July 7/07

Bible Reading of the day
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Matthew 9,9-13. As Jesus passed on from there, he saw a man named Matthew sitting at the customs post. He said to him, "Follow me." And he got up and followed him. While he was at table in his house, many tax collectors and sinners came and sat with Jesus and his disciples. The Pharisees saw this and said to his disciples, "Why does your teacher eat with tax collectors and sinners?"He heard this and said, "Those who are well do not need a physician, but the sick do. Go and learn the meaning of the words, 'I desire mercy, not sacrifice.' I did not come to call the righteous but sinners."

Comparing Three Muslim Brotherhoods: Syria, Jordan and Egypt. By: Prof. Barry Rubin - 7/6/2007
Islam's Global War against Christianity.By Patrick Poole. American Thinker site. July 7/07
Comparing Three Muslim Brotherhoods: Syria, Jordan and Egypt.Global Politician. July 7/07/07
Lebanon's proxy war-Al-Ahram Weekly - July 7/07
Lebanon's long history of puppets masquerading as leaders.The Daily Star. July 7/07

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for July 07/07
Maronite Archbishop Accuses Government of Wanting to 'Islamize' Lebanon-Naharnet
Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC Played a Role in The Gemayel Killing-Naharnet
Hezbollah to send ex-minister to Paris Lebanon meeting.European Jewish Press
Arms, Ammunition Seized from Sheikh Fathi Yakan's Apartment-Naharnet
19 Firefighters Injured in Lebanon While Battling Huge Blaze-Naharnet
100,000 Pirated CDs and DVDs Destroyed-Naharnet
South Korean troops arrive in Lebanon to join UNIFIL.International Herald Tribune
Gaza/Israel/Lebanon: Release the Hostages.Reuters

Eitan slams IDF for 'failing to deliver' in Lebanon.Jerusalem Post
Iran pulling strings to create Mideast turmoil.The Jewish Journal of greater L.A
De-miners say clearing Nahr al-Bared of UXOs will take at least a month
-Daily Star
US spells out conditions for $250 million in promised aid-Daily Star
Lebanon shelves summer festivals for second year
-Daily Star
Moussa, Assad to discuss Lebanese crisis
-Daily Star
Conference raises awareness on use of minors in armed conflict
-Daily Star
Luxembourg's defense minister demands more from UNIFIL
-Daily Star
AUB alumni elect board of directors
-Daily Star
Efforts under way to protect innocents at battered camp
-Daily Star
Palestinian Red Crescent evacuates three civilians from Nahr al-Bared
-Daily Star
Fire destroys electronics warehouse in Jnah-Daily Star
Come what may, Lebanese keep coming home-Daily Star
Many youth are seeking greener pastures abroad-Daily Star
Lucky '777' wedding fever sweeps Beirut, despite instability-Daily Star

Arms, Ammunition Seized from Sheikh Fathi Yakan's Apartment
Lebanese authorities seized weapons and ammunition during a raid on an apartment that belongs to Sheikh Fathi Yakan, a Sunni Islamist leader who is close to Syria, state-run National News Agency reported Friday. It said members of the state security apparatus busted Yakan's apartment in Abi Samra neighborhood in the northern port city of Tripoli at mid-night Thursday. NNA said machine guns, ammunition as well as binoculars were confiscated from the apartment Yakan had used as an office as well as an arts institution. Authorities also seized guns and ammo during overnight raids on a school in Tripoli's Abi Samra neighborhood and on a house in Qalamoun, An Nahar newspaper reported Friday. Meanwhile, security sources told the daily As Safir that a Fatah al-Islam ringleader in the May 20 killings of Lebanese army soldiers has been arrested. They said Walid B. was detained Thursday evening in north Lebanon and handed over to the Lebanese army intelligence for interrogation. Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 07:45

Maronite Archbishop Accuses Government of Wanting to 'Islamize' Lebanon
Maronite Archbishop Beshara Raii accused Prime Minister Fouad Saniora's government of wanting to Islamize Lebanon, two days after the Council of Maronite Bishops slammed the cabinet. Raii, in an interview with As Safir daily published Friday, urged the government to retrieve a draft law submitted to parliament that would allow Lebanon to join the "Children's Rights in Islam" treaty.
He accused the Saniora government of wanting to "Islamize" Lebanon and "eliminate" Lebanon's trademark of peaceful coexistence among its various sects.
Raii's fiery stance came after the Bishops on Wednesday expressed fears that canceling of the contest for recruiting new staff at the Internal Security Forces (ISF) puts the performance of the institution at risk. The bishops also criticized the acquisition of foreigners of more than seven million square meters of land.
"We fear that there will come a time where the Lebanese will feel they are outsiders in their own country," they said in a statement.
Raii said what concerns the Christians is that the ongoing political power struggle gripping Lebanon is in fact a "regional conflict" and not one between Sunnis and Shiites. "The conflict in Lebanon has taken the shape of a Sunni-Shiite power struggle over who takes charge of what has been termed as the Maronite politics," he explained.  "So if the Sunnis and Shiites agree, their agreement would come at the expense of the Christians," Raii told As Safir, adding: "And if they disagree, the Christians become their victims.""What worries Christians most is that the current government is taking Lebanon towards Islamization," he said.
He lamented the government's decision to remove Great Friday from the official holidays' list without consulting Christian authorities.
Raii said he hoped the government would retrieve such a decision. He said the "Children's Rights in Islam" accord disregards the Christian presence in the country and makes Lebanon an "Islamic state and an Islamic society." "We reject this and we condemn the government's move which is working on dividing (Lebanon) rather than uniting the country," he said. Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 12:39

Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC Played a Role in The Gemayel Killing
Reliable sources informed on the investigation in ex-minister Pierre Gemayel's assassination told Naharnet Friday that Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command played a role in the crime. The sources said a vehicle used in the assassination, a Honda VRC, was stolen from the mountain resort of Brummana in October 2006 and taken to an area in the northern sector of the eastern Bekaa valley where car bandits operate. Shortly after that, a member of Jibril's Syrian-backed PFLP-GC approached the gang and bartered the car for a quantity of weapons, the sources added. The car was used in the Nov. 21 assassination of Gemayel in Suburban Jdaideh, almost a month after it was stolen from Brummana, the sources added. The vehicle was later driven to Syria, which turned it back to Lebanon in Dec. 2006 in line with a warrant issued by the Interpol, they explained. One source said lab tests showed that the car was used in the Gemayel assassination and two of the gunmen who used it were killed later in clashes between Lebanese Forces and Fatah al-Islam terrorists in Tripoli's Mitein street on May 20.
Bodies of the gunmen and samples taken from the car were under lab tests to determine identities of all the culprits who gunned down Gemayel, the source added.
He said all details related to the investigation in Gemayel's killing and the Fatah al-Islam link have been relayed to the U.N. committee investigating the 2005 killing of ex-Premier Rafik Hariri and related crimes. Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 16:19

Hizbullah Assigns Two-Man delegation to Paris Meeting
Hizbullah will send a former cabinet member to participate in multi-party talks in France aimed at breaking Lebanon's political deadlock, the Shiite opposition group said Friday. The group has assigned senior official Mohammed Fneish to the two-member team, along with foreign affairs chief Nawaf Moussawi, the party said.
Fneish was energy minister in the government of Prime Minister Fouad Saniora before resigning along with five other pro-Syrian ministers in November.
After talks with a French envoy who delivered invitations for the mid-July dialogue, Moussawi said on Wednesday that Hizbullah welcomes the initiative, which showed France was "standing alongside the Lebanese without taking sides." The meeting will take place on July 14-16 with between 30 and 40 delegates taking part, the foreign ministry in Paris announced on Friday, rather than July 14-17 as announced by the envoy while in Beirut. Two members of the Western-backed Saniora government, Telecommunication Minister Marwan Hamadeh and Youth Minister Ahmed Fatfat, are also to take part in the meetings outside Paris. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner is to play the role of moderator in a bid to ease the worst political crisis in Lebanon since the civil war came to an end in 1990.(AFP-Naharnet)Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 18:36

100,000 Pirated CDs and DVDs Destroyed
Lebanese security forces have destroyed around 100,000 pirated CDs and DVDs as part of a crackdown on violators of intellectual property rights, An Nahar daily reported Friday. It said the ISF and judicial police carried the pirated CDs to Aley municipality square Thursday and smashed them by small bulldozers under the glare of representatives of software companies. The newspaper said police seized the CDs during raids in several Lebanese regions.
Business Software Alliance (BSA) representative Ali Harakeh lauded the government, saying it is serious in cracking down on those who violate intellectual property rights. "The Lebanese government has stressed its determination to continue this campaign," he said. Beirut, 06 Jul 07, 08:51

19 Firefighters Injured While Battling Huge Blaze

Nineteen firefighters sustained burns and suffered suffocation while battling a huge blaze that ripped through an electronics warehouse in Beirut's Jnah neighborhood.
A statement issued by Beirut's fire department said 12 tenants were rescued by fire crews shortly after the blaze broke out around 7 am Thursday near BHV mall.
It said firefighters used ladders to reach occupants on the upper floors of the apartment building. It was not immediately clear what caused the fire that tore apart the Dalbani electronics depot in basement level-4 of a four-storey apartment building that also houses Byblos bank as well as an LG electronics store. The daily An Nahar said firefighters fought to contain the extensive blaze for several hours. By late Thursday night, the fire, which inflicted heavy material damage, was fully contained, according to An Nahar. Beirut, 05 Jul 07, 10:04

