LCCC ENGLISH DAILY NEWS BULLETIN
June 2/2007

Bible Reading of the day
Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ according to Saint Mark 11,11-26. He entered Jerusalem and went into the temple area. He looked around at everything and, since it was already late, went out to Bethany with the Twelve. The next day as they were leaving Bethany he was hungry. Seeing from a distance a fig tree in leaf, he went over to see if he could find anything on it. When he reached it he found nothing but leaves; it was not the time for figs. And he said to it in reply, "May no one ever eat of your fruit again!" And his disciples heard it.  They came to Jerusalem, and on entering the temple area he began to drive out those selling and buying there. He overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who were selling doves. He did not permit anyone to carry anything through the temple area. Then he taught them saying, "Is it not written: 'My house shall be called a house of prayerfor all peoples'? But you have made it a den of thieves." The chief priests and the scribes came to hear of it and were seeking a way to put him to death, yet they feared him because the whole crowd was astonished at his teaching. When evening came, they went out of the city. Early in the morning, as they were walking along, they saw the fig tree withered to its roots. Peter remembered and said to him, "Rabbi, look! The fig tree that you cursed has withered." Jesus said to them in reply, "Have faith in God. Amen, I say to you, whoever says to this mountain, 'Be lifted up and thrown into the sea,' and does not doubt in his heart but believes that what he says will happen, it shall be done for him. Therefore I tell you, all that you ask for in prayer, believe that you will receive it and it shall be yours. When you stand to pray, forgive anyone against whom you have a grievance, so that your heavenly Father may in turn forgive you your transgressions."

Free Opinion
Are Lebanon's dozing leaders finally ready to get to work? Daily Star. June 2/07
The Truth about Syria.FrontPage magazine.com. Jine 2/07

Latest News Reports From Miscellaneous Sources for June 2/05/07
Lebanon army storms camp in pursuit of militants-AP
Heavy Fighting Flares at Camp as Army Sends Reinforcements-Naharnet
Lebanese army masses around refugee camp. AP
Militant Sniper Fire Claims Soldier's Life-Naharnet
March 14 Alliance Proposes 'Historic Settlement' to End Lebanon Impasse-Naharnet
EU Welcomes the Hariri Tribunal-Naharnet
Hizbullah: International Tribunal Illegal and Illegitimate-Naharnet
Beirut Boulevard Where Hariri Was Killed Reopened for Traffic-Naharnet
Hariri, Live on TV, Urges Nasrallah to Meet Him-Naharnet
Netherlands on List to Host Hariri Tribunal-Naharnet
Hezbollah and Syria denounce UN over tribunal for Hariri killing.International Herald Tribune
Lebanon's Prime Minister: Syria is Threatening my Country.TIME
Tribunal divides opinion in Lebanon.BBC News
Hezbollah's secret nectarines.BBC News - UK
Al-Qa'eda prepares for a new wave of terror.Telegraph.co.uk
Israel considers giving up the Golan Heights to Syria.WLOS
Is Syria working to foment civil war?Globe and Mail
Rival camps spar over next step after UN vote on Hariri tribunal-Daily Star
Magistrate asks Interpol to help round up Libyan suspects in Moussa Sadr mystery-Daily Star
Many fear more bombs after UN approval of court-Daily Star
Moscow warns sharp increase in military aid may 'destablize' Lebanon-Daily Star
UNIFIL spokesman rules out linkage between resolutions 1701 and 1757-Daily Star
US Congress gives AUB $2 million for scholarships-Daily Star
Hungarian doctors, nurses arrive to help refugees-Daily Star
US Embassy stops taking calls about visas-Daily Star
Dutch 'not interested' in hosting yet another court-Daily Star
Security Council vote on tribunal draws mixed reactions-Daily Star
Text of Security Council Resolution 1757Daily Star
Rival Lebanese politicians identify common socio-economic interests-Daily Star
Sewage remains primary pollutant in Lebanese waters-Daily Star
Clashes - and talks - continue in North-Daily Star
Rice repeats demand for Tehran to halt enrichment-Daily Star
Vatican establishes diplomatic relations with UAE-Daily Star

Heavy Fighting Flares at Camp as Army Sends Reinforcements-Daily Star
Heavy Fighting broke out anew on Friday between Lebanese troops and Fatah al-Islam militants surrounded inside the northern Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared as the military sent reinforcements to hunt the extremists. About 50 armored carriers and battle tanks from elite units massed at the northern edge of the camp and drove toward the forward-most positions, according to Associated Press Television News (APTN) crew at the scene.
