Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for November 21/12
Clinton arrives in Cairo for Gaza truce talks  
After West Bank, Clinton back in Jerusalem
Terror attack on Tel Aviv bus injures 23 people
At least 25 injured, 5 seriously, in Tel Aviv bus bombing. Alert for more attacks
For Israel, a truce is the worst of all worlds: Tied hands, Hamas unbowed
Gazans fire 62 rockets at South, 20 intercepted
Diplomatic effort yet to yield results on cease-fire
Gazan gunmen execute alleged collaborators
Iran sent military aid to Hamas: parliament speaker
White House condemns 'terrorist' bus bombing in Tel Abib
Is there a connection between the Gaza events, Hamas and al-Assad?
Gaza fighting rages as truce remains elusive
In Gaza conflict, Hezbollah stays on sidelines
Iran Sent Military Aid to Hamas
Report: Gemayel Launches Initiative in Coordination with Suleiman
Jumblat Continues Efforts to End Political Crisis, Seeks Consensus among Foes
March 14 Warns against Opening Southern Lebanon Front
Abductors Release Lebanese Teenager in Syria after Ransom Paid
Palestinians in south Lebanon celebrate Tel Aviv bus blast
Safadi says new Cabinet requires political consensus
Lebanese University elections postponed
Mansour first Lebanese official to visit Gaza
Mikati willing to resign if it resolves crisis
Ghosn warns against attempts to endanger stability
Safadi sees economy growing 1-1.5 pct in 2012
Eurozone fails to reach deal on Greece aid

At least 25 injured, 5 seriously, in Tel Aviv bus bombing. Alert for more attacks
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report November 21, 2012/Magen David declared a multi-casualty episode following a bombing attack on a bus in the Tel Aviv main street of Shaul Hamelekh Blvd. Wednesday, Nov. 21, in which at least 25 people were injured, five seriously. An emergency has been declared in the area around the blast, focusing on the nearby Defense Ministry and ID General Staff headquarters and Ichilov hospital, where the staff were sent to bomb shelters. Tel Aviv’s huge Mercaz Azrieli mall, office and apartment building has just been closed and evacuated. A witness of the bus bombing reported a man placing a package on one of the seats and exiting the bus. Another claimed the package was thrown into the bus through a window. A large dragnet, backed by helicopters, has been thrown around the area for suspects and abettors. The attack took place as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was closeted in Jerusalem for her second meeting with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders to discuss the stalled Gaza ceasefire talks in cairo. debkafile: The Tel Aviv bus attack, recalling the 2000 Palestinian suicide bombing offensive plaguing Israel streets, could prompt an early Israeli decision to go forward with the IDF ground operation against Gaza terrorists. Police have been on alert for terrorist attacks since last week when Hamas and Jihad Islami threatened to revert to their suicide bombing campaign inside Israeli towns.

For Israel, a truce is the worst of all worlds: Tied hands, Hamas unbowed
DEBKAfile Exclusive Analysis November 20, 2012/Jerusalem, Cairo and Gaza were all waiting for US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to arrive Tuesday night, Nov. 20, for tying up the ends of a Gaza ceasefire accord. Until then, Israel held back from its approval and the Palestinians were hurling as many deadly missiles as they could.
debkafile’s analysts say that by giving in to international pressure for a ceasefire, Israel’s leaders Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman would show they have failed to learn from their predecessors’ mistakes in ending the last two wars against terrorists inconclusively and prematurely.
After those wars, Israeli civilians were again thrust into the front line against missiles. In 2006, it was the population of northern Israel; in 2012, a million people living in southern Israel are in this intolerable predicament. And after Hamas’s rockets reached Tel Aviv and Jerusalem for this first time in this round of Palestinian missile aggression, the next round will no doubt spill over into the central Israeli heartland as well.
Tens of thousands of soldiers and reservists were meanwhile held on the Gaza border in suspense for a ground incursion. They stood there and watched as the missiles flew over their heads to explode in their towns and villages and in Cairo, the politicians wrangled over an early ceasefire.
Operation Pillar of Cloud was kicked off Nov. 14 with the targeted assassination of one of Israel’s most implacable enemies, Ahmed Jabari, commander of the Hama military wing, amid high hopes that this time it would be different. They were heartened by the IDF’s recovery of its legendary speed, precision and inventiveness and trusted the troops to finish the job left undone by Cast Lead in 2008.
Israel’s political and military leaders fervently vowed not to stop until lost deterrence was regained, Palestinian missile and terror capabilities were degraded and the people of the south could at last lead normal lives.
Hamas and Jihad Islami were caught off-balance by the loss of the Hamas commander in chief and the highly successful air operation which followed. But instead of seizing this moment for rapid in-and-out, lightning ground incursions against well-defined targets, the three Israeli ministers paused.
The chance then passed into the hands of the terrorists who used it to send their Iran-made missiles against Greater Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. At that instant, they multiplied their million targets to five.
Israel responded by calling up 75,000 IDF reserves and pouring 68,000 troops onto jumping-off stations along the Gaza border ready for an incursion.. One lesson was drawn from the 2006 conflict against the Lebanese Hizballah: Missiles cannot be stopped by air strikes.
The IDF spokesman Brig. Yoav Mordecai then started releasing upbeat televised communiqués announcing that the air offensive had so far deqraded 30, 40, 50 percent of the Palestinian missile capacity. However, as he spoke, Hamas somehow managed to expand the radius and intensity of its missile blitz until, finally Tuesday, on Day 7 of the Israeli operation, they landed two massive salvoes of 16 Grad missiles each on Beersheba’s quarter of a million inhabitants.
By then, the military had sensed that the three ministers running the operation were dithering between embarking on a ground operation to finish what they started and giving in to the mounting international pressure to accept a profitless ceasefire.
With US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton due to land in Israel Tuesday night, it was clear they had missed the boat for independent decision-making.
The Israeli public was informed by the media that the negotiations for a truce with Hamas and Jihad Islami led by Egypt were heavy going but approaching an announcement.
debkafile traces the progress of the negotiating process in Cairo, stage by stage:
1. From Friday, Nov. 16, two days into the Gaza operation, the three Israeli ministers at the helm bowed to President Barack Obama’s repeated requests every few hours for yet another 24 hours' grace for Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan and Qatar Emir al-Thani to conclude their bid for a ceasefire.
2. Saturday, Nov. 17, the IDF units mustered on the Gaza border received orders to go in. Some notified their families by text messages. Less than an hour later, the order was cancelled and they were pulled back after another phone call was received in Jerusalem from President Obama.
3. By then, it was too late for Israel’s leaders to correct their worst strategic mistake. They had gone along with Obama’s devolution of the ceasefire brokerage effort on three avowed foes of the Jewish state: Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood; Erdogan who keeps on slamming Israel as “a terrorist state;” and the Qatari ruler, who is bankrolling Hamas’s purchases of sophisticated weapons smuggled out of Libya.
The “truce brokers” prevented Israel from taking its place at the table. The Israeli delegation sent to Cairo was confined to exchanges though Egyptian intelligence officers, while at the same time forced to accept Hamas and Jihad Islami as negotiating partners.
4. When they saw tens of thousands of IDF reservists standing idle on the Gaza border, Hamas and Jihad Islami strategists concluded that, while they may have lost the opening round of the war, they had gained enough momentum to make up for it in the days that followed.
5. Building up their stake for the endgame, the two terrorist organizations intensified their missile blitz on Israel and raised their terms for a ceasefire. Meanwhile, international pressure from Western leaders on Jerusalem to step back from a ground operation was crushing.
By Tuesday, Netanyahu was willing to assure visiting German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle: “I would prefer this to end with a diplomatic solution. I hope we can achieve one, but if not, we are fully entitled to defend ourselves by other means and we shall use them.”
The Prime minister had also come around to accepting Egypt’s role in monitoring and managing the proposed ceasefire and providing guarantees for its implementation.
Netanyahu, Barak and Lieberman gave there consent to this arrangement in the face of strong objections from top military commanders and intelligence pros. The latter argued that, even with the best will in the world, the Muslim Brotherhood rulers of Egypt were not up to the task.
6. The clincher was the news that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had left the Obama party touring the Far East and was on her way to Jerusalem and Cairo Tuesday night to tie up the last ends of an accord to stop the fighting in Gaza.
The issue had acquired ramifications which transcend the embattled Palestinian enclave: For Washington, Morsi’s acceptance of a key role in the execution of the truce would signify that Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood had after all chosen to join the US-Israel orbit in preference to the radical Middle East camp - albeit without fanfare for fear of embarrassment at home and in the inter-Arab arena.
The Obama administration expects Israel to go along with this perception.
debkafile’s sources report that this is a dangerous illusion because, in the first place, it does not truly represent the intentions or orientation of the Egyptian president or the Muslim Brotherhood. In the second, it flies in the face of ten years of experience.
Even when Hosni Mubarak, a far more pro-Western figure, ruled Egypt, Cairo never upheld a single security accord negotiated with Israel for the Gaza Strip or Sinai and sponsored by Washington. Why would the Muslim Brothers behave any differently?
But even if Cairo does take charge of the ceasefire deal, it would put Israel in the invidious position of having to run to the Egyptians to complain about every Hamas violation, helpless to do anything about the smuggling into the Gaza Strip of fresh and better munitions with more powerful multiple warheads, or stop the groundwork being laid for the next Palestinian blitz.
The boast by government sources that the first missile fired from Gaza in violation of the truce would be met with an extra-powerful response unfortunately recalls the pledge of a former prime minister Ariel Sharon. After he disengaged Israel from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and pulled out every last civilian and soldier, Sharon declard that the first bullet fired from the Gaza Strip would be met with a powerful response.
Since then, the bullet has evolved into a missile… and is still growing.

