizing that the world was "entering a new era of accountability."
Although shorter than the 80 years that prosecutors had sought, the sentence set a precedent for an international justice system aimed at deterring future war crimes. The court rejected all the defense's appeals for leniency. "It is really significant that Taylor's status as a former head of state was taken as an aggravating factor as far as his sentence was concerned," said Geraldine Mattioli-Zeltner of Human Rights Watch. "That is a very important precedent and I hope that Syria's Bashar Assad and Sudan's Omar Hassan al-Bashir take note."
Accused of genocide, Sudan's President Bashir is wanted by the International Criminal Court. The court is soon due to start the trial of Ivory Coast's ex-president, Laurent Gbagbo. President Assad does not currently face charges over the bloody suppression of an uprising. Dressed in a blue suit and yellow tie, Taylor sat impassively through the roughly 45-minute sentencing.
Hands clasped in front of his mouth and his brow furrowed, Taylor shifted uneasily when the camera broadcasting proceedings settled on him.
The sentence was welcome for Edward Conteh, a Sierra Leonean whose left arm was hacked off by the rebels.
"Taylor is now 64 years old, I know that he cannot do 50 years in prison, so I'm satisfied," Conteh said in Freetown, scene of some of the bitterest fighting of the war. Sierra Leone's average life expectancy dipped to 37 years during the war, in which an estimated 50,000 people were killed. Lussick described some of the most hideous atrocities: the amputations of limbs which became a hallmark of the conflict, the gang rape victim whose eyes were torn out so she could not identify the perpetrators, the mother forced to carry a bag of human heads - including those of her children.
"She was forced to laugh while carrying the bag dripping with blood," he said. "She saw the heads of her children." Taylor is due to serve his sentence at a high security prison in Britain. In the Liberian capital Monrovia, the Taylor family spokesman called the trial a mockery of justice. "They did this because America and Britain want to use our resources. Taylor did not yield to them for our oil. They had to do it to get our resources," Sando Johnson said. Both sides are expected to appeal.

Three Assyrians Killed in Mosul, Iraq, Mother, Daughter Raped
 5-29-2012/ Mosul (AINA) -- According ankawa.com, an Arabic language Assyrian website, three men entered the home of Fr. Mazin Eshoo on May 23 and killed his father and two brothers, and raped his mother and sister. The attack occurred in the the neighborhood known as Health Quarter in Mosul, north Iraq.
The assailants rode motorcycles and entered the home via the backyard.
Fr. Eshoo is the priest at the Church of Immaculate Syriac Catholics. Two years ago he was kidnapped and released unharmed shortly thereafter.
© 2012, Assyrian International News Agency. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use.

Iran Denies Report It Plotted Assassinations with Hizbullah
Naharnet/30 May 2012/Iran's U.N. mission has strongly denied a U.S. newspaper report alleging evidence existed implicating Tehran or its Lebanese ally Hizbullah in international assassination plots, Iranian media reported on Wednesday."Iran has always condemned any terrorist acts and these baseless accusations are being made against the Islamic state in line with Iranophobia and the policy of putting illegal pressure on Iran," the Iranian mission said in letter to the Washington Post newspaper, which published the report, according to the Arman daily. The mission called the allegation "baseless" and stressed that Iran itself had been "the biggest victim of terrorism in recent years," with the assassination of several of its nuclear scientists.
The Washington Post report on Monday cited unnamed U.S. and Middle Eastern security officials as saying evidence had been amassed showing Iran or Hizbullah were behind plots to kill two Saudi officials, half a dozen Israelis, several Americans and other targets in at least seven countries, including Azerbaijan. Sources told the paper the plots were seen as part of an ongoing covert war in which Iran also has been the victim of assassinations. It claimed that activity for the plots abruptly halted earlier this year, when Iran agreed to hold talks with world powers on its disputed nuclear program.
The last round of the talks, between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group comprising the United States, Britain, France, Germany, China and Russia, took place in Baghdad last week and ended inconclusively.
The next round of those talks are to take place in Moscow on June 18-19 as both sides publicly harden their positions for what are likely to be extremely tense negotiations over Iran's controversial nuclear program and Western sanctions.
*SourceAgence France Presse.

How Tehran Is Outflanking Washington
Michael Singh /New York Daily News
May 30, 2012
Last week's talks in Baghdad between Iran and the P5-plus-1 -- the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia -- yielded no agreement. Paradoxically, however, both Washington and Tehran are likely to view the negotiations as successful, but for vastly different reasons.
There is an interest that both Iran and the United States hold in common: staving off military action, whether by the U.S. or Israel. From there, however, U.S. and Iranian motivations diverge; understanding this divergence is key to understanding why the talks thus far have failed.
Iranian officials publicly dismiss but likely privately worry about the consequences of war, while U.S. officials often seem more worried about the consequences of military action than about the Iranian nuclear program a strike would be designed to destroy.