Islam's Global War against Christianity
By Patrick Poole _ American Thinker site
July 05, 2007
From Nigeria to Indonesia, Christians are under siege in virtually every single country in the Muslim world, the victims of countless acts of discrimination, depredation, brutality, and murder that are so widespread and systematic that it can rightfully be called the new Holocaust. This time, however, the perpetrators of this Holocaust aren't wearing swastikas, but kufi skull caps and hijabs.
Some of the oldest Christian communities in the world are subject to relentless attack and teeter on the brink of extinction at the hands of the "Religion of Peace": Palestinian Christians in Gaza and the West Bank; Assyrian, Syriac and Chaldean Christians in Iraq; Coptic Christians in Egypt; Evangelical and Orthodox Christians in Eastern Ethiopia and Eritrea; Armenian Orthodox Christians in Turkey; and Maronite Christians in Lebanon.
Several of these communities date back to the beginning decades of Christianity and all have weathered wave after wave of Islamic persecution for centuries and more, but in the very near future some will simply cease to exist. In our lifetime, the only trace of their past existence will be in footnotes in history books (and probably only Western history books at that).
Meanwhile, we in the West hear much from radical Islam's apologists how the US is engaged in a war against Islam citing of our military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are lectured on the inviolability of the Muslim ummah and justifications of defensive jihad.
But an extensive search this past weekend of the websites of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Islamic Society of North America, the Islamic Circle of North America, the Muslim American Society, the Muslim Student Association, the Fiqh Council of North America, and the Muslim Public Affairs Committee - the most visible institutional representatives of Islam in America - found not a single mention or reference of the religious persecution of Christians by their Islamic co-religionists, thereby making them tacit co-conspirators in the Final Solution to the Christian problem in the Muslim world.
The global war on Christianity by Islam is so massive in size and scope that it is virtually impossible to describe without trivializing it. Inspired by Muslim Brotherhood ideology and fueled by billions of Wahhabi petrodollars, the religious cleansing of Christians from the Muslim world is continuing at a break-neck pace, as the following recent examples demonstrate.
Iraq: In the current issue of the American Spectator, Doug Bandow observes that centuries of dhimmitude have left Christians in the war-torn country without any means of self-defense. Washington policymakers have refused to lend assistance for fear of showing partiality, despite the murder of hundreds of Iraqi Christians, the kidnapping and torture of Christian clerics, the repeated bombings of Christian churches, the torching of Christian businesses, and the flight of close to half of the entire Iraqi Christian population since April 2003. Those who remain have been subject to the imposition of shari'a by the Shi'ite Mahdi Army and Sunni militias (al-Qaeda doesn't bother with such niceties, preferring to murder them immediately instead), including the recent published threat in Mosul of killing one member of every Christian family in that city for Christian women not wearing the hijab and continuing to attend school. (Be sure to remember that the next time an Islamist apologist claims that the hijab is a symbol of women's liberation.)
Egypt: Journalist Magdi Khalil chronicles in a new report ("Another Black Friday for the Coptic Christians of Egypt") the campaign of violence directed against Christian Copts almost weekly immediately following Friday afternoon Muslim prayers. Inspired by Islamist imams preaching religious hatred in mosques all over the country and protected by government officials willing to look the other way, rampaging mobs of Muslims set upon Christians churches, businesses and individuals, from Alexandria to cities all the way up the Nile. Coptic holy days are also favorite times for Muslim violence, which the Egyptian media likes to describe as "sectarian strife" - as if it were actually a two-sided affair.
Gaza: Ethel Fenig recently noted here at American Thinker ("More Gaza Multiculturalism") the systematic destruction of churches and desecration of Christian religious objects by Jihadia Salafiya following the HAMAS takeover of the Gaza Strip from their Fatah rivals and the imposition of Islamic rule. The head of Jihadia Salafiya told reporter Aaron Klein that any suspected Christian missionary activity in the area will be "dealt with harshly". (Ynet News)
Saudi Arabia: According to the Arab News, a Sri Lankan Christian man barely escaped with his life in late May when he was found working in the city of Mecca, Islam's holiest city, which is officially barred to non-Muslims. In December, an Indian man had been sentenced to death for accidentally entering the city, but was spared after the Indian embassy made an urgent appeal to the Saudi Supreme Court.
Pakistan: In Islamabad, Younis Masih was sentenced last month to death under the country's frequently invoked blasphemy laws, which were also used against six Christian women suspended from a nursing school after they were accused of desecrating a Quran. And as protests against Salman Rushdie's knighthood raged, a Muslim mob armed with guns, axes and sticks attacked Christians worshipping in a Salvation Army church in Bismillahlpur Kanthan. (Associated Press; United Press International; Mission News Network)
Bangladesh: Almost a dozen Christian converts in the Nilphamari district were beaten last week by Muslim villagers wielding bricks and clubs, and threatened with death if they did not leave town immediately. Local hospitals subsequently refused them treatment. Christians in the area have also been prevented from using the only potable water well in the area after a pronouncement by religious authorities at the mosque in Durbachari. This came after 42 former Muslims were baptized as Christians in the local river on June 12. (Compass News Direct)
Malaysia: Government authorities demolished a church building on June 4th in Orang Asli settlement in Gua Musang in Ulu Kelantan, despite prior government approval of the project. The church was built on donated property after the entire village had converted to Christianity just a few months ago. Also in late May, the Malaysian high court ruled that Muslims who convert to Christianity must appeal to the religious shari'a courts to officially be deregistered as Muslims and reregistered as a Christians. (Journal Chretien; Associated Press)
Indonesia: Agence France Presse reported last month on an attack by the Islamic Anti-Apostate Movement, who stormed a church service in a Protestant church in the West Java town of Soreang. The AFP report notes that more than 30 churches have been forced to close in West Java and dozens more throughout the country in recent years due to Muslim violence, churches which were among the few spared during the outbreak of hostilities during 1997-1998, where hundreds of Christian churches were burned to the ground and never rebuilt.
Turkey: The Christian community is still reeling from the torture and ritual slaughter of three Protestants at a Christian publishing house in Malatya in April by an armed Islamist gang, which was preceded by the murder last year of Catholic priest Andrea Santoro in Trabzon and the assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul in January. An additional six men allegedly associated with the same Muslim gang were arrested on May 30th for plotting an attack on a Christian pastor in Diyarbakir. (Lebanon Daily Star; ADKNI)
Cyprus: The Cyprus Mail reports that during a meeting last month in Rome the Archbishop of the Cypriot Greek Orthodox Church pleaded with the Vatican Secretary of State for the Pope's assistance to pressure Turkish authorities in restoring and repairing Christian sites and churches in areas occupied since the invasion of the island nation by Turkey in July 1974 and the ethnic cleansing of 160,000 Greek Christian Cypriots.
Lebanon: More than 60,000 Christians have left the country since last summer's war between Hezbollah and Israel, fearing the rise of both Sunni and Shi'ite extremism and terrorist activity. The Sunday Telegraph recently revealed the results of a poll finding that at least half of Lebanon's Maronite community were considering leaving the country. More than 100,000 have already submitted visa applications at foreign embassies.
Algeria: In what is considered one of the more "moderate" Muslim regimes, Al-Quds Al-Arabi announced that the Algerian government has just issued regulations requiring advance permission for non-Muslim public events, following a 2006 law aimed at limiting Christian evangelism in the Kabylia region and the Sahara. (MEMRI )
Morocco: In the country that The Economist magazine in 2005 anointed "the best Arab democracy", all Moroccans are considered Muslims at birth and face three years in prison if they attempt to convert. They are also prohibited from entering any of the few churches permitted to operate for the foreign inhabitants of the country. Moroccan Christians must operate covertly for fear of imprisonment by the government and attacks by Islamists. They cannot bury their dead in Christian cemeteries, and they must be married by Islamic authorities or face charges of adultery. Late last year, a 64 year-old German tourist, Sadek Noshi Yassa, was sentenced to six months in jail and fined for missionary activity. (Journal Chretien)
Nigeria: Police in Gombe arrested sixteen suspects after a Muslim mob stoned, stripped, beat, and finally stabbed to death a Christian teacher, Christiana Oluwatoyin Oluwasesin, after she caught a student cheating on an exam in March. Her body was then burned beyond recognition by the mob who falsely accused her of desecrating a Quran. The suspects were released last month without any charges being filed, prompting Christian leaders to accuse government authorities of a cover-up and raising concerns about additional attacks. (Christian Today)
Eritrea: Just a few weeks ago, the Islamic government installed a new Orthodox Patriarch after they removed the previous Patriarch and placed him under house arrest for no stated reason. Compass News Direct reported in February the death of Magos Solomon Semere, a Christian who had been imprisoned in a military jail for four and a half years for illegal Christian worship, the third Christian to die in government custody since October. Authorities have also cracked down on unapproved churches, jailing at least two thousand Protestants and members of the Medhane Alem Orthodox renewal movement since the beginning of the year and publicly burning confiscated Bibles. (Christian Post; Compass News Direct ; Journal Chretien)
It is not an exaggeration to say that I could extend this brief list ad infinitum with additional Islamic countries and news items from just the past few weeks' worth of incidents of violence, discrimination, intimidation and murder targeting Christians in the Muslim world. In many instances, the government and religious authorities in these Muslim countries work hand-in-hand in their campaign of religious persecution.
A scene in the Academy Award-winning movie Schindler's List gives us some insight into what is happening all across the Muslim world with respect to Christianity. As the SS Commandant Amon Göth and his Nazi Stormtroopers prepare to liquidate the Jewish ghetto in Krakow, Poland, Göth (played in the movie by Ralph Fiennes) gives his men a peptalk:
For six centuries there has been a Jewish Krakow. Think about that. By this evening, those six centuries are a rumor. They never happened. Today is history.
This scene is being repeated in the Friday sermons in mosques and on Islamic satellite TV all over the world, only this time it is the Christians in addition to the Jews who are targets. Great efforts are being made to make the two-thousand year history of Christianity in North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia a blasphemous rumor. Soon students in Turkey will be taught that the Hagia Sophia, the greatest architectural structure in the Muslim world, wasn't built by the Christian Emperor Justinian in the Sixth Century, but by the Sultan Mehmed II a thousand years later after the Ottomans seized the Byzantine capital. That Christians lived at all in the Muslim world, let alone that much of the territory occupied by Muslims used to be Christian lands before the Islamic Wars of Conquest, will be nothing but a rumor by the end of this century punishable according to the precepts of shari'a.
President Bush announced last week that he will be sending a special envoy to the 57-member Organization of Islamic Countries. Hopefully, the systematic persecution of Christians and other religious minorities will be the first and primary item in the new envoy's portfolio, with the 2007 annual report of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom and the State Department's Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, which name virtually every single country in the OIC for its human rights abuses and religious cleansing, as evidence for our country's concern.
The fact remains that not a single Christian or Jew lives in peace in the Muslim world, and if it is truly our nation's foreign policy to spread democracy around the world, this issue is the perfect topic for us to press. Back at home, raising Islam's global war on Christianity should be the immediate response to the seemingly endless media grievance machine of radical Islam's Western apologists. Until they begin to address the new Holocaust perpetrated in the name of Islam, their complaints and denials are nothing but bald hypocrisy.
**Patrick Poole is an occasional contributor to American Thinker. He maintains a blog, Existential Space.

