Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for July 18/12
Assad's struggle to stay in power 'futile': France
Suicide attack kills Assad's brother-in-law, defense minister
Bomb kills Syrian ministers in blow to Assad
Assad’s kinsman Shawqat and defense minister Rajiha killed by suicide bomber
Battles break out near Syrian presidential palace
Bomb at heart of Assad's inner circle damaging, but not decisive
Assad moving troops from Golan to Damascus: Israel
Assef Shawkat, Syria's shadowy enforcer
Ex-defense minister Turkmani among Damascus blast dead: Al-Manar
UN schedules vote on new Syria resolution
Panetta: Violence in Syria spinning out of control
Another pivotal moment in Syria
Syrian rebels set sights on ‘liberating’ capital
Palestinians join Syria revolt: activists, FSA
Vatican vows to fight money laundering after critical report
Germany sees rising threat from militant Islamists
Syria defector Manaf Tlass in Paris, urges constructive transition
Kadima quits Israel government, coalition holds
Lebanese Pilgrims Appear in New Video, Abductors Say Will Free Two Captives
Al-Jazeera: Two abducted Lebanese pilgrims in Syria to be released
FPM supporters demonstrate in Beirut in support of Lebanese army
Lebanon's Arabic press digest - July 18, 2012
One Killed in Tripoli by Gunshots Fired in Celebration of Damscus Bombing
Aoun: Some Sides are Seeking to Break up Army into Militias
In Maarab, Gemayel Warns of Bids to 'Divide Lebanese into Supporters, Opponents of Army'
Have you seen this man/Shane Farrell
A close shave/The Syrian Social Nationalist Party and its criminal record and history
Muslim scholars hopeful 2 Lebanese hostages’ release imminent
Clash near Sidon, celebratory gunfire in Tripoli over Damascus blast
House destroyed, church damaged in Syrian shelling of Lebanese border towns


Lebanon's Arabic press digest from the Daily Star
July 18, 2012/ The Daily Star
Lebanon's Arabic press digest.
Following are summaries of some of the main stories in a selection of Lebanese newspapers Wednesday. The Daily Star cannot vouch for the accuracy of these reports.
Al-Joumhouria
Attempt to replace Sunni-Shiite strife with Sunni-Christian confrontation
The language of the street prevailed in Lebanon Tuesday with supporters of the Free Patriotic Movement blocking roads under the pretext of defending the military, which issued a statement calling for the “cessation of sit-ins and road blockages, [as] they harm the interests of citizens and [adversely] affect their lives.”
Therefore, this street action – which suddenly moved from the blockade of the airport road to the closure of the Metn and Kesrouan roads – becomes suspicious.
It also carries many question marks as to Aoun’s enthusiasm in using the street. Is it an attempt to shift the Sunni-Shiite conflict to a Sunni-Christian conflict after Hezbollah found itself vulnerable as a result of a combination of factors and developments, beginning with the Arab Spring and the rise of [Sunni] Islamists and [unlikely] to end with the imminent collapse of the Syrian regime and the mobilization of Sunnis in Lebanon?
Hezbollah has reached a point where it fears [that Assir’s sit-in will expand to include] the closure of Sidon’s coastal road. According to information made available to Al-Joumhouria, members of Hezbollah’s leadership have failed to agree on how to respond if this step is taken by Sheikh Ahmed Assir. This is what prompted a speedy change: turning the Sunni-Shiite crisis, which began to expand with calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament, to a Sunni-Christian one under the slogan of solidarity with the army.
Al-Akhbar
No contact between Aounists and allies before “liberation” of electricity
The Free Patriotic Movement once again returned to the street Tuesday, but this time under the banner of supporting the Lebanese Army.
Meanwhile, the EDL contract workers’ crisis lingered after attempts to open channels of communication between the FPM and Hezbollah failed.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah will address the Lebanon situation and the party’s relationship with its allies Wednesday on the anniversary of victory over Israel in the 2006 war.
Al-Mustaqbal
Army renounces those who blocked roads in solidarity with the military, Gemayel and Harb warn of consequences
Aoun blocks Baabda road on Sleiman, Kahwagi
What will the coup government do after prominent leaders within the Cabinet turned against it?
MP Michel Aoun has no stability in his world. The same thing applies to Hezbollah, which has no “security” in its world, making government claims of “stability” look fake. This has become manifest in the series of chaotic incidents moving from one area to another under the guise of support for the Army, moves which the latter has denounced.
The street action resulted in the blockage of the National Museum road as well as Nahr al-Mot and the international highway at the Sayyad roundabout. It also reached the extent of blocking the Baabda road on President Michel Sleiman, who visited the ABC mall in Dbayyeh upon his return from a visit to Turkey.
Ad-Diyar
March 8 source: “Timing of Oranges’ [FMP's]” action embarrasses Hezbollah and the Army
Sectarian slogans and the use of "Oranges" do not [secure] electoral popularity
Road closures, whether right or wrong, have become a natural consequence of the absence of a firm political decision to salvage what can be salvaged of this limp government, which is headed toward the abyss.
This is a real concern expressed by a source from the March 8 coalition against the backdrop of the "fabricated" street action.

Lebanese Pilgrims Appear in New Video, Abductors Say Will Free Two Captives
Naharnet/17 July 2012,/Al-Jazeera television aired Tuesday a video it received from the abductors of 11 Lebanese Shiite pilgrims who were kidnapped in Syria in May, in which the kidnappers announced they will release two of the captives. “In response to the appeal of the Muslim Scholars Committee in Lebanon, we will hand over two of the guests in our custody to their families under the supervision of the Muslim Scholars Committee in Lebanon and the state of Qatar,” the abductors said in what they dubbed “Statement Number 3.” “We have informed the Turkish government in order to confirm our good intentions,” the statement added. But the abductors rejected to “forget what was voiced in the first statement: the demand of an apology from (Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyed) Hassan Nasrallah who was justifying for (Syrian President Bashar) Assad his deeds while the honor of our women was being violated in Homs and who claimed that what’s happening in Syria is nothing but media fabrications.”