Indeed, for many within the United States and other P5-plus-1 countries, the mere fact of "intensive" talks about Iran's nuclear program is itself a success. There is a narrative, espoused by then-candidate Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential campaign, that at the root of the Iran nuclear crisis is U.S.-Iran conflict, and that the root cause of that conflict is mistrust.
As a candidate, Obama pledged to meet personally with Iranian leaders and predicted that the Iranians "would start changing their behavior if they started seeing that they had some incentives to do so." And as President, in his famous June 4, 2009, speech in Cairo, Obama spoke of the need to "overcome decades of mistrust."
In this narrative, talks are successful insofar as they end not in collapse but in a sustained negotiating process -- that is, more talks.
For Iran, meanwhile, there is little indication that the talks are aimed at building confidence or opening up the broader possibility of U.S.-Iran rapprochement. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the Iranian regime views normal relations with the United States as undesirable, even threatening, while it views a nuclear weapons capability as strategically vital.
Giving up the latter for the former would make little sense to Tehran.
Prolonging the talks serves a threefold purpose for Iran beyond merely buying time or delaying an attack: first, to enhance Iranian prestige by sitting as co-equal with the world's great powers and discussing the great regional and global issues of the day; second, to secure tacit acceptance of nuclear advances once deemed unacceptable; and third, to gain relief from sanctions without making major concessions.
In this round, Iran appears to have made progress toward the first and second goals, but not the third. Regarding the first, Iran reportedly included in its proposals items relating to Syria and other regional issues -- clearly legitimizing its role as a regional power player.
Regarding the second, Iran's low-level uranium enrichment appears off the table for discussion, and Western analysts now frequently assert that insisting on the full suspension of enrichment and reprocessing by Iran is "unrealistic," even though it is called for in a series of UN Security Council resolutions.
The focus instead is now on Iran's 20% enrichment. While the recent discovery of 27%-enriched uranium at Iran's Fordo facility may have an innocent explanation, it would come as little surprise were Iran to pocket the P5-plus-1 concessions and move the goalposts once again.
While Iran failed to meet its third likely objective -- sanctions relief -- it has little reason to rush. It is true that oil sanctions have had a harmful effect on the Iranian economy, but history suggests that authoritarian regimes are willing to allow their people to endure severe hardship for the furtherance of the regimes' own survival.
For any negotiation to succeed, one must begin by understanding the interests of the other side. The fundamental bargain offered by the U.S. asks Iran to trade something it apparently values enormously -- the ability to produce nuclear weapons -- for something in which it has no demonstrable interest and likely regards as threatening, closer ties with the West.
To change this and give negotiations a chance of succeeding, Iran must be presented with a different bargain: end its nuclear weapons work or face devastating consequences. Iran must be convinced that continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability will threaten, rather than ensure, the regime's ultimate survival, and that talks are not a substitute for but a complement to a broader strategy, which includes ratcheting up the pressure on Tehran and bolstering the credibility of the U.S. military option.
The true failure of Baghdad and previous rounds of talks is not the failure to reach an agreement, but the failure to correctly apprehend Iranian ambitions and implement a strategy to counter them.
Michael Singh is managing director of The Washington Institute and a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council.
 

Iran's Ahmadinejad 'not afraid' of Israeli strike
Dudi Cohen/Reuters/ 05.30.12/Ynetnews
Speaking to France 24 television, Iranian president says does not expect 'miracles' at next round of nuclear talks with West. On Houla massacre: Murderers must be punished
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Wednesday he did not expect talks next month with six world powers in Moscow on Iran's nuclear program to yield any major breakthroughs.
The six powers - the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany - failed to persuade Tehran on May 23 to halt its most sensitive nuclear work, but they will meet again in Moscow on June 18-19 to try to end a stand-off that has raised fears of a new war that could threaten global oil supplies.
"We are not fools. We are not expecting miracles at the next meeting," Ahmadinejad said in an interview with France 24 television. "There will be areas of work that will go in the right direction and we will work towards them so that we reach a constructive accord."
He said Tehran had "good proposals" to make, but that it would only announce them when the time was right, and both sides had to work hand in hand to restore confidence.
Ahmadinejad reiterated Iran's "legal right" to enrich uranium to 20% and said other countries would have to explain why Iran was not allowed to do this and what they would offer Iran in exchange if it stopped enriching uranium. During the interview, the Iranian leader said the world's main problem was Israel, not Iran. Addressing the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, Ahmadinejad said "we are not afraid of such an attack." Iran's nuclear progress is closely watched by the West and Israel as it could determine how long it could take Tehran to build atomic bombs, if it decided to do so. Iran denies any plan to do this and says its aims are entirely peaceful. Asked if Tehran would accept an offer under which other countries would enrich its uranium if it suspended its nuclear program, Ahmadinejad said he was open to it. "That offer has not been made, but it would ease the situation and would help build trust," he said.
Ahmadinejad also condemned the killing of 108 people, many of them children, in the Syrian town of Houla last week, saying those who had committed the crime should be punished even if the government was behind it. "All those who carried out these murders are guilty and I hope the people responsible are punished," he said. While Iran has supported popular uprisings that removed longtime leaders in Egypt, Libya and Yemen, it has steadfastly supported the Syrian leadership, a rare ally in the Arab world, which is largely suspicious of Shiite Iran's ambitions for greater regional influence.
