LCCC ENGLISH NEWS BULLETIN
August 31/2006

Latest New from Miscellaneous sources for August 31/2006
Annan Says Lebanon Working to Prevent Arms Transfers-Bloomberg
Israel's Intelligence Chiefs Warn Lebanon War Is Relocating -DEBKA file
Lebanon govt to subsidise postwar home rebuilding-Reuters
Lebanon refuses contact with Israel -AP
Bomb in Baghdad market district kills 24 AP
Annan: Israel must lift Lebanon blockade-AP
Chavez visits Syria, pledges solidarity against US-Jerusalem Post
Deadlock over Lebanon blockade-International Herald Tribune
UN sees first peacekeepers in Lebanon within days-Euronews.net
Israel rejects U.N. blockade appeal.AP
India to be peacekeepers in Lebanon: Pranab-NDTV.com
Travelling the road to ruin in Lebanon-Reuters
Donors looking to rebuild Lebanon-BBC News
Root causes, real and imagined-Canadian Jewish News
Iran still enriching uranium - U.N. officials
Iran's time to talk is over-Asia Times Online 
Iran faces risk of sanctions National Post
Lebanese PM offers rebuilding funds to bombing victims-CBC.ca
The importance of Naguib Mahfouz.Slate
Bomb Explosions in Iraq Leave at Least 52 People Dead-Wall Street Journal 

ON THE AXIS OF JIHADISM
By Bill Roggio
By Behrooz Bahbudi and Walid Phares
Because for 11 years years, the American public wasn’t informed about the threat that lead to September 11 and because the classrooms and newsrooms of the United States were not educated enough about the global threat of “Jihadism,” we feel it is incumbent on individual citizens to educate themselves about this danger and mobilize to prevent a Future Jihad looming around the world and at home. It is important that American citizens understand who the “Jihadists” are, what they want to achieve, and how they are proceeding. Without this knowledge, the American public will be unable to be part of the political debate about national security and the War on Terror. And if deprived from the support of an informed public, the US Government, now and in the future, cannot sustain difficult decisions pertaining to the defeat of the Terrorist enemy.
The ideology of the Terrorists: Jihadism
American and other democratic societies around the world, including Jewish, Christian, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and other, have been subjected to an international ideological campaign by the ”Jihadists” who aim to bring about a worldwide domination, that is the creation of a totalitarian global regime, similar to the Taliban. Their ideology opposes Democracy, Pluralism, Secularism, and is a direct threat to Peace.
“Jihadism” rejects international law as we know it, the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, most governments around the world, women’s rights as agreed on in modern times, free arts and expression, and any interpretation of the universe, history, and values other than their own. “Jihadism” discriminates against all humans who do not abide by their vision. It calls them “Kuffars” (Infidels). This ideology prescribes violence against the “Infidels” should they be Christians, Jews, Hindus, Muslims or others; it calls for a global warfare against all who oppose them; and it terms this war “Jihad”. Hence, this ideology, in its various forms and expressions, is against international law and should be banned by the international community.
Jihadists: The Two Forces
There are two major “trees” of Jihadism: The Salafists and the Khumeinists. The Salafists, influenced by the radical Wahabis and the “Muslim Brotherhood” call for the removal of the current Arab and Muslim Governments and their replacement by a worldwide power they call “Caliphate.” The Salafist movement produced al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world and identifies itself as “The International Salafi Jihadi Movement.” It is omnipresent in the Muslim world and has a significant presence inside democracies worldwide. The Salafi Jihadists established the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This was the model they wished to multiply around the globe. The Khumeinists are the Jihadist followers of the teachings of Iranian Ayatollah Ruhallah Khumeini. They have established what they call an “Islamic Republic” in Iran and have funded movements, including Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Iranian Regime oppresses its own peoples and seeks regional and world expansion through Terrorism and Nuclear threat.
Axis of Jihadism
Each of the two “Jihadi” blocs has its own strategy and area of action: al Qaeda and the Salafists have infiltrated many countries and penetrated some government institutions in the Muslim world. They have also established cells within Western and other democracies. The Khumeinist Jihadists have full control of Iran’s regime and created an axis of terror in the Middle East, including the Baathist regime of Syria and Hezbollah. Both powers aim at crumbling America, undermining democracies and repressing freedoms in the Arab and Muslim world. Although with different long-term goals, the Jihadi Salafists and Khumeinists have converging interests against common enemies: democracies. In many places and on different occasions the two blocs of Jihadism have established interim alliances: the regimes in Iran, Syria and Sudan and the organizations of al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jemaa Islamiya, and many others have cooperated: against democracies and civil societies, they have formed an axis of Jihadism. This is what the American public and civil societies around the world are up against since the 1990s. The victims of Jihadism belong to all ethnicities and religions: from the Muslim Sunni civilians in Algeria, the black Africans in Sudan, the Copts of Egypt, Shiites and Kurds of Iraq, Christians and others in Lebanon, innocents in Indonesia, Iran, to the societies of Russia, Argentina, India, Europe and the United States.
In short, humanity is under attack by Jihadism. The American people must learn more about the ideological movement that is waging war against them. The American public must ask the U.S. Congress to investigate Jihadism.
Dr Behrooz Behbudi President, Global Unity Partnership Born in Tehran, US Citizen, Educated in Iran, Australia, Canada and the US Businessman, Advocate for Democracy in the Greater Middle East .
Dr Walid Phares Senior fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Professor of Middle East Studies.
August 30, 2006 12:18 PM Print

Lebanon refuses contact with Israel
By HUSSEIN DAKROUB, Associated Press Writer
BEIRUT, Lebanon - Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora said Wednesday that he refused to have any direct contact with Israel and Lebanon would be the last Arab country to ever sign a peace deal with the Jewish state.
"Let it be clear, we are not seeking any agreement until there is just and comprehensive peace based on the Arab initiative," he said.
He was referring to a plan that came out of a 2002 Arab League summit in Beirut. It calls for Israel to return all territories it conquered in the 1967 Mideast war, the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital and a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem — all in exchange for peace and full normalization of Arab relations with Israel.
Israel has long sought a peace deal with Lebanon, but Beirut has hesitated as long as Israel's conflicts with the Palestinians and Syria remained unresolved.
Saniora said Lebanon wants to go back to the 1949 armistice agreement that formally ended the Arab-Israeli war over Israel's creation.
Also on Wednesday, a Hezbollah cabinet minister said that the guerrilla group will not release two captured Israeli soldiers unconditionally, and that they would only be freed in a prisoner exchange.
"There will be no unconditional release. This is not possible," Minister of Energy and Hydraulic Resources Mohammed Fneish said in Beirut. He is one of two Hezbollah members in Lebanon's Cabinet.
"There should be an exchange through indirect negotiations. This is the principle to which Hezbollah and the resistance are adhering," he said.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said earlier Wednesday that the Israel-Hezbollah cease-fire could be "a cornerstone to build a new reality between Israel and Lebanon."
Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan also said they hoped the cease-fire deal could evolve into a full-fledged peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon.
Implementation of the cease-fire "gives us a foundation to move forward and settle the differences between Israel and Lebanon once and for all, to establish a durable peace," Annan said.
Also Wednesday, Saniora said that his government would pay $33,000 per house to compensate residents whose homes were destroyed by Israeli attacks. The government has been criticized for being slow to respond with financial support for people who lost homes in the fighting.
Saniora said 130,000 housing units had been destroyed or damaged in more than a month of Israeli airstrikes and ground fighting with Hezbollah guerrillas, mostly in south Lebanon. He did not give a breakdown of the completely destroyed houses.
Hezbollah launched rebuilding campaigns in its strongholds within days of the Aug. 14 cease-fire, burnishing its support among residents.
Saniora said he would ask delegates to an international donors' conference in Sweden on Thursday to take responsibility for rebuilding specific villages hit by Israeli attacks. Organizers of the conference are aiming to raise $500 million in aid for Lebanon, Sweden's aid minister said Tuesday.