Mexican tycoon passes Bill Gates as planet's richest person
Wed Jul 4,
MEXICO CITY (AFP) - Mexican telecom tycoon Carlos Slim Helu has overtaken Microsoft founder Bill Gates as the richest person on the planet, the Mexican financial website Sentido Comun reported.
Sentido Comun said the Mexican billionaire's wealth had rocketed past Gates following the red-hot performance of his telecommunications firm, America Movil.
US-based Forbes magazine, renowned for its rankings of the world's wealthiest individuals, updated its listings in April to rank Slim as the second richest individual in the world, as he bested the legendary US investor Warren Buffett.
The Mexican financial website said Slim's lead over Gates amounted to billions of dollars.
"Thanks to a 26.5-percent rise in the shares of America Movil during the second quarter, Slim, who controls a 33-percent interest in Latin America's largest mobile phone company, is substantially richer than Gates," Sentido Comun said.
"The difference between their two fortunes is around nine billion dollars in favor of Slim," the financial website claimed.
It said it had based its calculations largely on the share price movements of companies controlled by Slim.
The website said soaring performances from Slim's other business interests had also helped propel him past Gates.
Aside from America Movil, Slim controls the INBURSA financial group and the Grupo Carso industrial firm with interests spanning retail stores, coffee shops and restaurants.
One reason for Slim's meteoric rise might be because he is also still working.
Gates stepped aside as Microsoft chief in 2000 to devote his energies to the philanthropic foundation he runs with his wife, Melinda.
Forbes in April had pegged Slim's wealth at a staggering 53.1 billion dollars, and said Gates was sitting on a 56-billion-dollar fortune.
Slim, the son of Lebanese immigrants, has had business in his blood from his early days when he helped out in his father's shop, "The Star of the Orient."
The 67-year-old started out in real estate and was already affluent enough when he graduated from university with an engineering degree to buy stakes in a stock brokerage and a bottling firm.
During the crippling Latin American economic crisis of the early 1980s, Slim snapped up and reformed a number of distressed businesses, banking massive profits for Grupo Carso.
Carso gained its name from the first three letters of Slim's name and the first two of his late wife's, Soumaya Gemayel.
Analysts say one of Slim's smartest and most lucrative deals occurred when he took control of Telefonos de Mexico (Telemex) in 1990 as the then government moved to privatize the sprawling monopoly.
Slim oversaw a 1.8-billion-dollar investment to take over Telemex, but he then overhauled the company and expanded its service as the telecom firm became the star of the Mexican stock exchange and more than returned Slim's initial investment.
The Mexican billionaire has also made some savvy stock picks.
In 1997, he bought about three percent of Apple Computer at 17 dollars a share shortly before the company launched its hit iMac computer. Twelve months later, Apple's shares topped 100 dollars.
Despite his vast riches, Slim reportedly shuns corporate jets and flashy offices and sported a plastic watch during the 1990s.
Widowed in 1999, Slim has boosted his philanthropic presence and overseen his three sons' careers within his business empire.
Like Gates, he has developed a strong profile on the philanthropic front.
Earlier this month he allied himself with the foundation of former US president Bill Clinton and with Canadian mining magnate Frank Giustra to launch an anti-poverty campaign in Latin America.
Fifty-three percent of Mexico's population of 104 million live in poverty, which is defined as living on less than two dollars a day, World Bank data show.


Comparing Three Muslim Brotherhoods: Syria, Jordan and Egypt
Prof. Barry Rubin-Global Politician
- 7/6/2007
The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, of course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, of course, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.

First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood's policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (al-Qa'ida, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).

The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir--which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.