Ahmadinejad said that the West and certain Arab countries were interfering in Syria and were sending weapons to help bring down the government.
"We cannot trust these people because their objective is to bring down (Syrian President Bashar) Assad," he said.

Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya'alon : Iran laughing all the way to the bomb
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4236308,00.html
Yoav Zitun Published: 05.30.12,/Ynetnews
After former Mossad chief Dagan says strike on Iran would hasten bomb, minister and former IDF chief says Israel 'must prevent unconventional regime from obtaining unconventional capabilities'
"Iran is laughing all the way to the bomb," Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya'alon said Wednesday, while noting that a new report showed that the Islamic Republic has had produced almost 6.2 tons of uranium enriched to a level of 3.5% since it began the work in 2007.
Speaking at a conference in Tel Aviv organized by The Institute for National Security Studies, Yaalon said "there is no indication that Iran feels threatened in any way, despite all the pressure (from the West) and economic difficulties. It still hasn't brought the regime (in Tehran) to the point where it has to choose between a bomb and survival. They're not there."
According to the report, which was published by The Institute for Science and International Security, "This total amount of 3.5% low enriched uranium hexafluoride, if further enriched to weapon grade, is enough to make over five nuclear weapons."
Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan told the conference a strike on Iran could hasten the Islamic Republic's development of an atom bomb. Responding to Dagan's comment, Ya'alon said "as someone who has experienced war, I understand how important it is to leave the military option as a last resort. But if we'll have to choose between a strike and an Iranian bomb, we'll choose a strike."
Ya'alon, who is also Israel's vice prime minister and a former IDF chief, explained that the Iranian threat "is not solely against the State of Israel. We are the 'Little Satan' and American is the 'Great Satan.' (The Iranian regime) has hegemonic aspirations that are accompanied by messianic, apocalyptic religious beliefs.
"Therefore, one way or another, we must prevent this unconventional regime from obtaining unconventional capabilities," he said.
Iran, Ya'alon added, does not foresee an Israeli strike in 2012, "because there are elections in the US. (Iran) knows the West and understands there is no green light for an Israeli attack. That is why they have come to the (nuclear) negotiations (with the world powers) without a sense of urgency.
"Our position is clear. They must give up (uranium) enrichment entirely, transfer all enriched material out of the country and close the facility in Qom," the vice PM told the conference.
Addressing the escalation in Syria, Ya'alon said President Bashar Assad will eventually have to step down. "It can happen sooner – by way of an assassination – or in several months," he said.
"The fall of (Assad's regime) will constitute a severe blow to the axis of evil, which stretches from Tehran to Damascus, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip."

Obama nixes French-Saudi plan to finish Assad by bombing his palace
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report May 30, 2012/US President Obama recently vetoed a detailed Franco-Saudi plan for ending President Bashar Assad’s rule by means of a massive air strike against his palace that would at one fell swoop wipe him, his family and top leadership circle out, debkafile’s military and intelligence sources report.
Their plan was for the presidential palace situated atop Mount Qassioun northeast of Damascus to be devastated by French warplanes taking off from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier off Syria’s Mediterranean coast and Saudi and United Arab Emirates bombers flying in through Jordan.
They would bomb the palace for 12 hours in several sorties while at the same time American fighter jets launched from a US aircraft carrier cruising in the Mediterranean or Red Sea would shut down Syria’s air defenses, which are considered among the most sophisticated and densely-arrayed in the region.
US warplanes would also keep the Syrian Air Force grounded and prevented from repulsing the incoming bombers.
This plan was presented to President Obama separately by Nicolas Sarkozy before he was voted out of office and Saudi Defense Minister Prince Salman, who arrived at the White House on April 12 for a personal presentation. The prince maintained that there is no end in sight for the Syrian conflict; it would only spread and ignite the rest of the Middle East. The peril could only be rooted out at source by a single, sharp military strike that would remove Assad and his close clan for good. This would be the only acceptable kind of Western-Arab armed intervention in Syria and it had the added advantage of being effective without bringing foreign boots to Syrian soil.
In early May, Sarkozy was still trying to talk Obama around to the plan. He spent his last days in the Elysée Palace in long telephone conversations with the White House in which he drove home three points:
1. Because Assad has concentrated his family, top military command and intelligence chiefs at a single nerve center behind the fortified walls of the Qassioun Palace, the snake’s head can feasibly be cut off at one stroke. The case of Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi was different because, unlike Assad, he never stayed long in one place and was constantly on the move.
2. Once that nerve center is destroyed, Syrian army and intelligence would be bereft of their sources of command. Their troops may remain in their bases and wait for news, while their officers may use the sudden political vacuum in Damascus to try and seize power. In either case, the Syrian military would be free of its orders to crush the anti-Assad revolt.