There was no confirmation that the army units were making a final push to take over the camp, instead of simply advancing to grab territory and isolate the militants in pockets. But a significant decrease in shelling, accompanied by a rise in machine gun fire from armored carriers and exchanges of automatic rifle fire, suggested the troops were already engaging the militants. Military officials at the high command would not comment on the troop movements. There were no immediate reports of casualties in the clashes, which came after a calm night and a day after a Lebanese soldier was killed in exchanges. His death brought to 80, including 35 soldiers, the number of people confirmed killed since fighting first broke out on May 20 and led to a mass exodus of people from the camp.
Clouds of smoke billowed from Nahr al-Bared where Fatah al-Islam militants have been holed up in a 13-day siege by the Lebanese army. The concentrated bombardment began in the morning, with heavy barrages targeting Fatah al-Islam positions after army posts came under fire from militants, according to a military communiqué. The shelling continued through the morning with troops "returning fire with appropriate weapons," according to the army statement. Sporadic gunfire exchanges have continued daily since a truce halted three days of heavy fighting. On a separate front, members of the mainstream Fatah movement of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Islamist Jund al-Sham group exchanged gunfire in Ein el-Hilweh, Lebanon's largest refugee camp near the port city of Sidon.
According to the account, a Fatah militant, whose brother had been killed by the Islamists earlier this month, shot at one of Jun al-Sham members he thought was responsible, without hitting him. That led to an exchange of small arms fire and grenades that lasted about half an hour at the camp late Thursday.(Naharnet-AP-AFP) Beirut, 01 Jun 07, 10:02

Hariri, Live on TV, Urges Nasrallah to Meet Him
MP Saad Hariri, addressing Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in a live TV interview, has urged the Hizbullah chief to meet with him in a bid to end the ongoing Lebanon crisis.
"I am ready to meet Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah … and Gen. Michel Aoun and with any honest (person) who wants to salvage this country from the traps and discords planned by external (nations)," Hariri told Kalam el-Nass on LBC television late Thursday. He stressed that the March 14 coalition, to which he belongs, will not set any conditions for a dialogue, adding that "we agree" to the formation of a national unity government "after we meet and discuss the issue."
Creation of a national unity government has been a key Hizbullah demand. The Hizbullah-led opposition has been campaigning outside the Grand Serail since Dec. 1 in an effort to topple Prime Minister Fouad Saniora's cabinet. Beirut, 01 Jun 07, 11:00

March 14 Alliance Proposes 'Historic Settlement' to End Lebanon Impasse
The March 14 majority coalition called for dialogue with the Hizbullah-led opposition to achieve a "historic settlement" based on respect for multi-confessional Lebanon and rejection of allegiance to foreign powers.The coalition, which backs Premier Fouad Saniora's government, issued a statement late Thursday praising the creation by the U.N. Security Council of an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of ex-Premier Rafik Hariri and related crimes that have been blamed on Syria. Such a proposed reconciliation with the opposition, the statement said, should be based on the 1989 Taif accord that distributed power equally between Christians and Muslims. It called on Syria to "recognize, once and for all, Lebanon's independence."
The opposition, the statement said, should support implementation of what has been agreed on in previous rounds of national dialogue, especially demarcation of the joint borders with Syria and setting up diplomatic relations between Beirut and Damascus. "The March 14 factions stretch a hand to all, without any exception, and invite all Lebanese factions to dialogue leading to entente on all these principles that can usher Lebanon out of its crisis and provide the appropriate climate to organize presidential elections in line with the relevant constitutional schedule," the statement said. The forthcoming presidential elections, the statement added, "should be independent and should be followed by (the formation of) a national government to shore up requirements of national partnership through parliament."