How To Defuse the Israel-Gaza Conflict: Cairo's Crucial Role
David Makovsky/New York Times
November 20, 2012
The New York Times convened an online panel of five Middle East experts to discuss diplomatic efforts to end the deadly confrontation between Israel and Palestinian militants in Gaza. The following contribution was made by Washington Institute Ziegler distinguished fellow David Makovsky, director of the Institute's Project on the Middle East Peace Process.
As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton begins her Middle East visit today, she will undoubtedly discover that cease-fires do not come in only one shape or size.
It seems likely that the parties now will favor a "less for less" approach. As it is just two months before his own re-election, Benjamin Netanyahu could herald Israel's successful elimination of Hamas operations chief Ahmed Jabari as well as Israeli success in targeting all known long-range Fajr-5 rockets.
For its part, Hamas will herald the fact that its rockets achieved farther range than ever before, reaching into both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
Finally, as the broker of any deal, Egyptian leader Mohammad Morsi will enjoy some short-term plaudits before his upcoming maiden voyage to Washington. With everyone wondering about the direction of the new Egyptian government, Morsi can promote his part in the cease-fire negotiations to show Americans that he is part of the solution and not part of the problem.
Notwithstanding the short-term gains a limited cease-fire brings to the parties, a "more for more" cease-fire would be intriguing. Since those negotiations are invariably protracted, it is probably only attainable as a "stage two." However, being on the ground with Israelis and Palestinians during this crisis has reinforced my belief that a broader cease-fire may have better chance not to be violated. But this requires each side to do more. For Egypt, "more" means undercutting the prospect of Gaza violence reoccurring in the future. The main step would involve the shutting down of a network of tunnels from Sinai into Gaza, where rockets are smuggled. Their sustained actions is the one thing that could enforce the deal. So long as Egypt does not act, Israel is likely to believe the cease-fire is temporary as the stockpiles will be replenished.
Egypt has leverage with Hamas. The Egyptian president was successful this past summer when 16 Egyptian soldiers were killed by jihadi forces in the northern Sinai, and Morsi demanded that Hamas shut down its smuggling network of tunnels. The Gaza group sees its future linked to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood.
Furthermore, Cairo itself could enable regular political contacts with Israel apart from the existing intelligence channel. This is the first time since their bilateral peace treaty of 1979 that there have been absolutely no high-level political contacts between Egypt and Israel.
For its part in the cease-fire, Hamas will undoubtedly ask Cairo to open up the Rafah crossing point between Egypt and Gaza. Egypt has been wary of this -- not wanting more Palestinians or Palestinian goods in Egypt, and worrying that it will lead to a certain blurring of functions whereby Egypt will somehow be sucked into the Gaza vortex. Yet, the opening would also allow Egypt more leverage over Hamas, giving Hamas something to lose.
As part of a wider deal, Israel will want to know if Hamas has been successful in acting against jihadi groups that can inflame the region at will by firing rockets at Israeli cities. However, in return, Hamas may be well positioned to extract economic and other concessions from Israel to ease various restrictions on Gaza.
Of course, even a broader cease-fire is not an enduring solution since there is no three state solution. Without a wider peace effort involving Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, a cease-fire has its limitations. Taken together, a less for less approach might be more politically feasible. However, either now or later, the U.S. will find a broader cease-fire has at least the potential of avoiding further rounds of violence.