3. The French, Saudi and UAE air forces lack a central command center capable of coordinating a major combined air operation and therefore depend on the United States to provide this essential component. American military input is also vital for paralyzing Syria’s air defenses by applying its cyber warfare capabilities to disrupt the radar systems of Syria’s anti-air missile batteries.
Our Washington sources report that Obama consistently resisted repeated French and Saudi efforts to jump aboard their initiative.
The Saudi defense minister at one point in their conversation told the US president harshly that it was time for the Americans to stop talking and start acting. But Obama remained unmoved.
These events, revealed here by debkafile, provide the background for Presidents Barak Obama and Francois Hollande’s divergent responses Tuesday, May 29, to the al-Houla atrocity and its 108 brutally murdered victims. The White House repeated its objection to military intervention in Syria “at this time,” because it would only “increase the carnage.” A military option was left on the table.
That was standard Obama-speak for the crisis in Syria, behind which he remains determined to stay out of armed action for unseating President Assad and instead seek a deal with the Russians on the Syrian ruler’s fate as part and parcel of a comprehensive accord on Syria and Iran’s nuclear program.
President Hollande was at first quoted as saying he does not rule out armed intervention in Syria. Elysée sources later watered down this statement with the qualifier: …”only with UN Security Council approval.”On top of the American hurdle, Moscow and Beijing rushed Wednesday, May 30, to reiterate that they would oppose (veto) any Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in Syria, so effectively nipping the French intention in the bud. Bashar Assad accordingly had no qualms about sending UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan off empty-handed from a final bid to salvage his peace mission: The world powers have left him sitting pretty in his palace, unconcerned about his future and free to pursue one of the most vicious anti-opposition campaigns of modern times.

New satellite images show fresh activity in Iran nuclear site, IAEA says
By Reuters and Haaretz | May.30, 2012/Haaretz
Officials linked to UN nuclear watchdog present May 25 image showing 'ground scraping activities' at the Parchin base near Tehran; Iran has stated it saw no reason for UN to inspect site.
One image from May 25 showed signs that "ground-scraping activities" had taken place at the Parchin facility as well as the presence of bulldozers, according to diplomats who attended a closed-door briefing by UN nuclear agency officials. This will probably strengthen Western suspicions that Iran is "sanitizing" the site of any incriminating evidence before possibly allowing inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the complex. "They clearly think they have something to hide," one Western envoy said. The Parchin complex is at the centre of Western suspicions that Iran has been developing a nuclear weapons capability despite Tehran's repeated denials of any such ambition.
Last week, the IAEA said in a report issued to member states that satellite images showed "extensive activities" at the facility southeast of Tehran - in what diplomats said was an allusion to suspected cleaning there. At Wednesday's briefing for diplomats accredited to the Vienna-based agency, IAEA Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts presented satellite images from November, April and earlier this month, participants said. The May 25 image indicated that two or more small side buildings - adjacent to the main structure that is of interest to the UN agency - had been removed, diplomats said. One said this suggested that "serious work" was being carried out there.
Nackaerts did not elaborate on what he believed was happening at the site, apart from reiterating that the agency needed to go there to clarify the issue, diplomats said.
Iran, which denies Western accusations it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons capability, has dismissed charges aired about Parchin as "childish" and "ridiculous."
Earlier this week, Iran's state-run TV and semi-official Fars news agency both cited
the head of the country's nuclear agency Fereidoun Abbasi as saying that Iran had not been convinced of the need to inspect the Parchin site, adding that "no documents or reason has been presented to us" to persuade Tehran otherwise. According to the Iranian nuclear chief, the UN's nuclear watchdog "is interested in visiting Parchin due to pressure from countries that want the agency to investigate the issue," reiterating Iran's refusal to stop enrichment: "We do not ask for permission from anyone to meet our country’s demands.”
“It would be better for them to negotiate with our country with regards to obtaining fuel and not ask us to stop producing fuel,” Abbasi added.
"There is no reason for us to give up enriching uranium to 20 percent because we produce this fuel only to meet our needs, no more and no less," He said.
Abbasi's remarks were made the U.S. Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) claimed that Iran has significantly stepped up its output of low-enriched uranium and total production in the last five years would be enough for at least five nuclear weapons if refined much further.

Iraq: A satellite state of Iran?
by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
The Jerusalem Post
May 30, 2012
http://www.meforum.org/3253/iraq-satellite-state-iran
How much influence does Iran wield in Iraq? This question has long been a matter of debate and in light of the US troop withdrawal has become all the more relevant, especially with rumors of Iranian plans to have Mahmud Shahrudi, who is an Iraqi-born member of Iran's Guardian Council and advocates clerical involvement in government, succeed the quietist Ali al-Sistani in Najaf.
Unfortunately, partisan politics on the left and right have precluded serious analysis on the subject.
In any event, we can begin by noting that Iraq has close economic ties with Iran. According to the Iranian ambassador to Baghdad, quoted in a report by the Tehran Times, trade transactions between the two countries over the past Iranian calendar year (ending on 19th March 2012) amounted to more than $11 billion.
