LCCC ENGLISH DAILY
NEWS BULLETIN
November 14/2013
Bible Quotation for today/God
Is Light
01 John 01/05-10: "Now the message
that we have heard from his Son and announce is this:
God is light, and there is no darkness at all in him.
If, then, we say that we have fellowship with him, yet
at the same time live in the darkness, we are lying both
in our words and in our actions. 7 But if we live in the
light—just as he is in the light—then we have fellowship
with one another, and the blood of Jesus, his Son,
purifies us from every sin. If we say that we have
no sin, we deceive ourselves, and there is no truth in
us. But if we confess our sins to God, he will
keep his promise and do what is right: he will forgive
us our sins and purify us from all our wrongdoing.
If we say that we have not sinned, we make a liar out of
God, and his word is not in us.
Latest analysis, editorials, studies, reports, letters & Releases from miscellaneous sources For November 14/13
Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources For November 14/13
Suleiman Urges
Disciplinary Authorities to Deal with Violations in State Institutions
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/President Michel Suleiman on Wednesday called
on the country's regulatory and disciplinary bodies to carry out their role
regarding violations taking place in state institutions and municipalities.
Suleiman headed a meeting for the disciplinary committee for municipalities,
which was attended by Caretaker Premier Najib Miqati, Caretaker Interior
Minister Marwan Charbel, the director-general of the presidency, Dr. Antoine
Shuqair, and head of the Higher Disciplinary Committee Judge Marwan Abboud. A
Baabda palace statement said Suleiman was briefed on the work that the
disciplinary committee for municipalities has carried out since its
establishment almost a year ago.The president urged the body, in addition to the
other disciplinary committees, to carry out their duties. He said the adoption
of an administrative decentralization law, along with the prerogatives that it
gives to local authorities necessitates efforts to put municipal officials in
the picture of accountability. The conferees agreed to follow up the
implementation of a circular issued by the caretaker PM on the necessary
measures to implement the law against violators. The meeting was preceded by
closed-door talks between Suleiman and Miqati who discussed the latest
developments and the president's visit to Saudi Arabia on Monday. Meanwhile,
Charbel issued a circular on Wednesday, saying the monitoring of construction
and the end of building violations lies on both the municipalities and the
Internal Security Forces.
He called for disciplinary measures against officials who issued illegal
licenses without technical inspection. Charbel had previously said it was the
duty of the municipalities not the police to deal with construction violations.
He later issued a circular to allow the ISF to take over the task of cracking
down on illegal construction after municipalities failed to do so and several of
them gave licenses to builders that the police deemed illegal. But the measures
led to protests in several areas and to disagreements whether some buildings
under construction were legal or not, resulting in Wednesday's circular.
Senseless criticism For President Michel Sleiman's Saudi Visit
November 13, 2013/The Daily Star
Even before President Michel Sleiman had landed in Saudi Arabia Monday, before
the purpose or outcome of his talks with King Abdullah were apparent, he had
faced a torrent of abuse from the March 8 coalition, an orchestrated campaign
that also accused the kingdom of blocking the formation of a new Cabinet. It was
a direct and aggressive assault on the visit, and seemed to represent a new
level of criticism from the bloc. It is one thing to slam talks after they have
taken place, but to do so before they have even opened smacks of blind
opposition, of taking a contrarian stance just for the sake of it. This is not a
position that is guided by Lebanese principles or interests, but rather by those
of external powers. This dangerous stance, which threatens ties between the two
countries and the position of Shiites in the kingdom, comes from a position of
obedience to Iran and a differing stance on the Syrian regime. Since the 1950s,
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Lebanon have enjoyed consistently close ties, on
levels ranging from the economy to tourism and industry. Hundreds of thousands
of Lebanese have made their fortunes in Saudi Arabia: Indeed, around 80 percent
of Lebanese millionaires achieved such success thanks to such a warm reception
in the country. And in Lebanon’s greatest times of need, Saudi Arabia has always
stood by to support the country, both politically and financially. After so much
essential infrastructure was destroyed by Israel in the 2006 war, the kingdom
was there to hold up the country and to inject gravely needed reserves into the
Central Bank, steps that helped the entire country, regardless of political
affiliation or religious sect. The outcome of Sleiman’s talks with Abdullah were
as supportive as to be expected. Saudi Arabia promised strengthened support for
the country and stressed the need for political stability. It committed itself
to increased aid for Syrian refugees in Lebanon and to a political solution to
end the civil war across the border. In the region, and certainly among the Gulf
Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia is an essential leader. The decisions that the
kingdom makes, others follow. As such it is clearly not in Lebanon’s interests
to attack Saudi Arabia, even were it not such a close friend. The petty, but
deep-seated and bitter, political squabbling and bickering between Lebanese
groups must be kept out of the country’s regional partnerships. The security and
stability of Lebanon – governmentless and fragile – depends upon these
relationships. The Lebanese people, battered daily by the corrupt and
directionless workings of local politicians, must be allowed to be spared the
further damages of a weakened position in the region. Let the country keep these
windows wide open. For we need the fresh air these partnerships can bring. Until
Lebanon is a self-sustaining island unto itself, attacks on our neighbors will
do nothing to help the country.
Sleiman asks for Hariri’s help in Cabinet formation
November 13, 2013 /By Hussein Dakroub/The Daily Star
BEIRUT: President Michel Sleiman has asked former Prime Minister Saad Hariri for
help in facilitating the formation of a new government, sources at Baabda Palace
said Tuesday, as the Cabinet crisis has entered its eighth month, deepened by
national divisions over the conflict in Syria. Sleiman met Hariri at the Guest
Palace in the Saudi capital Monday shortly after he had talks with Saudi King
Abdullah and other top Saudi officials at the king’s palace in Riyadh on the
Lebanese crisis, regional developments, the 31-month war in Syria and its
repercussions on Lebanon’s security and stability. Before returning to
Beirut Tuesday, Sleiman met in Riyadh with a delegation from the Lebanese
Business and Investment Council in Saudi Arabia. “President Sleiman consulted
with Hariri on the internal situation in Lebanon, particularly the Cabinet
crisis,” a source at Baabda Palace told The Daily Star.
“The president asked Hariri for help in facilitating the formation of a new
government by underlining the importance of all the parties to soften their
conditions over the shape of the Cabinet,” the source said.
“Sleiman stressed the importance of all the parties participating in the
government regardless of the number of ministers,” he added. “The president also
stressed the need to resume dialogue between the rival factions.”
Hariri’s response was not immediately known. As the head of the Future Movement,
which leads the March 14 coalition against the Hezbollah-led March 8 alliance,
Hariri’s stance on Sleiman’s request is deemed crucial concerning the Cabinet
deadlock.
Future MP Nouhad Mashnouq said Hariri’s participation in the Sleiman-Abdullah
meeting was “a clear message” from Saudi Arabia to all Lebanese that it
supported moderation, rather than religious extremism, in Lebanon.
Through Hariri’s participation in the Riyadh talks, “the Saudis sent a clear
message to all the Lebanese about their support for moderation. The Saudis’
declared political choice is moderation and this moderation is represented by
[former] Prime Minister Saad Hariri,” Mashnouq told OTV in an interview Tuesday
night. He said Hariri’s participation in the talks was also intended to refute
rumors of a political rift between the kingdom and the head of the Future
Movement. Political sources described Sleiman’s visit to Saudi Arabia as “highly
important,” saying the visit had given Lebanese-Saudi relations a new boost.
Hariri’s participation in the Sleiman-Abdullah meeting amounted to a Saudi
signal of its intention to facilitate the president’s mission on the Cabinet
formation, the sources said.The Baabda source said Sleiman’s talks with Saudi
officials did not touch on the Cabinet crisis or next year’s presidential
elections.
The parliamentary Future bloc praised Sleiman’s visit to Saudi Arabia, hoping
the outcome of the talks in Riyadh would serve the cause of state building in
Lebanon.
“The bloc hopes that this [Sleiman’s] visit, with its facts, results and
connotations, will be a major landmark on the road to boosting the state
building, applying the law and supporting the official security and political
institutions,” the bloc said in a statement issued after its weekly meeting. A
statement issued after their meeting in Riyadh said Sleiman and Abdullah
stressed the importance of maintaining security and stability in Lebanon in the
face of growing threats linked to the war in Syria. They also urged the March 8
and March 14 parties to abide by the Baabda Declaration to protect the country
from the repercussions of the Syrian turmoil.
Sleiman’s visit to Saudi Arabia coincided with a fierce campaign launched by
Hezbollah against the kingdom and its key ally in Lebanon, the Future Movement,
which the party blames for the Cabinet deadlock and paralysis in Parliament.
Hezbollah’s deputy leader Sheikh Naim Qassem said he did not expect positive
results from Sleiman’s visit to Saudi Arabia, describing it as “a normal visit.”
But Speaker Nabih Berri disagreed, saying he hoped that the president’s visit
would carry positive developments concerning the Cabinet stalemate, whereby all
the parties would accept the March 8 alliance’s proposal for a 9-9-6 Cabinet
lineup. He said that the 9-9-6 Cabinet proposal gives the March 14 coalition an
“absolute majority.”
“A 9-9-6 government is a golden opportunity for the March 14 alliance that
should not be missed,” Berri told Al-Joumhouria newspaper. The Future Movement
and its March 14 allies have rejected the 9-9-6 Cabinet proposal, which grants
veto power to both the March 8 and March 14 camps. Instead, the Future Movement
has demanded the formation of a neutral, nonpartisan government as a way out of
the Cabinet impasse.
In addition to praising the president’s visit to Riyadh, the Future bloc renewed
its call for Hezbollah to withdraw its fighters from Syria and abide by the
Baabda Declaration.
The bloc lashed out at Hezbollah’s escalation of its political campaigns against
the March 14 coalition and the group’s accusation of treason against its rivals.
While some Hezbollah officials and MPs have escalated their verbal attacks
against their rivals in the March 14 coalition, others called for dialogue and
the adoption of solutions that would bring parties closer, the Future statement
said. “This reflected the deep confusion and contradictions through which the
party is going at this stage,” it added. The bloc condemned Hezbollah’s approach
that is based on “arrogance, conceit and threats” in dealing with its Lebanese
rivals. “Hezbollah should offer proof of its seriousness [for dialogue] by
issuing a clear and honest declaration expressing its full commitment to the
Baabda Declaration and an immediate withdrawal of its fighters from Syria,” the
statement said. The bloc said Hezbollah should also affirm that Lebanon’s unity
and sovereignty can only be safeguarded “if it stops playing the role of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ regional arm and abandons its insistence on being
a military organization independent from the state.” The Future Movement has
said that Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Syria and its commitment to the Baabda
Declaration were essential for any partnership government with the party. Qassem
ruled out the formation of a new government without Hezbollah’s participation,
saying the Cabinet ball was in March 14’s court.