Regarding al-Qa'ida--both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure--the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival. An example of this kind of thinking comes from Rajab Hilal Hamida, a Brotherhood member in Egypt's parliament, who said:

From my point of view, bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi are not terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support all their activities, since they are a thorn in the side of the Americans and the Zionists.... [On the other hand,] he who kills Muslim citizens is neither a jihad fighter nor a terrorist, but a criminal and a murderer. We must call things by their proper names![1]

His final sentence is intended to show the difference between the Brotherhood's and al-Qa'ida's views of strategy and tactics.

Al-Qa'ida has a growing presence in Syria, and it is trying to grab militants who would otherwise be Brotherhood supporters. In Jordan, it has operated independently as a small group carrying out terrorist operations--which have been condemned by the Brotherhood there, since a number of Jordanians and Palestinians have been killed in bombings.

In Egypt the story is somewhat different, since the jihadist group is an al-Qa'ida affiliate, and many leaders--in fact one might argue the principal influence--of the organization come from Egypt.[2] Again, though the factors of rivalry and concern over government reactions would make the Brotherhood keep its distance from al-Qa'ida, individuals, wanting more immediate revolutionary action, have furnished recruits in the past.

In considering the relationship of the Brotherhood groups with al-Qa'ida three key factors must be kept in mind. First, the Brotherhood and the jihadists are the two main Islamist streams today. They are not enemies, and there has been no violent conflict between them, nor has there been a great deal of ideological battle. Yet at the same time they are rivals, following different strategies and knowing that one or the other would gain mass support and perhaps state power. Thus, it would be misleading to speak of cooperation, except in the special case of Iraq, as discussed below.

Second, a critical difference between the two groups is that the jihadists--except in Saudi Arabia and Iraq--focus on attacking what is called the "far enemy," that is, Israel, the United States, the West in general. The Brotherhoods, in contrast, while strongly anti-Israel (and supporting Hamas, see below) and anti-Western, focus on the "near enemy," that is, Arab governments. Thus, for them, while al-Qa'ida is fighting for the cause, it is also undermining it (except in Iraq) by pulling resources out of the struggle for change within the Arab world.

Third, while the Brotherhood groups are tactically flexible (as has been shown above), al-Qa'ida is exclusively focused on armed struggle. The Brotherhood groups view the revolutionary process as a long-term one, involving such things as providing social services, educating and indoctrinating young people through institutions, using elections, compromising at times with Arab governments, showing restraint to avoid government repression, at times allying with non-Islamist groups, and so on. Thus, while al-Qa'ida is far more of a danger in terms of terrorism, it is far less likely to seize state power because of what would be called in Leninist terms, its "infantile leftism."

The best example of this is the use of elections. In Jordan and Egypt, Brotherhood groups embraced opportunities to run candidates in elections even when they knew that the regime would not count the votes accurately or let them win. Al-Qa'ida has condemned elections as putting human voters and parliamentarians in the place of God in terms of making laws. Contrast here the views of the al-Qa'ida leader in Iraq, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and the influential Brotherhood ideologue Qaradawi. In a January 23, 2005 statement, Zarqawi condemned the upcoming Iraqi elections and threatened to kill those running and voting.[3] In sharp contrast, Qaradawi endorsed elections, arguing that the majority of voters would back an Islamist party, while liberals would get little support. If truly fair elections were to be held, he insisted, Islamists would win by a landslide.[4] This analysis correctly predicted the results of the 2005 Egyptian and 2006 Palestinian elections.

In institutional terms, all the above points apply in discussing the Iraqi insurgency if one looks at it as a struggle led by al-Qa'ida. However, in terms of the insurgency itself, while the Brotherhood groups strongly support it and view it as an important struggle, there is no institutional involvement, as there has been in backing Palestinians in the past.

Additionally, the Syrian Brotherhood has a problem, because the government it is fighting is a major patron of the Iraqi insurgency and uses it to strengthen its support among the Islamists who function publicly in Syria. They support it enthusiastically, but in the short run, at least, it does not benefit them; the Syrian Brotherhood would be happier if the leadership did not come from al-Qa'ida.

If one wants a parallel to past experience, one might compare the Brotherhoods' attitude to revolution and armed struggle to the official Communist parties and al-Qa'ida's to Maoist groups in the 1960s and 1970s. The former argue that the time is not ripe for revolution and that a variety of methods be used; the latter are for all-out revolutionary struggle now.

Thus, the Brotherhood groups have a profile of their own, self-consciously quite different in strategy and tactics--though very parallel in ideology and goals--from the jihadist groups.

To what extent are the Brotherhood groups coordinating among themselves in the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood? Does it provide strategic orientation, tactical coordination, and financial and/or operational support?

The Brotherhoods operate in parallel rather than collectively, and there is virtually no coordination between them. If asked, Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria would of course say that they support each other, but in practice it is surprising how little practical backing is offered. For one thing, they are all internally oriented rather than internationalist, except on the Palestinian and Iraq issues, though some funds raised by Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-controlled institutions are donated to Islamist struggles abroad.

Aside from their daily focus and largely "national revolution" goals, there are other reasons for this orientation. Conditions in each country are very different; Abd-al-Majid al-Dhunaybat, controller-general of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, said in an interview that the groups in Egypt and Jordan make their own decisions based on local conditions. Indeed, he denied that any international organization existed and said that this was an idea put forth by the Brotherhood's enemies.[5]

At the same time, however, Dhunaybat admitted that the leader of the Egyptian Brotherhood--elected only by that group--is seen as being the supreme guide of the movement as a whole. In his words:

The brothers in various countries... try to standardize the understanding, ideology and positions regarding the world events involving all the groups. Meetings take place every now and then... without there being any obligation to a certain policy on the domestic level. In other words, each country has its own exclusive organizational and political nature and relations with the state in which it exists. This gathering has no binding capacity regarding any domestic decision.[6]

The individual Brotherhoods have a specific problem with coordinating too openly or extensively. The regimes in Egypt and Jordan would not appreciate a vocal stance of calling for the overthrow of other Arab governments, while in Syria the movement is too harried to help anyone else and--except from Jordan--receives little assistance in its life-and-death struggle. For all practical purposes, while these groups respect the same ideologues--for example, Yusuf Qaradawi--they operate independently and in response to local conditions. This is another distinction between them and al-Qa'ida, whose effort to create an Islamist International is in sharp contrast to Brotherhood practice.