Palestinian Media on Gaza: Contrasting the PA and Hamas
David Pollock/Washington Institute
November 20, 2012
In contrast to the more measured tone of Palestinian media coverage of the Gaza conflict in the West Bank, Hamas-controlled media are relentlessly inciting violence, indulging in venomous hate speech, and gloating about imaginary hits on Israeli civilian targets.
Analysis of Palestinian media over the past week of fighting in Gaza shows a vast difference between Palestinian Authority and Hamas coverage. In the West Bank, print and broadcast media controlled or influenced by the PA are emphasizing Palestinian suffering, but generally avoiding hate speech, calls to arms, or boasting about damage to Israel. In Gaza, by contrast, Hamas media are relentlessly inciting violence, indulging in venomous hate speech, and gloating about imaginary hits on Israeli civilian targets.
The official PA newspaper, al-Hayat al-Jadidah, consistently refers to the late Hamas commander Ahmed Jabari and other Palestinian casualties, both military and civilian, as "martyrs." It does not, however, feature demands for retaliation. On the contrary, it has highlighted diplomacy and other nonviolent reactions, such as President Mahmoud Abbas's intention to request upgraded status at the UN General Assembly on November 29, his call for "peaceful resistance" to occupation, and PA humanitarian aid shipments to Gaza. The paper even carried an online poll about whether there should be "continued negotiations during the current political climate" (59 percent answered "no") rather than questions about rockets or suicide bombings.
Also conspicuous by their near-absence from PA media are boasts or even factual reports about Hamas rockets landing in Israel. This stands in stark contrast to non-PA reports from the streets of Ramallah, where new songs calling for rockets to "hit Tel Aviv" have become popular. In fact, PA media tend to refer only sparingly to Hamas at all. When they do, it is most often in the context of general calls for Palestinian unity in confronting the current crisis.
Independent West Bank media, including al-Quds newspaper and television and al-Ayyam newspaper, are following a similar line. For example, al-Quds TV carried a live report of a Ramallah demonstration in which Fatah's Jibril Rajoub and a local Hamas official called for Palestinian unity in the face of "Israeli aggression." But during the entire week of combat, only one monitored op-ed in any West Bank newspaper -- by Adli Sadiq, in al-Hayat al-Jadidah -- used full-fledged hate speech about Israelis, calling them "snakes" who are "hungry for blood."
The opposite is true of Hamas media in Gaza. The group's official al-Aqsa television channel and website are replete with violent images and exhortations to martyrdom, including explicit advocacy of terrorizing, killing, and dismembering "Zionists," whether soldiers or civilians. For example, on November 16, the channel carried a video declaring, "Oh occupier, we are coming toward you. Leave our land. All of Palestine is ours. There is nothing here for you but death...You will end as body parts. That is Allah's promise." Two days later, it broadcast statements such as "We have longed for the suicide attacks. Expect us soon at bus stations and cafes," and "The Qassam brigades love death more than you love life."
Al-Aqsa also features constant claims -- some true, some fabricated -- about Hamas hitting Israeli civilian targets. On November 15, for instance, the channel asserted that "the electricity network in the southern part of [Tel Aviv] was hit" by a "locally made" Hamas rocket. On November 18, it claimed that Ben Gurion Airport was closed, with "planes being redirected to a secret base in the north."
A new twist in Hamas media, reminiscent of past Hizballah campaigns, is showing scare messages in Hebrew about "getting you in your sleep" and "waiting graves." The impact, if any, is probably reduced by various linguistic errors that have already provided fodder for Israeli parodies on YouTube.
More substantively, the group's media and spokesmen are mostly avoiding talk of Palestinian unity. Instead, they have emphasized -- as Hamas leader Khaled Mashal put it during a November 19 press conference -- wider claims of support from "the entire Islamic umma," explicitly including Iran. When they mention the PA at all, it is usually to complain about continued harassment of Hamas supporters in the West Bank.
The past week's major differences between PA and Hamas media demonstrate two key yet often overlooked points at stake in this crisis. First, beyond the obvious conflict between Israel and Hamas, the latest developments are also part of a continuing contest between the PA and Hamas. Second, these rival Palestinian governments are vastly different: compare Hamas's viciously incendiary, relentlessly militaristic message with the PA's emphasis on political opposition to Israel, not violent confrontation.
For U.S. policy, one immediate objective should therefore be to help the PA emerge from this crisis with at least some of its eroding authority and image intact, as a counterweight to the endless terrorism and rejectionism of Hamas -- which is as pointless as it is popular in many other fundamentalist quarters. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's sudden trip to Ramallah is a good place to begin.
*David Pollock is the Kaufman fellow at The Washington Institute. He would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Katie Kiraly, Heba Dafashy, and Sonia Hinson.