“No government [could be formed] without Hezbollah. We will not seek to form a
government without our [March 14] partners in the nation. The ball is in your
court and we are waiting,” Qassem told an Ashoura gathering in Beirut’s southern
suburbs.
Nasrallah Says
Resistance to Emerge 'Stronger' if Iran Deal Sealed, Warns of Targeting Ashura
Processions
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/
..Hizbullah Chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah assured on Wednesday that the
resistance will emerge stronger in case a deal was struck between Iran and
international powers.
Nasrallah surprised his supporters on Wednesday evening when he made a rare
public appearance in the Beirut neighborhood of Rweiss, on the tenth night of
Ashura.
A day before the annual popular procession is expected to take place, he warned
that “bombings, bloodshed and booby-trapped car explosions” could take place,
but he stressed, however, that nothing will stand between “people and (Imam)
Hussein.”
"If after the negotiations with Iran things head towards a war, everyone must
get worried, although others will become more preoccupied than us,” Nasrallah
said in his speech.
"But if an accord was reached, our party will become stronger and with a better
presence locally and regionally,” he added.
He elaborated: “When negotiations take place, usually allies of the
communicating poles get worried but we are not. Our allies do not worry us and
we have two allies only, Syria and Iran that have never abandoned us.”
“Do you expect that Iran will ask Hizbullah to abandon its rights, resistance
and hand over the country to the other faction? Those who know Iran's history
know that this will not happen.”
Iran and world powers failed to agree a deal on Tehran's disputed nuclear
program at talks in Geneva at the weekend but are planning to meet again on
November 20 for further negotiations.
Western diplomatic sources say the two sides were close to a deal, but that Iran
backed away because it was unhappy with some of the wording in the text
presented by the six powers.
The P5+1 is made up of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council
-- Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States -- plus Germany.
They have been negotiating with Tehran for years over its nuclear program, which
some suspect is aimed at developing a nuclear weapon -- a claim Iran vehemently
denies.
Nasrallah had started his Wednesday speech by pointing out to Israel's “efforts
to push for a war in the region.”
He said: "There is no doubt that Israel is pleased to observe what is happening
in the Arab and Islamic world, and to see the killing and the disputes between
nations and inside each country and each society.”
Nasrallah continued: “It used all its power lately to prepare for an attack on
Syria and today while the P5+1 are negotiating with Iran, (Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu gets furious and tries to obstruct an accord and
reaches out to his Arab allies.”
“Any accord that prevents a war in the region is rejected by Israel. It wants a
war that secures its power and security.”
Nasrallah accused some Arab countries of acting similarity to Israel by
rejecting any political solution in Syria and and an international agreement
with Iran.
Addressing Saudis, Qataris, Omanis, Kuwaitis and Emiratis, asked: “Where would a
war in the region lead to? Israelis know very well, and their allies as well,
that they can start a war anywhere but they cannot limit it to a certain
region.”
Regarding reports saying Israel has installed devices to spy on Lebanese
communications, Nasrallah remarked that Lebanon “has always been under threat.”
“The Lebanese must know that everything, from phone calls to things shared on
the internet, is spied on,” he said.
The Hizbullah chief announced his readiness to confront this issue, if the
Lebanese state fails to do so.
“If the state does not do anything to deal with this mater, the resistance would
do so many things,” he stated.
“When the state is incapable, the resistance will not give up its responsibility
and it is ready to assist in this respect.”
Speaker Nabih Berri revealed last Wednesday that Israel had set up a number of
espionage stations along its border with Lebanon, starting from al-Naqoura
passing by Khayyam all the way to Sheba.
The biggest espionage station is allegedly installed in al-Abbad and Jan al-Alam
areas, which are located near the U.N. demarcated Blue line.
Tackling local political concerns, the Shiite leader accused Saudi Arabia of
obstructing the formation of a new cabinet.
“There is a Saudi decision that calls on the March 14 alliance not to form a new
cabinet,” he said
He continued: “We have advised them (March 14) to separate Lebanese matters from
the Syrian crisis and not to bank on the developments of the neighboring
country's war.”
“All facts indicate that things are heading towards a direction that is not
desired by Saudi Arabia. All those waiting for a victory in Syria to form a
cabinet, we tell them you will not win in the Syrian war.”
Nasrallah urged the formulation of a new cabinet that is composed of 9 ministers
from the March 14 coalition, 9 ministers from the March 8 alliance, in addition
to 6 figures associated with President Michel Suleiman and premier-designate
Tammam Salam.
He warned: “The collapse of the state's bodies and institutional vacuum cannot
be dealt with by a caretaker cabinet.”
“We want a 9-9-6 council of ministers that preserves the rights of everyone.”
Judge Saqr
Rejects Lifting Legal Warrant against Ali Eid, Freeing Ahmed Ali
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/State
Commissioner to the Military Court Judge Saqr Saqr rebutted on Wednesday pleas
submitted by Arab Democratic Party leader's attorney, citing their “illegality”
as a reason. "Saqr examined a report of defenses submitted by Ali Eid and
(detained suspect) Ahmed Ali's lawyer Huyam Eid and rebutted them for failing to
conform to legal conditions,” the state-run National News Agency said. The NNA
added that a request to free Ali and another to lift the investigation and
search warrant issued against former MP Eid were also rejected. Saqr referred
the documents to First Military Investigation Judge Riyad Abu Ghida to take the
necessary decision in this matter. On Tuesday Eid evaded a summons to undergo
questioning by a military tribunal judge over his alleged aid to a suspect in
the mosque bombings of the northern city of Tripoli. Eid's attorney handed Abu
Ghida a report claiming that the suspect cannot attend the questioning session
for medical reasons. Lawyer Eid submitted the alibi to Abu Ghida, who referred
it to the military prosecutor, Judge Saqr, for the appropriate response. Abu
Ghida had issued on Thursday a subpoena against Eid and his drives Ali, on
charges of helping Ahmed Merhi escape justice by smuggling him to Syria.
Merhi is the suspected driver of the explosive-laden vehicle that blew up near
al-Taqwa mosque. Huyam Eid called on Tuesday for Ali's release and said the
military tribunal should withdraw the arrest warrant issued against the Arab
Democratic Party leader. The twin car bombings that targeted the Sunni al-Taqwa
and al-Salam mosques on August 23 have left hundreds of casualties.
Geagea: March 14
Adamant to Hold Presidential Polls on Time, No One is Capable of Imposing
Cabinet Agenda
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/The March 14 alliance will work hard to hold
the presidential elections at the end of President Michel Suleiman's mandate in
May next year, Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea said.
There will not be a repeat of previous elections in a sense that the mandate
expires without being able to elect a new president, Geagea said.
“The Lebanese Constitution is very clear when it says that if a new president
was not elected ten days before the end of the current head of state's tenure,
then the parliament would meet automatically to elect a new president,” he told
the Saudi Okaz daily in an interview.
Geagea rejected vacuum in the country's top post and reiterated that he wasn’t
“currently” a candidate.
“But I will say it out loud when I decide to announce my candidacy, which will
be accompanied by a very clear program because the campaign will not be a
hobby,” he said. Asked about the cabinet that Prime Minister-designate Tammam
Salam is seeking to form since his appointment in April, Geagea said: “The
government should be made up of personalities from outside the March 8 and 14
alliances.”He said it should be a technical cabinet that deals with the people's
daily affairs.
“Currently neither March 8 or March 14 are capable of imposing their agenda,” he
added.
Geagea also slammed Hizbullah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, wondering “what
victories he has achieved.”
“I believe that in the past 13 years and specifically since Israel's withdrawal
from southern Lebanon, Hizbullah has been defeated,” he said, adding “its latest
defeat was its involvement in the fighting in Syria against the Syrian
people.”Hizbullah members are fighting alongside President Bashar Assad's troops
against the rebels that are trying to topple him.
Hizbullah and Nasrallah “have become the enemies of the Arab and Islamic
people,” Geagea told Okaz. “Is that called victory?” the LF chief asked in
reference to the latest remarks made by the party's secretary-general in a
speech last week.
Geagea reiterated that Nasrallah is following “an ideology whose authority is
outside Lebanon … and whose interests contradict Lebanese interests most of the
time.”The LF chief lauded Suleiman's one-day visit to Saudi Arabia on Monday,
describing Riyadh as “the heart of the Arab and regional politics.”
Saudi Arabia had always supported Lebanon and its leaders did no harm to the
Lebanese people and their interests, he said.
The trip came at the appropriate timing, Geagea added, after several local
parties criticized Suleiman for making the visit during bad circumstances.
Saniora Slams Hizbullah, Urges its Withdrawal from Syria to
be Included in Cabinet Lineup
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/Head of al-Mustaqbal parliamentary bloc MP
Fouad Saniora reiterated on Wednesday that Hizbullah should withdraw from the
neighboring country Syria before it participates in any cabinet lineup.“There
are only two options either Hizbullah returns from Syria and we agree on a
cabinet formation together or a non-political government would be formed and we
resume the all-party talks,” Saniora said in comments published in the Kuwaiti
al-Rai newspaper.He stressed that the 9-9-6 formula, which was proposed by
Progressive Socialist Party leader MP Walid Jumblat, will only inflict further
division and chaos among the rival parties.“We have already seen the results of
such a cabinet lineup,” Saniora stressed.The Mustaqbal lawmaker pointed out that
the main point of contention is “Hizbullah's military involvement in battles in
Syria, shifting away from the Baabda Declaration that the party described as
merely ink on paper.”Saniora stressed that “two wrongs don't make it
right.”Asked if a cabinet that doesn't represent the March 14 and 8 alliances
would survive, the ex-PM said: “such cabinet could deal with the people's daily
interests and security, while we (March 14 and 8 coalitions) resume the national
dialogue.”Endeavors are ongoing to end the cabinet deadlock amid reports that
President Michel Suleiman insists on forming it ahead of the Independence Day on
November 22 based on any distribution of portfolios as long as the rival parties
agree.Prime Minister-designate Tammam Salam continuously said that conditions
and counter-conditions set by the rival sides have brought his efforts to form a
cabinet to a stalemate. Since his appointment to form a cabinet in April, Salam
has been seeking the formation of a 24-member cabinet in which the March 8,
March 14 and centrists camps would each get eight ministers. However, Hizbullah
chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah expressed support to Jumblat's proposal to form a
new cabinet in which the March 8 and 14 alliances would get nine ministers each
and six ministers would be given to the centrists – Suleiman, Salam and
Jumblat.This formula prevents a certain party from controlling the government by
giving veto power to Hizbullah and its team and another veto power to March 14,
he said.