Israel rejects U.N. blockade appeal
By Luke Baker -JERUSALEM (Reuters) - Israel rejected a call by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan on Wednesday to lift its air and sea blockade of Lebanon, saying it would only end the 7-week-old siege once all aspects of a ceasefire were in place.  Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also told Annan he would not withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon until the full implementation of the ceasefire, which took effect on August 14 and put an end to 34 days of conflict with Hizbollah. Olmert's statements effectively amounted to a rejection of the two main requests Annan had come to Jerusalem to discuss, but Annan later played down the differences of opinion, saying his and Olmert's thinking were not so far apart.
"There isn't that much of a difference between Prime Minister Olmert and myself," Annan told a news conference in the West Bank city of Ramallah when asked about the apparent failure of his bid to strengthen the 2-week-old ceasefire.Earlier, during an hour of talks with Olmert, Annan said he pressed for a lifting of the embargo, imposed after the start of the war against Hizbollah on July 12, on economic grounds.
Olmert said any relaxation of pressure on Lebanon's ports and airspace depended on the full implementation of U.N. resolution 1701, which governs the ceasefire with Hizbollah. "The (resolution) is a fixed buffet and everything will be implemented, including the lifting of the blockade, as part of the entire implementation of the different articles," he said. Olmert was equally firm when Annan suggested Israel should withdraw its troops from Lebanon within "days or weeks," once up to 5,000 U.N.-backed peacekeepers are on the ground. "Israel will pull out of Lebanon once the resolution is implemented," Olmert said, indicating a longer timeline. Olmert also reiterated his call for the U.N. force to be deployed not just in southern Lebanon but along the border with Syria, a deployment that the U.N. resolution makes dependent on a request from the Lebanese government. Annan, in Jerusalem after visiting Lebanon, had made lifting the blockade his top priority, after describing it as a "humiliation" for Lebanon as well as an economic millstone.
SCANT PROGRESS
The secretary-general said he hoped to double to 5,000 the number of U.N. troops in Lebanon soon and urged Israel and Hizbollah to end swiftly disputes blocking a lasting ceasefire. On Tuesday, Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz said Israel would pull out thousands of troops once a "reasonable" number of U.N. soldiers had been deployed, but did not give a figure. Resolution 1701 calls for a deployment of 15,000 U.N. peacekeepers by November 4, alongside Lebanese army forces. In another sign that Annan had made little progress in his discussions with Israeli leaders, he did not take questions from journalists after meeting Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and neither was forthcoming about their hour-long talks.
Annan restricted himself to saying he hoped resolution 1701 could be the basis for a durable peace. Aides said he would travel to Syria and Iran, Hizbollah's backers, later this week. On a visit to southern Lebanon on Tuesday, Annan said "serious irritants" to the truce were also the fate of abducted Israeli soldiers and that of Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. U.S. civil rights leader Jesse Jackson, on a visit to the region to try to mediate a prisoner exchange, told Israeli Army Radio he had been informed by a Hizbollah leader that the two soldiers seized by the guerrilla group were alive. He said that during a visit to Damascus on Monday, "a Hamas leader told me ... that the Israeli soldier captured by Hamas is alive." Palestinian militants abducted Corporal Gilad Shalit in a cross-border raid from Gaza in June. Italy's first contingent of 800 troops, out of an eventual 3,000 pledged, set sail on Tuesday on what Rome said would be a "long and risky" mission. The aircraft carrier Garibaldi and four other naval ships were due to reach Lebanon by Friday. France promised to send a 900-strong battalion before the middle of September, with a second battalion to follow. About two dozen Spanish troops began a reconnaissance mission to Beirut on Wednesday, ahead of a larger deployment. The United Nations hopes to create a buffer zone in south Lebanon free of Israeli or Hizbollah forces and policed by the expanded U.N. force alongside some 15,000 Lebanese troops. It is hoping Muslim nations will send troops to balance the 7,000 or so pledged by European countries. The Turkish government has agreed in principle to a deployment but needs a parliamentary approval, with a meeting set for September 5.
The war killed nearly 1,200 people in Lebanon, mainly civilians, and 157 Israelis, mostly soldiers.
(Additional reporting by Nadim Ladki in Beirut and Jonathan Saul in Jerusalem)

Nasrallah’s bad excuse
By Ahmed Al-Jarallah
Editor-in-Chief, the Arab Times
8/29/2006
AFTER the devastation of Lebanon, killing of entire families — including the aged, women and children, destruction of bridges and other infrastructure, and decimation of the Lebanese economy, Hassan Nasrallah has woken up to realize the magnitude of the crisis he has brought to his people. Like small children, who bite their fingers after committing a blunder, Nasrallah has admitted his fault saying “I would not have ordered the seizure of the two Israeli soldiers that sparked the 33-day war if I had known the Jewish state would react with such fury.”
Such men, who never think twice about committing their people and country to serve the interests of foreign countries, usually have limited freedom because they operate according to the plans and agenda of others without any consideration for the fact that the people of their own country will pay the ultimate price. If for the sake of argument we admit Nasrallah is acting alone without receiving instructions from Iran, then his recent excuse proves that he is not qualified to be a decision maker. At the peak of Israeli aggression, Nasrallah claimed Israeli forces were planning to launch such an attack between September and November 2006. He also claimed he kidnapped the two soldiers to force Israel to launch the attack, which turned Lebanon into rubble, earlier than planned. His excuse proves that Nasrallah, the leader, who was bragging during the Israeli attack, is the same man who has admitted his dreadful miscalculation.
This also proves he is incapable of taking any well-judged political or military decision. This man had given himself the right to lead the Lebanese and force them to meet a horrible fate. If any Lebanese had dared to object he would have been blamed and accused of being a political trader and agent of Israel and the United States.
With such a crooked mentality and megalomania, Nasrallah allowed himself to destroy Lebanon and hurt the interests of Arab countries. If he knew of Israel’s plans to attack Lebanon between September and November, we wonder why Nasrallah didn’t make a public statement or wait until the Israelis made the first move. If he had done any of this the Israelis would have been considered the attackers and blamed by the whole world. In such a scenario Nasrallah would have been in the right position to defend his country.
Arab countries didn’t make any mistake when they described Hezbollah’s move an ill-calculated adventure. Now Nasrallah himself has admitted his miscalculations and spur-of-the moment decisions have led to the destruction of Lebanon and its economy. The people of Lebanon won’t forgive Nasrallah for this blunder, which may force him out of the history of that country.
Nasrallah has a last opportunity to reach safe shores by disarming his men, surrendering to the legitimate Lebanese authority and ending his ties with Tehran.
In a recent interview given by Nasrallah we sensed his desire to give up his high stand. We hope our assessment is correct and we are still able to comprehend Nasrallah’s words properly.e-mail: ahmedjarallah@hotmail.com
 

Fox News team release: What is the message?
By Walid Phares
August 29/06
The release in Gaza of Fox News journalist Steve Centanni and camera man Olaf Wiig, kidnapped as of August 14 by a group calling itself "Holy Jihad Brigade" raises a number of salient issues related to the kidnapping and release:
1) "We were forced to convert to Islam at gunpoint," Centanni told FOX News. "Don't get me wrong here. I have the highest respect for Islam, and I learned a lot of good things about it, but it was something we felt we had to do because they had the guns, and we didn't know what the hell was going on."
Such a statement raises a number of points. First it is not unusual that Jihadists groups would force hostages to convert to Islam. But at the same time it hasn't been a systematic behavior. Over the past 25 years, Jihadist organizations, cells and captors -including al Qaida, Hezbollah, Laskar Jihad, Jemaa Islamiya, Salafi Combat group, etc have taken hostages. In many cases the Jihadists either asked the hostages or forced them to convert. But in other cases they haven't. Statistically, most hostages who have been executed were not asked to convert, while those who were released were either asked if they wished or in some cases were told that it would be better for them to do so. Obviously, hostages -especially if they weren't evangelists - would accept the conversion as a mean for securing liberation or at least physical security. But there were cases of Priests, Evangelists and Christian local leaders, who were executed after they refused to convert. These cases didn't receive the publicity received by media or secular Western citizens’ hostages.
However, there were cases where hostages were released without being forced or even asked to convert.
The question emanating from these hostage-conversions is two fold: a) is it considered as legitimate one in the eyes of Islamic law? Under international law, any forced conversion under threat is null and void. Under Sharia law a similar verdict could be issued by an Islamic court who would argue that conversion by force is not acceptable (La ikrah fil deen). But Jihadi interpretation may argue that the conversion is standing with the immediate consequence that reverting back from the new religion is punishable by death. This would play a considerable role in intimidating the ex hostages, and would allow the Terrorist group to call for sanctions in the future against the journalists.
2) The group calls itself "The Holy Jihad Brigade." As in previous cases, this may not be a new organization but a name given by the kidnappers or those who ordered the kidnapping for this particular operation. There have been many names that appeared after a Terrorist operation or hostage taking and never heard from again in Iraq, Gaza, Lebanon, and Kenya to name few cases. A Palestinian security official told AP that "Palestinian Authorities had known the identity of the kidnappers from the start." The source said "the name was a front for local militants." While indeed the name was created as a front for a local operation, the question is who ordered it? Hamas-led Government Prime Minister Ismael Hanieh said "it is not al Qaeda, and there is no al Qaeda in Gaza." In fact al Qaeda presence exists in Gaza and it was reported in many previous reports not denied by the Hamas cabinet. However it would be less likely that al Qaeda was behind the operation because of the modus operandi of the group: Such as sending a video to al Jazeera, and as in some cases in Iraq or Pakistan, execution could have ensued. So, who could be behind the kidnapping and the release? There are strong possibilities that the Hamas organization (which is in power) could be behind the operation. Why?
3) Hamas has been complaining about the US support to Israel, but more importantly about Washington's pressures to shut down all economic support to the US-listed Terrorist organization. In many speeches by Haniya and Hamas spokespersons, they blamed the US for the "sanctions" against their Government. It is widely known in the Palestinian territories that the financial conditions of Hamas' Government is worsening, allowing their opponents in Fatah to criticize them. An unofficial hostage operation against journalists affiliated with a media network perceived as close to the US Administration and very critical of Hamas, could have been authorized by the security agencies of Hamas as a way to send a message to Washington. Haniya may not want to cut it completely with the United States yet, knowing that the Mahmoud Abbas forces can still take advantage of the situation, hence the authorization for a "local" group to perform a Jihadi-like abduction and release to send a message Westbound.
4. Another analysis takes the regional situation into account and factors in the Syrian and Iranian regimes that have a strategic alliance with Hamas with Tehran funding the group and Damascus hosting its headquarters. Requests from either one or the other regimes for such an operation in Gaza are not unlikely. Since the Tehran embassy incidents both Iran and Syria demonstrated that they do not implicate themselves in hostage taking on their own soil. For two decades at least, Jihadist groups allied to the two regimes have taken, released, and some times executed hostages in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories by proxies.
5. Is that a signal for a developing trend? It could well be. During the Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon, CNN and other media complained from intimidation and control of the reports by Hezbollah. And as Iran and Syria are mobilizing for confrontation with the international community over the nuclear crisis with Ahmedinijad and on the international forces with Assad, Western and international media should be careful in their planning for coverage in Jihadi controlled areas.
**Dr Walid Phares is a Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of Future Jihad
August 29, 2006