Responding to Assad's Use of Airpower in Syria
Eddie Boxx and Jeffrey White/Washington Institute
November 20, 2012
Through innovative use of Patriot missile batteries and command-and-control aircraft, Washington and its allies could create a much-needed protective arc for Syrian civilians without having to penetrate the regime's still-formidable air defenses.
The Syrian air force continues to terrorize the civilian populace and slow the rebel advance. After twenty months of conflict and over 32,000 deaths, Bashar al-Assad has survived in part because of the regime's ability to strike anytime, anywhere from the air. In order to protect Syrians from this indiscriminate use of airpower, the international community should enact "airborne controlled" and "ground–based enforced" northern and southern safe zones.
BACKGROUND
Soon after the uprising began in March 2011, the regime adopted an aggressive approach involving tanks, infantry carriers, and artillery, but no aircraft. These forces were used to seal and storm cities such as Deraa and Latakia. In early June 2011, Assad responded aggressively in the northwestern town of Jisr al-Shughour after the regime lost 120 troops. And in January 2012, the regime initiated artillery operations across the country.
This escalation did not have the desired effect, however, and as the armed opposition became more proficient, the regime was forced to rely on its air force. In April, Assad reacted to unexpected rebel gains in Idlib and Aleppo by dispatching helicopters to engage "liberated" villages. By the end of May, as the opposition mounted offensives, the regime was consistently using helicopter gunships to make up for its reduced mobility, which the rebels had caused by interdicting lines of communication with roadside bombs and ambushes. This shift culminated in the July 12 massacre in Tremseh, a town of 7,000 that was bombed by helicopters and stormed by the regime's shabbiha irregulars.
BOMBING CIVILIANS AND REBEL RESPONSE
The Syrian air force targets civilians and has primarily employed its aircraft in a punitive and retaliatory manner rather than a tactical one. The majority of airstrikes have been against towns and neighborhoods where the rebels have gained control rather than specific rebel military targets.
One example of this mindset is the inception of "barrel bombs." The regime has used its Mi-8/17 helicopters to drop old storage tanks or sheet-metal cylinders packed with explosives and metal scrap on various communities; these bombs are simply pushed out the rear of the aircraft from high altitudes. Whether this approach is intended to maximize the multifunctionality of helicopters or save factory-grade munitions for use by attack jets, it has clearly been effective at terrorizing civilians.
In August, the regime also began to employ jets in strafing and bombing campaigns as battle lines in Aleppo city hardened and helicopter usage peaked. One explanation for this transition to fixed-wing aircraft could be the maintenance issues associated with operating some fifty helicopters. A more probable reason was the increased rebel air defense capability, which forced the regime to operate at higher altitudes.
Indeed, the main armed opposition, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), has responded to regime air power by engaging and downing limited numbers of aircraft and attacking airbases. Currently, rebel equipment is believed to include fifteen to twenty-five ZU-23 antiaircraft guns, two to five 57-millimeter towed air-defense artillery guns (or other types), and fifteen to thirty SA-7 man-portable air-defense systems (reports of SA-16s and SA-24s have emerged as well). In battle, the rebels have primarily relied on heavy guns like the ZU-23 and, on at least one occasion, a MANPAD. The FSA has reportedly shot down at least five rotary-wing and six fixed-wing aircraft, with at least seven video confirmations of their success. Uncorroborated FSA footage shows planes and helicopters being shot down and even captured fighter pilots and aircraft wreckage. Other reports place the number of aircraft kills higher, at nineteen, but FSA videos and claims are difficult to verify.
In order to reduce the airpower threat, FSA forces have also sought to overrun and harass regime airbases, including those at Abu Duhur, Minakh, Taftanaz, and al-Qusayr. Their objectives are twofold: to diminish the number of aircraft launching against them and take advantage of aircraft vulnerability during takeoffs and landings. Four of their successful aircraft engagements have occurred near bases.
STATUS OF THE SYRIAN AIR FORCE
Of the 600 aircraft in its total inventory, the regime likely has no more than 200 that are combat-capable (approximately 150 jets and 50 helicopters), and even those have varying degrees of effectiveness. Based on historical maintenance shortcomings and the current pace of operations, Assad is probably able to employ no more than 50 percent of these 200.
Although the air force might be reserving its higher-end MiG-25s and -29s and SU-24s in preparation for external intervention, it may simply be unable to use these air-to-air designs in air-to-ground roles. The MiG-25 -- known as a "flying ironing board" because it is intended for high-altitude intercepts, not low-level maneuvering -- is certainly not suited for air-to-ground operations. The regime may also be concerned about further defections. A MiG-21 pilot made a much-publicized defection to Jordan in June, and reports from inside the air force indicate that more fighter pilots would defect if given the chance. The Syrian air force was not prepared to fight an insurgency; it has long been focused on Israel. This may explain the surprising usage of L-39 Albatross trainer aircraft around Aleppo, which could stem from their lower incidence of maintenance problems compared to more-finicky MiGs, their better performance at lower altitudes and speed, or simply the fact that more pilots are proficient with trainer aircraft.
More broadly, the use of aircraft indicates the regime's waning ground offensive capabilities. Throughout the conflict, Damascus has relied on heavy weapons (field artillery, mortars, rockets) as the main engine of destruction and casualties, but it is increasingly turning to airpower to slow the FSA advance, as evidenced late last month during the proposed Eid al-Adha ceasefire. Rather than diminishing during that religious holiday, air attacks spiked significantly (e.g., over sixty airstrikes on October 29 alone, compared to the previous average of twenty to twenty-five per day).
SYRIAN AIR DEFENSES
At the beginning of the civil war, Syria's air defense network ranked among the most capable and dense in the world. Located primarily along the interior Damascus-Homs-Aleppo corridor and the Mediterranean coast, the overlapping coverage of missiles and radars consisted of approximately 650 static air-defense sites, the most potent of which was the SA-5 Gammon due to its range of 165 nautical miles and 100,000-foot altitude capability. Syrian platforms also included approximately 300 mobile air-defense systems, the most significant of which were the newer SA-11/17 and the highly capable anti-stealth and anti-cruise missile SA-22.
Yet Syria's Russian-made legacy systems have limitations. Turkey recently diverted a Russian jet bound for Syria that was reportedly carrying much-needed spare parts for the air-defense network. Also, NATO and Israeli air forces have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to penetrate and suppress these systems. And in recent months, the internal war has significantly degraded their effectiveness. As seen among ground combat forces, rampant absenteeism and defections have diminished the readiness of the regime's missile and radar systems. In addition, the FSA has captured SA-2 and SA-8 antiaircraft launchers and overrun SA-2 and SA-5 facilities. Toward the end of October, as rebels consolidated gains in the northern Idlib province, regime forces destroyed some surface-to-air missiles to prevent them from falling into rebel hands. Even so, the regime's air defenses remain formidable.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Because of its role in limiting the rebel advance, airpower is key to the Assad regime's survival. Ever since Damascus began responding with force against civilians, the FSA and other opposition elements have asked the international community to establish a no-fly zone and supply them with antiaircraft weapons. Despite the FSA's territorial gains, even a reduced regime air force has the ability to target any area at any time -- a situation that affects Syrians physically and, perhaps more important, psychologically. Although artillery has been responsible for the majority of civilian casualties, numerous atrocities (e.g., the thirteen-plus aerial bombings of bakeries as civilians stood in line for bread) illustrate the people's vulnerability to air attacks.
Crafting a viable U.S. and international response to this problem requires an innovative approach that does not entail large numbers of aircraft, personnel, and resources, such as the one used in Libya. It must be able to circumvent the degraded yet lethal Syrian air defenses while protecting civilians from air attacks.
One recently discussed option -- a creative, ground-based approach using Patriot missile batteries -- could work if integrated with three key U.S. aircraft: the E-3 AWACS, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and E-8 JSTARS. These airborne "eyes and ears," which were pivotal to the success of no-fly missions in Libya, Bosnia, and Iraq, would operate outside of Syrian air defense coverage. Patriot missile units placed in Turkey and Jordan could reach into Syria and give the FSA a protected arc some 40-50 miles from the borders. The FSA already controls most of the areas within this hypothetical arc, and the no-fly zone would be formed along currently defended boundaries where the opposition is most active. Admittedly, Patriots were originally intended for "point defense," not as no-fly enforcers. But if paired with the appropriate airborne command-and-control radar assets, the Patriot's fire-control radar and PAC-2 missiles would deter and perhaps even eliminate Syrian air attacks in the protected zone.
More specifically, based on mountainous terrain, altitude capabilities of regime aircraft, and placement of launchers, the Patriot arc could cover Aleppo and parts of Idlib province in the north and even Deraa in the south. The AWACS and JSTARS would increase the Patriot radar range by over 100 miles while providing early detection and cueing via secure data links. Besides increasing radar coverage, the airborne systems would provide airspace control, aircraft identification, and surveillance capabilities as well as oversee engagement orders to Patriot units. And given the nature of the Patriot system -- the higher the target, the more effective the missile -- the current regime tactic of flying above antiaircraft coverage would improve the arc's effective range. Coupled with the provision of even low-tech antiaircraft arms to the FSA, the use of Patriots would establish a creative, multilayered air defense.
The past twenty months in Syria have proven the physical and psychological effects of indiscriminate bombing of civilians, including an increased flow of refugees. Responding to this problem with a Patriot-enforced option would compel Assad to concede a portion of his country, much like Saddam Hussein had to in Iraq. Yet it would not be as escalatory as a traditional no-fly zone with an extended bombing campaign and constant patrols over Syria. It could therefore be a pill the regime is willing to swallow. In short, through innovative use of U.S. weapons systems that entail little or no effort to penetrate the regime's dense air defenses, Washington and its allies could create a protective arc in the south and north, providing a much-needed safe haven for Syrians inside Syria.
Lt. Col. Eddie Boxx, USAF, is a visiting military fellow at The Washington Institute. Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at the Institute and a former senior defense intelligence officer. The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors; they do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, United States Air Force, or Air University.