Berri Assures Will Follow Up on Israeli Espionage Activities 'Until the End'
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/ Speaker Nabih Berri expressed his relief on
Wednesday over the conclusions reached at the telecommunications committee's
meeting on the Israeli spying report, praising also parliamentary “consensus” to
confront Israel's activities. Berri urged during his weekly Wednesday talks with
parliamentary blocs “continuing to exert necessary efforts” in this matter."The
parliament will follow up on this issue until the end,” Berri assured, according
to the state-run National News Agency. "This is a purely national case and it
concerns the state, its institutions and all the Lebanese,” he said. The
parliamentary telecommunications committee denounced on Monday the Israeli
espionage stations along the border as violation of Lebanon's sovereignty,
pointing out that it is happening despite the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1701 and the presence of the UNIFIL. The committee's meeting came
after the speaker revealed on Wednesday that Israel had set up a number of
espionage stations along its border with Lebanon, starting from al-Naqoura
passing by Khayyam all the way to Sheba.The biggest espionage station is
allegedly installed in al-Abbad and Jan al-Alam areas, which are located near
the U.N. demarcated Blue line.Source/Agence France Presse.
Nasrallah: Killing shows country on dangerous path
November 13, 2013/By Antoine Amrieh/The Daily Star
TRIPOLI, Lebanon: Hezbollah Secretary-General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah condemned
the killing Tuesday of pro-Hezbollah Sunni Sheikh Saadeddine Ghiyyeh, warning
that the assassination was blatant proof of the dangerous path events in the
country and in Tripoli in particular were taking. “This assassination is a
dangerous indicator and proof of the ominous path events are taking in Tripoli,
in particular, and Lebanon in general,” Nasrallah said in a video addressing
supporters in the Beirut southern suburbs, who were gathered for an Ashoura
ceremony. March 8 parties and officials also condemned the killing arguing that
violent rhetoric in Tripoli incited a masked gunmen to assassinate Ghiyyeh.
Nasrallah described the killing as an act directly targeting the resistance.
“This targets everyone who has the courage to express a view that is different
than the ideas of the takfiri groups of Lebanon and the region,” Nasrallah said.
He also voiced surprise that some political groups in Lebanon ignored the crime.
The Hezbollah leader called on the state to deal with the assassination of
Ghiyyeh just as it dealt with the explosions that rocked Beirut’s southern
suburbs and Tripoli in July and August. A security source told The Daily Star
that one of two gunmen on a motorcycle shot Ghiyyeh in the head, neck, shoulder
and chest. Ghiyyeh was later transferred to Sayidet al-Hayat Hospital in Zghorta,
where he died of his wounds, a source at the hospital told The Daily Star.
The security source said the gunman shot Ghiyyeh at close range as he attempted
to get into his car parked outside his house in Buhsa, Tripoli. Ghiyyeh is an
official in the Islamic Action Front and is close to pro-Syrian regime Sheikh
Hashem Minqara, the head of the Islamic Tawhid Party. Several months ago,
Minqara was briefly arrested after he was accused of withholding information
about the August bombs in Tripoli that killed at least 47 people and wounded
hundreds more. Hezbollah and the Islamic Action Front also have a history of
close ties. Hezbollah also condemned the killing in a statement, saying such a
murder was a product of the divisive sectarian rhetoric in the country,
particularly in Tripoli. On Tuesday, Minqara spoke publicly about Ghiyyeh’s
killing and called on the government to “uncover the criminals so that they get
maximum punishment.”
“The state should put an end to the deteriorating and unprecedented security
situation before it’s too late,” Minqara said in a televised news conference,
reading a statement by the Islamic Tawhid Party. “Who will stop this madness in
Tripoli?” he asked. Tuesday’s killing was the result of fiery speeches by
political and religious figures, and this violence will continue to escalate
against both supporters and opponents of the Syrian regime, he said.
“I hope everyone recognizes the danger of this critical phase,” he said.
Security agencies cordoned off the assassination scene and forensic teams
stepped in. The crime sparked fears among Tripoli residents of possible
retaliation by supporters of Minqara and the Islamic Action Front. Some shops
shut down as a result.
Reaction from the Future Movement was limited. Commenting on the assassination,
Mustafa Alloush, a Future Movement official, said he did not know Ghiyyeh, but
he opposed the “logic of killing, regardless of who it targeted.” The former MP
said that people committing such acts of violence actually served the Syrian
regime’s ends. He did not elaborate on how. Following its weekly meeting, the
Future parliamentary bloc did not comment on the matter. For his part, caretaker
Sports and Youth Minister Faisal Karami condemned the killing in a statement.
“I can only say that stopping the bloodshed is a patriotic and religious
obligation in these difficult days,” said Karami, who hails from Tripoli.
“Everyone involved in any criminal act is punishable under the law.”
Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun said the assassination of Ghiyyeh
indicated that Tripoli was under the control of terrorists. “There is no
security decision to stop problems in Tripoli – this is a joke,” Aoun told
reporters after chairing the weekly meeting of the FPM bloc at his Rabieh
residence. Sheikh Abdel-Amir Qabalan, vice president of the Higher Shiite
Council, also condemned the crime as a terrorist act. Qabalan said the killing
of Ghiyyeh, whose stances he described as moderate and open, aimed to kill
wisdom, cooperation and openness. “It is the result of incitement to kill and
spreading takfiri ideas that are sweeping the region and not sparing Lebanon,”
Qabalan said in a statement. Qabalan called on the Army, other security bodies
and the judiciary to punish the perpetrators to set an example.
Hariri's
Participation in Suleiman-King Abdullah Meeting a Point of Contention
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/Conflicting reports emerged on
Wednesday over whether President Michel Suleiman was aware that former Prime
Minister Saad Hariri would be present during his meeting with Saudi King
Abdullah in Riyadh. According to As Safir newspaper, Suleiman wasn't informed
about Hariri's participation, wondering in a report about the aim of such a move
by Saudi Arabia.
Diplomatic sources told the newspaper that Saudi Arabia deliberately invited
Hariri to attend the meeting as a message to local and foreign parties that
settling the Lebanese political crises will not happen without Hariri. The
newspaper reported that during the meeting, which took place in Riyadh on Monday
during Suleiman's one-day official visit to the Saudi capital, Hariri had a
brief 10 minutes address.
Presidential Palace sources considered in comments published in As Safir that
the royal will regarding Hariri's participation can not be “rejected.” the
sources noted that the President wasn't annoyed by the matter as the point
behind his visit to Saudi Arabia was to bridge the gap between the rival
parties. However, al-Joumhouria newspaper reported on Wednesday that Suleiman
was not dismayed by Hariri's participation in his meeting with King Abdullah.
According to the daily, the Saudi Royal Diwan previously informed the Baabda
Palace about the matter. Sources close to al-Mustaqbal movement, which is led by
Hariri, told the newspaper that Riyadh wanted to stress by Hariri's
participation on his key role in the local Lebanese affairs. “The matter isn't
to target PM-designate Tammam Salam, who already has the support of Saudi Arabia
and Hariri, but rather to stress on his role,” the sources pointed out. The
president returned on Tuesday from Saudi Arabia, where a day earlier he held
talks with King Abdullah during a meeting attended by Hariri, top Saudi
officials, including Crown Prince Salman and the Saudi ministers of foreign
affairs, interior and information. For his part Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali
Awadh Asiri said in comments published in the Saudi newspaper Okaz that the
meeting between King Abdullah and Suleiman was “fruitful and positive,” without
mentioning Hariri. He pointed out that the two officials addressed the bilateral
ties and ways to boost cooperation between the two countries. “Suleiman's visit
reflects the depth of the Saudi-Lebanese ties,” Asiri told the newspaper,
stressing that it was a perfect opportunity to respond to those who decided to
forget the fundamental role played by the kingdom. According to As Safir
newspaper, Suleiman didn't receive any clear answers about the cabinet crisis. A
member in Suleiman's delegation that the President agreed with the Saudi
officials on the importance of resolving the government deadlock, stressing that
the details weren't discussed. “Saudi Arabia doesn't interfere in the matter but
blesses the steps taken to end the dispute,” the source said.
Syria War Leads to Rise of Kidnappings in Lebanon
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/For nearly
three weeks, kidnappers held Lebanese pharmacist Wissam Khatib, threatening to
kill him and his children if his family didn't pay a ransom of tens of thousands
of dollars.
During his captivity, Khatib — often shackled and blindfolded — went through
depression, terror, pain. But, he says, the trauma was not a surprise. A
well-to-do pharmacist in the eastern city of Zahle, the 40-year-old Khatib knew
he was a target. He had escaped one kidnapping attempt in August, when he saw
masked gunmen approaching his pharmacy and fled before they saw him. He expected
them to return, knowing that Lebanon's weak security forces couldn't help him.
"The state knew, security forces knew, but they didn't help me at all," Khatib
told The Associated Press.
Hostage-taking of wealthy businessmen in Lebanon has risen more than seven-fold
in an unlikely knock-on effect from Syria's civil war. Security officials say
gangs who once made their money smuggling fuel and contraband through the porous
Syria-Lebanon border have watched their trade wither because of the violence, so
they are turning to kidnapping to make a profit.
Lebanon is suffering multiple woes from the war next door. The tiny country,
with a population of 4.5 million, has been flooded with an estimated 1 million
Syrians fleeing the conflict. Also, tensions between its Sunni and Shiite
communities have spiked, sometimes exploding into deadly clashes, mirroring the
sectarian hatreds in Syria, where Sunnis largely support the rebellion, and
Shiites and the Alawite sect back President Bashar Assad. The kidnapping wave —
a more indirect repercussion — illustrates the multiple, unexpected ways that
Lebanon, with its fragile hold on security, is vulnerable to the turmoil across
the border. There are fears the problem could spread — and that abductions could
spread beyond criminal activity and into political motives — as Syria's war,
which began in March 2011, continues. "The reason why there are so many
kidnappings is because the state is failing. State security is unable and cannot
work," warned Lebanese security analyst Nizar Abdul-Qader. Security officials
acknowledge they are overwhelmed by the mounting problems rooted in Syria's
conflict.