“We do not have a problem with any sect and we are rather struggling for the freedom and dignity of our people,” the kidnappers added in their statement. The statement did not mention the identity of the two captives the abductors intend to release. The Lebanese men were on their way back from a pilgrimage in Iran when gunmen intercepted their buses in the northern Syrian province of Aleppo. The rebel Free Syrian Army has denied any involvement in the operation. Meanwhile, Sheikh Salem al-Rafehi, member of Lebanon’s Muslim Scholars Committee, told LBCI television that through its efforts the committee “wanted to underline that sectarian tensions will not prevent it from supporting the aggrieved.” And as he denied his knowledge of the names of those who will be freed, Rafehi clarified that the committee does not have direct contact with the abductors, “but rather with the Muslim scholars who met in Istanbul.”“We urged them to release Hussein Ali Omar because his health situation is unstable and we have communicated with his family,” Rafehi added. On the other hand, Rafehi called on President Michel Suleiman to seek “the release of the Islamist detainees from prison, who have been suffering great injustice.”In a previous video, the abducted pilgrims said they were “the guests of the Syrian revolutionaries,” expressing support for “their revolution against oppressors.”
Earlier on Tuesday, President Suleiman held talks with Turkish leaders about the fate of the 11 pilgrims. "We told the Lebanese side that we will do our best to find the kidnapped pilgrims but our opportunities are also restricted," a diplomatic source told Agence France Presse after Suleiman's meeting with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Ahead of his trip to Turkey, Suleiman told reporters earlier in the day that “there are some good signs” about the case of the 11 pilgrims.
“I am exerting all efforts and holding contacts and routine meetings to secure their release,” he added. Their abduction is not a democratic act and does not serve any cause, the president said.
Naharnet.

The school of victories
Hazem Saghiyeh/Now Lebanon/ July 16, 2012
Saying that we achieved victory in the 2006 July War and believing it are merely foundations for a mad claim. Indeed, logic implies that a military victory constitutes a prelude to a better political and social reality for the winner, its people and, accordingly, its society. However, the reality underlying this victory was something else entirely. Relations between the Lebanese have never fallen to such lows and decadence as after the 2006 July War, and this is best proven by the May 2008 events. Sectarian feelings have never been as acute as following this victory and are still escalating. The failure to establish political unanimities as a basis for a relatively stable power has never been as strongly felt as the time that has elapsed since 2006. A quick look from Akkar to the southern border, including Tripoli and Saida of course, is enough to confirm it. Accordingly, we stand before the following option: We have indeed achieved a massive victory, which could not be used in politics and society. This means that it is a free and meaningless victory. The alternative is that we never achieved victory in the first place; rather, we have twisted facts and portrayed them as a victory, a “divine victory” at that.
The writer of these lines is in favor of the second statement, which is based on a deep-rooted traditional school of thought in Arab policies. In 1948, we called the defeat “Nakba” (i.e. ‘catastrophe’) but we quickly said that “Abdel Nasser’s revolution” in 1952 and the ensuing military revolutions were a response to this “Nakba”. In 1967, we called the defeat “Naksa” (i.e. ‘setback’) but we still considered that the fact “progressive regimes” had not fallen was a victory, as such, against Israel and the United States beyond it. In 1973, the Arabs lost even more land but we coined the expression of “the October victory” where [former Syrian president] Hafez al-Assad was the “October hero.” In Iraq, Saddam Hussein was quite good at giving the denominations of “the mother of all battles”, “Saddam’s Qadissiyya” and others to his great and resounding victories. It is certainly fitting to belong to this school of thought for those who speak of our great victory in the glorious July War following which the Lebanese-Israeli border became wholly trouble-free. *This article is a translation of the original, which appeared on the NOW Arabic site on Monday July 16, 2012

Have you seen this man?
Shane Farrell , July 18, 2012 /Now Lebanon
Not far from the Beirut Arab University in Tarik al-Jdeideh, a working-class Sunni stronghold and the site of intra-sect clashes in May, sits a nondescript clothes shop run by a man named Mustafa. Above him hangs a poster of a grinning Saad Hariri, the former prime minister who has been out of Lebanon since April 2011, which he has claimed is for security concerns. The poster’s blue ink, the colors of Saad Hariri’s Future Movement, shows signs of fading, hinting that the picture has been up there for quite some time. Mustafa is still unquestionably loyal to “the leader of the Sunnis,” backing up his words of praise with a broad smile. He believes the offer Hariri made to fly 11 kidnapped Lebanese Shia from Turkey back to Lebanon on his private jet back in May was important in bringing Sunnis and Shia together, despite the fact that the offer amounted to little, as early reports that the kidnapped were released turned out to be incorrect. But when questions turned to Hariri’s conspicuous absence, now in its fifteenth month, Mustafa’s smile faded. “I think Hariri should return,” he said. “He provides the Sunni street with stability and unity when he is here.”
Others have the same message, but are more overtly critical of the former PM’s absence. They are not satisfied with the explanation that he’s been absent for so long on the grounds that his life was in danger. “There are always threats on one’s life as a politician, so why should he remain out of the country?” says local resident Maya, who refused to give her family name.
Indeed, in recent months there have been several assassination attempts on prominent March 14 members. In February, the Security Forces revealed that they had foiled an attempt on the life of Kataeb MP Sami Gemayel. Then, in April, two bullets were fired at Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, apparently missing his head by inches. In June, Future bloc leader MP Fouad Siniora was alerted to an assassination plot against him.
Most recently, March 14 MP Boutros Harb was targeted by an armed assailant earlier this month, and two explosive detonators were found in the elevator of his office.