Terror attack on Tel Aviv bus injures 23 people
By JPOST.COM STAFF LAST UPDATED: 11/21/2012 14:04 Bus explodes on Tel Aviv's Shaul Hamelech Street, of 23 injured, one seriously, one moderately wounded; police confirm explosion was a terror attack, are searching for additional suspects, explosives. Terrorists blew up a bus on Tel Aviv's Shaul Hamelech Street around noon Wednesday.
A total of 23 people were injured the attack, according to police.
One person was severely injured, one moderately and one light to moderately, according to a spokesperson from the city's Ichilov Hospital. The remainder of the casualties were lightly injured or suffering shock.  None were in a life threatening condition, though two have been taken into surgery, the hospital spokesperson said.Police confirmed that the explosion was a terrorist attack, although said it did not appear to be a suicide bombing and thus police were searching the area for additional explosive devises. The bus was on Dan's number 142 line.
Police arrested a suspect near the Ramat Gan diamond exchange, but he was later found not to be connected to the attack. Police believe at least one terrorist may still be at large in the area, armed with explosives.
Tel Aviv police had added additional officers in the city before this attack due to heightened state of alert in place in light of the IDF operation in Gaza and rocket attacks in recent days, Tel Aviv police chief Yoel Ohayon said at the scene of the terror attack.
He further called on the public to stay alert.
While it appeared the bomb was left on the bus and not the result of a suicide bombing, Ohayon said that at this point in time, "it is very difficult to say exactly what happened."Palestinian media reports said the Fatah-linked Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade took responsibility for the attack, although that was unconfirmed.
Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri praised the bombing, but stopped short of claiming responsibility.
"Hamas blesses the attack in Tel Aviv and sees it as a natural response to the Israeli massacres... in Gaza," he told Reuters.
"Palestinian factions will resort to all means in order to protect our Palestinian civilians in the absence of a world effort to stop the Israeli aggression," Abu Zuhri said.The attack came on the eighth day of IDF Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip, which has seen hundreds of rockets fired into Israel, including four in the Tel Aviv area.
The last time a bomb blast hit Tel Aviv was in April 2006, when a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 11 people at a sandwich stand near the old central bus station.
Wednesday's attack took place as US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was in Israel trying to calm tensions over Gaza. She was due to fly to Cairo later in the day for talks with Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, who is spearheading ceasefire negotiations.
Reuters contributed to this report.

Look for signs of Iran in what is happening
by Emad El Din Adeeb/Asharq Alawsat
Iran is playing the role of the saboteur in the Arab arena, exploiting issues of regional tension at the time of the Arab Spring revolutions. This is in order to heat up the region so as to disturb Tel Aviv and Washington, prompting them – at the end of the day – to accept negotiations with Tehran on Iranian terms.
This Iranian behavior, based on trading and bartering at times of crisis, is a fundamental philosophy of the Revolutionary Guards, who control the joints of the state in Tehran. The Iranian principle is based on the following simple premise:
“Stoke up a regional fire until the world complains of the flames, and then they will come to you with their calls to intervene. Here, and only here, can you barter with them and take what you want”. So, the Iranian merchant, who traditionally dealt in pistachio nuts, carpets and caviar, has now become adept at trading in crises.
The question that comes to mind is what crises will be exchanged for what Iranian demands?!
From the Iranian perspective, Tehran is searching for three main things:
1. Recognition of its right to nuclear capabilities, not to manufacture a nuclear bomb.
2. An end to the international trade and economic embargo on the Iranian state.
3. The re-integration and acceptance of Iran into the international community at all levels.
As for Israel and the US, they are trying, with all their might, to do the following:
1. To pressure the Iranian regime from the outside until it starts to erode from the inside.
2. To encourage an “Iranian Spring” to shake the authority of the supreme leader and the religious state, and to support the democratic and liberal forces there.
3. To reign in Iran’s territorial expansions in Lebanon and Gaza, Bahrain and Yemen.
As for the countries that are now bearing the brunt of Iran’s policies, they see Tehran as the new “Great Satan” which has ignited the fires of tension in the region. Some believe that Tehran is preparing to engulf the entire Arab region by heating up all its regional issues, closing down its oil straits, provoking small wars, increasing sectarian strife and providing extremist groups with money, weapons and training, in order to use all of this as a bargaining chip when it comes to negotiating with Washington.
We are just a trivial piece in the Iranian chess game, and it does not matter to Tehran if it inflames the entire region, destroys its economy, and puts everyone on the brink of a devastating war!