The offer was apparently a direct rejection of the call by the Hizbullah-led opposition for early parliamentary elections. The statement called on the opposition to adopt "a clear decision outlining rejection of all sorts of domination and hegemony" in reference to Syria's attempts to control the decision-making in Lebanon.
It said U.N. Security Council resolution 1701, which ended 34-days of war between Hizbullah and Israel last summer, should be fully implemented and the Lebanese government should be the sole authority throughout Lebanon. This was in reference to Palestinian bases, refugee camps and Hizbullah strongholds which are off limits to state authority.The statement declared full support for the Lebanese army which is battling the "Syrian-sponsored" Fatah al-Islam militants in north Lebanon's Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp. Beirut, 01 Jun 07, 07:42

Netherlands on List to Host Hariri Tribunal
The Netherlands is one of the countries picked to host an international tribunal for the assassination of former Premier Rafik Hariri agreed by the U.N. earlier this week, the Dutch foreign ministry has said. "The Netherlands is not the first candidate," ministry spokesman Herman van Gelderen told AFP on Thursday. "We believe this kind of tribunal could also be hosted in other countries." "It shouldn't be taken for granted that the tribunal must be in the Netherlands," he added.
The Hague already hosts the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Special Court for Sierra Leone, which has its headquarters in Freetown, also has a chamber in The Hague, where former Liberian president Charles Taylor will be judged from Monday. Hariri and 22 other people were killed in a massive truck bombing in Beirut in February 2005, triggering a groundswell of domestic and international protests that forced Syria to end nearly 30 years of military domination in Lebanon. An initial U.N. inquiry implicated Damascus and its allies in Lebanon, where four pro-Syrian security chiefs were arrested in late 2005. But Syria has vehemently denied any involvement. The tribunal, which will be held in an as yet undetermined "neutral" location, is not likely to be up and running for several months at least and it is not clear how it will operate or who will actually stand trial.(AFP) Beirut, 01 Jun 07, 09:03

Beirut Boulevard Where Hariri Was Killed Reopened for Traffic
Lebanese authorities reopened Thursday the road where ex-Premier Rafik Hariri was killed, a day after the U.N. Security Council voted to set up an international tribunal to try his suspected assassins. Beirut Mayor Abdel-Monem al-Ariss said the spot on the Lebanese capital's seafront would remain "a historic symbol in the heart of Beirut." Police cleared roadblocks in front of the road where Hariri and 22 others were killed on February 2005. The seaside boulevard had been closed for more than two years while the U.N. commission investigating the murder scoured the ground, adjacent buildings and the nearby sea for evidence.
Among the first to drive through was a passenger minivan, whose driver stopped, got out of the vehicle, knelt and kissed the ground, saying: "God have mercy on your soul."Earlier, Carole Farhat, who survived the bombing two years ago, watched as laborers filled the bomb crater with gravel and paved over it. She said she was glad to be alive "to enjoy this moment.""I've come to see the spot where I was seconds away from death. It might be a good sign for Lebanon and for us," said Farhat, who was thrown in the air by the bombing as she crossed the road. She lost much of her hearing and sustained injuries to her eyes.