Many Sunnis feel that since March 14 figures who have had attempts on their lives are remaining in Lebanon, so should Hariri. But Hariri, whose own father was assassinated in 2005, is remaining abroad. Farouq Itani, a taxi driver and writer from Tarik al-Jdeideh, was extremely critical of the former prime minister, saying he lacked courage and did not inspire confidence as a leader. According to Itani, Future Movement supporters will tow the party line when questioned by outsiders, stressing that “After all, Hariri is the Sunni leader.” But among the Sunni community itself (in Beirut, at least), Itani says people are vocal in their disappointment with Hariri.
He has been out of the country for much longer than expected, and on numerous occasions hopes that he would return were dashed. March 14 MP Marwan Hamadeh, for instance, mentioned as far back as October 2011 that the Future leader was preparing to return, and in January of this year Hariri himself tweeted that he would be coming back to Lebanon soon. However, later that same month, he suffered a broken leg as a result of a skiing accident in the French Alps, which he said was keeping him from returning. That was six months ago.
In the meantime, Hariri has largely relied on Twitter and infrequent press statements as a means to communicate with the public, but he remains out of the political spotlight. Even his official website, saadhariri.com, does not appear to have been updated since the end of 2011. In his absence, other figures are rising to prominence, according to some pundits. If political banners are anything to go by, Prime Minister Najib Mikati appears to have increased his support in Tripoli at Hariri’s expense, while Sheikh Ahmed al-Assir has become a prominent figure in Hariri’s hometown of Saida (though this may be because of his fiery rhetoric against Hezbollah rather than his numerical support). Moreover, clashes between Sunnis in Tarik al-Jdeideh in May have been attributed, in some quarters, to a lack of leadership within the mainstream Sunni community. More and more people, some pundits argue, are acting not in line with their political leaders, but of their own accord. This may or may not be true.
In any case, as it stands there is a gaping power vacuum in the mainstream Sunni community that Hariri will struggle to fill the longer he remains abroad.
Luna Safwan contributed reporting and tweets @lunasafwan. Shane Farrell tweets @shanekfarrell.

A close shave
Now Lebanon/July 16, 2012
Gunmen from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party were at the fore of the May 2008 attempted coup that saw the combined militias of the pro-Syrian March 8 bloc overrun West Beirut. Decades ago the party shed any intellectual pretensions of a secular region and a strong, pan-Arab nation, and has, since the 1970s, made more of a reputation for being Syria’s ill-trained Lebanese pit bull. Assassination, violence, thuggery and intimidation have been the party’s hallmarks, and yet in general elections it can still send a clutch of MPs to parliament.
On Sunday, Walid Azar, the SSNP candidate in the Koura by-election, lost by a mere 1,300 votes to Fadi Karam of the Lebanese Forces. And so while we can all rejoice at the defeat of a party that supports a system that is currently murdering its own citizens, we should not ignore the fact that of Koura’s 57,537 registered voters, the SSNP garnered 11,200 ballots from an election-day turnout of 47 percent. In short, the SSNP was not rejected outright; indeed over 40 percent of the voters cast their ballot for what is arguably the most sinister party in the Lebanese political spectrum.
Koura is not an impoverished region. If it were, we could explain away the results by citing low voter intellect, the influence and relative proximity of Syria, and intimidation or bribery. But this was not the case. The people of Koura are in many instances highly educated, prosperous and sophisticated. So why the support for a party that demonstrated years ago that it was politically unpalatable to those who aspire to a modern, sovereign and democratic Lebanon? Ironically, the answer in part must lie with the LF’s lingering wartime reputation for its unsavory brand of Christian nationalism, one that was sprinkled with thuggery and allegations of organized crime. It is a reaction that has driven many Christians, disillusioned with the LF and the right-wing Kataeb party, into the arms of the Free Patriotic Movement in the past half-decade, despite that organization’s bizarre alliances, obvious contradictions and blatant hypocrisy. It seems that on Sunday, a similar impulse drove voters in Koura back to the SSNP and in so doing, very nearly sent another of its members to parliament. Is resentment of the LF so strong that it can drive educated voters who want to reject a party that had a reputation for mafia-style politics to embrace another party whose “members” gunned down innocent civilians on the streets of Beirut in May 2008? If so, it is a very telling, not to mention depressing, snapshot of the way we vote.
Since his release after 11 years of imprisonment, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has demonstrated that, despite his party’s past—and at this point we should add that Hezbollah, Amal, and the Progressive Socialist Party, among others, all have a “past”—he is committed to the role of the state in all matters, including the issue of non-state arms and Lebanon’s territorial integrity. The same can hardly be said for the SSNP and its allies in March 8. But if these assurances and Geagea’s apparent rehabilitation from warlord to political savant are not enough, then surely the smart voter would either go with one of the four other candidates or cast a blank ballot in protest of the narrow range of choices. A wasted vote? Hardly. Until we learn to vote for what we want—presumably a free, democratic, sovereign and prosperous nation, governed by the rule of law and defined by the offices of the state—instead of what we don’t want, then we will never move forward as a country.
As it was, the best man for Lebanon won. But it was a close shave.

Assad's struggle to stay in power 'futile': France
July 18, 2012/Daily Star /PARIS: France Wednesday denounced Syrian leader Bashar Assad's struggle to stay in power as futile and raised concerns about mounting violence in the conflict-torn country.
"The situation in Syria is worsening day by day as the violence intensifies. Bashar al-Assad must understand that his struggle to retain power is futile and that nothing will stop the Syrian people's march to a democratic future," French foreign ministry spokesman Bernard Valero said. He also called on those still backing Assad to turn against him. "The last supporters of the regime must understand that repression leads nowhere and we urge them to dissociate themselves from the bloody repression carried out for 16 months," he said.He said France was "more than ever committed to have a resolution adopted" at the UN Security Council in order to "put an end to the repression and implement a political transition in accordance with the aspirations of the Syrian people."