La Biennale di Venezia / ‎‏63‏rd Venice Film Festival /‎
Presentation of the ‎‏7‏th Beirut International Film Festival (October ‎‏4‏th‏-11‏th ‎‏2006‏‎) ‎
The ‎‏7‏th edition of the Beirut International Film Festival will take place from October ‎‏4‏th to ‎‏11‏th ‎‏2006‏‎ – after a break of three years and despite the dramatic situation in the city and in ‎Lebanon generally. It will be presented on Monday, September ‎‏4‏th ‎‏2006‏‎, at ‎‏6‏‎ p.m., in the ‎Press Conference Room on the ‎‏3‏rd floor of the Palazzo del Casinò, during the ‎‏63‏rd Venice ‎Film Festival. The Director and the President of the Beirut International Film Festival, Colette ‎Naufal and Alice Edde, will be present, as will the President of La Biennale di Venezia, ‎Davide Croff, and the Director of the ‎‏63‏rd Venice Film Festival, Marco Müller. The ‎conference will take place in the presence of the Mayor of Venice, Massimo Cacciari.‎
Colette Naufal, who has been the Director of the Beirut International Film Festival since ‎‏1997‏‎, and Chairman of the Beirut Film Foundation since ‎‏2003‏‎, has announced that: ‎‎“Members of the international film community are joining together to sign a statement of ‎solidarity with this year’s Beirut International Film Festival. The statement will mark the launch ‎of the new MakeFilmsNotWar campaign. Starting in Venice, the campaign will be taken to ‎other countries around the world to promote international communication and respect for ‎human rights, rather than hatred, oppression and war.”‎
The President of La Biennale di Venezia, Davide Croff, declares: “The Venice Film Festival ‎and La Biennale di Venezia can do no less than promote the partnership between two ‎initiatives, which have always believed in a culture of peace”, whilst the Director of the ‎‏63‏rd ‎Venice Film Festival, Marco Müller, who last year was the recipient of the first “Heart of ‎Sarajevo” Award (for having contributed to creating the Sarajevo Film Festival under the ‎bombs, a symbol of peace in wartime), adds: “Festivals can also act as platforms for dialogue ‎and tools of mutual awareness and understanding. Helping the revival of the Beirut Film ‎Festival, after a hiatus of three years, represents an important signal that can only accelerate the ‎peace process. To take the decision of organizing a festival in Beirut means stating the ‎possibility of an immediate return to normality, to civilised life.” ‎
The MakeFilmsNotWar peace campaign, organised by the Lee and Gund Foundation, which ‎finances the Beirut Festival, has sent this declaration of support to the Biennale: “Despite the ‎wide-scale bombing and devastation of Lebanon's infrastructure, the ‎‏7‏th Beirut International ‎Film Festival will still take place as planned from October ‎‏4‏th‏-11‏th ‎‏2006‏‎. In solidarity with the ‎Beirut Festival, we urge fellow filmmakers to attend and support efforts to promote peace, ‎reconciliation, and reconstruction.”‎
The first Beirut Festival was held in ‎‏1997‏‎. Over the years, ‎‏18‏‎ to ‎‏20‏‎ international films have ‎had their regional premiere presented there, alongside a competition for Lebanese films (shorts, ‎documentaries and feature-length fiction). The Festival also organizes a competition for ‎screenplays, which is open to Lebanese filmmakers.‎Venice, .. ‎
 

Kofi Annan has no new information on IDF captives
By AP AND JPOST STAFF
Family members of the kidnapped IDF soldiers said Tuesday evening that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had no new information for them regarding their loved ones.
"He promised to help us," said Karnit Goldwasser, wife of captive reserve soldier Ehud Goldwasser.
"(Annan) also said that he would make efforts to help Gilad Shalit's family, and not just our families," Karnit added.
Kofi Annan arrived for talks with Israeli leaders Tuesday, as part of a Mideast tour aimed at shoring up the UN-brokered cease-fire.
During the visit, Annan met with families of the three kidnapped IDF soldiers. The families were hoping that Annan would do more to pressure Hizbullah on the issue. They also hoped that such pressure would, at the very least, result in the International Red Cross gaining access to the soldiers.
"We ask (Annan) to act toward releasing our soldiers," Eldad Regev's brother, Benny, said before the meeting with Annan. "The UN decided that Lebanon and the Lebanese government and Hizbullah must release the soldiers without any conditions. This was the resolution. We expect him to act toward achieving it."
The family members also appealed for word on the soldiers' conditions.
"They must first of all give us a sign of life. (Annan) must act toward that. It's a moral demand that's basic in any negotiations," Benny Regev said.
"I know that Kofi Annan is an important man ... he has a lot of power and influence and he can speak to the government in Lebanon," said Karnit Goldwasser, Ehud Goldwasser's wife.
They also were expected to ask him to back down from his demand that Israel lift its blockade of Lebanon, for fear that an end to the siege would allow Hizbullah to move its captives out of Lebanon.
Israel's UN Ambassador Dan Gillerman said the meeting between Annan and the families carried important symbolism.
"I hope that he will leave here with a real feeling of obligation, of a moral mission to do everything he can - and he is going to several capitals in which there is influence on this matter - to bring about Udi, Eldad and Gilad's speedy return home," Gillerman told reporters.
He also met with Defense Minister Amir Peretz and as expected, had appealed for Israel to lift the blockade.
Annan, who spoke after meeting with Peretz, said Israel was responsible for most of the violations of the fragile cease-fire that ended the 34-days of fighting between Israel and Hizbullah guerrillas in southern Lebanon.
"We need to resolve the issue of the abducted soldiers very quickly," Annan said during his visit to Naqoura in south Lebanon. "We need to deal with the lifting of the embargo - sea, land and air - which for the Lebanese is a humiliation and an infringement on their sovereignty."
However, Israel has said it will only reopen access to Lebanon once it is assured forces deployed on Lebanon's borders can stop the weapons flow to Hizbullah guerrillas. Israel wants to see international forces patrolling the Lebanon-Syria border, along with Lebanese troops, arguing that Syria is one of Hizbullah's main arms suppliers.
However, Lebanon has said only its troops will be posted on that border.
"Israel will be happy to stop the sea and aerial blockade if we felt that the land crossings would not be the main smuggling routes," said government spokeswoman Miri Eisen. "Israel is certain that if there is no serious force to stop (smuggling), both Syria and Iran will continue to back, fund and arm Hizbullah in Lebanon."
Eisen said that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would also call for "the unconditional return of our captives in Lebanon" during his meeting with Annan.