Even when the Brotherhoods influence the movement in other places, these contacts are bilateral. For example, Hamas in the Gaza Strip is related to the Egyptian Brotherhood, while Hamas in the West Bank has its links to the Jordanian Brotherhood. Furthermore, to make matters even more complex, the Hamas external leadership is located in Damascus, where the Syrian Brotherhood is outlawed, and its patron is the regime that persecutes the Brotherhood. At times, in discussing the Hamas victory, Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood sources have said that the "Muslim Brotherhood" won the Palestinian elections. Yet, again, these are parallel and fraternal movements, not truly branches of a transnational organization.

Next, the strategic and tactical orientation of each national branch (objectives, alliances, organizational forms, attitudes toward the political system in the country where it operates, etc.) should be considered.

What is truly remarkable in discussing the Muslim Brotherhoods of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt is how three groups so parallel in origin, ideology, and goals have developed so differently due to the local situations they face. This fact also reflects the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qa'ida groups. The former have proven tactically flexible; the latter committed to armed struggle as the only proper strategy.

One might sum up the conditions in this way: The Muslim Brotherhood groups are as anti-American and extreme in their goals as the bin Ladinist ones. However, they almost always put the emphasis on gaining power within the context of a single country, compared to the international jihadist policy of al-Qa'ida. Equally, Muslim Brotherhood groups are far more likely to seize power than the bin Ladinist ones, but as long as they do not govern countries, they are also less dangerous in terms of terrorist violence. It also should be noted, however, that many violent revolutionary groups--especially in Egypt--have emerged from the more militant end of the Muslim Brotherhood spectrum.

Briefly, the distinction between the Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian groups may be summarized as follows:

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is a revolutionary underground group, because it has been outlawed by the government there. Law Number 49 of 1981 declares mere membership in the group to be punishable by death. In 1982, the regime unleashed a huge wave of repression against the Muslim Brotherhood, destroying much of its infrastructure and driving it into exile. The Brotherhood has unsuccessfully tried to regain from the regime the right to operate in Syria. Thus, for example, in 2001, it supported a manifesto backed by a broad spectrum of oppositionists urging the end of single-party rule and holding democratic elections.[7] Given the failure of these efforts, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood today is part of a broad coalition of anti-regime groups, which include the former vice president of the regime. In political terms, it functions as a leading group--perhaps in the future, the leader--of the Sunni Arab community, which comprises roughly 60 percent of the population. Thus, it can be characterized as revolutionary (though not necessarily through its own preference) and communalist. Yet while the Egyptian and Jordanian Brotherhoods are in an optimistic mood and are arguably gaining ground, their Syrian counterpart is frustrated and prevented from exploiting a trend toward Islamist thinking in Syria. In recent years, the regime has cultivated Syrian Islamists by building new mosques, allowing radicals to be preachers, and supporting the Islamist insurgency in neighboring Iraq. For obvious reasons, these cultivated activists have not adhered to the Muslim Brotherhood and may build rival groups, including al-Qa'ida affiliates.

As for the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, it is a legal group that uses peaceful methods and participates in elections through its political wing, the Islamic Action Front. It has at times cooperated with the monarchy, though recently relations have been strained by its show of sympathy for al-Qa'ida's leader in Iraq, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, which led to a regime crackdown on the Brotherhood in July 2006. It is restrained due to fear of repression but also moderated by having a share of authority. It controls professional groups and other institutions. However, it also knows that the regime will never let it win elections. Thus, the key element of its strategy is a willingness to remain permanently a group that enjoys benefits and privileges but cannot take power or change the country. While it appeals to many Palestinians, the Jordanian Brotherhood also has a considerable East Bank membership and thus is not a communalist organization. Given the decline of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Fatah (that is, Palestinian nationalism), the Brotherhood could become the main organization gaining loyalty from Jordanian Palestinians.

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is somewhere in between its two counterparts. It is not technically legal, but is allowed to function normally most of the time. Leaders and activists are periodically arrested by the government to remind the Brotherhood that it functions only if the regime finds its behavior satisfactory. Denied the right to have a party of its own, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has found it easy to work with or even virtually take over other parties, notably the Wafd in the 1980s, and is even willing to work with liberals to press the regime for concessions. In the 2005 elections, when allowed to run what amounted to its own slate, the Brotherhood won 20 percent of the seats in parliament.[8] While it is incorrect to say that the Egyptian Brotherhood has not been involved with violence--and many factions have also left to form terrorist groups--the movement generally avoids it.

To gain a sense of how the Brotherhood can conduct a cultural war, the case of Faraj Fawda is indicative. Fawda was a liberal critic of the Islamists. In 1992, Fawda debated Brotherhood leader Muhammad al-Ghazali at the Cairo Book Fair. Brotherhood members in the audience heckled Fawda. When Fawda was murdered five months later by an Islamist, Ghazali testified at the killer's trial, saying that he had acted properly in killing an "apostate" like Fawda. After being sentenced to execution, the defendant shouted: "Now I will die with a clear conscience!"[9]

The Brotherhoods also played a key role in the Danish cartoon controversy. Qaradawi was a key person in spreading the protest movement. The Egyptian Brotherhood demanded an apology for the publication and urged a boycott of Danish products.[10] The Islamic Action Front organized a protest demonstration in Amman.[11] They clearly saw this as a good issue on which to build a broad base, as defending Islam against alleged attacks on it in the West. Abu Laban himself has strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, so he connected into this network on his visit in an attempt to get an active response on the issue.