Syrian government appoints new defense minister
By REUTERS LAST UPDATED: 07/18/2012 15:44 BEIRUT - Syria appointed General Fahad Jassim al-Freij as defense minister, state television said, to replace Daoud Rajha who was killed in a bomb attack on Wednesday. Freij, who was previously the chief of staff of the armed forces, is from the province of Hama, a center of unrest in the 16-month-old revolt against President Bashar Assad

Assad’s kinsman Shawqat and defense minister Rajiha killed by suicide bomber
DEBKAfile Special Report July 18, 2012/Bashar Assad’s survival is in serious question after the deaths of his top allies, his brother-in-law Security Chief Assif Shawqat and Defense minister Gen. Dawoud Raijiha by a suicide bomber, while holding a top-level meeting in the National Security building in Damascus, Wednesday, July 18. Interior Minister Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ibrahim Shaair is in critical condition. This was the deadliest blow to the Assad regime in the 17-month Syrian uprising, striking deep inside the president’s inner circle and family: Shawqat was married to his sister. It took place on the fourth day of fierce fights with rebel forces which seized parts of Damascus and are battling superior government forces backed by heavy tank, artillery and machine gun fire and helicopters.
The bomber must have had an inside track to the top level of the Assad regime to have come close enough to reach a cabinet meeting with security officials in the heavily fortified National Security building and blow himself up among them. To ward off the rebel assault on the capital, the Syrian regime engaged in the high-risk tactic of letting them enter the southern districts of Damascus, to trap them and then finish them off with superior fire power. Assad meanwhile scattered his key government departments in fortified buildings around Damascus: The General Staff was assigned the military complex on Shuhada Street and the cabinet met at the National Security building. Now the Syrian ruler is forced to believe that all his security arrangements are deeply penetrated by his enemies who knew exactly where and when to strike.

Bomb kills Syrian ministers in blow to Assad
http://ca.news.yahoo.com/bomb-kills-syrian-defense-minister-damascus-battle-rages-104736393.html
By Dominic Evans and Khaled Yacoub Oweis | Reuters – BEIRUT/AMMAN (Reuters) - Syria's defense minister and President Bashar al-Assad's brother-in-law were killed in a Damascus suicide bomb attack carried out by a bodyguard on Wednesday, the most serious blow to Assad's high command in the country's 16-month-old rebellion.
The bomber, said by a security source to be a bodyguard assigned to Assad's inner circle, struck a meeting attended by ministers and senior security officials in the Syrian capital as battles raged within sight of the presidential palace. State television said Defence Minister Daoud Rajha and Assad's brother-in-law Assef Shawkat, the deputy defence minister, had been killed in a "terrorist bombing" and pledged to wipe out "criminal gangs".
A Syrian security source confirmed Shawkat, 62, was killed and said intelligence chief Hisham Bekhtyar was wounded. State television said Interior Minister Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaar had also been wounded in the blast. The men form the core of a military crisis unit led by Assad to take charge of crushing the revolt.
"The terrorist explosion which targeted the national security building in Damascus occurred during a meeting of ministers and a number of heads of (security) agencies," state television said.
Bashar has not appeared since the attack or made any statement, but sources with knowledge of the situation said the president was not at the meeting where the attack took place.
The attack came on a fourth day of fighting in the capital, where rebels from outside the city have brought the fight to end four decades of rule by the Assad family close to the power base of the ruling elite for the first time. Republican Guard troops sealed off the Shami hospital near the site of the explosion, activists said. An army statement issued after the blast said Syria was "more determined than ever to confront all forms of terrorism and chop off any hand that harms national security".
An army barracks near the "palace of the people", a huge Soviet-style complex overlooking the city from the western district of Dummar, came under rebel fire around 7.30 a.m. (0030 EDT), activists and a resident said. "I could hear the sound of small arms fire, and explosions are getting louder and louder from the direction of the barracks," Yasmine, an architect, said by telephone from Dummar.
FIRE IN THE BARRACKS
Video footage broadcast by activists appeared to show a fire in the barracks overnight as a result of an attack by mortar rounds, but residents who saw the fire said they had not heard explosions to indicate it was a result of an attack. Dummar is a secure area containing many auxiliary installations for the presidential palace and the barracks is just hundreds of meters from the palace itself.
Fighting also erupted overnight in the southern neighborhoods of Asali and Qadam, and Hajar al-Aswad and Tadamun - mainly Sunni Muslim districts housing Damascenes and Palestinian refugees.
Five explosion were later heard in the capital on Wednesday, close to the base of the 4th armored division, led by Assad's brother Maher, residents said.
Assad and the ruling elite belong to the minority Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam that has held power in Syria since a 1963 coup.
It has endured more than a year of rebellion but recent high level defections signaled support beginning to fall away.
Two Syrian brigadier-generals were among 600 Syrians who fled from Syria to Turkey overnight, a Turkish official said on Wednesday, bringing the number of Syrian generals sheltering in Turkey to 20, including a retired general.
OPPOSITION CAUTIOUS
In Damascus, government troops used heavy machine guns and anti-aircraft guns against rebels moving deep in residential neighborhoods, armed mostly with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades.
Rebels directed their fire overnight at a large state facility turned headquarters for pro-Assad militia, known as shabbiha, drawn mainly from Alawite enclaves in nearby hills.
Army tanks and anti-aircraft guns, used as an infantry weapon, took positions in the northern neighborhood of Barzeh, where hundreds of families from the neighboring district of Qaboun are seeking shelter.
"Anti-aircraft guns are firing at Qaboun from Barzeh. There are lots of families in the streets with no place to stay. They came from Qaboun and from the outskirts of Barzeh," said Bassem, one of the activists, speaking by telephone from Barzeh.
In the central neighborhood of Midan tanks and infantry fighting vehicles known as BDMs took positions in main thoroughfares and sporadic fighting was reported.
"Armor have not been able to enter the alleyways and old streets of Midan. The neighborhoods of old Zahra and the old area near Majed mosque are in the hands of the rebels," said Abu Mazen, an activist in the district.