Now, Khalid Mishal is the leader
By Tariq Alhomayed/Asharq Al-Awsat
Why is everybody now seeking a truce or ceasefire in Gaza, particularly Israel and Hamas, as is evident from their statements, not to mention Egypt, of course? The answer is very simple, and becomes clearer day after day, namely that Israel has achieved its objectives, as has Hamas, whilst Egypt – which is in the eye of the storm – has other motives.
Netanyahu believes that Israel has dealt a strong blow to Hamas’s infrastructure and gained international support for its aggression against the Gaza Strip due to the rocket fire from Gaza. However he does not want to destroy Hamas completely because the alternative would be other groups whose loyalties lie with Iran, which is the greatest inciter of this war. Netanyahu, of course, is also aware that any ceasefire agreement will include repercussions regarding future rocket fire from Gaza, whilst Muslim Brotherhood-ruled Egypt will serve as a guarantor for this expected ceasefire. The Israeli Prime Minister has therefore committed Cairo to taking the same steps as the Mubarak regime; no military front has been opened, nor have relations with Tel Aviv been suspended, rather Egypt’s efforts and solutions have all been political. This is because Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi does not have many options, he truly wants a ceasefire, and this is something that cannot be denied. Mursi is seeking to put an end to the repercussions this conflict is having upon the Egyptian interior.
Egyptian public opinion, not to mention the general situation in the country, prompted Khalid Mishal to say, during a press conference in Cairo, that “the enemy wanted to test the new Egypt…the 25th January Egypt, and the response was not what was expected. It wanted to test the Arabs during their Spring, however the Arabs have met our hopes.” Mishal is well aware of the danger of embarrassing Egypt at this juncture, particularly as he has achieved what he wanted from the Gaza war. One of the results of this war and the forthcoming ceasefire will be the return of Mishal as leader of Hamas and indeed of the Gaza Strip as a whole, with Israeli recognition, of course, particularly following the successful completion of the ceasefire, which will be internationally backed by Egypt. So what many people have forgotten, and which I made reference to in my article “Mursi and Hamas in a predicament”, is that Mishal, even before the most recent Israeli aggression, had announced his lack of desire to stand – for the fifth time – for the leadership of Hamas, a position he has held since 1996. This is due to divisions within the Hamas movement, and we have repeatedly heard about the possibility of Mishal being replaced by either Ismail Haniyeh or Mousa Abu Marzouk. Following this, we heard the General Guide of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood calling on Mishal to remain silent and not repeat his talk about stepping down, after he intervened against the backdrop of the internal Hamas crisis prior to the current Gaza war. This crisis prevented the elections for Hamas’s political bureau, as well as the choosing of Mishal’s successor, whilst Mishal himself returns to the leadership today from the gateway of the Israeli war on Gaza. Therefore Mishal is the one expressing a desire for ceasefire, saying “we do not want escalation, Hamas is courageous but not reckless!” Indeed, Mishal is calling on the Palestinians today to put an end to their internal divisions, and here one can only say: Are you serious?
What I want to say is that everybody wants to see an end to the Israeli aggression against Gaza, and this includes those who are sincere, as well as the helpless. However, there are also those who want to see an end to the Israeli aggression against Gaza in order to protect what they have achieved; Mishal has returned as a leader, whilst Netanyahu has benefited domestically and internationally. As for the victims, these are, as always, the Palestinians and their Cause. This is the truth, albeit a bitter one.

President Mursi’s test
By Ali Ibrahim/Asharq Alawsat
Between the conflicts in Gaza in 2008 and 2012, many events have taken place and the shape of the regional map has changed to a large extent, including the major players, but the facts of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have remained the same, including the division between Gaza and Ramallah. Now, after the January 25th revolution, everyone is anticipating how the new Egyptian President will act towards the latest events in Gaza, given that his regime stems from the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has traditionally close ties with Hamas.
Many see the current war in Gaza as a test for the Egyptian President Mohammed Mursi; a test which has suddenly exploded from nowhere at a time when attention was focused on Syria and the horrors that are happening there. Many Western views suggest that Israel and Hamas are seeking to discover the nature of the new Egyptian regime’s policies, and how it will react to the first major crisis that affects Egypt’s borders directly. Will the Egyptian President rush headlong into an adventure that would endanger Egypt; a country still seeking to restore its internal stability, or will he act as a statesman, managing the delicate balance of Egyptian public sympathy for Gaza? Many Egyptian interests are at stake, in light of the balance of forces, the international connections, and the country’s urgent internal needs.
It seems that the new Egyptian President, or the new Egyptian regime, has passed the test so far. Mursi has acted as a statesman who does not resort to adventurism or uncalculated steps that may gain temporary popularity among his audience. Rather, he has resorted to diplomacy and communication with all parties, and has sought to involve the influential international and regional actors that can exert pressure. This is in order to achieve calm on the ground and to stop the ongoing war which both sides are aware will not lead to anything, even if an Israeli ground invasion occurred.
Cairo has so far been able to walk this tightrope, using the available cards in its hand to prompt influential international parties, especially the US, to take an active role in resolving the conflict and reaching a comprehensive settlement. Here it must be noted that the signs are not moving towards an escalation or a ground invasion. The Western world, which considers the Israeli bombardment to be justifiable in response to rockets fired from Gaza, has sent more than one indication to Tel Aviv that a ground invasion may alter attitudes and may be more difficult to support, as the British Foreign Secretary William Hague said. We must also consider the words of Khaled Mishal, head of the Hamas political bureau, who delivered a press conference in Cairo at the same time as an Israeli delegation was also present, trying to establish conditions for a truce. To summarize Mishal’s most important points, he said that Hamas was not reckless, and that it does not want an escalation or a ground war. This means that he is seeking a truce, and so he threw the ball back in Israel’s court. It was also noticeable in Mishal’s speech that he was keen to send a message to the Egyptians, namely that Hamas knows Egypt’s internal priorities, and that it is keen on the security of Sinai. This message was delivered in order to dispel Egyptian fears of security chaos, due in part to the situation in Gaza and the tunnel network there.
Hamas’ situation has undoubtedly changed. Its regional ally for many decades, the Syrian regime, is now out of control. Hamas could no longer justify a relationship with a regime that massacres its own people, and so it closed down its office in Damascus. Now it is forced to rely more on Cairo, and this will impose new changes, in one way or another, because of the nature of Egypt’s different interests. The Syrian regime used to see Hamas as a mere tool or playing card in regional disputes, and had no interest in a solution [to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict]. Yet Egypt is interested in finding a viable solution on the ground, thus providing the necessary environment for Hamas to devote itself to development issues and reduce security risks in the future.