Daniel Germani, an engineer who was also injured in the bombing, said the reopening of the road would allow his team to repair the famous St. George Hotel, which was severely damaged in the blast. Five hotel employees were killed and eight were wounded, he said. He estimated damages to the hotel at $10 million, saying they had yet to receive compensation.(AP-Naharnet) Beirut, 31 May 07, 20:28

Militant Sniper Fire Claims Soldier's Life
A Lebanese soldier was killed by Fatah al-Islam militants' sniper fire Thursday, the latest casualty of the 12-day standoff between the army and the fighters at the northern refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared, security officials said. The death raises to 32 the number of soldiers killed since fighting between the military and the militants began May 20. The army said that least eight Fatah al-Islam extremists were also killed on Wednesday when the two sides fought fierce battles that left three soldiers wounded. "Between eight and 10 Fatah al-Islam elements were killed yesterday (Wednesday) when the army responded with direct hits to fire which was targeting its positions," an army spokesman said. At least 20 civilians and about 60 fighters have been killed up till now. The Palestinian refugee camp is ringed by hundreds of soldiers, backed by artillery and tanks, in place to storm the camp and prevent fighters from fleeing. The government has vowed to crush the militants, who have said they will fight till the end. Thousands of Palestinians have fled Nahr al-Bared, but thousands more are still inside, along with the Fatah al-Islam fighters. Sporadic gunfire exchanges have continued daily since a truce halted three days of heavy fighting. The security officials said the soldier who was killed had been hit by militants' sniper fire from inside the camp. They said three soldiers were wounded during overnight fighting.(AP-AFP-Naharnet) Beirut, 31 May 07, 20:36

Mottaki Discusses Lebanon with Muallem
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki arrived in Damascus on Thursday and held talks on Lebanon with his Syrian counterpart, Walid Muallem, reports said.
Mottaki made no comments about the reason for his visit to Iran's staunchest ally in the region but Iran's official news agency IRNA said he and Muallem held talks on regional issues, including Iraq and Lebanon. "All Iraq's neighbors should help to bring about security in Iraq," IRNA quoted Mottaki as saying during the meeting, describing Iraq's security as a fundamental problem. On problems in Lebanon, Mottaki accused the United States "and the Zionist regime of planning this tension in order to prevent the Lebanese from reaching political unity."  His trip comes a day after the U.N. Security Council ignored Syrian objections and voted to create an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 murder of former premier Rafiq Hariri in neighboring Lebanon.(AFP-Naharnet) Beirut, 31 May 07, 19:47

Hizbullah: International Tribunal Illegal and Illegitimate
Hizbullah blasted as illegal a U.N. Security Council resolution setting up a tribunal to try suspects in the murder of ex-Lebanese Premier Rafik Hariri, claiming the United States could use it for political aims. "The resolution is a violation of the sovereignty of Lebanon and an aggressive interference in its internal affairs," Hizbullah said in a statement. "This is a blatant violation which makes the resolution illegal and illegitimate both nationally and internationally," it said.
"The ruling coalition (in Lebanon) has presented a great gift to the American administration, as they put between its hands a political card which it can use for political pressure." Hizbullah leads the Syrian-backed opposition which the Western-led ruling coalition has accused of blocking the ratification by parliament of an agreement for the creation of the Hariri murder tribunal. On Wednesday, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution which set June 10 a date to implement a 2006 agreement between the United Nations and the Beirut government to establish the court. Prime Minister Fouad Saniora had asked the council earlier this month to establish the tribunal, citing the refusal of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to convene a session to ratify the creation of the court.
Berri, however, rejected these accusations Thursday. "It is an honor I claim that I don't violate the constitution of my country or indulge in sowing divisions among its sons, and I left for you the opposite 'honor': ignoring (national) reconciliation and the constitution that guides us in Lebanon," Berri said in a brief statement.(Naharnet-AFP-AP) Beirut, 31 May 07, 19:16

EU Welcomes the Hariri Tribunal
The German presidency of the European Union on Thursday welcomed a UN. resolution setting up a special tribunal to probe the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. "This UN Security Council resolution sends out an important signal from the international community that politically motivated attacks and killings in Lebanon must not go unpunished," it said in a statement. "The presidency would welcome it if the Lebanese republic were to seize the opportunity granted to it by the U.N. Security Council to ratify the special tribunal itself by the June 10, 2007, deadline." Berlin called on the international community and the parties in Lebanon to ensure the quick establishment of the tribunal and full cooperation with it. "In this context, the presidency reiterates its call to all sides in Lebanon to resolve the domestic political crisis through dialogue, by following democratic procedures and by respecting the country's democratically legitimized institutions," it said.