Rebel fighters have called the intensified guerrilla attacks in recent days, which have targeted shabbiha buses, unmarked intelligence patrols and armored vehicles in the capital, the battle "for the liberation of Damascus".
But senior opposition figures took a more nuanced view.
"It is going to be difficult to sustain supply lines and the rebels may have to make a tactical withdrawal at one point, like they did in other cities," veteran opposition activist Fawaz Tello said from Istanbul.
"But what is clear is that Damascus has joined the revolt," Tello, a Damascene, told Reuters. "By hitting well known Sunni districts of the city, such as Midan, the regime is exposing the sectarian nature of the crackdown." The United Nations Security Council was scheduled to vote later on Wednesday in New York on a Western-backed resolution that threatens Assad's government with sanctions unless he stops using heavy weapons in towns and cities. Russia has declared it will block the move.
(Additional reporting by Oliver Holmes and Erika Soloman in Beirut and Jonathon Burch in Ankara; Writing by Philippa Fletcher; Editing by Peter Millership and Giles Elgood)

What’s al-Assad thinking now?
By Tariq Alhomayed/Asharq Al-Awsat
With the ongoing battles in the heart of the Syrian capital, the Syrian crisis may be carving out a different path with surprising results. Now the fires of the Syrian revolution are close to engulfing the tyrant of Damascus himself! The news that filtered through yesterday shows that al-Assad’s grip is now shaking, and that he has not only lost control of large parts of Syria but perhaps even Damascus.
Yesterday, the Israeli Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Aviv Kochavi, told the Knesset that al-Assad had transferred his troops from the Golan Heights to Damascus and other internal conflict areas. Likewise, the British Foreign Secretary, speaking from Jordan, said: “The situation is so grave and so unpredictable that I don't think any option should be ruled out in the future”, whilst the French and Americans issued warnings of al-Assad transferring chemical weapons to various sites within Syria, in addition to Baghdad calling on Iraqi nationals to leave! All these statements, events and information suggest that the situation in Syria is moving towards a new turning point, which may involve many surprises, and so the logical question is: How is al-Assad’s thinking now?
In order to answer this question we must be aware of a vital matter, namely that those who have met al-Assad recently say that the man lives in his own world and is completely detached from reality. This is evidenced by his last three interviews, showing that he does not care what is going on around him and does not sense any danger. This is also what Syria’s dissident ambassador to Iraq confirmed, when he said in a recent interview with the Sunday Telegraph that al-Assad was detached from reality. However the latest developments, and what is happening on the ground in Syria and Damascus in particular, in terms of battles and genuine, successive divisions, suggest that al-Assad has re-evaluated his position and we are now discovering the true order of his priorities. The withdrawal of al-Assad’s forces from the Golan Heights means that the real enemy for the Syrian President and his regime is not Israel, but rather the Syrians. This is despite the fact that the tyrant of Damascus, and his allies such as Hassan Nasrallah, still talk about the resistance and confronting “the Israeli enemy”, which tells us that al-Assad will not drown alone, but with all his allies, Nasrallah included.
Al-Assad’s thought process now is confined purely to carrying out more death and destruction, as all the political solutions are vanishing in front of him and there is no room for more tricks and procrastination. The Syrian President’s options to escape are also limited; he can either flee to Tehran or meet the same fate as Gaddafi, as it is no longer possible to secure the same terms as Ali Abdullah Saleh, Ben Ali or even Mubarak!Therefore, al-Assad is left with Gaddafi’s fate, or a sudden regime collapse, his escape, and then perhaps a military coup. This is a long overdue development that is now becoming increasingly likely with the continued fighting in Damascus. The fact that al-Assad is bringing more troops from the Golan Heights means that he has become a prisoner reliant on his forces, rather than their leader as he was in the past, especially with the increasing pace of military defections.

Regarding Iran, U.S. and Israel not on the same page at all
By Amos Harel | Jul.18, 2012/Haaretz
Differences on this issue could bring more serious consequences today than they have in the past. There will be a brief lull in the airborne conveyance of American VIPs to Israel, between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to the country on Monday, and the anticipated visit of Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta next week. For outward consumption, American and Israeli officials are striking diplomatic poses, and downplaying differences of opinion regarding actions to be taken, or not taken, regarding Iran's nuclear program. Clinton is likely to keep issuing pronouncements about how officials in Jerusalem and Washington "are on the same page" on this issue. Yet the uncharacteristic silence maintained by Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak in recent weeks about Iran, as well as the flying visits of top U.S. officials to this country, alternately stir and reflect worries in the Obama administration over the Netanyahu governments actual intentions toward Tehran.
Tension between Israel and the United States on the Iran question comes and goes with the seasons. Last fall, we witnessed similar tensions. However, differences on this issue could bring more serious consequences today than they have in the past. Despite Clinton's assurances that the Americans will display "prudence and creativity" while handling the Iranian file, America's analysis of what is happening in that country has remained static; nor has the Americans' stand on what should be done shown much development. The Obama administration continues to sanctify the sanctions, whereas Israeli officials have become increasingly skeptical about their efficacy. MK Roni Bar-On (Kadima ), chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, claimed on Monday that Iran is capable of dealing with sanctions imposed on it for another year, at least. Israel insists it cannot wait such a long time; the concern is that the Iranians will exploit a year of waiting to complete work on nuclear reactors and pass the "threshold" - the point at which they could produce nuclear weapons without Israel being able to stop them militarily. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has warned that Tehran could reach this threshold in another few months. People who have talked recently with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu say he is displaying firm determination about Israel's possible response to the Iranian nuclear program.
Should a decision ultimately be reached to launch an attack against the Iranian nuclear facilities, Netanyahu will have to brace for three problematic repercussions: a grave, probably unprecedented, crisis in relations with the United States; the possibility of continual rocket and missile fire against civilian targets in Israel; the possibility that international reservations about Israel's unilateral action would impede "follow-up" activity - continued international sanctions against Iran and steps to stop the Iranians from quickly rebuilding their nuclear program.