To carry out their operations, the Brotherhood groups are reasonably well-funded. Their money seems to come from four major sources. First, rich adherents to the movements give donations. This is especially true of Egyptians who emigrated to Saudi Arabia or Kuwait and became rich there. One of the main Islamist Egyptian businessmen is Hisham Tal'at Mustafa, who is a partner of the Saudi billionaire Prince al-Walid ibn Talal al-Sa'ud. Second, the Brotherhoods in Jordan and Egypt control professional and other associations from which funds can be drained for their cause. Third, in Egypt at least, there are Islamic banks and enterprises--sometimes involved with major corruption scandals--which are a source of money. Finally, there is international funding, including Saudi state and Kuwaiti or Saudi charitable foundations, in some cases passed through the international organization. The Saudis and Kuwaitis involved are not so much trying to use the Brotherhoods as state sponsors but rather merely ensuring that they do nothing inimical to Saudi or Kuwaiti interests.

Is the Muslim Brotherhood conducive to dialogue with the United States, and if so, over what specific issues? If by dialogue what is meant is to talk to American officials, the answer is generally yes. However, if what is meant here is the ability of American officials to change Brotherhood positions through explanations and mutual understanding or to engage in negotiations that would lead to any cooperation, the answer is generally no.

The Islamic Front in Jordan says that holding such a dialogue is a decision that might be taken by any individual group. Dhunaybat has no objection to his Egyptian colleagues doing it, but:

We in Jordan, however, believe that in terms of the situation in the Arab and Islamic world, particularly with regard to Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and its role in the region, America does not want a dialogue in which it can listen to others and change its policies. What we see is that it wants to dictate certain terms by promoting this so-called dialogue, which is like giving instructions. Therefore, I believe that there is no benefit in holding a dialogue with the people in charge of the U.S. policy.[12]

Yet Dhunaybat also has no objection to the Islamic Action Front in Jordan--which his group largely controls--from having a dialogue with the United States. This approach is clearly a division of labor in which the Brotherhood maintains the stance of an internationalist revolutionary group, while the Front, as a political party, can have such contacts if it aids its own interests.

There are some specific points on which the Brotherhoods both want to influence the United States and think that doing so would be possible. These include the Egyptian Brotherhood's desire that the United States push harder for democratic elections and more civic rights in Egypt. While they would denounce such things publicly as imperialistic, the Brotherhood wants to widen its sphere for public action. If elections were freer, the Brotherhood could win more seats. Indeed, some leaders believe it would win outright in free elections, though this is more doubtful. Of course, another goal of the Brotherhood is to win legal status as an organization.

Syria is clearly the most interesting case. Both the United States and the Syrian Brotherhood view the regime as an enemy. Would this be a case of the adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend? The answer is likely, yes. The Syrian Brotherhood might well be willing to talk about U.S. covert support. Indeed, since it is participating in a wider coalition also, it could more easily excuse such a policy as going along with its partners.

It should be stressed, however, that this is a dangerous game. A stronger Syrian Brotherhood might be able to seize leadership of the 60 percent Sunni Arab population and take over the country, transforming Syria into an Islamic republic. Such an outcome could create far worse crises and threats to U.S. influence in the region. In addition, it should be noted that while the Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan are the largest Islamist factors in their respective countries, this is no longer necessarily true for their counterpart in Syria.

The Brotherhoods' view of the United States and its allies is profoundly hostile. They view the United States as extremely hostile, trying to take over the Middle East and destroy Islam. While they are passionately opposed to U.S. support for Israel, they are no happier with American support for the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes.

In terms of their analysis of and hostility toward the United States, there is not much difference between the Brotherhoods and al-Qa'ida, though their responses to this analysis are very different. One difference in analysis is that al-Qa'ida argues that American support is the main reason why Arab regimes survive. This legitimates their priority on attacking the United States. The Brotherhoods have a more sophisticated understanding of the sources of power and support for regimes, though they overstate American influence and responsibility in their own countries.

The preceding analysis may seem to apply mainly to Egypt and Jordan. The Syrian Brotherhood has to deal with the fact of American hostility toward Damascus, though it no doubt has some belief in conspiracy theories that they are secretly allied. At any rate, this does not make them any less anti-American. One response may be to argue that America is a great threat to Syria but that the Ba'thist regime is incapable of handling it and that only an Islamist government could do so victoriously.

Given these positions, the Brotherhoods' support for the Iraqi insurgency is not surprising. All three, including their top leaders, have attacked the U.S. presence in Iraq in the most extreme terms and have called for supporting the insurgents. It should be remembered that even if the Brotherhood groups do not have institutional links to the insurgency leadership (which largely comes from al-Qa'ida), they are all Sunni Arab Islamists and in this case seem undisturbed by this distinction.[13]

When Zarqawi, himself a Jordanian, was killed, Zaki Sa'd, the leader of the Islamic Action Front, praised him but also distinguished the Brotherhood from al-Qa'ida regarding their tactics. Zarqawi, he said, was acting not only legitimately but as a Muslim must act in fighting the American forces in Iraq, and the Islamic Action Front supported these actions. Yet it also denounced operations targeting innocent civilians. He did not specifically mention Iraqis in this context but used as his examples the bloody bombing of hotels in Amman by al-Qa'ida forces. [14]

The Brotherhoods have not directly organized units or sent members to Iraq, though it is probable that some of the Jordanians (but fewer of the Egyptians or Syrians) who go there might be rank-and-file members. After all, the leaders of all three groups have told them that fighting the Americans is an Islamic duty. It should also be noted, however, that contrary to al-Qa'ida, the Brotherhoods focus on fighting the American forces rather than the Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds. For them, the battle in Iraq is against non-Muslims rather than an attempt to take over the country and defeat non-Arabs or non-Sunni Muslims there.[15]

In what direction, then, are the Brotherhood groups evolving? Each Muslim Brotherhood group faces a key question regarding its evolution. For the Egyptians, it is whether to continue in the phase of da'wa--recruiting, propagandizing, base-building, and accepting the limits the government places on it--or to move into a more activist phase, demanding political changes and being willing to confront the regime. Given the organization's current high level of confidence, as the younger generation takes over and the government perhaps appears weaker--especially during the transition to a new president--it could well push harder.

In Jordan, the movement faces the same options, but is probably even more skewed to the side of caution. Its choice is whether to accept the limits of its current operation or to push harder on elections and on a real parliamentary system in which the legislature can affect the monarch's policies and decisions. Especially important--and delicate--here is the communal relationship. The Brotherhood could become more dependent on Palestinian support, which would broaden its base while also making it more suspect to the regime. It seems likely that caution will prevail.