Annan: Israel must lift Lebanon blockade
By AMY TEIBEL, Associated Press Writer
JERUSALEM -
JERUSALEM - With Israel's prime minister standing by his side, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan renewed his demands Wednesday that Israel immediately lift its sea and air blockade of Lebanon, but failed to win Israel's consent.
Annan also said he hoped Israel would withdraw all its forces from south Lebanon once the number of U.N. forces in Lebanon has doubled to 5,000, a number he said could be reached in "coming days and weeks."
However, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert suggested Israel was not prepared to do that until a U.N.-brokered cease-fire deal that ended 34 days of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah guerrillas was implemented fully.
Under the deal, some 15,000 Lebanese soldiers and up to 15,000 international troops are to be deployed and enforce an arms embargo on Hezbollah. Currently, some 2,500 U.N. observers are monitoring the Israel-Lebanon border, but have a very limited mandate.
Also Wednesday, Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora said Wednesday that his government would pay $33,000 per house to compensate residents whose homes were destroyed by Israeli attacks.
Saniora said 130,000 housing units had been destroyed or damaged in more than a month of Israeli airstrikes and ground fighting with Hezbollah guerrillas, mostly in south Lebanon. He did not give a breakdown of the completely destroyed houses.
The fighting between Israel and Hezbollah began after two Israeli soldiers were captured by the Islamic militant group. On Wednesday, a Hezbollah cabinet minister said that the guerrilla group will not release the two captured Israeli soldiers unconditionally, and that they would only be freed in a prisoner exchange.
"There will be no unconditional release. This is not possible," Minister of Energy and Hydraulic Resources Mohammed Fneish said in Beirut. He is one of two Hezbollah members in Lebanon's Cabinet.
"There should be an exchange through indirect negotiations. This is the principle to which Hezbollah and the resistance are adhering," he said.
On Tuesday, Annan called the Israeli blockade of Lebanon a "humiliation" and an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty. But Israel has said it would not lift its blockade unless international forces, along with Lebanese troops, are deployed on the Israel-Lebanon border, as well as on Lebanon's frontier with Syria to prevent the flow of weapons to Hezbollah.
Syria has said it would consider the presence of international troops on its border a hostile act and Lebanon has said it would deploy its own forces there, but not let international troops patrol in the area. Annan has backed Lebanon in the dispute and called on "all the neighbors" to cooperate in implementing the cease-fire deal.
The U.N. chief said he won assurances from Lebanese authorities that they are serious about enforcing the arms embargo on Hezbollah, and that he believes Israel's security concerns could be addressed in this way.
"We need to be flexible, because I don't think there's ever only one way of solving a problem. We shouldn't insist that the only way to do it is by deploying international forces," he said.
The lifting of the blockade is necessary to help Lebanon's economy recover from the war and to strengthen Lebanon's government. "I do believe the blockade should be lifted," Annan said in a news conference with Olmert.
Olmert sidestepped the issue, saying only that Israel wants to see a full implementation of the cease-fire.
Annan said he is working to increase the size of the international force in Lebanon "as rapidly as possible" and to double the current number to 5,000 quickly. A five-ship Italian fleet departed on Tuesday carrying 800 soldiers and was expected to arrive in Lebanon on Friday.
"We hope that as we do that, the Israeli withdrawal (from Lebanon) will continue and by the time we are at that level, Israel will have fully withdrawn," Annan said.
Olmert said Israel hoped to pull out from Lebanon "as soon as possible," but suggested the deployment of the 5,000 U.N. troops would not be enough to secure that objective. After meeting with Annan on Tuesday, Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz said that "Israel will pull out once there is a reasonable level of forces there." He did not say what that level would be.
Olmert, meanwhile, said he hoped the cease-fire would provide dialogue between Israel and Lebanon.
"I hope the conditions will change rapidly to allow direct contact between the government of Israel and the government of Lebanon to hopefully to reach agreement between the two countries," he said. The deal could be "a cornerstone to build a new reality between Israel and Lebanon."
Israel has long sought a peace deal with Lebanon, but Lebanon has hesitated reaching a separate agreement with Israel as long as Israel's conflicts with the Palestinians and Syria are unresolved.
Both Annan and Olmert demanded the unconditional release of two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah on July 12, the incident that triggered the war. A third Israeli soldier was seized by Palestinian Hamas militants in late June and is being held in Gaza.
Annan said he would do everything in his power to win the release of the three soldiers. He said that in his visit to Lebanon, before coming to Israel, he met with a Hezbollah member of the Lebanese Cabinet and discussed the fate of the soldiers. "I did not get the impression that they are not alive. I believe they are alive," he said. Israel is the second stop on Annan's 11-day Mideast tour intended to shore up the truce.

Lebanon: Hezbollah Rearms
August 29, 2006 23 40 GMT
Summary
New indications suggest Hezbollah is receiving shipments of small arms and anti-tank munitions from Syria.
Analysis
Sources in Lebanon indicate Syrian arms shipments are passing into Lebanon. Mules, rather than vehicles, are moving small arms, ammunition and some anti-tank munitions over the Anti-Lebanon Mountains along the Lebanese-Syrian border, across the Bekaa Valley and up into the western mountains, particularly through the Greek Orthodox mountain village of Bteggrine. From here, with the assistance of the Syrian Social Nationalist party, the shipments can reach Hezbollah in the southern suburbs of Beirut, where they can be dispersed south.
Hezbollah does not, however, appear to be moving these arms south of the Litani River, where the bulk of fighting took place during the recent conflict with Israel. Many more arms are probably being stockpiled inside the Bekaa, Hezbollah's main stronghold.
Significantly, no signs indicate shipments of artillery rockets are occurring. The larger Fajr series, which Hezbollah has called the Khaiber-1 and were used to strike Haifa, are difficult to transport without motor vehicles in meaningful numbers. This signals Israel is effectively interdicting large shipments of weapons into Lebanon. Israel is watching supply lines from Syria very closely, and Lebanese citizens have become accustomed to the drone of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles conducting surveillance.
While these small arms would certainly be useful in a guerrilla war inside of Lebanon, Hezbollah has other options. Some Hezbollah elements are particularly concerned about a renewed Israeli offensive, especially after the virtually inevitable fall of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. But Hezbollah is in a remarkably good position as reconstruction money pours in and the militant group basically rebuilds all of southern Lebanon, thus becoming the de facto landlord with a new source of substantial income: rent. To this end, Hezbollah is going out of its way both to avoid provoking Israel and to rebuild its domestic support structure, while at the same time preparing for the next confrontation.
Meanwhile, Syria has kept its border with Lebanon wide open, and has virulently refused to allow U.N. peacekeeping troops to deploy along the Lebanese-Syrian border. In addition to allowing Hezbollah to maintain supply routes past Lebanese soldiers patrolling the border, Syria has preserved its main pressure tactic against Lebanon. Whenever Lebanese politics show signs of diverging from Syrian interests, Syrian customs officers severely restrict the flow of goods over the Lebanese-Syrian border as a stern reminder to its neighbor that as the country's chief fuel supplier Syria controls Lebanon's power switch.
The Lebanese army has, however, deployed its Eighth Brigade along its border with Syria. The Eighth Brigade is entirely Christian and fought against Syria in 1989, making for a strong historical animosity. The Lebanese army could not send a stronger message opposing the rearming of Hezbollah. Thus, we will be watching to see whether the Eighth Brigade can effectively interdict these pack animal shipments or whether they continue to slip through.

NASRALLAH'S BLUNDER
By AMIR TAHERI
http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/nasrallahs_blunder_opedcolumnists_amir_taheri.htm
August 29, 2006 -- WELL, what do you know: What was presented as a "Great Strategic Divine Victory" only a week ago is now beginning to look more like a
costly blunder. And the man who is making the revisionist move is the same who made the original victory claim: Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general
of the Lebanese branch of Hezbollah. In a TV interview in Beirut Sunday, Nasrallah admitted second thoughts about the wisdom of capturing the two Israeli soldiers, an incident that triggered the war: "The party leadership never expected a response on such an unprecedented scale and volume [by Israel]," he said. "Had we known that what we did would lead to this, we would certainly not have embarked upon it." For a roundabout way of eating humble pie, this was not bad for a man whom Western media have portrayed as the latest Arab folk hero or even (as one U.S. weekly put it) a new Saladin. Why did Nasrallah decide to change his unqualified claim of victory into an indirect admission of defeat? Two reasons. The first consists of facts on the ground: Hezbollah lost some 500 of its fighters, almost a quarter of its elite fighting force. Their families are now hounding Nasrallah to provide an explanation for "miscalculations" that led to their death.
Throughout southern Lebanon, once a stronghold of Hezbollah, pictures of the "martyrs" adorn many homes and shops, revealing the fact that many more
Hezbollah fighters died than the 110 claimed by Nasrallah. What angers the families of the "martyrs" is that Hezbollah fighters had not been told that the sheik was starting a war to please his masters in Tehran, and that they should prepare for it.
The fighters found out there was a war only after the Israelis started raining fire on southern Lebanon. In fact, no one - apart from the sheik's Iranian contacts and a handful of Hezbollah security officials linked to Tehran and Damascus - knew that Nasrallah was provoking a war. Even the two Hezbollah ministers in the Lebanese government weren't consulted, nor the 12 Hezbollah members of the Lebanese National Assembly. The party's chief policymaking organ, the Shura (consultative assembly), hasn't held a full session since 2001. The "new Saladin" has also lost most of his medium-range missiles without inflicting any serious damage on Israel. Almost all of Hezbollah's missile launching pads (often placed in mosques, schools and residential buildings) south of the Litani River have been dismantled. Worse still, the Israelis captured an unknown number of Hezbollah fighters and political officers, including several local leaders in the Bekaa Valley,
Khyam and Tyre.
The second reason why Nasrallah has had to backtrack on his victory claims is the failure of his propaganda machine to hoodwink the Lebanese. He is
coming under growing criticism from every part of the political spectrum, including the Hezbollah itself. Last week he hurriedly cancelled a series of victory marches planned for Beirut's Shiite suburbs after leading Shiite figures attacked the move as "unmerited and indecent." Instead, every village and every town is holding typical Shiite mourning ceremonies, known as tarhym (seeking mercy), for the dead. Nasrallah has tried to rally his base by distributing vast sums of Iranian money through his network - by the end of last week, an estimated $12 million in crisp U.S. banknotes. But if Nasrallah had hoped to buy silence, if not
acquiescence, he is being proved wrong. Some Lebanese Shiites are scandalized that they are treated by Iranian mullahs as mercenaries, and see Nasrallah's
cash handouts as diyah (blood money) for their dead. And a dead man whose family receives a diyah cannot claim the status of "martyr" and enjoy its
prerogatives in paradise. As the scale of the destruction in the Shiite south becomes more clear, the pro-Hezbollah euphoria (much of it created by Western media and beamed back to Lebanon through satellite TV) is evaporating. Reality is beginning to reassert its rights.
And that could be good news for Lebanon as a nation. It is unlikely that Hezbollah will ever regain the position it has lost. The Lebanese from all sides of the political spectrum are united in their determination not to allow any armed group to continue acting as a state within the state. The decent thing to do for Nasrallah would be to resign and allow his party to pick a new leader, distance itself from Iran and Syria, merge its militia into the Lebanese army and become part of the nation's political mainstream. In last year's elections, Hezbollah ended up with 12 seats in the 128-seat National Assembly, thanks to a series of alliances with other Shiite groups as well as Christian and Druze parties. As the scale of Nasrallah's blunder becomes clearer, it is unlikely that Hezbollah would be able to forge such alliances in the future.
To be sure, Nasrallah remains a powerful man. He has hundreds of gunmen at his disposal plus a source of endless supplies of money and arms in Iran. He
can still have his political opponents murdered inside and outside Lebanon either by his goons or by hit men from Damascus and Tehran. But his chances of
seizing power through a coup de force or provoking a civil war are diminishing by the day. Arab leaders never resign, even when they admit having made tragic mistakes. And Nasrallah is no exception. In reality, however, Lebanon has already moved into the post-Nasrallah era. And that is the only good news to come out of the mini-war he provoked.
***Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.