The rub is that the defense of Israel's home front and the continuation of pressure against Tehran depend greatly on U.S. cooperation. The procurement of crucial components needed to protect Israeli civilian areas against enemy missiles is largely dependent on the favorable disposition of the Americans. For the time being, they are showing restraint and tact with Israel. But that will change should Netanyahu ignore warnings from President Barack Obama and attack Iranian targets shortly before the November 6 U.S. elections. It could be that Clinton's blunt pronouncement on Monday, giving every indication that convicted spy Jonathan Pollard will spend the rest of his life behind bars, was tied to tensions and developments in U.S.-Israeli diplomacy over how to deal with Iran.

Dealing with Syria's Chemical Weapons: Military Options
Michael Eisenstadt /Washington Institute
July 17, 2012
Given the complexities of military action, Washington and its partners should pursue a policy of deterrence, assistance, containment, and elimination to prevent the use or diversion of Syria's chemical arsenal.
Growing violence in Syria has raised concerns that the Assad regime might use its massive stockpile of chemical weapons (CW) against the opposition, or that antiregime insurgents, al-Qaeda, Hizballah, or other states might divert some of these arms for their own use. Just yesterday, Nawaf al-Fares -- Syria's former ambassador to Iraq who recently defected to the opposition -- warned that the regime would use CW if cornered. Such concerns have prompted calls for action to deal with this threat. Yet past experience in Iraq and Libya demonstrates the complex nature of this operational and policy problem.
SYRIA'S CHEMICAL PROGRAM
Syria has probably the largest and most advanced chemical warfare program in the Arab world, reportedly including thousands of tube and rocket artillery rounds filled with mustard-type blister agents, thousands of bombs filled with the nerve agents sarin and possibly VX , and binary-type and cluster CW warheads filled with nerve agents for all its major missile systems. Its CW infrastructure is believed to include several production facilities and numerous storage sites, mostly dispersed throughout the western half of the country. (Syria is also believed to have a biological warfare research and development program, though it is not believed to have produced biological weapons.)
POSSIBLE SCENARIOS
The Syrian regime is not known to have used CW in the past; there is no evidence for longstanding rumors that it did so in Hama in 1982. Yet other governments in the region used CW against domestic opponents -- Yemen during its civil war in the 1960s, and Iraq against Kurdish and Shiite rebels in 1988 and 1991, respectively -- so such a scenario is not implausible in Syria. More likely, Damascus would increase its use of heavy artillery and aircraft before resorting to CW, though the growing role of shabbiha paramilitaries in the fighting complicates efforts to assess Syrian calculations regarding CW use.
Other scenarios presuppose the breakdown of security at CW storage facilities. For example, Syrian insurgents could use captured CW munitions against regime forces (just as some Iraqi insurgents used derelict CW munitions in improvised explosive devices against U.S. forces). Parts of the chemical stockpile could also be diverted by al-Qaeda, Hizballah, or even Iran, which reportedly destroyed its own CW stocks in the early 1990s prior to acceding to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Diversion by nonstate actors could be difficult and dangerous if they lacked proper protective gear, training, and logistical support. Bulk agent is stored in large containers that may be hard to move, and filled munitions might leak if they were of poor quality or inadequately maintained. Moreover, binary-type munitions require two chemical components that are likely stored separately, so diverted weapons of this sort would be useless unless both components were acquired. Due to these complexities, local insurgent groups might not consider CW worth the effort to obtain.
In the event of security breakdowns at storage facilities, the diversion of small numbers of munitions by local insurgents willing to accept the risks involved might not attract notice. Yet Israel and the United States are reportedly keeping many of Syria's CW-related facilities under surveillance, so larger diversions could prove difficult to accomplish without detection. Such a diversion would require trained personnel and a significant logistical effort -- therefore, it would likely be noticed, especially if it aimed to remove CW from the country (e.g., to Lebanon).
MILITARY OPTIONS
Israel, the United States, and other concerned countries could prevent the diversion or use of chemical weapons by launching airstrikes on CW bunkers (to deny access to the facilities or destroy munitions), or by sending in ground troops to physically secure storage facilities. Either option would require the neutralization or suppression of Syrian air defenses, further complicating an already difficult undertaking.
Airstrikes. The effectiveness of airstrikes would depend, in part, on the quality of the intelligence guiding them. In this regard, Iraq and Libya provide a cautionary lesson -- U.S. intelligence mischaracterized the scope and sophistication of CW programs in both countries. Thus, most of Iraq's then-extant CW arsenal survived the 1991 Gulf War because the United States lacked accurate intelligence on the regime's CW infrastructure, and because many munitions had been removed from storage bunkers and dispersed into open fields prior to the conflict. They were subsequently destroyed by the Iraqis and UN weapons inspectors.
Although direct aerial bombing might destroy large numbers of Syria's CW munitions, some chemical agents would likely be released into the air, endangering nearby civilians (though the downwind hazard could be mitigated by striking during favorable weather conditions). Moreover, many munitions would probably survive the strikes, leaving them vulnerable to pilferage -- presuming that looters had the proper protective gear to function in a contaminated environment. Alternatively, the entrances to mountainside CW bunkers could be obstructed by bombing and then mined from the air with cluster munitions. This would reduce the likelihood of any unintended release of agent while hindering access to entombed munitions.
Despite these limitations on airstrikes, Israel might be prompted to bomb particular CW storage facilities if it believed that Hizballah or al-Qaeda were in the process of pilfering munitions from them. It might also strike a Hizballah convoy transferring such munitions to Lebanon.
Boots on the ground. A more systematic approach to preventing diversion or use would be to insert special operations and conventional forces to seize and secure at-risk CW facilities. Depending on the scope of the effort, this could require thousands if not tens of thousands of troops and significant intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and air support -- though the 75,000 figure that some media outlets have attributed to Defense Department planners seems excessive. Such a force would need to be able to defend itself against both insurgent and regime forces. It must also be capable of operating in a contaminated environment should regime forces bombard CW sites in order to complicate its mission. Although U.S. allies could contribute important assets to such an effort (e.g., Jordan's Special Forces Brigade), it would have to be a U.S.-led effort, as few other countries have the forces and expertise required for such a mission.