He also noted that around 1.2 million Iranian pilgrims visited the Shi'a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in that same year. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, a lifting on import tariffs by the Coalition Provisional Authority led to an influx of cheap goods from Iran, and shopkeepers in Karbala have not been unaware of the increase of Iranian products on sale in their stores.
Nor is there a shortage of signs in Farsi advertising accommodation for pilgrims, and many Iraqis in the city have now learnt the Persian language. Unsurprisingly, these developments have provoked suspicions of Iranian cultural infiltration.
When there was a US troop presence in Iraq, Tehran provided backing for small Shi'a militant organizations known as the "Special Groups." These militias came into increasing conflict with the central government as the sectarian civil war began to subside in 2007-8.
Nonetheless, after the American withdrawal, the Special Groups have had no casus belli, and so it is that they have either disbanded or turned to the political process.
A case-in-point is the League of the Righteous, led by Qais Khazali, who is at odds with Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers that comprise an important part of the ruling coalition. By backing the groups that can give rise to internal Shi'a rivalries, Iran can increase its own influence by playing a role as mediator, adviser and kingmaker.
Linked to this point is the fact that in the aftermath of the 2010 elections, which entailed a prolonged stalemate among Iraq's political factions, the Sadrists and the strongly pro-Iranian Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq [ISCI] eventually joined the current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law bloc on Iran's advice.
Thus, it cannot be denied that the Iranian influence exists economically and politically.
Oddly enough, both the US and Iran backed Maliki for a second term as prime minister following the 2010 elections, but of the two countries, it was Iran that showed a degree of influence on the political process in advising the Sadrists and ISCI to unite with Maliki. The US in contrast had no role in suggesting or facilitating coalition-shuffling.
Yet it does not follow that the Iraqi government simply subordinates what it perceives to be its own interests to those of Iran. Iraq is still a leading customer for US arms, despite Iranian disapproval, and will probably remain so over the coming years.
It is also notable that the negotiations over the question of an extension of the US troop presence were conducted in such a way as to exclude the Sadrists from the Iraqi government's decision-making.
The reason the discussions broke down was because of a universal consensus among Iraq's political factions that no legal immunity could be granted to US troops; otherwise all agreed on a postponement of the withdrawal deadline. The voices of pro-Iranian factions were completely irrelevant.
Further, while the Iraqi government has generally not come out in support of the Syrian uprising (with the Sadrists declaring Bashar Assad to be a "brother" solely by virtue of his supposed Shi'a identity), it is not necessarily the case that this stance is due to Iranian influence, for it is clear that the Iraqi government is also keen to avoid actively aiding the Assad regime, as evinced by Baghdad's warning to Tehran in March that it would not permit arms shipments to Syria to pass through its territory or airspace.
This announcement came partly in response to American concerns that Iraq was in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1747 that bans arms exports from Iran.
What then of the rumors that Iran is aiming to have Shahrudi succeed Sistani in Najaf? If this were to happen, it would indeed have a profound impact on Iraqi politics, shifting the country towards a much more decisively pro-Iranian alignment.
Nevertheless, there are numerous obstacles that render the prospect of Shahrudi acquiring a position of dominance in Najaf unlikely, primarily because such a move would probably encounter stringent opposition from the Dawa party that is led by Nouri al-Maliki and is the most powerful Shi'a political faction in Iraq (far more so than either the Sadrists or the ISCI).
The Dawa party, unlike the Sadrists or ISCI but in keeping with the consensus in Najaf that itself hinders the possibility of a Shahrudi takeover, has generally not embraced Khomeini's doctrine of velayat-efaqih (governance of the jurist).
Besides, al-Maliki and his bloc, whose greatest concern has always been consolidation of their own power base, are aware of Sunni Arab and Kurdish anxieties about shifting towards an Iranian model of government, and accordingly, as analyst Reidar Visser notes, have been working with al-Iraqiya – the main opposition bloc – and the Kurds to block attempts by ISCI and the Islamic Virtue Party – a branch of the Sadrist movement – to introduce clerical veto in Iraqi law, such as is practiced in Iran.
In short, Iraq is not a satellite state of Iran. In general, the Iraqi government thinks it is in its best interests to maintain good relations with both Iran and the United States. Although Iranian influence in the country is undoubtedly present economically and politically, it does not follow that Iraq complies with Tehran's wishes.
When it comes to Iraqi politics, what matter more than any foreign influence are the rivalries between and within the various factions, often entailing personal power struggles going back many years.
In the end, the formation of the current Iraqi government as per the Arbil compromise struck by Massoud Barzani had nothing to do with the US or Iran, but was rather rooted in the problem of the personal animosity between Maliki and Ayad Allawi, who is leader of the opposition bloc but like Maliki a Shi'ite and has many Shi'a groups in his bloc such as the White Iraqi National Movement.
*Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an adjunct fellow at Daniel Pipes' Middle East Forum.

Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan
irantracker.org
By Frederick W. Kagan, Ahmad Majidyar, Danielle Pletka, Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
May 23, 2012
This report is a product of the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War. It expands and builds on the 2008 report on Iranian influence.