"The weight on the state is heavy — it's above what the state can handle," said
one official in the Interior Ministry, which is in charge of security forces. He
said such kidnappings for ransom in the past were "very, very rare."The Internal
Security Forces recorded 73 kidnappings between August 2011 and September 2013.
In contrast, there were 14 cases total in the previous five years.
Most of the abductions take place in the eastern Bekaa Valley, where heavily
armed clans hold sway, some of them involved in the smuggling trade.
Gangs once made their money sneaking cheap cigarettes, fuel, clothes and other
items into Lebanon from Syria. But now, unable to freely pass through areas in
Syria that have become war zones, they've turned their hand to kidnappings at
home, three security officials told AP. They've found accomplices among Syrian
and Lebanese men struggling in Lebanon's economy, hit hard by the war next door,
the officials said.
The kidnapping is creating a sense of palpable panic. Lebanese media routinely
runs pleas from families of the abducted.
On Oct. 12, the family of one seized man, Ramez Bahnam, went on TV to plead with
the kidnappers to release him, saying his health would deteriorate. Hours later,
they asked the kidnappers "to ensure he is taking his medicine regularly."
Bahnam was released eight days later. The security officials said most
kidnappings end with ransoms being paid, usually less than the high initial
demands made by kidnappers, though families are usually reluctant to acknowledge
paying, in part out of fears of becoming repeat targets.
Khatib, the pharmacist, said he was snatched in late September. As he opened his
pharmacy in the early morning, masked gunmen screeched up in a car and forced
him in. During 17 days in captivity, he was blindfolded and shackled, with the
gunmen telling him they would kill his children if his family didn't pay the
ransom. They also called his family, threatening to kill him. "I said, 'Kill me.
Shred me to bits. But my family, nobody touches them,'" Khatib said. He was
released on Oct. 16. Khatib denied paying any ransom, saying his kidnappers
freed him because of pressure from tribal leaders, but the security officials
said they believe some money was paid.
Among those snatched was Youssef Loubani, a 50-year-old Palestinian businessman
living in Lebanon, whose kidnapping in the Bekaa Valley was reported on Nov. 4.
He was released two days later, likely after his family paid off the kidnappers,
a security official said. The new kidnappings have overwhelmingly targeted
Lebanese and Arabs living in the country, not Westerners. So far, there's little
interest in foreigners because of the media attention they attract, said
analysts of the British risk-assessment firm Drum Cussac Information Services.
But in November, two German men were briefly seized en route to the Bekaa town
of Shleifa. It wasn't clear why: Two security officials said the abduction came
after an argument with drug dealers, but a third said the Germans were taken at
gunpoint and ordered to pay for their freedom. While the wave of kidnappings is
criminal in nature, there has been one major one more directly connected to
Syria's war. In August, Lebanese gunmen kidnapped two Turkish pilots near Beirut
airport, in retaliation for the abduction of nine Lebanese Shiite men by rebels
in Syria in May 2012. The Shiites and Turks were freed last month under a three
way deal that also freed a group of women held in Syrian prisons. Analysts and
officials say al-Qaida-style kidnappings that often end with the slaughtering of
their hostages is a distant scenario for now. But they warned Lebanon was
vulnerable. The risk would grow if al-Qaida sought to punish Western countries,
for instance, for becoming publicly involved in the Syrian crisis or were
perceived to side with the Assad government, analysts of Drum Cussac Information
Services said in a written response to questions. "Should the security situation
in Lebanon degrade even further, there is indeed an elevated potential for such
activity to occur," they said.
How to Fix the
Iran Nuclear Deal
By: Dennis Ross/Washington Institute
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-to-fix-the-iran-nuclear-deal
New Republic
The administration needs to reassure its allies that the West can reach a
limited nuclear agreement without damaging its negotiating position or the
sanctions architecture.
As Secretary of State John Kerry and other ministers arrived in Geneva this past
weekend, expectations rose that a limited agreement might be reached on the
Iranian nuclear program. It was not, but the next meeting is already set for
November 20, and while debate is likely to become more intense as to whether a
limited agreement makes sense at this time, there is value in taking a step back
and asking what might be achieved at this point and what could make it
acceptable.
To begin with, it is worth recalling that "freeze for freeze" was a proposal
that Javier Solana, representing the European Union, sought to produce in talks
with his Iranian counterparts in 2007. The idea was the Iranians would freeze
the development of their nuclear program -- meaning the enrichment of uranium
and production of centrifuges -- in return for the freezing of sanctions on
Iran. At the time, Iran's nuclear program had not accumulated even one bomb's
worth of material and its centrifuges numbered a tiny fraction of what they have
operating and installed today -- and while the Bush Administration supported the
proposal, it was not part of the EU three's direct negotiations with the
Iranians.
The freeze for freeze idea was never accepted by the Iranians, even though it
was envisioned to be an initial step in a process to reach a wider agreement.
Today, a variation of the freeze for freeze idea, also as the first step in a
process, may be in the offing. To be sure, the realities are quite different
than they were six years ago. Today, the United States is very much involved in
the negotiations; Iran has accumulated as much as six bombs worth of enriched
uranium, has produced close to 19,000 centrifuges, including more than a
thousand of the next generation of IR-2 centrifuges which may be five times as
efficient as their IR-1 predecessors; and is building a heavy water plant
capable of yielding plutonium. And, of course, unlike six years ago, the
Iranians are suffering from the weight of unprecedented economic sanctions.
The deal that was brooded in Geneva and may soon emerge might be described not
as a freeze for a freeze but as a "cap for a cap" -- meaning that there would be
a cap on the Iranian nuclear program and a cap on the sanctions that are being
imposed on the Iranians. The Iranians would essentially suspend their enrichment
of uranium at 20 percent, begin the process of converting it to fuel or diluting
it to a less purified form, and not add to the number of centrifuges they have
operating. While the Iranians operate and spin close to 10,000 centrifuges, a
little more than half of what they have actually produced, they would not add to
their overall number. But they would, however, be able to replace those
centrifuges that break down, meaning that the Iranians would be permitted to
continue to enrich uranium at the 3.5 to 5 percent level. So enrichment would be
capped only at the level that uranium is purified and not by the amount that
could still be accumulated.
There is one other important part of the Iranian nuclear program that is still
at issue right now in the emerging deal: The heavy water plant the Iranians are
building at Arak. The issue seems to be whether all work on it will be suspended
for the six months of the "first step" deal. Heavy water would enable the
Iranians to have an additional pathway to producing a nuclear bomb -- either
through plutonium or through enriching uranium to weapons grade. Certainly, if
the work on the Arak reactor is not suspended, the Iranians could continue down
the path that would enable them to finish the plant by the end of 2014; once
on-line, the plant could not be attacked without releasing Chernobyl-type
radiation into the surrounding area and atmosphere. Indeed, the reason the
Israelis attacked the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 and the Syrian reactor at
al-Khybar in 2006 before they became operational was to avoid the possibility of
radiation releases.
In short, the emerging deal is one that would cap but not limit all of the
Iranian nuclear program. In return for that, the sanctions regime would not be
lifted, but a part of it would be relaxed. While the sanctions that restrict the
Iranian ability to sell their oil and conduct normal financial transactions
would not be touched, the Iranians would be allowed to access perhaps as much as
$15 billion of its hard currency in foreign banks, trade in gold and precious
metals, and apparently be able to import limited materials for some of its
domestic industries.
One other point about the emerging deal: it is designed to be the first step in
advance of reaching what might be described as an agreed definition of the civil
nuclear power that Iran would be permitted to have. For the United States, the
key is to ensure that the Iranian nuclear program would not leave Iran in a
position in which it would have a break-out capability that would permit it to
move quickly or at a time of its choosing to produce nuclear weapons. For the
Iranians, they would be able to enrich, and the restrictions on their program
would not single them out or undo their basic achievements. In theory, it ought
to be possible to bridge the gaps if the Iranians are actually willing to have
only a demonstrably peaceful nuclear capability.
At this point, it appears that the Obama Administration and its partners in the
negotiations believe that President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif
are willing to curtail the Iranian nuclear program but cannot, at this stage, go
as far as we need them to go in extensively rolling back their nuclear
infrastructure -- and we cannot lift the crippling sanctions on them unless they
do so. On the one hand, we need time to negotiate a more far-reaching agreement
-- or at least test whether it is possible; on the other, we don't want them to
continue to advance their nuclear program in the intervening period. The
so-called first step agreement is, thus, designed to buy us time by capping or
limiting the Iranian nuclear infrastructure and development; in return for
accepting such a cap, the Iranians would get a limited relaxation of sanctions.
The Administration believes that we retain our leverage because the core
sanctions regime will remain in place and the Iranian economy cannot recover
without ending that regime.
And here is the rub with the Israelis and others in the Middle East: They fear
that the limited relaxation of sanctions will quickly erode the sanctions
regime. Notwithstanding our claims that the sanctions architecture will remain
in place, there is a widespread belief in the Israeli security establishment
that many governments and their private sectors will see an opening and will be
convinced that they can and will be able to start doing business again. As they
start approaching the Iranians, the Iranians will see that the sanctions are
going to fray and they simply need to hang tough and concede no more. From the
Israeli standpoint, the first step will thus be the last one and the Iranian
program, even if capped, will be at such a high threshold that Iran will have a
break-out capability. They see no reason to give up our leverage now and let the
Iranians off the hook.
For its part, the Administration believes it is not doing so. It sees the
Iranian economic needs remaining great, the limited relaxation can buy Rouhani
more political space and the authority to negotiate more -- something he must do
if Iran is to recover economically at a time when the expectations are again
growing among the Iranian public. To dash those expectations won't just weaken
Rouhani but ultimately threaten the regime itself -- or so the Administration
seems to think. As such, it sees the limited agreement as weakening neither our
negotiating position nor the sanctions architecture. Is it possible to bridge
this divide in a way that also serves the aim of rolling the Iranian nuclear
program back?
I believe so. First, we must be clear that the easing of sanctions will, in
fact, be limited and will not affect our enforcement of existing sanctions and
those who try to evade them. We will continue to vigorously pursue all loopholes
and efforts to work around sanctions. This also means that we must continue to
emphasize the reputational costs to any businesses that seek to resume commerce
directly or indirectly with Iran.
Second, while the Administration has asked Congress to hold back on adopting new
sanctions for now so as not to undercut Rouhani, I think we must also recognize
the importance of signaling the Iranians and everyone else that there will be an
intensification of sanctions if the diplomacy fails to produce an end-game
agreement. Rouhani is president precisely because of the high cost of sanctions.