As for Syria, the Brotherhood there faces the possibility of beginning an active revolutionary armed struggle to overthrow the regime, trying to use the unpopularity of the Alawite-dominated government (the Alawites are not even Muslims) to rouse the Sunni Arab majority to jihad. Given the weakness of the current Syrian leadership, its international isolation, and multiple problems--far greater than its counterparts in Egypt and Jordan--it is quite possible that a major crisis would be seen by the Brotherhood as creating such a revolutionary situation. Yet newer groups with stronger bases in Syria, or at least able to operate more freely there, might be the ones who gain most from this situation.

In terms of their stands on different issues, especially regarding international affairs, the Brotherhoods are fairly candid. Inasmuch as they conceal anything, it is to downplay their goal of an Islamist state in which they rule or specific points such as the likely treatment of non-Muslims in a country they would rule. The cautious rhetoric of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood concerning domestic politics, the Syrian Brotherhood's willingness to participate in a broad anti-regime front, and the Egyptian Brotherhood's professions of support for democracy all conceal their objectives of monopolizing power and transforming their societies.

Yet this does not mean that these goals are not often discussed, even publicly. Sometimes this is done indirectly. For example, such key Egyptian Brotherhood leaders as Salah Abu Isma'il and Muhammad al-Ghazali, and then-head of the organization Omar al-Tilmisani praised Sudan at a time when it had temporarily become an Islamist state.[16] They certainly endorsed the application of Muslim law, Shari'a, as the law of the land and have advocated this continually.[17]

In its March 2004 platform, the Egyptian Brotherhood stated:

Our mission is to implement a comprehensive reform in order to uphold God's law in secular as well as religious matters.... Our only hope, if we wish to achieve any type of progress, is to adhere to our religion, as we used to, and to apply the Shari'a (Islamic law).[18]

In order to achieve this goal, the Brotherhood's "mission is to build a Muslim individual, a Muslim family and an Islamic rule to lead other Islamic states." On specific points, it explains, this means that the media should be censored to coincide with Islam, and the economic and political system should also be structured in this vein. Equally, the "focus of education," at least in the early years of schooling, "should be on learning the Qur'an by heart," and "women should only hold the kind of posts that would preserve their virtue." In parliament, Egyptian Brotherhood members have focused on trying to control the culture, with a great deal of indirect success.

The Brotherhood's former leader and guide, Mamun al-Hudaybi, explained that its purpose is to establish Islamic unity and an Islamic Caliphate, while former Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashur stated: "We accept the concept of pluralism for the time being; however, when we will have Islamic rule we might then reject this concept or accept it."[19]

Within the Brotherhood groups, there are also examples of pluralism, most obviously in the Egyptian case. Like parties based on Marxism, from the start, the Brotherhood had a strategy built on the notion of stages. The first stage is base-building. Individuals and families are indoctrinated with proper thought and behavior, coming to constitute a society within the society based on Shari'a. This is the phase of da'wa, a historic Muslim word meaning spreading the faith but which here can be likened to mass- and cadre-organizing. As with Communist parties, the key question is when this phase should be turned into a revolutionary stage, where active measures are taken to seize state power.

The older leadership, which has a better memory of the massive regime repression during the period from the 1950s to 1980s, is more cautious. An example is the current guide, top leader Muhammad Mahdi Akif, who joined in 1948 and was imprisoned in the 1950s and 1960s.

Some of the younger and middle-aged members want a more energetic policy, not using violence but pushing harder for elections, being more aggressive in demanding legalization, and eventually running a candidate for president. Their experience often comes from involvement in the Jama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) in the 1970s, a more militant organization that did extensive student and community organizing, after which some of its members joined the armed struggle of the 1990s.[20] Examples here include such Brotherhood leaders as Isam al-Aryan, head of the political bureau, and Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Futuh.

One issue on which there are disputes is how to deal with the likely succession from President Husni Mubarak to his son, Gamal. One view is to make a deal with the government in which the Brotherhood accepts this transition in exchange for legalization, an end to the emergency laws, and fairer elections.

In Syria, there are not any clear major differences within the Muslim Brotherhood. This, however, does not just reflect strength. Those who have different views are instead operating as independent Islamists or perhaps even thinking of turning to al-Qa'ida rather than joining the Brotherhood and expressing their positions in its ranks. It should be emphasized that for a Syrian Islamist to join the Brotherhood today is a questionable decision, because he could organize for Islamism far more freely as an independent who conceals his ultimate goals. In other words, the Syrian Brotherhood might come to be seen as an outdated organization of a previous generation, a phenomenon that is clearly not happening in Egypt (where the Brotherhood outlasted its younger rivals) or Jordan.

[1] Ruz al-Yusuf, January 28-February 3, 2006.
[2] For a history and analysis of Islamist movements in Egypt, see Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics, Second Revised Edition (Palgrave Press, 2002).
[3], January 23, 2005.
[4] Al-Jazeera television, February 6, 2005. View this statement at:
[5] Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 10, 2006.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Al-Hayat, January 16, 2001.
[8] On the Brotherhood's participation in the debate over elections, see A. Shefa, "Towards the September 7 Presidential Elections in Egypt: Public Debate over the Change in the Electoral System," Middle East Media Research Insititute (MEMRI) Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 237, September 2, 2005,
[9] On this and other issues in the struggle between Islamists and liberals, see Barry Rubin, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (NY: Wiley Press, 2005), pp. 1, 23-24.
[10] Times of London, January 31, 2006.
[11] Gulf News, February 11, 2006.
[12] Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 10, 2006.
[13] For examples, see the documents translated in "The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Support of Fighting Americans Forces in Iraq," MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, No. 776, September 3, 2004.
[14] MEMRI TV, June 14, 2006,
[15] See for example the interview with Humam Sa'id, assistant controller general of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, in al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 7, 2004.
[16] On these issues and on the Muslim Brotherhood as a parliamentary party, see Magdi Khalil, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and Political Power: Would Democracy Survive?" Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2006),
[17] This point is discussed in Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] For a detailed history of this era and group, see Rubin, The Long War for Freedom.
***Prof. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary university. His new book is The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).