Executive Summary
Since 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to pursue a coordinated soft-power strategy throughout its sphere of influence, using political, economic, and military tools to promote its agenda. Unlike the period of the early 2000s, however, Iran’s payoff for that strategy is in doubt. The Arab Spring has presented Tehran with new opportunities but also new challenges in the Middle East. In general, it has brought a growing Sunni-Shi’a sectarian tinge to regional conflict, and Iran finds itself on the wrong side of that fight in most countries in the region. As that sectarian conflict spreads, Iran will have more difficulty presenting itself as a pan-Islamist regional leader—and Saudi Arabia, and possibly Turkey, likely will emerge as the obvious and natural Sunni Arab resistance to the Persian Shi’a.
As long as Bashar al Assad remains in Damascus, the Syrian alliance with Tehran is likely to remain strong. Should the predominantly Sunni insurgency oust Assad and take power in some form, however, the Iran-Syria relationship would very likely fracture. However, the depth of that relationship would make unwinding it no easy matter for Syria and those states that support its new rulers. Understanding the full scope and scale of the Tehran-Damascus alliance will be essential for policymakers regardless of the outcome of the current Syrian insurgency.
The ascension of Hezbollah to a position of dominance in Lebanese politics in 2011 has allowed Tehran to establish much more direct relationships in Beirut without the mediation of Syria. This development could not have come at a better time for Iran, as it suggests that Iran’s interests in the Levant can be protected and advanced even with a greatly weakened Syrian regime.
Of all Iran’s proxy relationships in the region, its entente with Hamas is likely to be the most difficult to retain in the face of growing sectarianism in Iraq, Syria, and the Persian Gulf. A formal split with Iran and the loss of Hamas headquarters in Damascus in early 2012 promises more turmoil for both Hamas and the Palestinians it governs. Overall, Iranian support to regional allied and proxy militaries, however, has remained very strong and quite possibly has increased.
The revolution in Egypt has thus far delivered little by way of practical results for Tehran. Cairo, likely under some additional pressure from the Persian Gulf states and from Washington, DC, has made only miniscule steps in the direction of renewed relations with Iran.
In Iraq, Tehran’s policies have been largely successful, giving Iran an unprecedented degree of influence there at the expense of the United States and of Baghdad’s Arab neighbors. A friendly Iraq is not only an important part of the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” but also serves as an opportunity for Iran to evade the increasingly harsh international sanctions regime and to continue financing regional groups.
Iranian efforts to influence events in Afghanistan have been largely unsuccessful, as Afghan president Hamid Karzai pursues a strategic partnership with the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) despite Iranian pressure not to do so. Although ideologically opposed to the Taliban, Tehran continues to provide calculated support to the radical Sunni movement as a way to accelerate the withdrawal of US forces from its eastern neighbor.
We began our study of Iran’s regional influence in 2007 because we saw an emerging Iranian strategy to apply both hard- and soft-power tools to improve and consolidate Tehran’s position in the region. The pattern of Iranian economic, social, political, and diplomatic activity seemed to possess a unity that US policy—stove-piped into separate US concerns such as the war in Iraq, the Israel-Palestinian peace process, the Iranian nuclear program, and, subsequently, the Arab Spring—often seemed to miss. This study makes clear that Iran does, indeed, pursue such a coherent smart-power approach to the region, although not always with success.
Nothing about the ongoing struggle in the region is inevitable. The most important conclusion this study can offer is the growing importance of evaluating Iranian strategy in any one area within the context of Iranian strategy as a whole. One of the greatest mistakes the United States can make is to imagine that Iranian activities in a given arena—the nuclear program, for example—are isolated from Iranian undertakings in another.
The United States and its allies and partners in the region and beyond must not only understand Iran’s regional strategy and influence but also develop a coherent strategy of their own with which to confront them. Considering the relative economic, political, and diplomatic power of the two sides, it is simply unacceptable for the United States and its allies to allow Iran even such progress as it has made in these realms. To the extent that soft power can substitute for or enhance and support the effectiveness of hard power, developing a coherent influence strategy for the Middle East is imperative for US national security. Click on the below link to read the full report
http://www.irantracker.org/sites/default/files/imce-images/IranianInfluenceLevantEgyptIraqAfghanistan.pdf

Assad's Response to the Annan Plan: Violence as Usual
Jeffrey White /Washington Institute
May 29, 2012
In light of the Houla tragedy and other indicators of growing violence, the UN observer mission in Syria will likely be withdrawn, spurring the regime to escalate its offensive operations even further.
The massacre of over 100 civilians in Houla last Friday has focused attention on the Syrian regime's conduct during the ceasefire brokered by UN envoy Kofi Annan. President Bashar al-Assad agreed to Annan's overall plan, but since its "implementation" on April 12, his forces have systematically ignored its provisions, which include a ceasefire, suspension of troop movements toward population centers, withdrawal of forces from these areas, and a ban on using heavy weapons against them. Instead, the regime is increasing its violent campaign against the opposition -- actions such as armored raids on centers of resistance, violent suppression of demonstrations, and bombardment of civilian areas with artillery and attack helicopters were on the rise before last week's massacre and have shown no sign of slackening since.