The legally binding U.N. resolution, which was approved by the Security Council on Wednesday, sets June 10 a deadline for an agreement on the tribunal to come into force. Hariri and 22 other people were killed in a massive truck bombing in Beirut in February 2005, triggering domestic and international protests that forced Syria to end nearly 30 years of military domination in Lebanon. An initial U.N. inquiry implicated Damascus and its allies in Lebanon, where four pro-Syrian security chiefs were arrested in late 2005. But Syria has vehemently denied any involvement and vowed not to cooperate with the tribunal.(AFP-Naharnet) Beirut, 31 May 07, 19:40

Are Lebanon's dozing leaders finally ready to get to work?
Friday, June 01, 2007
Editorial-Daily Star
After more than six months of reckless politicking and pouring fuel on the fires of instability, the ruling coalition in Lebanon has finally acknowledged the urgent need to address the governing crisis in this country. In a joint statement on Thursday, the leaders of the parties in the ruling coalition called on the opposition to engage in dialogue and form a national unity government.
This development is rather late in coming. The country's sleeping political class has allowed the power struggle to drag on for far too long, and has seemingly striven to make matters worse throughout. Instead of exchanging views and keeping their disagreements on a level that would not affect the lives of ordinary citizens, they have been relentless and venomous in their attacks, often escalating tensions to the point of peril. The two sides have been engaging in a reckless game of brinkmanship that has on several occasions stirred sectarian passions to a point of frenzy, pushing the country dangerously close to the brink of an abyss. Average Lebanese citizens have had no recourse other than to look on helplessly as their leaders shamelessly gamble with their destinies.
Now suddenly the ruling coalition seems to have grasped the urgency of the situation and is calling upon members of the opposition to help them rule this country. But the chickens may have already come home to roost: It may already be too late to stave off the consequences of months of recklessness on the part of the political establishment. According to the Global Peace Index published this week, Lebanon already ranks among the bottom 10 states in the world in terms of peace and sustainability. And thanks to the actions - or rather inaction - of Lebanon's political class, this country could soon be vying for the spot at the bottom of the heap, where civil-war-torn Iraq is currently relegated. The report's sponsor correctly stated that the data ought to serve as a "wake-up call" for leaders around the globe.
Our own somnolent leaders will not be able to repair the damage they have done with a handful of nationalistic slogans. For more than six months, the two sides have been brandishing nothing but symbolic phrases such as "truth," "resistance," "justice," "national unity," "independence" and "sovereignty." The time for empty slogans has long passed; it is time for a plan of action. What we need now is a detailed plan to break the gridlock that has paralyzed government activity and strangled the economy. We need a specific plan of action for constitutional reform, drafting an electoral law and paying down the national debt. We need committees to actually start working on resolving the problems this country is facing.
Any exit to the political crisis will have to begin with a serious effort on the part of Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The two leaders will have to meet and map out a course of action with haste, before this country is engulfed in the flames sparked by the irresponsible actions of its leaders.


The Truth about Syria
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | June 1, 2007
Frontpage Interview’s guest today is Barry Rubin, director of the Global Research for International Affairs (GLORIA) Center of the Interdisciplinary University, and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal and of Turkish Studies journal. He is the author of The Long War for Freedom, Yasir Arafat, The Tragedy of the Middle East, and Hating America. His articles have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Foreign Affairs, and many other publications. He has been a Council on Foreign Relations Fellow and is the editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs. He is the author of the new book The Truth about Syria.
FP: Barry Rubin, welcome to Frontpage Interview.
Rubin: Glad to be here.
FP: What inspired you to write this book?
Rubin: In dealing with the Middle East today, one often cannot escape a feeling akin to being Alice in Wonderland. Bitter partisan disputes turn any discussion of regional issues into something that has less to do with the Middle East than with domestic American politics. The academic field is plagued both with an abandonment of professional standards—even the most basic ones such as consistency, evidence, fairness—and tremendous power (one might say almost hegemonic control) by Arab nationalist ideology. Instant experts appear on the Middle East and Islam who make the most obvious and silly errors.