There should be no illusions about what happens if diplomacy fails to
significantly roll back the Iranian nuclear program. We don't do Rouhani any
favors if the appearance takes hold that there will be no more sanctions -- even
if there are no more agreements. From that standpoint, why not accept an
approach in which the Congress adopts the next wave of sanctions but agree that
they will not be implemented until the end of the six month period of the first
step agreement or a clear break down of diplomacy.
Third, at least with our friends who are concerned about what they perceive as
our eagerness for any deal with the Iranians -- and this perception is held even
more deeply among our Arab friends than the Israelis -- we should be clearer
about what we mean by rolling-back the Iranian nuclear program. I understand not
wanting to negotiate among ourselves and not giving away bottom lines, but one
reason the first step deal seems so alarming to the Israelis and others is they
don't know what we mean by a bad deal at the end of the day. They seem to think
that we are so eager to avoid the use of force, given public opinion, that we
will accept anything. We need to let others know, at least privately, that
prevention remains the objective and has always meant that if diplomacy fails,
force is the likely result. In addition, we should also make clear that we have
a number of absolute requirements for any nuclear end-state agreement: Iran must
dramatically reduce the number of centrifuges, ship out essentially all of its
enriched uranium and, at a minimum, convert its heavy water plant into a light
water reactor. In short, we must convey more clearly that we know where we are
going on the nuclear issue with Iran.
The benefit of leveling in this fashion is that it not only puts the Iranians on
notice but also reassures our friends in the area. That may be especially
important at a time when the Administration needs to send a message other than
that it is lessening our interests and stakes in the region and has bigger fish
to fry elsewhere in the world.
**Dennis Ross is counselor at The Washington Institute.
The Myth of the
Shi’a Crescent
By: Laurence Louër/Asharq Alawsat
http://www.aawsat.net/2013/11/article55322216
The notion of “Shi’a crescent” was first articulated in late 2004 by King
Abdullah of Jordan in an interview he gave a few weeks before the first
parliamentary elections in Iraq, in which he expressed his fears about the
growing influence of Iran in the Arab Middle East. Since then, the “Shi’a
crescent” has been used extensively in the media in its analysis of the
reshaping of Middle Eastern politics. Several developments in the region have
fed into this narrative: the ongoing role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and its more
recent involvement in the Syrian civil war, the fact that Bashar Al-Assad’s
regime draws much of its support from Alawites (an offshoot of Shi’a Islam), and
accusations of an alliance between Iran and Yemen’s Houthi rebels, to name just
a few. The success of this expression reveals some of the preconceptions that
circulate, in the Middle East and elsewhere, about the Arab Shi’a and their
relations with Iran. First, the Shi’a are seen as constituting a unified body
that crosses national borders that puts obedience to religious authority higher
than loyalty to nation and political rulers. Secondly, the Shi’a are considered
inherently tied to Iran, a state that would command both their religious and
political loyalty. These views are not only distorting the reality: They lead to
dangerous domestic and foreign policies that undermine social integration and
political stability, and feed the rhetoric of the radical Salafists who are
doing so much to create sectarian discord.
A multipolar Shi’a world
A distinct feature of contemporary Shi’ism is the existence of a clerical class
with an important cultural role. It is dominated by large families, often
claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammed, who are organized on a transnational
and trans-ethnic basis, with branches scattered to the main corners of the Shi’a
world. However, this has not had the effect of unifying the Shi’a into a single
body. In fact, in this case the opposite has occurred, with Shi’a clerics
divided between rival poles of religious authority, promoting different views
and competing for influence in society. The most well-known of these rivalries
is between the cities of Najaf and Qom.
Over the course of the 19th century, Najaf became the main religious learning
center and the place of residence of the most influential Shi’a religious
scholars. It is there that the doctrine of the marjaiya al-taqlid (“the source
of emulation”) was elaborated. Enjoying canonical status today, it stipulates
that every Shi’ite who has not reached the capacity to practice ijtihad
(literally “diligence,” but here meaning the independent interpretation of
religious law) must follow the views of a particularly knowledgeable religious
scholar called the marja (al-taqlid). The rulings of the marja are spread
through networks of agents (wakil), official representatives of the marja and,
increasingly, through modern means of communication including books, leaflets
and websites.
Najaf succeeded in maintaining its preeminent position in religious learning
until the 1980s. Since then, it has had to face the ascent of Qom in Iran. The
city rapidly grew in influence after the revolution that overthrew the shah in
1979, as the new Iranian regime invested heavily in the development of its
infrastructure. The city also benefited from the repression of Najaf’s religious
seminars by the Ba’athist regime, which pushed hundreds of religious scholars
and students, both Iraqis and foreigners, to leave Iraq. Many found refuge in
Qom, where they found a propitious environment for pursuing their scholarly
activities. If Qom came to replace Najaf as the main learning center after the
revolution, it never replaced it as the place of residence of the most widely
followed marja worldwide. Ruhollah Khomeini was no doubt celebrated by many
Shi’as, scholars and laymen, as the man who brought down the shah’s tyrannical
regime. However, despite all his efforts to promote himself as a transnational
marja, he never matched the religious influence of Najaf’s marjaiya, namely Abu
Al-Qasem Khoei, who was the main marja of Najaf between 1970 and 1992. He
remained the most widely followed religious scholar in the Shi’a world despite
being subjected to strict control by the Ba’athist regime.
Khoei, and today Ali Sistani, who has followed him as the principal scholar of
Najaf, have rejected some important ideas put forward by Khomeini, most
conspicuously the famous doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which is the doctrinal
pillar of the Islamic Republic of Iran and stipulates that an Islamic state must
be ruled by a mujtahid. This conception goes against mainstream Shi’a religious
thinking about state and government, which is more accommodating of different
types of government, providing it allows its Shi’a citizens to practice their
faith. Thus Ali Al-Sistani has clearly said that democracy is a perfectly
legitimate form of government, and has claimed no direct governmental role for
clerics in a post-Saddam Iraq, even calling for political leaders who wear a
turban to not accept ministerial portfolios. In his view, and in that of many of
his peers, direct involvement in politics is detrimental to faith and religious
institutions.
This view is widely shared beyond Najaf, including in Qom itself, where Khomeini
had difficulty finding supporters among high-ranking clerics. This led him to
endorse a junior cleric, Ali Khamenei, as his successor, and upon his accession
to the post of supreme leader in 1989 Khamenei was hardly recognized as a
mujtahid, and certainly not as a marja. He tried to impose himself on the
higher-ranking scholars of Qom, including attempts at coercion, and, when he
realized that he could not force the hearts and minds of his peers, declared in
1995 that he would only exercise his religious authority outside of Iran. His
attempts were rebuffed by many, especially in the Arab world. Mohammed Husein
Fadlallah, a Lebanese mujtahid born and trained in Najaf, and who became one of
the foremost religious references of Lebanese Shi’a and was close to Hezbollah,
declared himself a marja shortly afterwards, a clear way of saying that he
refused to recognize Khamenei’s authority.
The Islamic Republic of Iran: A controversial model
The velayat-e faqih doctrine and the Iranian state model it sustains are also
the subject of fierce debates within Shi’a political Islam. Upon the advent of
the Iranian revolution, the various Shi’a Islamic movements were enthusiastic
about this development, becoming the main channels for the exportation of the
revolution, which was a pillar of Iranian foreign policy in the aftermath of the
revolution. This was particularly so of the two rival transnational activist
networks of Al-Da’wa Al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Call), which originated in
Najaf’s religious seminars, and the Message Movement, stemming from a group of
clerical families from the city of Karbala led by the marja Mohammed Al-Shirazi.
Born in Iraq in the late 1950s and 1960s, the two movements spread to Lebanon
and the Gulf monarchies, most notably Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain.
The Lebanese cell of Al-Da’wa was one of the main constituents of Hezbollah upon
the movement’s creation in 1982. In Kuwait, Al-Da’wa activists formed a legal
opposition group that competed for votes in elections. In Bahrain, the movement
included some of the most senior opponents to the government and was among those
demanding the reinstatement of the parliament that was disbanded in 1975. While
it did not call for the advent of an Islamic revolution, it was a major
contributor in spreading Khomeini’s ideas in the country.
Constituting itself into a network of influence that remained supportive of the
political establishment in Kuwait, seen as benevolent to the Shi’as, the Message
Movement turned into a revolutionary movement in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where
it made itself known under names that left no ambiguity about its program: the
Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula (OIRAP) and the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB). OIRAP was behind the events
that came to be known as the Intifada of Muhrram 1400 (November 1979) in Saudi
Arabia’s Eastern Province. The IFLB prepared a coup in 1981, which ended up with
the arrest or exile of the majority of the movement’s members.
The upsurge of enthusiasm for the Iranian experience among Shi’a activists
progressively weakened following deep shifts in regional politics. On the
Iranian domestic scene, the end of the 1980s, marked by the drawing down of the
war with Iraq in 1988, witnessed the sidelining of the traditional supporters of
the revolutionary Shi’a movements in favor of those, such as Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, who wished to rebuild Iran’s relations with its neighbors and world
powers. Some Shi’a activists who were still dreaming of bringing down the
“unjust rulers” felt betrayed, and others took the opportunity to redefine their
goals in ways more in line with what seemed possible: fighting with political
means for reforms that would enable the Shi’as to have a better share of wealth
and power in countries where they suffered from discrimination. Many of those
who embraced this reformist approach reflected that it had been an error to put
their destiny in Iranian hands. They were also disappointed with the Iranian
experience, considering that the Islamic Republic had evolved into an
authoritarian regime. This was notably the case of a group of lay officials of
Iraqi Al-Da‘wa, who split from those, mostly clerics, who continued to pledge
allegiance to Khomeini. They left Iran for Syria and Western Europe. Saudi OIRAP
followed suit and renamed itself the Reform Movement.
Others, who are referred to in Shi’a Islamist parlance as “the Hezbollah line”
or the “Imam’s Line” (“Imam” referring to Khomeini), remained committed to the
Iranian political model and the doctrine of velayat-e faqih. However, they
reached the conclusion that this model was only implementable in Iran, where the
vast majority of the population professes the Shi’a creed. In countries where
Shi’as had to coexist with other sizable religious communities, the aim of
creating an Islamic republic was abandoned in favor of establishing pluralist
political systems. This was the option put forward by Hezbollah in Lebanon in
the aftermath of the civil war.