Thus, while the Houla attack was unusual in the number killed, it was standard operating procedure for Assad's forces. The regime has essentially reverted to its preceasefire behavior, and the several hundred UN monitors on the ground are little more than a speed bump for violence against the people.
Military Operations
The regime has continued military operations throughout much of the country during the so-called ceasefire, though with special emphasis on the traditionally restive provinces of Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Deraa, Rif Dimashq, and Deir al-Zour. Its tactics have included the following:
Attempts to eliminate areas of rebel control (e.g., Rastan and parts of Idlib and Aleppo provinces) and destroy Free Syrian Army (FSA) formations there.
Attempts to isolate centers of opposition/resistance by cutting essential services (water, power, and communications), severing road access, establishing fire bases from which to bombard these areas, and other methods.
Bombardment of civilian areas, including Rastan, Hama, Homs, Khan Sheikon, Jisr al-Shughour, and multiple parts of Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, and Deraa provinces.
Attempts to choke off smuggling routes and illegal crossing points along the border with Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, producing clashes with FSA elements and smugglers as well as incidents of cross-border fire.
Efforts to reassert control of contested areas through large deployments of regular, irregular (shabbiha), and security forces (intelligence, police) and the establishment of fixed and mobile checkpoints.
Regime operations have relied on the use of heavy weapons within and against urban areas. The presence and use of tanks (T-72, T-62, T-55), BMP infantry fighting vehicles, mortars, and artillery in and around cities has been well documented since the Annan plan went into effect, with the regime modulating their employment to reduce their exposure to observation. In particular, it has avoided using heavy weapons when UN monitors are present, holding fire when they arrive and resuming when they depart. This tactic has been seen most recently in Rastan, where the government is trying to break rebel control with a combination of siege, bombardment, and direct assault.
The regime has also reportedly increased its use of combat aircraft in the past two weeks. Attack helicopters in particular have been firing on towns and rural areas, especially in Idlib and Aleppo provinces, but also in Latakia province. For example, opposition sources claim that more than fifty helicopter-fired "missiles" (probably rockets) hit farms in the Jebel Zawiya area on May 23.
The regime has accompanied these operations with a deception campaign aimed at reducing the visibility of its forces and confusing observers about their activities. To evade direct observation, it has disguised personnel and vehicles as police or paramilitary forces and hidden heavy weapons behind walls, berms, and overhead cover. It has also conducted operations away from UN monitors. When observers have discovered heavy weapons, the regime has sometimes attempted to portray them as ambulances, as disarmed systems, or as "not heavy."
Suppression of Dissent
The regime routinely employs a range of violent measures to intimidate the opposition, break strikes, deter/disperse demonstrations, and disrupt the organizational and support base of the armed and unarmed resistance. These measures include: indiscriminate fire on civilians from checkpoints and snipers; disruption of protests using live fire, tear gas, and physical assault; breaking strikes by forcibly opening closed shops, looting them, and beating their owners and employees; and systematic attacks on medical personnel and facilities that provide care to possible rebels. The regime has also attempted to prevent opposition supporters from meeting with UN personnel; when such meetings do occur, it has sometimes retaliated with shelling and arrests.
Arrests and detentions are widespread as well, with sweeps, raids, and targeted arrests a daily occurrence. In some cases the regime has detained and threatened relatives or associates of known opposition figures in order to compel wanted individuals to turn themselves in. Torture of detainees has also been well documented.
In addition, the government is increasingly employing scorched-earth operations in areas of dissent, such as burning and looting homes and businesses, torching farmlands and olive orchards, and killing livestock. These and other repressive actions do not draw the same attention as some of the larger-scale military operations, but they are part and parcel of the regime's violent response to the rebellion.
Information Operations
The regime has sought to impose its narrative on the situation -- namely, that it enjoys the support of the people, that it is fighting "armed terrorists" supported by Western and jihadist agents, and that Syria's minorities are at risk. Toward this end, it has publicly exploited the major terrorist-type attacks seen in Damascus and Aleppo in order to smear the opposition. It has also conducted a farcical parliamentary election to "prove" that the people back the government. And in the case of the Houla massacre and other incidents, it has sought to justify its military and security operations by depicting the armed opposition as the primary cause of violence. Damascus has been aided in these efforts by allies Russia, Iran, and Hizballah, who typically repeat the regime's propaganda line.
Implications
As the Houla tragedy makes clear, the Assad regime is prepared to use whatever violence it deems necessary to suppress the opposition, and the UN mission has not fundamentally changed the military dynamics of the situation. Damascus clearly views the UN monitors as simply one more tactical obstacle to be circumvented as it works to break the revolt. The armed opposition has responded accordingly, with clashes between regime and FSA units on the rise and now approaching the levels of early April. The rebels are specifically tying their actions to regime attacks, including Friday's massacre.