Is there a connection between the Gaza events, Hamas and al-Assad?
By Dr. Hamad Al-Majid/Asharq Alawsat
It is difficult not to link the savage Israeli attacks on Gaza with al-Assad's savage attacks on the Syrian people. This is because the Israeli attack has loosened the rope hung around the Syrian regime’s neck, and diverted the spotlight, even if only slightly, away from the Syrian arena. In turn this has given the Syrian regime, as well as its Iranian and Russian allies, not exactly hope for survival - for this is unimaginable - but rather a chance of extending al-Assad’s reign. They hope that the entwined nature of the regional situation will create new variables and struggles to divert more Arab and international attention away from the priority, namely accelerating the end of the Syrian regime.
Some argue that the military conflict between Hamas and Israel is in fact a proxy conflict between Iran and Israel, whereby Hamas is acting on behalf of Iran in accordance with clear directives from Tehran, aiming to reduce the pressure being mounted on the Bashar al-Assad regime. Yet even if some interests link Hamas to Iran, the events and facts on the ground indicate otherwise. Ever since the Hamas leadership withdrew from Damascus and displayed a clear and logical stance towards the Syrian revolution, the movement's relations with the regimes in Syria and Iran have been experiencing heightening degrees of tension. No one could now imagine Hamas accepting to serve as a bridge for Iran to implement its dirty agenda against the Syrian people, with whom Hamas now boasts stronger relations than with Tehran. Experts in criminal investigations always say: Whenever you are unable to find the perpetrator, search for the beneficiary. In this case, Israel is the primary beneficiary par excellence from everything that is happening in Gaza. According to the London-based Financial Times newspaper, Israel was the one that sparked military confrontations (by assassinating Ahmed al-Jabari, the leader of the al-Qassam Brigades - the Hamas military wing - and then by launching air-raids on various Gaza Strip locations where weapons are being stored). Israel has also transformed the Gaza Strip into a testing ground for its new weapons. For example, al-Jabari’s assassination was carried out using a drone aircraft. These days, Israel is experimenting with its "Iron Dome" missile interception system, which was once a subject of controversy when the Israeli media questioned its effectiveness during the "Operation Cast Lead" in December 2008.
By assassinating al-Jabari, Netanyahu has achieved a popular victory in front of the Israeli people. Al-Jabari often insulted the Israeli government and mocked its intelligence service, which always boasted of being able to monitor the entire Palestinian arena when masterminding the concealment of Gilad Shalit. Netanyahu wants to stand for re-election amidst scenes of the Palestinian people being repressed, and their leaders being assassinated. In addition, by provoking certain Palestinian factions into firing missiles towards residential areas, Israel has further strengthened its stance against any Western recognition of a Palestinian state. Using the stone stained with Gaza’s blood, Israel has been able to kill a number of political and military birds. It is without doubt the primary beneficiary here, and in this regard the theory of Hamas conspiring with Iran to champion the Bashar al-Assad regime sounds somewhat naïve, and borne out of ideological and political disputes.

In Gaza conflict, Hezbollah stays on sidelines
BEIRUT (AP) — While the death toll from the Israel-Gaza conflict has mounted, Hezbollah has offered quiet words of encouragement to the Palestinians, pledging support and calling on Arab states to send them weapons to fight Israel. But beyond that, the Lebanese militant group appears to be staying firmly on the sidelines.
Despite its own formidable missile arsenal and its reputation as the region's leading anti-Israel resistance force, Hezbollah is approaching the Gaza crisis with caution, mindful that any action it takes could backfire at a time when the group faces unprecedented challenges at home.
The military option appears off the table for Hezbollah. If it were to join Gaza's Hamas miliants in firing rockets at Israel, it would likely raise an outcry from many in Lebanon accusing the Shiite guerrillas of dragging the country into a war with Israel. When Hezbollah sent an Iranian-made reconnaissance drone over Israel last month, the group boasted of its capabilities — but critics in Lebanon slammed it for embarking on a unilateral adventure that could provoke Israel.
Hezbollah is also hamstrung by the civil war in Syria, which has heavily damaged its reputation. Once praised across the Arab world as its champion against Israel, now many — particularly in the region's Sunni Muslim majority — see it foremost as the backer of Syrian President Bashar Assad in his bloody crackdown on the uprising that erupted against his rule in March 2011.
Anything Hezbollah says against Israel's campaign will ring hollow for many. Already Syrian regime opponents have drawn parallels between Israel's bombardment of Gaza and Assad's crackdown, posting gruesome pictures on social media sites showing dead children in Syria and Gaza.
"Condemning Israeli violence while standing by a Syrian regime that is killing its own people definitely highlights the hypocrisy of Hezbollah's Syria stance. It will further sink its standing in the Arab street," said Randa Slim, a research fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington.
Activists say close to 40,000 people have been killed in 20 months of fighting in Syria. The brutal campaign by Assad's regime against the Sunni-dominated uprising has undermined the so-called "Axis of Resistance" — the anti-Israeli and anti-American alliance of Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Embarrassed by the bloodshed, leaders of Sunni Hamas who had been based in Damascus since the late 1990s broke with Syria, sided with the rebels and left for Egypt and Qatar, though Hamas' fighters in Gaza have continued to receive weapons from Iran.
Still, Hezbollah has tried to use Israel's campaign in Gaza — launched in an attempt to stop militant rocket fire — to shift the narrative away from Syria and back to its familiar ground of "resistance."
Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah pledged his group's support for Gaza's Hamas rulers, insisting it was unaffected by disagreements over the conflict in Syria.
"Iran, Syria and Hezbollah will not abandon Gaza and its people, and just as we were with them over the past several years we will continue to stand by them. This is our religious and moral and humanitarian obligation," he said in a speech to his supporters Monday night.
But far from his traditionally fiery speeches, the black-turbaned Hezbollah chief appeared subdued and bitter. He even implicitly suggested Hamas was ungrateful for the Iranian and Syrian role in supplying it with the longer-range rockets it has used to target Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, adding a jibe at Egypt for its help to Israel in closing the Gaza Strip.
"Despite the blockade imposed by some Arabs, how did the weapons reach Gaza, how did Fajr 5 missiles reach Gaza? ... Who sent them? And who transported them?" he said. "We need to ask who enabled Gaza to stand on its feet today, to fight and make surprises and to shell Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and to fire at planes and battleships."
He also accused Arabs of a double standard. "The Arabs are sending truckloads and shiploads of weapons to the Syrian opposition, but they do not even dare to send one bullet to Gaza for fear of upsetting Israel and the Americans," he said.
Founded in 1982 with Iranian support to fight Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah has since grown into one of the most robust, organized and sophisticated resistance groups in the world with a small army of about 6,000 fighters.
In 2000, it succeeded in driving Israeli occupation forces out of south Lebanon following an attrition war that eventually led to the withdrawal. In 2006, the group fought Israel to a standstill, raising the group in the eyes of many in the Arab world to almost iconic status. Hezbollah also gained political power, dominating the current government, which was formed after the group forced the ouster of its Western-backed predecessor.
But at the same time, Hezbollah has come under increasing pressure at home to disarm. Lebanon has become increasingly polarized along multiple lines — Sunnis versus Shiites, the anti-Syrian camp versus the pro-Syrian camp — and pro-Western groups in the country have accused Hezbollah of facilitating political assassinations of anti-Syrian figures in Lebanon.
The uprising in Syria, the main transit point of weapons bought from Iran to Hezbollah, presents the group with its toughest challenge since its inception.
Assad's fall would be a nightmare scenario for Hezbollah. Any new regime led by the country's majority Sunni Muslims would likely be hostile to Shiite Muslim Hezbollah. Iran remains the group's most important patron, but Syria is a crucial supply route. Without it, Hezbollah will struggle to get money and weapons as easily.
Given all the potential dangers, Hezbollah will likely stay on the sidelines of the Hamas-Israel fight, the U.S. security think tank Stratfor said in a report this week. "With Hezbollah uncertain how the Israel-Hamas battle will play out, the group appears to be taking a cautious approach," it said.
The Texas-based intelligence analysis firm also said it has received indication that Hezbollah has deployed operatives in plainclothes along the border with Israel to monitor the situation and prevent radical Palestinian groups from firing rockets into northern Israel, which would potentially force Hezbollah into a fight if Israel responded.
A Hezbollah official in south Lebanon confirmed the group was on full alert in case of any Israeli attack in light of the Gaza situation, but denied members were policing the border to prevent attacks on Israel.
"This is a job for the army and United Nations peacekeeper, not Hezbollah," he said, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss security issues.