Syria is a good case study for what is real and what is ridiculous. Also, there has not been enough good work done on this country, at least in book form, and it is increasingly important. Just to recite the basic facts indicates that: Syria is sponsoring a terror war against Iraqi civilians and American forces in Iraq; it is subverting Lebanon, not even stopping at killing the most popular political leaders there; playing the leading role in being the patron of radical Palestinian forces against Israel; promoting anti-Americanism; formulating the new “resistance” strategy which combines radical Arab nationalism and Islamism; being Iran’s main Arab ally; and even being the main Arab state sponsor of revolutionary Islamism.
To begin with, to understand Syria—like other regional forces—one must first examine the nature of the regime and its real interests. The way to do this is not to cite the latest interview or op-eds by Syrian leaders or propagandists in the Western media or what one of them told some naïve Western “useful idiot” who traveled to Damascus but rather to look at what the Syrian rulers say among themselves, what they do, how they structure the regime and perceive of their interests.
Syria is not a radical regime because it has been mistreated by the West or Israel but because the regime needs radicalism to survive. It is a minority dictatorship of a small non-Muslim minority and it offers neither freedoms nor material benefit. It needs demagoguery, the scapegoats of America and Israel, massive loot taken from Lebanon, an Iraq which is either destabilized or a satellite, and so on.
Take the simple issue of the Golan Heights. It is commonplace to say that Syria wants back the Golan Heights. But one need merely ask the simple question: what happens if Syria gets it back? If Syria’s regime made peace with Israel it has no excuse for having a big military, a dictatorship, and a terrible economy. The day after the deal the Syrian people will start demanding change. The regime knows that.
Or economic reform. Again, many in the West take it for granted that the regime wants to take steps to improve the economy. But it would prefer to keep a tight hold on the economy rather than open it up and face enriched Sunni Muslim Arabs who hate the regime both due to their class status and their religious community.
The list goes on. Yet few of these points figure into the debate over Syria where statements like “engagement,” “a common interest in Iraq,” “getting Syria away from Iran,” “the benefits of peace with Israel,” and the reasonableness of Bashar al-Asad get repeated like mantras.
This problem is enhanced by the lack of memory. An example, on his first trip to Damascus, Secretary of State Colin Powell was lied to by Bashar—who made him look like a fool—when Powell repeated Bashar’s claim that he had closed the oil pipeline to Saddam Hussein. On his second trip, Powell told reporters that he understood what had happened and would not be fooled again. Yet within hours he was repeating Bashar’s claim that he had closed the terrorist offices in Damascus. A reporter merely called them and found they were open for business as usual. And today Powell—and former Secretary of State James Baker who suffered similar humiliations and failures—proclaim how well they did in negotiating with Bashar.
FP: What policy should the U.S. pursue toward Syria?
Rubin: It is amazing how much Syria gets away with this. A very brave Syrian dissident once asked me, “Why does the whole world seem so afraid of this country?”
A campaign to contain Syria requires aiding those neighbors menaced by it and its allies: the Lebanese majority that opposes Syrian-Hizballah hegemony, Israel, and the majority in Iraq angered by Syria’s role in murdering them. It also means working with Arab regimes like those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan that stand against the Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas alliance due to their own interests. The United States and the West should show more regard for the interests of more moderate Arabs and Muslims rather than siding with the radicals against them. Likewise, Syrians must be shown that their leaders are failures and can offer neither lasting glory nor material gains. The regime must be contained until it crumbles or retreats. This can be a long process but it is ultimately a less costly one than the alternatives.
The starting point for an effective response is simply to understand the Syrian system on its own terms. The regime does not want to make peace, become moderate, or reform its economy. It wants to stay as it is and preferably to control Lebanon, continue the conflict with Israel forever, buy off the Islamists by supporting Hizballah and the Iraqi insurgency, and thus demagogically make its people cheer for Bashar as the great warrior of resistance.