Securing at-risk CW facilities would be only the beginning of a protracted accounting and elimination process that could take years. CW elimination is difficult enough to accomplish in a permissive environment (e.g., it took several years to destroy the bulk of Iraq's CW program in the early 1990s), even more so in a country still at war. Furthermore, the regime could inadvertently lose track of part of its CW inventory, mingling chemical with conventional munitions, as occurred in Iraq. This is especially true if it moves the weapons around to better secure them from the chaos of civil war.
Alternatively, if the regime uses its CW, the United States may be forced to deal with the consequences of a mass-casualty incident. This could include the insertion of small numbers of U.S. personnel into Syria to help create humanitarian enclaves or corridors and facilitate the provision of medical assistance to those affected.
CONCLUSION
Given these complexities, the preferred means of dealing with the problem of Syrian CW are deterrence, assistance, containment, and elimination.
Deterrence. Washington must convince the Assad regime that the use of CW is a game-changer that could prompt international military action. It should also spread the word among regime security forces that those complicit in the use of CW will be sought out and punished, while those who refuse orders to use CW will be assisted if they choose to escape the country, or shielded from retribution should the regime fall.
Assistance. To deal with the threat of diversion, the United States should quietly work with Russia, building on their history of cooperation on a variety of threat-reduction initiatives in order to offer Syria various means of maintaining accountability and control over its CW stockpile. While the United States does not have an interest in strengthening Assad, it does have an interest in the regime retaining control over its CW for as long as it is around (just as the United States offered the Soviet Union technology to help secure its nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, to avoid accidental or unauthorized use).
Containment. The United States should continue to work with Syria's neighbors to tighten border security and ensure that CW do not leak out of Syria. This includes being ready to support military efforts by allies to prevent the organized transfer of chemical munitions out of the country.
Elimination. Finally, if it has not done so already, Washington should begin planning to locate, secure, and eliminate Syria's chemical stockpile and infrastructure should the regime lose control of CW facilities or fall outright. It should also build on the lessons of Iraq and Libya in three ways: first, by preparing for the possibility that existing intelligence on Syria's CW is incorrect in fundamental ways; second, by realizing that the elimination of Syria's CW stockpile and infrastructure may have to be carried out under unsettled, perhaps even violent circumstances prior to or following the regime's fall; and third, by considering ways to find gainful employment for key Syrian CW engineers and scientists (as has been done for their counterparts in Russia, Iraq, and Libya) so that they are not recruited by other states of concern.
Michael Eisenstadt is director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute.

Iran: The chicken or the missile?
By Ali Ibrahim/Asharq Alawsat
A facetious news item in the British Daily Telegraph, entitled “Chickens facing censorship in Iran”, reported that a senior security official “has warned that films depicting scenes of chicken dinners could provoke the underprivileged classes to attack the rich”!
This is not the first report to expose Tehran’s attempts to direct media attention away from the economic problems caused by inflation and the effects of international economic sanctions. A week ago, the Iranian Minister of Culture warned the media against focusing on the economic hardships faced by the people due to the impact of sanctions, requesting the media’s cooperation to not highlight the country’s suffering in this regard. Likewise, an opinion poll on uranium enrichment conducted by a television station was withdrawn after it emerged that the majority of respondents were in favor of halting uranium enrichment in order to avoid sanctions. The withdrawal of the opinion poll was justified on the grounds that the results had been tampered with or that the sample of respondents was not valid.
It is ironic that these reports about the difficulties the Iranian people are facing in their everyday lives coincide with statements about new missiles being tested, nuclear progress, threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, and foreign expansion - with the funding and financial burden that this entails - especially with regards to Syria.
These are bold statements, intended to instill a sense of pride and belief in the Iranian people, whereas the reality of living they face is quite different, and the difficulties are growing as a result of these policies, as the talk of missiles and nuclear capabilities contrasts with the people’s simple, fundamental requirements.
The Iranian case is nothing new and is frequent amongst medium-size countries. The case of Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser was the best example of this in our region, whereby the country’s external ambitions represent a drain on internal potential and resources. It may be possible to carry the burden of these ambitions for a time, but after that it becomes an expensive, cumbersome and problematic issue within the state itself. The applause of supporters and followers abroad will not bring the chicken to the table, and a study of history shows that at a certain point, even great empires discover that the toll of their expansionist ambitions is more than enough to cause a collapse from within.
There is no harm in a country seeking to maximize its potential and encouraging its people to be proud of its achievements, but it seems that the Middle East is plagued by a school of thought that believes this is to be achieved through missiles, weapons, foreign adventures and militias...which leads to a climate of tension, conflict and instability. Meanwhile, the rest of the world knows that progress and prestige stems from the economy first and foremost. Indicators such as economic and scientific progress, average per capita income, production capacity, and services, whether health, education and so on, are signs of a strong nation.
The indicators currently come from Iran show that the economic sanctions, especially in the oil sector – the main source of the state’s income since taxes amount to less than 27 percent of revenue, have become a strain on the economy. However, as most of these sanctions are still in their infancy, they do not yet constitute the main burden on the state. It is certain that the cost of arming and funding programs to advance Iran’s external ambitions, or to support allied regimes such as Syria, is the main source of the current economic exhaustion, and sure enough it will also be the cause of overwhelming internal anger.

New York Times Shills for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
by Raymond Ibrahim/FrontPage Magazine
July 17, 2012
http://www.raymondibrahim.com/12001/new-york-times-shills-for-egypt-muslim-brotherhood
In a recent New York Times article titled, "As Islamists Gain Influence, Washington Reassess Who Its Friends Are," one Scott Shane does what the MSM does best: objectively list and discuss facts, but then offer an interpretation that has little grounding in reality.