Aoun: Syrian Refugees a Major Threat, We Urge President to Ask Army about its Defense Capacity
Naharnet /Free Patriotic Movement leader MP Michel Aoun on Tuesday warned that “the accumulation of refugees” on Lebanon's border with Syria “poses a threat” to the country, adding that President Michel Suleiman must ask the Army Command about "its ability to defend the borders so that we come up with a vision for the defense strategy."
“I said in the past that the accumulation of refugees on the Lebanese border confirms that they are not all refugees and this poses a threat, especially if they are fighters taking part in the war in Syria,” Aoun warned after the weekly meeting of the Change and Reform bloc in Rabiyeh. “Everyone knows that the issue of asylum starts with individuals asking you for help and ends with them mutineering against you,” he added. The FPM leader cautioned that “this issue has become very dangerous because they are spread across all areas,” calling on the government to “publish the numbers and oversee residency across Lebanon.” “No one knows the numbers and this is unacceptable. It is unacceptable that the director of army intelligence, the Intelligence Bureau, the General Security, the State Security, municipalities and mayors don't know anything about the numbers,” Aoun said. “They should clarify the numbers within 15 days and we will not remain silent,” he stressed.
In response to a reporter's question, Aoun said “the entire region poses a threat to Lebanon and unity can protect Lebanon.”
“The threat comes from outside and the issue of the Syrian refugees reflects massive negligence,” he added. Criticizing the speech delivered by Phalange Party leader Amin Gemayel on the sixth anniversary of the assassination of his son, minister Pierre Gemayel, Aoun said: “We heard a speech saying 'we don't accept half a sovereignty and a quarter of dignity,' but what do you want? The Lebanese army? We want the army as well.”“We call on the president to ask the Army Command about its ability to defend the borders so that we come up with a vision for the defense strategy and end the political debate,” he added. On Sunday, Gemayel said: “I will repeat Pierre's words: We will not accept half a dignity, but rather full dignity. We will not accept an incomplete authority for the army, as the army must extend its authority over the 10,452 square kilometers.” Separately, Aoun told reporters that no one is preventing citizens from “practicing their sovereignty on the ground.”
“There are border regions that don't enjoy sovereignty. There are no security zones and those who committed violations on the airport road were arrested and put in jail,” he noted.
Asked about Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea's latest remarks on boycotting the national dialogue table, Aoun said sarcastically: “I'm seeking a Nobel Peace Prize for Dr. Samir Geagea and he's classifying me as a criminal. What a shame. I don't accept that.”

Opposition MP: Lebanese PM subservient to Iran, Hezbollah
November 21, 2012 /Lebanese Future bloc MP Atef Majdalani said that Prime Minister Najib Miqati is serving the goals of the Shiite group Hezbollah and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
“What we heard from Miqati [on Tuesday] indicates that there are no state institutions to protect the interests of the Lebanese. Miqati is implementing the plans of Hezbollah to completely control the state,” Majdalani told Free Lebanon radio station on Wednesday. “The PM is also cleverly following the orders of Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah to put in place a national constituent assembly to change the Taif Accord and amend it under Iran’s request.” The 1989 Taif Accord brought a negotiated end to Lebanon’s 1975-1990 civil war.
Future bloc MP Mouin al-Merhebi also commented on Miqati’s remarks pertaining to his cabinet’s dissociation policy from the Syrian crisis, telling As-Sharq radio station that they indicated the PM was adopting double standards, “as if the government is not his, and as if he is not concerned by [the proliferation of non-state weapons in the country].”
The embattled Lebanese premier on Tuesday evening said that he would only resign within the context of a comprehensive political solution after repeated calls for his resignation were made by the pro-western March 14 coalition.In June, Nasrallah called on President Michel Suleiman to form a new, enlarged “national constituent assembly” composed of experts selected by the Lebanese people instead of only hosting a national dialogue session to resolve Lebanon’s controversial political deadlock.-NOW Lebanon

Lebanese minister rejects toppling cabinet
November 21, 2012 /Lebanon’s public works and transportation minister warned that toppling the country’s cabinet would plunge the country into “jungle law.” “In case the government gets toppled, we will be living by the law of the jungle with nothing to stop us,” the National News Agency quoted Ghazi Aridi as saying Wednesday. Aridi, who represents MP Walid Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party in cabinet, added that “it is necessary to go back to the institutions and maintain them in order for us to put our minds at ease.”March 14 alliance parties in Lebanon have blamed Internal Security Forces Information Branch chief Wissam al-Hassan’s assassination on the Syrian regime, and demanded that Prime Minister Najib Miqati step down over the bombing. Miqati’s government is currently comprised of ministers associated with the pro-Syrian regime March 8 alliance, spearheaded by Hezbollah.-NOW Lebanon

Lebanese NLP leader: Fall of government will improve situation
November 21, 2012 /National Liberal Party leader MP Dori Shamoun said that the political situation in Lebanon would improve dramatically once a government was formed to replace the cabinet of Prime Minister Najib Miqati.“When the achievement [of forming a new technocratic government] is reached, the political rule in Lebanon will be rectified and things will go back to normal,” Shamoun told As-Seyassah newspaper on Wednesday. The current cabinet is mainly comprised of politicians affiliated with the March 8 alliance led by the Shiite group Hezbollah and has been under increasing pressure by the March 14 opposition coalition after the specter of political assassinations recently returned to the country. Shamoun also lashed out at Speaker Nabih Berri for calling for extraordinary parliament sessions after March 14 announced in late October that it would cut all ties with the Miqati government, including parliamentary meetings. “Why didn’t he show this interest [in parliamentary work] when he closed the parliament for a year and a half?” Last week Berri called for the parliament to convene late in November on the occasion of the visit of Armenian President Serge Sarkisian. He also called for a special meeting to condemn the Israeli violence in the Gaza Strip.-NOW Lebanon