Going forward, the regime will likely escalate its military action even further. Since the Annan plan came into force, Assad's forces have been killing forty or more people daily, according to data from the opposition's Local Coordination Committees and the Syrian Revolution Martyr Database. Although this is a substantial reduction from the estimated ninety deaths per day before the ceasefire, when the regime was pressing a broad offensive against the opposition, it demonstrates Assad's continuing use of violence on a large scale. Armed rebels contribute to the violence, but the regime and its forces are the mainspring of the killing.
As a result, the Annan plan will likely be rendered meaningless by increasing casualties, and the observers withdrawn. Once that happens, the regime will almost certainly escalate its offensive operations, resulting in even greater casualties. The names of other massacres will probably be added to that of Houla.
*Jeffrey White, a former senior defense intelligence officer, is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of the Levant and Iran.


Egypt’s choice: The lesser of two evils
Hussein Ibish, May 30, 2012 /Now Lebanon
Muslim Brotherhood presidential candidate, Mohammed Mursi (L) and former prime minister and presidential candidate, Ahmed Shafiq (R), will face each other in a runoff election in June. (AFP Photo)
It may have been a real blessing in disguise for Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq to have been excluded from the TV debate between then-apparently leading candidates Amr Moussa and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh.
There are a number of plausible reasons that the highly uncharismatic establishment candidates Morsi and Shafiq demolished these relatively more charismatic and individual politicians. But it could also well have been a factor that Moussa and Aboul Fotouh did each other in by relentlessly making powerful accusations neither was able to successfully refute: that while they pretended to have moved beyond their prior associations and to represent something “new,” in fact Moussa was still nothing more than a remnant of the overthrown regime of President Hosni Mubarak while Aboul Fotouh was not only an Islamist, but a de facto part of the Muslim Brotherhood.
If Moussa and Aboul Fotouh successfully exposed each other as simply “light” or “stealth” versions of the felloul and the Brotherhood respectively, why not go for the real thing? In the event, that's exactly what the public did, preferring overt representatives of the former government and the traditional opposition, in almost equal numbers.
Many of the Egyptian revolutionaries instrumental in bringing down the former regime are understandably distraught. Indeed, they're faced with an impossible choice: the representative of everything they hate from the past and everything they fear about the future.
Typically in elections, most ballots are cast more against a given party or candidate than for one. But the coming Egyptian second round election will be almost entirely a question of which of these two unpalatable options most Egyptians find least disturbing.
Few are going to vote for Shafiq based on his “stability” and “experience” arguments; they'll be rallying around him as the only way to avoid a completely Islamist-dominated elected government.
Morsi's 25 percent win in the first round probably demonstrates the outer limits of the Brotherhood's present ability to secure enthusiastic votes. If he is able to create a broader coalition to win the second round, it will certainly be based on the idea that even Egyptians who are otherwise highly uncomfortable with the idea of an Islamist government should prefer such an experiment to a return to anything directly related to the former regime.
The Brotherhood is going to have to maneuver extremely quickly, and radically alter its tone, if it's going to be able to reach out to a broad enough coalition before the second round. If they can, this might prove a humbling and moderating experience, but suspicions about their long-term intentions will, and should, linger.
Shafiq has two built-in advantages. First, any impulse to have a divided government with different political forces in control of the parliament and presidency that can check and balance each other defaults to him. Second, any widespread boycott of the election based on the idea that both candidates represent intolerable positions is more likely to pull potential votes away from Morsi.
Indeed, it is almost certainly going to be the key to a Muslim Brotherhood victory to prevent secularists, non-Islamists, and others who would never vote for a representative of the former regime from simply staying home. If there is a widespread boycott, Shafiq's chances will be greatly enhanced, though if he wins, many will allege fraud by the ruling military government.
But if Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood are able to win by creating a broad enough coalition on the grounds that any other vote would be a final and irreversible "defeat for the revolution," this sets up a very serious potential political crisis for the country. The constitution-redrafting process is at a total impasse and there is no mechanism currently in place for moving forward with it. If Muslim Brotherhood candidates dominate parliament and hold the presidency, there is a very real question about how the military will react.
Already in a series of edicts, decrees, extraconstitutional “principles” and other documents issued by the military leadership, powers of both the presidency and the parliament have supposedly been transferred to the military. Under these documents, the military would have control of its own budget, final say on national defense issues and numerous other extraordinary prerogatives.
It’s likely that efforts by the military to secure its own powers in independent structures parallel to those to be determined by democratic elections would intensify in the event of a Morsi victory. In other words, it's hard to imagine the military simply walking away and handing the keys to the kingdom over entirely to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Under such circumstances, especially with no clear process under way for creating a new constitution, the military and the Brotherhood will have to either craft a deal neither of them is at all comfortable with, or begin what is likely to be a bitter, dangerous and prolonged power struggle.
*Hussein Ibish writes frequently about Middle Eastern affairs for numerous publications in the United States and the Arab world. He blogs at www.Ibishblog.com.