Anwar al-Bunni, a Syrian democratic dissident, explained in 2003 that the only thing that held back the regime was fear of America. Only due to “the fright it gave our rulers, that we reformers stand a chance here."
But once U.S. members of Congress flocked to Damascus, offering words of praise and advocating détente, Bunni was proven right. A few weeks later, he was sentenced on trumped-up charges to five years’ imprisonment.
Being nice to Syria will lead nowhere because the regime thrives on conflict and its demands—including a recolonized Lebanon--are too much against Western interests to meet. U.S. policy should treat Syria’s regime as a determined adversary whose interests are diametrically opposed to those of America, no matter who sits in the White House.
In this book, I try to show how Syria works, how the regime has maneuvered so brilliantly--and so ruthlessly to survive--and how it has much too often gotten away with this strategy. If you want to know why the region continues to be so unstable and beset by radicals and dictators--as well as why Western policies have often been inadequate and Western analyses remarkably wrong--this book answers those questions.
FP: Is there any real hope that the Lebanese people can free themselves from Syrian-Hizballah hegemony? What must be done to help them in this effort?
Rubin: Yes. The majority Sunni, Christian, and Druze leadership—and most people in Lebanon want their country to be free of foreign control and from the Islamism of Hizballah. They see it as a civilizational and nationalist as well as communal struggle. But of course many Shias also don’t support Hizballah. There is a lot of hatred toward Syria and much resentment of the Palestinians. We hear all the time about the conflict with Israel, of course, but not these factors.
It is important to remember that every day the Lebanese majority leadership, especially politicians and journalists, are risking their lives every day. There have been at least 15 major assassination attacks, inspired by Syria, since the February 14, 2005, killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. It should also be remembered that this was the event which ended American diplomatic contacts with Syria, after strenuous efforts by the Bush administration during the four previous years.
At the center of events today is the effort to put together a tribunal on the Hariri murder. The investigation’s interim reports clearly indicate that the killing was planned at the highest level of the Syrian government. The Lebanese government has cooperated with the UN on trying to hold a joint tribunal. Hizballah, as a Syrian client, has made its highest priority to kill the tribunal. Note that this was the issue about which Hizballah walked out of the Lebanese cabinet.
Thus, the Lebanese government and majority deserve international support in terms of aid, diplomatic help, and moral support. Why is the aid money flowing to the radical, terrorist Palestinian forces rather than the democratic moderate Lebanese? Why should Lebanese risk their lives to combat radical Islamism and the growing power of Iran and Syria if the West won’t help them?
This means the pressure on Syria should continue—and that includes its isolation and economic sanctions—the tribunal should move forward, too. In addition, the Syrian government has repeatedly hinted that unless the UNIFIL forces--sent by the UN to preserve the truce with Israel--cave in and accept Hizballah’s rearmament and reoccupation of the south, they will face attack by mysterious “independent” terrorist forces. The West must show guts in defending UNIFIL.
FP: You refer to “more moderate Arabs and Muslims” that the U.S. should be supporting. Who exactly are they and why are we not already fully supporting them?
Rubin: There is a terrible truth most people don’t want to discuss. There are no good policies and no solutions in the Middle East. That is a long discussion, which I have dealt with in such previous books as The Tragedy of the Middle East and The Long War for Freedom. If a solution to the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts is decades off shouldn’t that fact be taken into account by policymakers? If liberal forces are too weak—no matter how virtuous—to triumph must not that be factored into the equation?
So here is the paradox: no good options, no perfect policies, and yet great dangers. How to cope with this situation? A starting point is five basic principles.
First, support for Israel. It has become a mantra often stripped of meaning but the fact is that Israel is the only reliable ally in the region and its relative power does remain strong.