Published: 08/30/2006 12:00 AM (UAE)
Illustration by Nino Jose Heredia/Gulf News
Talk to Iran!" The phrase has become a mantra for all those who fear the Khomeinist regime but are equally scared of challenging it.
The idea of talks is attractive for a number of reasons. To begin with, it is based on the assumption that every problem must have a solution; all we need to do is look for it. Most people find the idea that a problem might, somehow, defy solution in a given timeframe, unbearable. The truth, however, is that life, including international life, is full of problems that do not have ready-made solutions at the time of our choosing. By recommending talks, therefore, we cling to the hope that the process might somehow produce a miracle. The "Talk to Iran" party pretends that it has struck gold with an original idea.
In fact this is a banal idea that has been in circulation for a quarter of a century. President Jimmy Carter thought of it in January 1979, a month before the mullahs seized power in Tehran, when he established contact with the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, then operating from a Paris suburb.
Once the mullahs were in control, the Carter administration intensified talks with them through the embassy in Tehran. Bruce Laingen, the charge d'affaire and a sincere supporter of the Islamic Revolution, was a daily visitor to the foreign ministry. Six months after the formal establishment of the Islamic republic, Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Bzrezinski held "a summit" with Mehdi Bazargan, Khomeini's prime minister to discuss "a strategic partnership". The process ended when Khomeinist "students", raided the US Embassy in Tehran. Since then, all US administrations, with the exception of the present one, have maintained some level of talks. However, none succeeded in influencing the Khomeinist strategy in any way. Others who talked to the Islamic republic fared no better.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, long-time foreign minister of West Germany, built his career around the hope of bringing the Islamic Republic into the international mainstream. He invented the phrase "critical dialogue" which, in practice, ended up meaning a joint criticism of the US by Iran and the Europeans.
Genscher's French colleague Roland Dumas was equally enthusiastic about what he called "a constructive dialogue" with the mullahs. The Genscher-Duma scenario was also tried by Spain's socialist prime minister Felipe Gonzalez and, more recently, Jack Straw, who was pushed aside as British foreign secretary only recently. Americans and Europeans have not been alone in achieving little or nothing, if not actually meeting with disaster, by talking to the Islamic Republic.
Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have been talking to Iran to determine the status of the Caspian Sea for 12 years without getting anywhere. Turkey has talked to Iran since 1989 to persuade it to stop the flow of money and arms to Turkish-Kurdish rebels and the Turkish branch of Hezbollah again to no avail. Egypt too did not make any headway on the issue of resuming diplomatic ties.
In every case the Islamic Republic has interpreted the readiness of an adversary to talk as a sign of weakness and, as a result, has hardened its position.
One might wonder why. Is it because Iran's leaders are out of touch with reality or have not mastered the art of diplomacy? The answer is no.
Two facts might help explain Iran's behaviour.
The first is that the Khomeinist regime is the last of the revolutionary regimes with universal messianic pretensions.
The second fact that might explain the behaviour of the Khomeinists, is related to the rivalries among them from the start.
Thus, no Khomeinist leader can be seen making the slightest concessions to an outsider, let alone a coalition of "infidel" powers, without risking political death.
Khomeinist diplomacy is designed to seek total triumph for the Islamic Republic and total surrender for its negotiating partners on all issues.
Current tension
All this brings us to the current tension around Tehran's refusal to suspend uranium enrichment as a precondition for talks about a package of incentives from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany.
It is obvious that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cannot accept that precondition without risking political suicide. Those who drafted the UN offer must have known this. It is, therefore, surprising that they now claim to be surprised by Tehran's response.
Since 1979 the real question with regard to Iran has been simple: should the world kowtow to the Khomeinist regime or should the Khomeinist regime accept the global rules of the game? Maybe it is time to provide a clear answer.
**Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.

Why Do Muslims Execute Innocent People?
Islamist Ideology
by Denis MacEoin
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2006
http://www.meforum.org/article/1000

While often ignored in the Western media, human rights abuses in the Islamic world are a daily occurrence. Both Muslim states and ad hoc religious courts order mutilation and execution, not only of criminals but also of individuals—mainly women—who have not committed anything which would be considered a crime in other societies. In some cases, Shari‘a (Islamic law) tribunals issue death sentences for those acquitted in regular courts.[1] In other cases, religious leaders invoke religion to sanction non-Islamic practices such as honor killings and female genital mutilation.

Original Islamic jurisprudence, however, does not necessarily mandate such severe punishments. In the early twentieth century, it even seemed that the introduction of modern legal codes in Muslim majority countries might ameliorate regular Shari‘a punishments, but in recent decades, traditionalists have pushed a back-to-basics program which has augmented application of Shari‘a punishment. Rather than modifying Islamic practice, many self-described Islamist reformers make matters worse by advocating retrenchment rather than reform.

Unjust Punishment
Many of the crimes for which death is mandated involve sex or honor. While capricious application of Shari‘a punishment is common throughout Muslim majority countries and communities, since the fall of the Taliban and because of the activity of Iranian journalists and bloggers, many of the specific examples which are known in the West come from Iran.

On August 15, 2004, 16-year-old Ateqeh Rajabi, was hanged in public in the northern Iranian town of Neka. Her crime was to have sex with her boyfriend. She had no lawyer, nor could her family find one willing to defend her. The capriciousness of the judge rather than a strict interpretation of the Qur'an contributed to her death. She had talked back to the judge, Haji Reza'i, who later remarked that he would not have ordered her execution had it not been for her "sharp tongue."[2]

In December 2004, Leyla, a 19-year-old girl with a mental age of eight, was sentenced to death for "acts contrary to chastity." The sentencing judge ordered her to be flogged before execution. Her situation was lamentable. When she was eight, her mother forced her into prostitution, letting her be raped repeatedly. She was later sold as a temporary wife (mut'a, sigha), legal in Twelver Shi‘ite law which allows temporary wives to be contracted for set periods ranging from one hour to ninety-nine years. Thirteen-year-old Zhila Izadi also received a death sentence—later commuted—after being impregnated by her older brother.

Other examples abound. In July 2005, Iranian authorities publicly hanged two boys, 18-year-old Ayaz Marhoni and 16-year-old Mahmud Asghari, in the shrine city of Mashhad for homosexual acts. Photographs of the boys with nooses round their necks just before their execution are available online,[3] but never appeared in Western newspapers or on television.

On January 7, 2006, an Islamic court in Tehran passed a death sentence on an 18-year old girl, identified only by her first name, Nazanin. She had stabbed an assailant while fighting off three men who attempted to rape her and her 16-year-old niece.[4] Reports suggested their attackers were members of the Basij, a radical militia charged with upholding the Islamic Republic's revolutionary principles. Nazanin was aged seventeen at the time of her offence, too young for a death sentence even under Iranian law that states that such sentences for minors should be commuted to five years' imprisonment. In Nazanin's case, the judge ignored extenuating circumstances and applied rigidly the law of retaliation (qisas). Under such a system, a life must be paid for by a life, an eye for an eye, except where the family of the victim is willing to accept blood money or compensation (diya) for lost body parts and organs.[5]

Iran is not the only Islamic country practicing spurious punishment. On April 21, 2005, in Spingul, a valley near Faizabad in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province, family members and villagers executed 25-year-old Bibi Amin after she was found in the company of a man to whom she was not married. She was buried to her neck and, for two hours, stoned.[6] There have been similar cases in Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Somalia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and other Muslim countries. Even in Egypt, where Shari‘a law has been modified, men and women are still imprisoned unequally for adultery.[7] That the application of such punishments is widespread and that its perpetrators justify their actions in Islam neither means that a consensus exists among theologians or that such interpretations have been consistent through time.

Qur'anic Attitudes toward Punishment
With only one exception, every chapter of the Qur'an begins with the words Bismillah ar-rahman ar-rahim, "In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate." While such compassion is lacking in modern application of Shari‘a law, this has not always been the case. Many traditional sources argue for limited punishment. The Sunan of Ibn Maja, one of the six canonical collections, cites a saying by Muhammad that reads, "Do not carry out punishments if you can find a way to avoid them."[8]

This example is echoed by another tradition from the Sunan of Tirmidhi: "Wherever possible, do not inflict punishments (hudud; singular hadd) on Muslims; if there is a way out for someone, let him go. It is better for the ruler (al-imam) to err in forgiveness than for him to err in punishment."[9] According to the twelfth-century jurist and philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes), "hadd punishments are suspended in doubtful cases," echoing another hadith to that effect.[10]

Still, in traditional Islam, adultery and fornication (both termed zina') are considered criminal acts worthy of a hadd punishment, which the Qur'an sets at 100 lashes.[11] Adultery itself is a difficult charge to bring under Shari‘a: it requires four adult male witnesses to the penetration; in contrast, only two males (or four females) need witness murder for the charges to stick. Nor is circumstantial evidence sufficient. Pregnancy is not enough to prove that adultery occurred since the law considers that a woman may have been penetrated in her sleep or, according to some scholars, the possibility that an embryo could have gestated for up to five years. The penalty for false accusation of adultery is seventy-five lashes.