The reformist shift was further fostered by major domestic changes that occurred
in several Arab countries with Shi’a communities in the course of the 1990s and
early 2000s. In Lebanon, the end of the civil war allowed the return of
democracy. Parliaments were reinstated in Kuwait (1992) and Bahrain (2002),
while in Saudi Arabia a Consultative Council was created in 1992, followed by
municipal elections in 2005 where the Shi’a candidates did very well in the
Shi’a localities of the Eastern Province. These changes were accompanied by
amnesty for most Shi’a political prisoners and exiles. The most far-reaching
changes occurred in Bahrain, where the various trends of Shi’a political Islam
gathered under the umbrella of a new political movement, Al-Wifaq (The Accord),
the goal of which was to achieve a genuine constitutional democracy.
In Iraq, the deposition of Saddam Hussein in 2003 permitted Iraqi Shi’a
activists to seize power. The chaos that followed the military intervention
favored the penetration of Iranian networks of influence in the country. As a
result of that, nowhere has the debate about relations with Iran and the
doctrine of velayat-e faqih been fiercer. The various Shi’a candidates were
initially divided between those who favored a national line but had been exiled
for years, such as the Al-Da’wa, which included current prime minister Nuri Al-Maliki
and those who continued to rely on Iran materially and ideologically, such as
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), controlled by
members of the Al-Hakim clerical family who came back to Iraq directly from
Iran. There were also those who had never left Iraq, such as Muqtada Al-Sadr, an
Arab and Iraqi nationalist who deeply resented the domination of the exiled
activists and the penetration of Iranian influence.
The reshaping of these movements’ political ideologies and alliances that took
place after the first Iraqi elections is revealing of the actual state of the
relations between Iran and Shi’a Islamic activists. Nouri Al-Maliki has
conspicuously accentuated his image of an Iraqi nationalist leader, seeking
supports in all segments of Iraqi society as well as Iranian support against his
rivals. SCIRI has renamed itself the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and declared
that it recognizes the religious authority of Ali Sistani, dropping the aim of
establishing an Islamic republic in Iraq and renouncing its previous support for
Ali Khamenei as the sole legitimate religious authority. As for Muqtada Al-Sadr,
he has courted Iran to obtain the material, logistical and political support he
needed to become a major power broker.
The lesson to be drawn from this plasticity of ideologies and alliances is that
Iran has been desacralized among a growing number of Shi’a Islamic activists,
and hence has become an ordinary player in Shi’a Arab politics. No longer the
bearer of a hegemonic political model, it is just another regime seeking to play
a role in regional politics through unstable alliances with proxies with whom it
shares interests at a certain moment in time, rather than a clearly articulated
ideology.
This article was originally published in The Majalla.
***Laurence Louër is research fellow at the Centre d'études et de recherches
internationales (Ceri) in Paris. She is the author of Transnational Shia
Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (Columbia/Hurst, 2012).
White House: Iran turned down proposal at Geneva
Ynetnews/Despite reported progress in nuclear talks, White House
says Iranians did not accept proposal. PM Netanyahu says he supports diplomatic
effort, but not proposal that was presented
Yitzhak Benhorin Published: 11.12.13, 23:05 / Israel News
WASHINGTON – The White House released a statement Tuesday saying that Iran
turned down the proposal of the six powers at the Geneva talks.
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said that "the P-5 plus one were unified
on the proposal that was put forward and that the Iranians did not accept that
proposal. And that's a statement of fact." He noted that while important
progress was made, "gaps remain, and there are still important issues to be
addressed between the P-5 plus one and Iran, and that is why there will be a
break, as you know, and the P-5 plus one will resume negotiations with Iran on
November 21st and 22nd." Carney noted that "the purpose of these negotiations is
to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon... Resolving this diplomatically
is the best way to resolve it. It is the responsibility of the president to
pursue a diplomatic opening, because the best way to ensure that Iran does not
acquire a nuclear weapon is to achieve an agreement through diplomacy, an
agreement that's verifiable, that's transparent and that requires Iran to take
concrete steps. "The alternative is military action. The president has
never taken any option off the table, and he does not now and will not. But it
is his responsibility as president to pursue a diplomatic opening to see if it
is possible to resolve this issue peacefully. "The American people justifiably
and understandably prefer a peaceful solution that prevents Iran from obtaining
a nuclear weapon, and this agreement, if it's achieved, has the potential to do
that. The American people do not want a march to war," the US press secretary
added. Addressing the attempts to resolve the issue of nuclear Iran
diplomatically, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Tuesday in a Tel Aviv
conference on alternative fuel, that Israel is interested in a diplomatic
solution, but not the one proposed in Geneva. "We want a diplomatic solution
that's a real solution," Netanyahu said. "A good deal that dismantles Iran's
nuclear capabilities." The prime minister noted that Israel was interested in
"preventing Iran from achieving its goal, from developing nuclear capability."
He added that the deal devised in Geneva "leaves Iran with all its facilities…
gives Iran a tremendous break," adding that he speaks "not only on behalf of
Israel, but also on behalf of many, many others. I speak for a bigger cause –
the cause of peace."
White House says world powers are united in Iran talks
Reuters – WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The White House said on Tuesday that world
powers are united in their effort to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran in spite
of signs of a split.
White House spokesman Jay Carney said the United States and its key allies were
united in Geneva at a round of talks that ended on Saturday and that "we remain
united." The Geneva talks broke up without a deal. French Foreign Minister
Laurent Fabius said afterward that France would not accept a "fool's game," an
indication that Paris opposed the deal that was being negotiated. Carney said
the United States is still working toward a deal. More talks are scheduled for
later this month. He said any deal that is reached would be one that "absolutely
meets our standards" that would be a verifiable way to ensure Iran is not
developing a nuclear weapon. "We need to pursue this. We need to see if Iran is
serious," he said.
(Reporting by Steve Holland; Editing by Will Dunham)
Saudi rejects U.N. Security Council seat, opening way for
Jordan
By Michelle Nichols | Reuters –UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - Saudi
Arabia officially notified the United Nations on Tuesday of its decision to
reject a seat on the U.N. Security Council, which U.N. diplomats said clears the
way for the likely election of Jordan as a replacement. The 193-member U.N.
General Assembly elected Saudi Arabia last month for a two-year council term
from January 1 but, in a surprise move, Riyadh declined the position a day after
the vote in protest of the council's failure to end the Syria war and act on
other Middle East issues. Western diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity,
said on Friday it appeared Jordan had agreed to replace Saudi Arabia on the
council after dropping out of a race against Riyadh for a seat on the U.N. Human
Rights Council. Jordan's place on the Security Council still would need to be
approved by two-thirds of the General Assembly. Saudi's official letter on
Tuesday to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon allows for a new election to be
called. "I wish to inform you that the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
has decided to advise you that Saudi Arabia will regrettably not be in position
to assume its seat in the Security Council to which it was elected," Saudi
Arabia's U.N. ambassador, Abdullah al-Mouallimi, wrote. He attached to the short
letter a copy of a Saudi Foreign Ministry statement that was issued a day after
the Security Council election last month and outlines Saudi's decision to
decline the seat.
SAUDI SHIFT
Saudi Arabia, Cuba, China and Russia on Tuesday won three-year seats on the
Geneva-based Human Rights Council, the United Nations' top rights body, despite
concerns about abuses and restrictions on freedoms in all four nations.
Mouallimi called on Friday for "profound and comprehensive" reform of the U.N.
Security Council that includes expanding its membership and "abandoning the veto
system or restricting its use."
"The Security Council has failed to address the situation in the Palestinian and
Arab occupied territories, an issue under consideration by the council for more
than six decades," Mouallimi told a General Assembly debate on council reform.
"The Syrian crisis continues, with a regime bent on suppressing the will of its
people by brutal force, killing and displacing millions of people under the
watch and sight of a council paralyzed by the abuse of the veto system," he
said. Syrian ally Russia, backed by China, has vetoed three council resolutions
since October 2011 that would have condemned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's
government and threatened it with sanctions.
Saudi Arabia has warned of a shift away from the United States in part over what
it sees as Washington's failure to take action against Assad and its policies on
Iran.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia last week
and praised the U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia as strategic and enduring but
strains in the nearly 70-year-old relationship were apparent.
(Reporting by Michelle Nichols; Editing by Bill Trott)
.
Report: Khamenei's conglomerate
thrived as sanctions squeezed Iran
Reuters Published: 11.12.13, 18:20 / Israel News
While Iranians were suffocating under economic sanctions, supreme leader’s
business entity, Setad, managed to avoid sanctions. Recently, US Treasury added
Setad to list. Although Khamenei not specifically named, US officials say
financial dynasty clearly under his office’s control. Seven years ago, the
United Nations and Western powers began subjecting Tehran to steadily harsher
economic sanctions. Around the same time, an organization controlled by Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei started to study how some developing economies
managed to grow fast.
Setad, as the organization is known, had amassed billions of dollars in property
seized from Iranian citizens. What Iran lacked and needed, Setad decided, was
conglomerates on a par with those of South Korea, Japan, Brazil and the United
States.According to an account this year by a senior official in the unit that
oversees Setad's financial investments, Ali Ashraf Afkhami, the organization
also picked the perfect candidate to create an Iranian national champion: Setad
itself. The ayatollah's organization would go on to acquire stakes in a major
bank by 2007 and in Iran's largest telecommunications company in 2009. Among
dozens of other investments, it took over a giant holding company in 2010. An
organizational chart labeled "SETAD at a Glance," prepared in 2010 by one of
Setad's companies and seen by Reuters, illustrates how big it had grown. The
document shows holdings in major banks, a brokerage, an insurance company, power
plants, energy and construction firms, a refinery, a cement company and soft
drinks manufacturing.
Today, Setad's vast operations provide an independent source of revenue and
patronage for Supreme Leader Khamenei, even as the West squeezes the Iranian
economy harder with sanctions in an attempt to end the nuclear-development
program he controls. "He has a huge sum at his disposal that he can spend," says
Mohsen Sazegara, a co-founder of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
military force, who is now living in exile in the United States. "When you have
this much money, that's power itself." Even as Setad was gaining ever-greater
control over the Iranian economy in recent years, the Western powers knew of the
organization and its connection to the supreme leader - the one man with the
power to halt Tehran's uranium-enrichment program. But they moved cautiously,
and Setad largely escaped foreign pressure.