NYT headquarters
The prevailing theme of his article is that there is "great change" in the Middle East, which certainly is true, though he fails to explain the fundamental factors behind this change, including the primary one that should interest Americans—namely, a counterproductive, if not irrational, U.S. Mideast policy. Nor does he explain the philosophical underpinnings of this failed policy—namely, the belief, pounded in every American child's head upon entering school, that all violence is a product of some grievance or material want: hence, all Islamic violence is a product of grievance and legitimate wants, all of which the U.S., under Obama, is going to satisfy by ensuring they gain control of Egypt—even as many Egyptians yesterday protested against Hilary Clinton's visit, insisting that "Egypt will not become Pakistan," a reference to the U.S. administration's obvious meddling in Egypt to empower the Sharia-enforcers.
Shane spends some time contrasting the Bush Administration "stark" Mideast policy, including its unwillingness to meet with the Muslim Brotherhood, with the Obama administration's willingness to meet, not only the Brotherhood, but members from the terrorist organization Al Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which Shane describes as having "renounced violence." Likewise, he argues that during the Bush years, "American officials did not always carefully distinguish between Islamists, who advocate a leading role for Islam in government, and violent jihadists, who espouse the same goal but advocate terrorism to achieve it."
He fails to acknowledge that what both "Islamists" and "violent jihadists" want—"a leading role for Islam in government," i.e., Sharia law—is in many respects the legal codification of terror: "a leading role for Islam in government" means whippings, beheading, amputations, sexual segregation, religious discrimination, death for apostates, and international hostility, even if only concealed, for the rest of the non-Islamic world, including the United States and especially its ally, Israel.
That Shane cannot—or will not—make this distinction is evident in the fact that he actually states that the Blind Sheikh's "guilt is questioned by many Egyptians, who see him as the victim of a conspiracy by the United States and Mr. Mubarak." Thus here is the NYT giving voice to yet another "Muslim conspiracy theory," about how the terrorist sheikh—whose many acts of terror include once issuing a fatwa permitting Muslims to ransack churches in Egypt to fund the jihad—may actually be "innocent."
And what was the Obama administration's excuse for secretly allowing another member of Al Gama'a al-Islamiyya—a group that, among other atrocities, slaughtered some 60 European tourists during the Luxor Massacre—to the White House? Simple: according to the State Dept, "It's a new day in Egypt. It's a new day in a lot of countries across the Middle East and North Africa." Adds Shane: "Long-held assumptions about who is a friend of the United States and who is not have been upset."
What does this utopian talk of a "new day" mean? What new event has caused "long-held assumptions about who is a friend of the United States" to be "upset"? In fact, a foremost factor is that, unlike former U.S. presidents, Obama threw the West's traditional Mideast allies under the bus, helping empower America's traditional enemies, the Islamists—all under the banner of "democracy." This is why there is a "new day." Yet Shane continues getting it backwards, writing "American hostility to Islamist movements, in fact, long predated Sept. 11, in part because of the United States' support for secular autocrats in Arab countries. During the 30-year rule of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was officially banned…"
This is distorted on several levels: First, Shane focuses on "American hostility to Islamist movements," not "Islamist hostility to America"—which is what prompted "American hostility" to the Islamists in the first place. Nor does he mention why U.S. foreign policy has traditionally been supportive of dictators: they are simply the better of two evils. A secular dictator is better than an Islamist one, who has an ideological agenda rooted in the 7th century. Yet reading the NYT article, everything is in a vacuum: the impression is that America was, for no good reason, inexplicably hostile to the Islamists, and inexplicably supportive of the dictators—dictators who in reality kept a lid on those who would violate both U.S. interests and the humanitarian rights of those Egyptians wishing not to live under Sharia law, the Islamists, who are now in power.
As one reads on, it becomes clear that Shane's distorted views are based on the distorted views of the "experts" he quotes. He writes that Morsi's "move on Sunday to revive the dissolved Parliament had Western experts scrambling to understand his strategy." Is it really hard to understand what Egypt's Islamist president was trying to do? Having won the presidency, and despite all his talk of rule of law, pluralism, etc., once president, he thought he could—as only the Muslim Brotherhood is notorious at doing—break his word and flagrantly return his Islamist friends to power. If "Western experts [were] scrambling to understand" this move, rest assured that virtually all Egyptian analysts, who are as realistic as only an Egyptian living in Egypt can be, saw Morsi's blunder for its sheer simplicity.
Shane closes his article with several assurances that "Experts on the Middle East" suggest that "Americans should not assume that the rise of Islamists puts the United States in greater danger from terrorists. The opposite may well be the case, they say."
He quotes the assurances of one Stephen McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy: "I would say people should not be too alarmed by the anti-American rhetoric"; McIlnerney adds that the end of Mubarak's rule in Egypt last year "is an important step in combating terrorism in the region and undermining its appeal." Go figure what this means. Anti-American rhetoric?—don't worry about it. Ousting the man who kept Islamic terrorists in prison?—this is "an important step in combating terrorism."
He also quotes one "Michele Dunne, an Egypt expert at the Atlantic Council, a Washington research institution," who confirms the same old line: "The major Egyptian terrorists, including the [blind] sheik and the current leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahri, were shaped by their rage against the Mubarak dictatorship. She further claims that "the movement of Islamists into mainstream politics should reduce the terrorism threat."
This is simply absurd, as it does not at all take the Islamists' own words, which consist of fatwas, treatises, and entire books unequivocally making clear that hostility for infidels—whether a secular regime or the United States—is a doctrinal matter, and not based on this or that grievance.
Worse, Shane closes with Dunne's warning: "If Islamist groups like the Brotherhood lose faith in democracy that's when there could be dire consequences."
Not quite. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists do not have any "faith" in democracy—which they always portray as an infidel practice to be exploited to empower Sharia. When it comes to Western things, the only thing they likely have faith in is the continued compliance of the Obama administration.