That does not mean that Islamic law does not embrace the death penalty for adultery. At some point—often said to have occurred during the rule of the second caliph ‘Umar (r. 634-44)—jurists began to set the punishment for married people as stoning to death based on a verse that had allegedly been dropped from the Qur'an.[12] Stoning is also mentioned in the Hadith, and there is no doubt that Muhammad sanctioned the punishment. However, strict conditions are determined for accusation and punishment. A distinction is made between unmarried and married offenders; inebriation, force, and errors such as intercourse with a woman mistaken for a man's wife or slave girl are mitigating factors while the demand for four eyewitnesses to sexual penetration makes it almost impossible to bring an accusation. It is because of the difficulties of formal adultery charges that many Islamic societies embrace honor killing.

Historically, there were significant differences in the treatment of free men and slaves. Modern Iranian law discriminates even further against religious minorities. The Islamic Republic might execute a non-Muslim man accused of having sexual relations with a Muslim woman, whereas a Muslim man who has sex with a non-Muslim woman is not subject to any penalty.[13]

Despite the potential for leniency in the application of Islamic rules, states acting in the name of religion have applied harsher penalties than traditional religious jurists. The Islamic Republic of Iran ordered Ateqeh Rajabi hanged even though Shari‘a only permits the execution of married adulterers, whereas she was single. At most, she should have received 100 lashes—and, according to many interpretations, these should not be laid on hard.

The hadith literature is not silent on two of the factors relevant to many of the recent applications of capital punishment in the name of Islam for crimes of honor. Tirmidhi relates an incident when a woman was brought to the Prophet, accused of adultery. It transpired that the man had forced her to have intercourse in acknowledgment of which Muhammad refused to have her punished.[14] Young age can also be cause for leniency. Ibn Maja records a statement by a boy who survived the massacre of the Jewish tribe of Banu Qurayza in 627, saying he had been spared the fate of the tribe's men because he had not yet grown pubic hair.[15]

What about a case such as Nazanin's, in which a person was killed? In Islamic law, offenses against the person come under the law of qisas. These offenses amount to five crimes: murder, voluntary manslaughter—such as when an offender sets out to beat a victim but kills him or her in the process, involuntary killing, intentional physical injury, and unintentional injury.

Retaliation—a life for a life—is permissible in the two instances of intentional killing or injury, but even in these cases, the victim's family may waive retribution in return for a set financial payment. In all other cases, only blood money may be demanded. If correct Shari‘a rules were applied, Nazanin would not face a death sentence for an involuntary killing, especially when she had acted in defense of her honor.

Theological Impediments to Reform
So why is there a growing discrepancy between the penalties justified in Islamic jurisprudence and the far more serious punishments applied? Traditional Muslims believe that the Qur'an is immutable. It is not just a sacred text like the Torah or the New Testament but a direct copy of God's word imprinted on the mind of Muhammad via recitation from the Archangel Gabriel. It cannot be rewritten. Indeed, a hadith attributes to Muhammad the saying, "Whosoever disputes a single verse of the Qur'an, strike off his head."[16]

This doctrine has become pernicious for all who attempt a modern understanding of the scripture. Whereas progressive Jewish and Christian scholars and clerics have devised forms of higher criticism that tackle issues of context and period, all efforts to do the same thing with the Qur'an have met with fierce resistance. Several Muslim reformers—notably Pakistani academic Fazlur Rahman (1911-88), Iranian cleric Muhammad Mujtahid-i Shabestari (b. 1936), Iranian philosopher ‘Abd al-Karim Soroush (b. 1945), and the Syrian Muhammad Shahrur (b. 1938)—have tried to develop ways to account for the social, linguistic, and religious environment at the time of the Qur'an's revelation when adjudicating and legislating on matters relevant to the modern world, such as women's rights. Their efforts have pushed the debate in a positive direction, but they are both better understood and better liked in the West than in the Muslim world.[17]

Muslim reactions to such reformist initiatives have been largely hostile and even violent. In the 1960s, a Pakistani religious court sentenced Fazlur Rahman to death.[18] Vigilantes have attacked Souroush on numerous occasions,[19] and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the Somali-born ex-member of the Dutch parliament;[20] Canadian writer Irshad Manji;[21] and Los Angeles-based psychologist Wafa Sultan, [22] all outspoken critics of Islamic social practice, are in hiding or under guard.

The pressure to reject contextualization of the Qur'an is illustrated by two cases, occurring more than sixty years apart in Egypt. In 1930, a cleric named Muhammad Abu Zayd, published a book of Qur'an exegesis titled Al-Hidaya wa'l-'Irfan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an bi'l-Qur'an, in which he treated concepts such as paradise as metaphors. Other clerics at Cairo's Al-Azhar University, the central seat of religious learning and authority in Sunni Islam, condemned him. Rashid Rida' issued a more forceful condemnation, accused the author of being an apostate, and called for his forcible divorce. All copies of the tafsir were collected by the police and destroyed. Clerics who had read it were dismissed from their posts.[23]

In 1992, history repeated itself. Egyptian academic Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd presented research in application for a full professorship at Cairo University. His work argued that the Qur'an had been written in a human language so that men could understand it. Since it was in a specific language, he argued, it was legitimate to read it with reference to our knowledge of seventh-century Arabic and the human world to which it was directed. His arguments created an uproar. Al-Azhar University condemned him. Leaflets and the popular press accused him of heresy. The Egyptian government tried him before a secular court on charges of apostasy. He was declared a heretic (mulhid) and an apostate (murtadd) and became the object of death threats from radical Islamists throughout the country. An Egyptian court ordered that he and his wife be divorced on the grounds that a Muslim woman cannot be married to a non-Muslim, even as he denied ever abandoning his faith. He now teaches at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands.[24] That parallel situations would occur sixty years apart illustrates how stifled scholarly discourse is at Al-Azhar.

A particularly flagrant example of academic suppression in a modern Shi‘ite context may be seen in the case of ‘Abdulaziz Sachedina, a prominent Shi‘ite academic, professor of religious studies at the University of Virginia, and coauthor of Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty.[25] In August 1998, Sachedina, who had received complaints from his local Muslim community about his teaching and writing about Islam, held a meeting in Najaf, Iraq, with grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. In the course of this interview, as recorded in detail by Sachedina, Sistani demanded that he could no longer "express any opinions in matters dealing with Islam, its religion, and its teachings." Prominent among the many theological errors of which Sachedina was accused was his promotion of an irenic, pluralist approach to Judaism and Christianity, which he saw as equals of Islam.[26]

The net result of such incidents is discouragement of serious revisionist work on the Qur'an and the Hadith. Fear for one's life, the safety of one's family, or one's livelihood are powerful disincentives to saying or writing anything controversial. The only arena in which open debate on such matters takes place is in Western academe, but it is likely here that some Muslim academics living in the West and, indeed, some Western scholars of Islam have chosen safer areas in which to carry out research, knowing the risks they now run from a single accusation of defamation.

Qur'anic Challenges
The problem is that, despite the belief that the Qur'an is the immutable word of God, in its current form the book was compiled only during the reign of the Caliph ‘Uthman (644-56) and organized into suras, ranging in length from a few verses to many pages. While the Qur'an was revealed over a period of twenty-two years, the order of compilation was curious: with the exception of the first sura (al-Fatiha), the longest suras come first and the shortest last. Early scholars debated when particular suras, verses, or groups of verses were "sent down." Determining chronology was often basic, all suras being labeled either Meccan or Medinan, based on in which of these two Arabian cities Muhammad had received a particular revelation. Sometimes it was possible to attribute certain passages to a particular incident, such as the Battle of Uhud or a dispute with the Prophet's wives. These asbab an-nuzul (occasions of revelation), insofar as they are reliable, permit a more nuanced picture of how the text developed during Muhammad's lifetime.

One thing is clear: later verses often express a position contrary to earlier ones. For example, early—mainly Meccan—verses express a positive view of Jews and Christians, whereas late ones—all Medinan—follow the souring of relations between the Prophet and both Jews and Christians. By this reckoning, there are late verses that abrogate (termed nasikh) and early verses which are abrogated (termed mansukh).

Verses commanding jihad against non-believers abrogate those of an ecumenical nature, moving from a position of "There is no compulsion in religion"[27] to "Fight those who do not believe in God or the last day, who do not forbid what God and his Prophet forbid, who do not believe in the religion of truth among those who were given the Book [Jews and Christians] until they pay the poll tax (jizya) by their own hands, having been brought low."[28]

The problem is that earlier sections of the Qur'an tend to be more amenable to a modernist interpretation than later ones. Where modern Muslims emphasize the verse decreeing that there is no compulsion in matters of faith, more radical or orthodox scholars trump such citations with nasikh verses overriding moderate interpretations.