In July 2010, the European Union included Mohammad Mokhber, president of Setad,
in a list of individuals and entities it was sanctioning for alleged involvement
in "nuclear or ballistic missiles activities." Two years later, it removed him
from the list. In 1, the US Treasury Department added Setad and 37 companies it
"oversees" to its list of sanctioned entities. Khamenei wasn't named in the
announcement, but a Treasury official later told a Senate committee that Setad
is controlled by the supreme leader's office.
Asked why Khamenei himself wasn't targeted, US officials told Reuters they did
not want to play into the hands of Iranian officials who maintain that
Washington's ultimate goal in pressuring Iran with sanctions is to topple the
government. "Regime change is not our policy," said one US official. "But
putting pressure on this regime certainly is." By the time Setad felt the
pressure, it was already a giant.
Setad was founded with modest ambitions. Its genesis was a two-paragraph order
issued in 1989 by Khamenei's predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, shortly
before he died. The order directed two aides to sell and manage properties that
had supposedly been abandoned during the chaotic years following the 1979
Islamic Revolution, and channel much of the proceeds to charity. The edict
ultimately sparked a new organization whose full name in Persian is "Setad
Ejraiye Farmane Hazrate Emam" – the Headquarters for Executing the Order of the
Imam. According to one of its co-founders, Setad was meant to last two years.
But under Khamenei's control, it remained in business, amassing a giant
portfolio of real estate by claiming in Iranian courts, sometimes falsely, that
the properties were abandoned. In fact, many were seized from members of
religious minorities, and business people and other Iranians living abroad.
Since 2000 it has moved into almost every area of the economy. In an interview,
David Cohen, the Treasury Department's Under Secretary for Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence, said Setad now generates "billions of dollars a year" in
revenue. He added that "the supreme leader's own money is handled and invested
in" a Setad division known as the Tadbir Economic Development Group, although he
said the amount isn't known. A Treasury Department spokesman said Tadbir also
manages investments for "other leadership figures" in Iran, but didn't name
them.
The Iranian president's office, the foreign ministry and Tadbir Economic
Development Group didn't respond to requests for comment. Iran's embassy in the
United Arab Emirates issued a statement calling Reuters' findings "scattered and
disparate" and said that "none has any basis." It didn't elaborate. Setad's
director general of public relations, Hamid Vaezi, said in an email that the
Reuters series is "far from realities and is not correct" but didn't go into
specifics. In a subsequent message, he said Setad disputes the Treasury
allegations and is in the process of hiring US legal counsel to challenge the
sanctions.
Setad's total net worth is difficult to pinpoint due to the secrecy of its
accounts and because its stakes in companies frequently change. But Reuters was
able to identify holdings of real estate, corporate investments and other assets
in Setad's control worth about $95 billion. That estimate is based on statements
by Setad officials, data from the Tehran Stock Exchange and company websites,
and information from the Treasury Department.
About $52 billion of that sum is in property. The head of Setad's real-estate
division said the property unit was worth that amount at a press conference in
2008. It is possible that this figure has risen or fallen since then as the
portfolio has evolved. Setad also has an estimated $43 billion or more in
corporate holdings, Reuters found with about $40-billion stake in Rey Investment
Co., $3-billion stake in the country’s largest telecom provider, and minority
stake in at least 24 publicly traded and 14 private companies. The Revolutionary
Guards, the powerful military unit tasked with protecting Iran from both
domestic and foreign threats, has long held a pivotal role in the country's
economy, with extensive holdings in defense, construction and oil industries,
according to the US State Department. Setad gives the supreme leader a
significant financial resource of his own, one that greatly adds to his power.
Khamenei appoints Setad's board of directors but delegates management of the
organization to others, according to one former employee. This person said the
supreme leader is primarily concerned about one thing: its annual profits, which
he uses to fund his bureaucracy. "All he cares about is the number," this person
said
Pope describes Jews as 'our big
brothers'
Reuters Published: 11.11.13, 15:05 / Israel Jewish Scene
In words of solidarity marking 75th anniversary of Kristallnacht, Francis says
Nazi state-sponsored ransacking of Jewish homes, businesses and synagogues
should not be forgotten
Pope Francis described the Jewish people as the "big brothers" of his Roman
Catholic flock on Sunday in words of solidarity marking the 75th anniversary of
the Kristallnacht attacks on Jews and their property in Nazi Germany.
Francis said the state-sponsored ransacking of Jewish homes, businesses and
synagogues, on the night of November 9, 1938, in which scores of Jewish people
were killed, marked a step towards the Holocaust and should not be forgotten.
"We renew our closeness and solidarity to the Jewish people, our big brothers,
and pray to God that the memory of the past and of the sins of the past helps us
to be always vigilant against every form of hate and intolerance," Francis told
thousands in St. Peter's Square in his Sunday mass. The leader of the Roman
Catholic Church has pledged good relations with Jews and his March election was
welcomed by the world's Jewish associations. Francis co-authored a book on
interfaith dialogue with Argentine Rabbi Abraham Skorka while he was Archbishop
of Buenos Aires.
Egypt's Morsi to Sue Rulers over 'Coup'
Naharnet Newsdesk 13 November 2013/Deposed Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi
plans to sue the army-installed authorities over his ouster, warning that
stability will only return once their "coup" is annulled, his lawyer said
Wednesday. Mohamed al-Damati and a team of lawyers on Monday visited Morsi in
jail, where he is awaiting the next hearing in a trial on charges of involvement
in the deaths of protesters during his year-long presidency.
"The president plans to take legal measures against the coup, and this will be
up to the defense team in the near future," Damati told reporters. "There are
complaints which will be presented to the prosecutor general (to say) that what
happened was a crime."Damati also said complaints could be filed to the
administrative court to annul "the move by (military chief) General Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi" to topple Morsi. Morsi, Egypt's first democratically elected president,
was removed from office by the army on July 3 after mass protests calling for
his resignation. He insists that he remains the president of Egypt and has
rejected the legitimacy of the court trying him. In a letter read out by his
lawyers, he reiterated his rejection of the process and warned of continuing
unrest. "Egypt will not regain its stability except by annulling this coup,"
Morsi said. Unrest has spiked in the country since Morsi's overthrow, and the
bitter divisions between his supporters and opponents have deepened. Morsi's
supporters have been holding near-daily protests around the country despite a
massive crackdown by the authorities that has killed more than 1,000 people.
Another 2,000 people, including the top leadership of Morsi's Muslim
Brotherhood, are behind bars. Morsi was catapulted from the long-banned Muslim
Brotherhood to the presidency after winning Egypt's first free elections in
2012. His victory was made possible by the 2011 uprising that toppled long-time
autocrat Hosni Mubarak. But his short-lived presidency was marred by political
turmoil, deadly clashes and a crippling economic crisis, prompting millions to
take to the streets in June to demand his resignation.Source/Agence France
Presse.
Muslim Persecution of Christians:
August, 2013
By Raymond Ibrahim/ November 12, 2013/in Muslim Persecution of Christians
Gatestone Institute
The attacks on Egypt’s Coptic Christians and their churches that began in July
on the heels of the popular June 30 Revolution — which saw the ousting of
President Morsi and prompted the Muslim Brotherhood to scapegoat and incite
violence against the Copts — became even more brutal in mid-August after
security forces cleared out Brotherhood “sit in” camps, where people were being
tortured, raped, and murdered. Among other things, over 80 Christian churches
were attacked and often torched. (Click here for a brief video of one of these
many churches set aflame.)
Upper Egypt, especially Minya, which has a large Christian minority, was hit
especially hard, with at least 20 attacks on churches, Christian schools and
orphanages. “The Islamists,” one resident said, “burnt and destroyed everything.
Their goal was to erase all the traces of a Christian presence; even the
orphanages were looted and destroyed.” After storming the Prince Tadros el-Shatbi
Church, Morsi supporters turned their attention to two homes for disadvantaged
children located near the parish church; there, they stole church offerings,
clothes, and children’s games before torching the entire building in a fire that
lasted over five hours.
The attacks were not limited to inanimate objects. According to the BBC,
10-year-old Jessi Boulus, an only child, was walking home from her Bible class
in a working-class area of the capital when a gunman killed her with a single
shot to the chest. Her mother, Phoebe, devastated, believes Jessi was targeted
purely because she was Christian.
The attacks on Egypt’s Christians were so fierce that, at one point, when they
started to run out of food, they were afraid to come out of their homes for fear
of being killed by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Many churches canceled services. Even at the Virgin Mary monastery, which was
also torched, one priest said, “We did not hold prayers in the monastery on
Sunday for the first time in 1,600 years.”
Although some in the West assert that the Christian minority needs to fight fire
with fire, when one 60-year-old Copt tried to do just that, firing a gun in the
air to scare away an invading Islamic mob, “It proved a fatal error,” the Sunday
Times reported: “They took offence at the fact that a Christian fired in the air
against them, and they stormed his home and shot him to death before taking his
body away and hacking it into parts.”
Scenes reminiscent of the original Islamic conquest of Seventh Century Egypt
replayed themselves: an Evangelical church in the village of Bedin was not only
attacked but converted into a mosque. Similarly, as reported by the AP, “After
torching a Franciscan school, Islamists paraded three nuns on the streets like
‘prisoners of war’ before a Muslim woman offered them refuge. Two other women
working at the school were sexually harassed and abused as they fought their way
through a mob.”
Meanwhile, the Western mainstream media sympathized with the Brotherhood while
ignoring the Coptic victims. Even the Coptic Church criticized the “false
broadcast by Western media” and called for an “objective” revision to be made of
the actions of those “blood-thirsty radical organizations…. [I]nstead of
legitimizing them with global support and political coverage while they are
trying to wreak havoc and destruction upon our beloved land, report all events
truthfully and accurately.”
One activist said of the U.S. and the EU, that they “almost daily issue
statements threatening to take further actions against our interim government
and army, portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as victims while not even mentioning
the destruction of over 80 churches, as well monasteries, orphanages, businesses
and Coptic schools by the Muslim Brotherhood.”
Father Rafic Greiche, the chief spokesman for the Catholic Church in Egypt,
criticized President Obama for not speaking out against the worst violence
against Egyptian Christians in nearly 700 years: “President Obama when he made a
speech he just touched on the burning churches instead of telling the Muslim
Brotherhood that they are terrorists and they are making terror on Egypt. He did
not speak loud for this and shame on him if he is a Christian that he does not
speak out loud.”