What impact does this have on punishment? Qur'anic verses that mention punishments are invariably late but not very detailed. Although the Qur'an always carries greater weight than the hadiths, it is not uncommon to see a hadith cited to support a harsher legal position. Thus, the verse, "There is no compulsion in religion" is outweighed by the tradition according to which the Prophet said, "Whosoever changes his religion, kill him,"[29] which forms a basis for the law of apostasy as it still stands.[30]

The Emergence of Islamic Neo-radicalism
What happened to some strains of Islam to favor the past over the present and glorify black-and-white interpretations of the Qur'an over more nuanced approaches? While the exact answer varies across regions, certain common factors emerge.

In several cases, a puritan form of Islam has either allied itself with a military or political force—for example the Salafi-Wahhabi movement's alliance with the Saud family in Saudi Arabia—or has itself taken political power, as with the early nineteenth-century Sokoto Caliphate in West Africa or, more recently, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's followers in Iran, the Taliban in Afghanistan, or, perhaps, the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. In all such cases, the resulting political systems have applied Shari‘a in a harsher form than usual.

In addition, from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, there has been a broader struggle between traditionalist and modernizing influences and movements. Growing European influence in Middle Eastern states led to demands for the introduction of Western-style constitutions, educational systems, and laws. Many regional countries adopted modern legal codes modeled on the French, Italian, Swiss, British, or other systems. This represented a great step forward in respect to areas such as family law, tangential women's rights, legal clarity, and modes of punishment.

There were, however, two drawbacks to this brand of modernization. The first was the alienation of the clerical class. Religious leaders are "the learned" (ulema), men who have undergone training as jurists within Shari‘a. Marginalized by the introduction of European criminal codes and the establishment of Western-style courts, divested in many places of their role as educators, and alienated by the overt secularization of many Muslim societies and cultures, the ulema dreamed of a return to basics. They were backed by like-minded lay thinkers, such as Hasan al-Banna (1906-49), a schoolteacher who founded the Muslim Brotherhood, an influential and radicalizing force in several countries in the Middle East and Europe.[31]

The reaction against modernization might have been muted had there been a loose movement for reformation of Shari‘a itself. Mainstream scholars held that it was impossible for modern jurists to challenge or alter the legal precepts set down in the early tenth century by the four main Sunni law schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. The classical formulation of this precept is that the gates of ijtihad, independent reasoning in matters of religious law, had been closed. The Qur'an—as the immutable word of God—could not be rewritten nor could the records of the Prophet's life and sayings—the other source from which Islamic law derived—be edited or reconsidered.

However, beginning in the late nineteenth century, a number of thinkers argued that, even if the sacred texts could not be altered, it was legitimate to exercise reasoning in order to bring the laws more in line with modern ways of thought and practice. At that time, Muslim attitudes to the West were generally positive. Arab, Iranian, and Turkish political reformers sought to emulate European political systems, science, technology, military know-how, schools, universities, and laws. They argued that Islam could advance by re-configuring itself along Western lines.

Despite this, a small number of intellectuals developed a countervailing trend that emphasized the religious and legal thought of the first three generations of the faith. This became the Salafi movement, derived from the Arabic term salaf (predecessors).[32] Salafi thinkers such as Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905)[33] reexamined the two basic texts, the Qur'an and the body of traditions or hadiths that make up the Sunna, the living record of how the Prophet and his companions behaved and thought. From this emerged a belief that, far from needing to be modernized, Islamic law and, by extension, Muslim life in general, had to return to how it was at the time of the Salaf. Most of the movements Western commentators term "fundamentalist" are Salafi.

While the first modern Salafi thinkers sought reform, later Salafi theoreticians narrowed the debate. Egyptian cleric Muhammad Rashid Rida' (1865-1935) published a periodical, Al-Manar (The Lighthouse), which influenced intellectuals across the Islamic world. His ideas formed a bridge between Salafi reformers and more radical movements such as Banna's Muslim Brotherhood.[34]

These new Salafists focused on improving Muslim morals and what has come to be known as "Shari‘a-mindedness." Sayyid Qutb (1906-66),[35] probably the most influential Islamist thinker of the twentieth century, took this moral emphasis and extended it to include violent action against both non-believers and unfaithful Muslim rulers. He argued that the term al-jahiliya, which had normally been used to define the "Age of Ignorance" that preceded Islam, should now be applied to the present day to the extent that modern society—including Muslim society—had distanced itself from Islam. Just as Muhammad fought a holy war against the forces of paganism in seventh-century Arabia, so, too, true Muslims should fight the barbarism of the modern age. Qutb outlined these ideas in a short book, Ma'alim fi' t-Tariq (Milestones on the Road), based on notes he kept in prison.[36] The text launched the new, radicalized, jihadist style of Salafi thought and activism.

It is this world-view that is echoed today by theorists such as Osama bin Laden and groups such as the Afghan Taliban. They argue that Islam cannot adapt to the changes imposed by history but must remain rigidly faithful to the existing interpretations of scripture, the models laid down by the Prophet and his companions, and the legal rulings developed from these sources by the first generations of legal scholars.

Reform without Reformation
There have been and are a number of reformers working to bring Islam into closer harmony with universal standards of justice, tolerance, pluralism, and human rights. These include Nurcholish Madjid (1939-2005), the founder of a school of Islamic neo-modernism in Indonesia, in which contextualized, independent reasoning in matters of religious law, ijtihad, is put forward as a path to renovation, and radicalism is understood as an obstacle to progress because of its authoritarian and intolerant nature; Mohammed Arkoun, an Algerian thinker, who teaches at the University of Paris III, for whom secularization and modernization are essential elements of Islamic progress; and feminists such as Asra Q. Nomani who have called for major liberalization in the sphere of women's rights.

Others present a liberalizing face to the Western media and academia but retain an essentially conservative position on everything from hijab (veiling) to jihad. This charismatic but, essentially, two-faced trend promotes an image of Islam as protective of human rights while sticking to an agenda in favor of strict Shari‘a limitations to such rights. Two notable figures in this context are Tariq Ramadan and Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Ramadan is the Swiss-born grandson of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna. With a broad academic background including Swiss doctorates in philosophy and Islamic studies, and Arabic and Islamic studies qualifications from Al-Azhar University, he has taught at several Western universities, including the University of Fribourg and St. Anthony's College, Oxford. While he is banned from the United States,[37] he has been accepted in Europe as a Muslim intellectual with a reputation for moderation. That said, many French intellectuals describe him as "The Master of Doubletalk" and regard him as an intégriste or fundamentalist. He has argued, for example, that Muslims should enter into mainstream society only to move it closer to Islam; that he accepts Western laws but only so long as they do not oblige him to do something against his religion; that stoning for adultery should be subject only to a moratorium until Muslim clerics discuss the matter; that Muslim women should insist on wearing the veil; that swimming pools should be segregated, and so on.[38] His support for radicals such as Yahya Michot, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, or Sayyid Qutb lays bare an agenda far from that of the moderate he likes to pass himself off to be.

Qaradawi (b. 1926) is another Azharite with an international following. Considered by most Muslims as a "moderate conservative" and lionized by London mayor Ken Livingstone, Qaradawi's moderation on issues such as elections and women's enfranchisement is a thin disguise for radicalism. He has issued fatwas and commented in lectures, television broadcasts, and on the Internet that wives should submit to their husbands; men may beat their wives "lightly;" men and women should mix only to a very limited degree; and women must wear hijab. He has deemed female genital mutilation, flogging of adulterers, and execution of homosexuals and apostates permissible and has endorsed suicide attacks against Israeli civilians or U.S. soldiers and civilians in Iraq. He has also condemned liberal democracies and urged Muslims to vent their anger publicly on issues such as the Danish cartoon controversy.[39]

Some Western governments have relied upon Ramadan, Qaradawi, and others to develop appropriate policies towards Islam and Muslims. Western media have painted them as authorities on Islam, enabling them to speak without an explicit mandate on behalf of Muslims. By drawing media and government attention to themselves while keeping their agendas hidden, they come to overshadow more authentically reformist figures. This problem is compounded by the numerous self-appointed bodies claiming to represent Muslims in Western countries, such as the Council for American-Islamic Relations and the Muslim Council of Britain.

None of these individuals have used their prominence to speak out about harsh punishments, the execution of minors, or the stoning of those whom most modern cultures would call innocent women. It is probable that many self-described reformers practice a form of taqiya or religious dissimulation in order to show a moderate face to the West and quite a different perspective to their constituents in the Muslim world.

Indeed, when challenged about the harshness of Shari‘a penalties, many Muslim writers and Islamist politicians state their dislike for the alternative—human rights as defined by the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights"—on the grounds that such agreements are of Western origin, that they will undermine the norms of Islamic societies, and that they are not themselves based on Shari‘a rulings. Some Muslim intellectuals have even argued that human rights do not exist in Islam. In 1985, Sa'id Raja'i-Khurasani, the permanent Iranian delegate to the United Nations, stated that the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which represented secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims and did not accord with the system of values recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran … his country would, therefore, not hesitate to violate its prescriptions."[40] According to Ayatollah Muhammad-Taqi Misbah-Yazdi, a contender for the role of Iranian supreme leader upon the demise or removal of ‘Ali Khamene'i, "Islamic human rights differ from the ‘Declaration of Human Rights.' … Human rights must be Islamic human rights."[41]

Conclusion
There are, then, several reasons why severe punishments and unreasonable judgments continue in parts of the Islamic world and why certain human rights—the freedom to change one's religion, to convert Muslims to another faith, to enjoy full civil rights as a Baha'i, Zoroastrian, Armenian, or Jew, to marry by free choice, to write about controversial religious issues—are nowhere recognized. In the absence of fully secularized educational systems and with the increasing political involvement of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hamas, the day when genuine reform arrives in most Muslim countries seems to be as far off as ever.

A hardening of sentiment against the West and an increasing tendency to fall back on conspiracy theories to explain Islamic problems seem to make insistence on tough Shari‘a -mindedness a desirable option for many if only as a weapon to use against perceived Western weaknesses. Desperate not to offend, the West has done little to make issue of abuses such as those promoted by judges like Haji Reza'i. While crimes such as his go unpunished, the continued stoning, hanging, flogging, and even beheading all serve to intimidate Western critics and are, therefore, encouraged by Islamic states and groups.

On a wider scale, a major debate needs to take place between advocates of Islamic or other relativist human rights agendas and supporters of the principle that such rights are, by their very nature, universal and applicable to all people at all times and in all places. Unfortunately, that debate cannot take place openly while there is a threat of violence from those who oppose the notion of human rights as a Western or Zionist evil.

What are the policy implications of this situation for Western countries, the U.N., and international human rights organizations? One is that they should give more genuine support to Muslim reformers, their conferences and publications, and, where appropriate, their teaching positions. Another is to pressure Islamic governments to make arrests when death threats and similar menaces are used instead of open argument. A recent Saudi doctoral thesis listed two hundred names of intellectuals who must be killed while, in May 2006, Osama bin Laden declared open season on all Muslim freethinkers. Neither the Saudi government nor the Islamic establishment elsewhere have moved to counter such provocations.[42]

Human rights issues must be linked more firmly to trade and other agreements. The multiculturalist notion that Muslims may not be criticized for the use of unjust and cruel punishments must be countered. The stigma of political incorrectness is counterproductive. Islamic countries and ordinary Muslims must be given incentives to observe human rights norms within their borders and disincentives to apply the Shari‘a in harsh and unjust ways.

The case of Egyptian democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim is instructive and suggests that outside pressure can work. In 2000, following his criticism of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's anointing of son Gamal as his successor, an Egyptian court arrested Ibrahim on spurious charges involving finance of his nongovernmental organization, the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies. The Bush administration responded by withholding nearly $200 million in aid pending Ibrahim's release. The Egyptian government responded by setting him free.

The payoff from support given to positive reform is potentially enormous. If genuinely reformist thinkers are enabled to have an impact within Muslim societies, violence, unjust punishments, and abuse of human rights in the name of religion will decline. In the end, a space for dialogue can only be opened up when intellectual debate joins forces with a determined war on terror—not only terror against Western interests but also against all violence done to Muslims themselves in the name of religion.

Denis MacEoin holds a Ph.D. in Persian studies from the University of Cambridge. He taught Arabic and Islamic Studies at Newcastle University and was for many years an honorary fellow at Durham University. He is currently the Royal Literary Fund Fellow at Newcastle University.

[1] The Washington Post, May 20, 2006.
[2] Amnesty International U.K., news release, Aug. 24, 2004.
[3] BBC News, July 28, 2005.
[4] Etema'ad (Tehran), Jan. 7, 2006.
[5] For examples from a Shi‘ite perspective, see Ayatullah Sayyid Abulqasim al-Khoei, Islamic Laws of Ayatullah Khoei, trans. Muhammad Fazal Haq (New York: Islamic Seminary Publications, n.d.), ch. 35, pp. 2808, 2814-5.
[6] AdvocacyNet, news bulletin, no. 37, May 23, 2005.
[7] "Punishment for Non-Marital Sex in Islam," Religious Tolerance.org, accessed June 6, 2006.
[8] Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Yazid ibn Maja ar-Rab'i al-Qazwini, Sunan Ibn Maja, Bab al-Hudud, Al-Islam.com, Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Waqf, Missions, and Guidance, Saudi Arabia, accessed July 5, 2006.
[9] Abu ‘Isa Muhammad at-Tirmidhi, Sunan at-Tirmidhi wa huwa al-jami' as-sahih, 4 vols., 2nd ed., ed. ‘A. ‘Abdallatif (Beirut: n.p., 1983) Al-Islam.com, Bab al-Hudud, hadith 2, accessed July 5, 2006.
[10] Ibn Rushd, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol. 6, p. 113, cited in Asifa Quraishi, "Islamic Legal Analysis of the Zina Punishment Awarded to Bariya Ibrahim Magazu, in Zamfara, Nigeria," Islam for Today, Jan. 20, 2001.
[11] Qur'an, 24:2.
[12] John Burton, Encyclopedia of the Qur'an, s.v "Abrogation," accessed June 21, 2006; Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Istitabat al-Murtadin, 82: 816, 817; Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and Musnad al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, ed., Samir al-Majzub (Beirut: Maktab al-Islami, 1993), vol. 2, p. 39.
[13] "Discrimination against Religious Minorities in Iran," report to 63rd session of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (Paris) and Ligue de Défense des Droits de l'Homme en Iran (Geneva), Aug. 2003.
[14] At-Tirmidhi, Sunan, Bab al-Hudud, hadith 22, Al-Islam.com, accessed July 5, 2006.
[15] Ibn Maja, Sunan, Hudud, 14:4:2532.
[16] "Hadith," Ibn Maja, Sunan Ibn I Majah (Lahore, 1995), Arabic with English translation by M. Tufail Ansari, Bab al-Hudud, Al-Islam.com, accessed July 5, 2006.
[17] On these and others, see Suha Taji-Farouki, ed., Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qur'an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
[18] M. Yahya Birt, "The Message of Fazlur Rahman," Association of Muslim Researchers, June 27, 1996.
[19] "Letter to President Rafshanjani," Human Rights Watch, New York, July 22, 1997.
[20] Ayaan Hirsi Ali, "Danger Woman," interview with Alexander Linklater, The Guardian (London), May 17, 2005.
[21] Johann Hari, "Islam's Marked Woman: Irshad Manji," The Independent (London), May 28, 2005.
[22] John M. Broder, "For Muslim Who Says Violence Destroys Islam, Violent Threats," The New York Times, Mar. 11, 2006.
[23] Ami Ayalon, "Egypt's Quest for Cultural Orientation," Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1999.
[24] Fauzi M. Najjar, "Islamic Fundamentalism and the Intellectuals: The Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 27:2 (2000): 177-200.
[25] Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988.
[26] Abdulaziz Sachedina, "What Happened in Najaf?" accessed June 6, 2006.
[27] Qur'an, 2:256.
[28] Qur'an, 9:29.
[29] "Hadith," cited in Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, Istitabat al-Murtadin, 68:2:1.
[30] For an Iranian view of the law on apostasy, see, Sayf Allah Sarami, Ahkam-i murtad az didgah-i Islam va huquq-i bashar, in Tahqiqat-i andisha-yi Islami series, vol. 4 (Tehran: Markaz-i Tahqiqat-i Istratizhik-i Riyasat-i Jumhuri, 1997).
[31] Lorenzo Vidino, "The Muslim Brotherhood's Conquest of Europe," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005, pp. 25-34; The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, vol. 3, s.v. "Muslim Brotherhood," comprising the following articles: Nazih N. Ayubi, "An Overview," pp. 183-7; Denis J. Sullivan, "Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt," pp. 187-91; Philip S. Khoury, "Muslim Brotherhood in Syria," pp. 191-4; Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan," pp. 194-7; Gabriel R. Warburg, "Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan," pp. 197-201.
[32] The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, vol. 3, Emad Eldin Shahin, s.v. "Salafiyah."
[33] ‘Uthman Amin, Muhammad ‘Abduh, trans. Charles Wendell (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953), pp. 1-103.
[34] Charles Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad ‘Abduh (London: Oxford University Press, 1933); Malcolm Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
[35] Ahmad Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993).
[36] Sayyid Qutb, Ma'alim fi ‘t-tariq (Cairo: Dar as-Shuruq, 1980).
[37] The Guardian, Dec. 17, 2004; Daniel Pipes, "Why Revoke Tariq Ramadan's U.S. Visa?" The New York Sun, Aug. 27, 2004.
[38] Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq: Discours, stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan (Lyon, France: Lyon Mag' Hors Serie, 2004).
[39] "The Qaradawi Fatwas," The Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2004, pp. 78-80; The Daily Telegraph (London), Feb. 3, 2006; Lamia Radi, "Qaradawi: Prophet Cartoons Is (sic) War Waged against Us," Middle East Online, Mar. 23, 2006.
[40] See Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, p. 8.
[41] Quoted in Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "Islamic Rights or Human Rights: An Iranian Dilemma," Iranian Studies, Summer/Fall 1996, p. 294.
[42] "Saudi Doctorate Encourages the Murder of Arab Intellectuals," Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch Series, no. 1070, Jan. 12, 2006; "To Kill a Muslim Freethinker," FrontPage Magazine, May 3, 2006; Aluma Dankowitz, "Arab Intellectuals: Under Threat by Islamists," MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis, no. 254, Nov. 23, 2005; Aluma Dankowitz, "Accusing Muslim Intellectuals of Apostasy," MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis, no. 208, Feb. 18, 2005.