Even more telling, although human rights activists and lawmakers have long been
asking that U.S. aid to Egypt be made contingent on the respect for the human
rights of minorities such as the Copts, the Obama administration failed to
include such a condition. In a direct response to the ousting of the Egypt’s
President Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, however, the administration
did reduce U.S. aid to Egypt by hundreds of millions of dollars. The rest of
August’s roundup of Muslim persecution of Christians around the world includes
(but is not limited to) the following accounts, listed by theme and country in
alphabetical order, not according to severity:
Attacks on Christian Places of Worship
Nigeria: A report revealed that, since January 2012 alone, 50 Christian churches
were attacked and 366 people killed in those attacks. (Attacks on churches,
however, have been going on for well over a decade; hundreds if not thousands of
churches have been destroyed.) In August, a Muslim mob with knives and iron rods
injured several members of the St. James Anglican Cathedral in Nasarawa—including
three pastors, four elders and choir members. According to a source, a “Muslim
woman sent her children to purchase water from the church’s borehole, and then a
misunderstanding over about 5 naira [less than 1 cent US$] occurred. The Muslim
woman then went and invited some of her Muslim neighbors, who stormed the church
and attacked the members of the church” as well as damaging Bibles and other
property.
Syria: The Antiochian Orthodox church of Sts. Sergius and Bacchus, one of only
two churches that served many Christians, was demolished after the Free Syrian
Army took over the region of Thawrah. According to one Christian refugee: “They
[FSA] tore up the sanctuary curtains, Bibles and other holy books, and broke all
the crosses, chairs and icons of Jesus and the saints. They stole electrical
appliances like fans, chandeliers and lights. They took whatever was in the
church, and sold it all. There is nothing there now.”
Turkey: After the Christian staff of the Saint Abraham monastery told a group of
Muslims that visiting hours were over, the Muslims threatened, cursed, and
ultimately attacked the staff, saying “we own this land, obey us or you will be
sorry.” According to a member of the monastery, “The monastery was attacked two
months before this incident by young [Muslim] Kurds from the town of Batman, but
we decided not to go public about it, this time we decided it’s enough. We gave
the police the footage from the surveillance camera from the previous attack and
now it is gone and no one was punished. They promised us to put guards here but
we don’t see any and when they [the police] came yesterday, they attacked us
with pepper spray instead of the attackers. Certainly all this cannot be merely
coincidences.”
Apostasy, Blasphemy, and Proselytism
Iran: Mohammad-Hadi Bordbar, known as Mostafa, an Iranian convert to
Christianity, was sentenced to ten years in prison under the pretext of “crimes
against state security.” Court documents state that the man confessed to “having
abandoned Islam to follow Christianity … considering evangelization his duty, he
distributed 12,000 pocket gospels.” According to Agenzia Fides, “After having
received baptism, Mostafa had set up a ‘house church,’ an assembly of home
worship, with prayer meetings at home, which are considered ‘illegal.’ Mostafa
was arrested in Tehran on December 27, 2012, after a police raid at his house.
The security officers detained and interrogated all those present at the meeting
for hours, about 50 Iranian Christians. In his home the police found material
and Christian publications, such as movies, books, CDs and over 6,000 copies of
the Gospel. Mostafa had already been arrested in 2009 for conversion to
Christianity, found guilty of apostasy, then released on bail. Similarly,
Ebrahim Firouzi, another young convert from Islam to Christianity, was sentenced
to one year in jail followed by two years in exile, after being accused of
starting and directing an evangelism group, launching a Christian website,
distributing Bibles and Christian literature, and attending house churches. The
judge described such activities as “propagating against the Islamic regime” and
said that Ebrahim was “an anti-Islamic Revolution agent inside the country.”
Uzbekistan: In the Samarkand region, some 30 police officers along with 60 other
officials raided a Christian children’s camp, subjecting all 22 children to
questioning. Brandishing their batons, police collected statements from the nine
adults present at the camp, and all the children, including the youngest, and
took them all to the police station for further questioning before releasing
them. Officials confiscated a number of items including Christian literature and
Uzbek-language New Testaments. Next, police raided the homes of the four adults
who organized the children’s camp, and confiscated more Christian literature. It
is believed that anti-proselytism related charges will be leveled against the
four.
Slaughter of Christians
Central African Republic: Anywhere from 15 Christians to dozens, including a
five-month-old baby, were slaughtered and 14 Christian villages emptied, after
the Islamic group Seleka, which earlier seized the African nation’s leadership,
raided their villages. According to Fr. Gazzera, a local missionary priest from
Italy, “It was terrible. Many villages are like ghost towns because they are
completely empty. Witnesses told me that the rebels had thrown the bodies of
those killed in the river.” During a sermon, the priest lamented how the Islamic
takeover of the country is producing “victims of the worst kind of barbarism”
who “are being tortured and killed,” while “our mothers and sisters are being
raped.”
Nigeria: A former Muslim terrorist recounted in detail the jihad on Christians
and how Islamic organizations in the nation, not just Boko Haram, see the
slaughter of Christians as one of the loftiest goals to which Muslims can
aspire. He also explained how, “If we ask our victim, ‘Will you become a Muslim
or not’ and he or she refuses, we will slaughter him like a goat…”
Somalia: Suspected al-Shabaab Islamic militants kidnapped and sexually abused a
28-year-old Christian wife and mother, while calling her an “infidel.” They also
texted her husband, who had fled with their small children, saying: “Your wife
has told us all about your Christian involvement and soon we shall come for you
too.”
Syria: Islamic rebels killed Paolo Dall’Oglio an Italian Jesuit priest who had
earlier disappeared in the east of the country. Before being slaughtered, the
priest had served for three decades in the Monastery of Saint Moses the
Abyssinian. Activists say he was killed by the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant. Dall’Oglio’s disappearance follows the kidnappings of the
Greek Orthodox and Syriac Orthodox archbishops of Aleppo; Paul Yazigi and
Yohanna Ibrahim were both kidnapped after gunmen intercepted their vehicle and
killed its driver near Kafr Dael as the clergymen returned from a humanitarian
relief mission on April 22. They are both believed to be held by Chechen
jihadists. Aside from religious leaders, hundreds of regular Christians have
been abducted and held for ransom, an activity that is legal according to Sharia
in the context of the jihad.
Dhimmitude
[Contempt for ‘Infidels’]
Indonesia: During celebrations marking the end of Ramadan, the Islamic month of
fasting and praying, an unidentified person hurled two Molotov cocktails into
the compound of the Assisi Catholic School in South Jakarta, the same school
U.S. President Barack Obama attended as a pupil before moving to another
facility located in Central Jakarta. According to police sources, the Islamic
extremists responsible for the bombings and attacks on religious minorities in
Java are linked to the same Islamic groups that beheaded three Christian girls
on their way to school in 2005.
Malaysia: A three-member panel of the Court of Appeal ruled unanimously in favor
of the proposed ban on Christians publications from using the word “Allah.” In
2009, when this issue of Christians using the word “Allah” was popularized,
churches were vandalized and those supporting the Christians’ using the word
“Allah” threatened with death. Also in 2009, the government seized shipments of
local language Christian Bibles because they contained the Arabic word for the
deity.
Pakistan: A Christian woman and her children are under great pressure to convert
to Islam or die by the Muslim family of their deceased husband and father.
According to the mother, Martha Bibi, “When I got married, the relatives [of my
husband] began to exert pressure so that I convert [to Islam]. But my husband
stood up for me, saying that ‘my wife and my children should feel free to
profess their faith.’ However, after his death his brothers have begun to
terrorize us. They have sworn to kill us if we do not convert to Islam.” Also,
approximately 30 armed Muslims attacked a Christian colony by opening fire at
residents and throwing projectiles at their homes and local church. The colony,
Shah Bagh, is near Joseph colony, where earlier nearly 200 Christian homes were
torched by rampaging Muslims. The attack was prompted after a local Christian
tried to stop the cable operator from charging Christians more money for cable
access. Many Christians were injured, often with bullet wounds.
Sinai Peninsula (Egypt): In the Sinai Peninsula, now populated with jihadis,
members of the Muslim Bedouins are abducting Christians and holding them ransom
for exorbitant sums. When their often destitute families are unable to pay for
their release, the Christians are tortured to death—including by crucifixion.
Shahar Shoham, director of Physicians for Human Rights, told CBN News : “Sinai
was always a place for human smuggling, but since around two years ago—even a
bit more—it started also to be a place of human torture. They torture them in
horrible methods, like hanging upside down from the ceiling, like using electric
shocks, like burning them on their bodies.”
Syria: Concerning the Islamic rebel takeover of Christian regions, one refugee
lamented how “if any Christians want to go back they have to become Muslim or
else they will be killed.” Displaced Christians further report their property
stolen, their homes confiscated, and their possessions sold on the black market.
Another refugee lamented they were running out of places to flee: “All the roads
are full of rebel fighters. It’s really dangerous. We have lost everything.
There is nothing for us over there now, nothing to return to. We just need help
to get out of here and settle in a country that is safe.”
About this Series
While not all, or even most, Muslims are involved, the persecution of Christians
in the Islamic world is on its way to reaching pandemic proportions.
Accordingly, “Muslim Persecution of Christians” was developed to collate some—by
no means all—of the instances of persecution that surface each month. It serves
two purposes:
1) To document that which the mainstream media does not: the habitual, if not
chronic, persecution of Christians.
2) To show that such persecution is not “random,” but systematic and
interrelated—that it is rooted in a worldview inspired by Sharia.
Accordingly, whatever the anecdote of persecution, it typically fits under a
specific theme, including hatred for churches and other Christian symbols;
sexual abuse of Christian women; forced conversions to Islam; apostasy and
blasphemy laws that criminalize and punish with death those who “offend” Islam;
theft and plunder in lieu of jizya (financial tribute expected from
non-Muslims); overall expectations for Christians to behave like dhimmis, or
second-class, “tolerated” citizens; and simple violence and murder. Sometimes it
is a combination.
Because these accounts of persecution span different ethnicities, languages, and
locales—from Morocco in the West, to India in the East—it should be clear that
one thing alone binds them: Islam—whether the strict application of Islamic
Sharia law, or the supremacist culture born of it.
Previous Reports:
•July, 2013
•June, 2013
•May, 2013
•April, 2013
•March, 2013
•February, 2013
•January, 2013
•December, 2012
•November, 2012
•October, 2012
•September, 2012
•August, 2012
•July, 2012
•June, 2012
•May, 2012
•April, 2012
•March, 2012
•February, 2012
•January, 2012
•December, 2011
•November, 2011
•October, 2011
•September, 2011
•August, 2011
•July, 2011