Second, it is very useful to have a united front against radical Islamism even though to some extent this is a fiction. One should have no illusions about the nature or steadfastness of the allies in this situation. On one level, Iran, Syria, and the various radical Islamist and the remaining radical Arab nationalist groups are the main enemy and threat. The interests of other Arab states are contrary to this axis. Yet, of course, to give one example, the Saudis are a repressive, retrograde dictatorship who themselves bankroll radical Islamism. They will cut separate deals with the “enemy” and do things like broker the Hamas-Fatah deal for a Palestinian coalition government. One must have no illusions and not become apologist for allies. But this was also true of the Cold War, wasn’t it?
There are some relatively more moderate regimes—Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon—that is a reality, and courageous liberal forces. There are governments which face extremist threats like Algeria and Iraq. Consider Tunisia, arguably the most progressive Arab state in social and educational terms yet ruled by a nasty dictatorship, though far less murderous than those on the other side. How about Egypt, a dictatorship that takes U.S. aid with one hand and promotes anti-American propaganda with the other?
So let’s not romanticize this into a “good” and “bad” guy’s situation. Again, no illusions. One can work the most with the better elements, do what is necessary with the more ambiguous figures, and struggle against the extremists. And let’s remember those latter forces are not going to be talked into moderation. Beyond ideology, they have interests that set them directly against the West and that is not going to change. This is a conflict, not a failure of communications.
Third, the central problem of the Middle East is the dictatorial regimes and dogmatic ideology of radical nationalism and Islamism. Rather than deal with their social problems, build good institutions, expand freedom, move toward democracy, set economic reforms, and so on, they blame all their problems on Zionism and imperialism. Demagogic appeals mobilize the masses behind them. The answer is not reform, they say, but struggle. The struggle never ends. And the resulting victims are said to create the need and justification for still more struggle.
This paradox, then, is that the dictatorships are the problems, breeding radicalism intentionally and also through the frustration created by their bad policies. Yet the West needs to work with many of them. A balance must be struck adjusted to every specific state and situation, all of which are different.
Fourth, a liberal, democratic Middle East must be the long-term goal. The democrats are on the right path, not only because they are friendlier to the West but since they are the only ones with real solutions. Yet the real danger of destabilizing societies and bringing in radical Islamist regimes is a real one, as the liberals themselves recognize. So these groups must be helped to survive and to flourish but this is a complex and long-term task.
Finally, a large element of policy must be public relations. Of course, the United States has to show Europeans and Arabs and domestic critics that it is trying to reconcile hostile forces, make peace, and so on. But public relations should never be confused with strategic policy, which means real concessions should not be given to generate good publicity.
FP: What do you think of the state of the war in Iraq?
Rubin: I was never a big fan of the whole idea of invading Iraq. One of the ideas I presented in 2003 was that President George W. Bush go to the Europeans and UN and say that he really wanted to invade Iraq so what would they give him not to do it. This especially related to keeping up the sanctions on Saddam Hussein. I can tell you from first-hand knowledge that contrary to mythology, virtually nobody in Israel’s policy or expert community wanted this war before the United States decided definitely to wage it and they did not view it as beneficial to Israel’s interests. At one point, cabinet ministers were so opposed that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered them to shut up so as not to undermine the U.S. ally.
In briefings, I warned that the United States had a limited time in Iraq and should get out as soon as possible. It is certainly arguable that the United States must help ensure a stable regime in Iraq but this is an endless task. Both victory and defeat are impossible in Iraq, since the United States can neither defeat or be defeated by the insurgency. My view is that once the Iraqi regime—which in large part means the vast majority of the Shia and Kurds—has a strong communal basis. It will fight to preserve itself and not lose. But there is no good purpose for a continued U.S. presence, protecting an ultimately ungrateful regime.
The irony here is that the Bush administration could not depend on the Middle East experts, most of whom are at best indifferent to U.S. interests or the welfare of the region’s peoples. But it then generated its own very poor expertise which did not understand how the region worked either. Or to put it another way, I agree that dictatorship is the problem and democracy is the solution in theory, Practice is something else entirely.
The whole debate on the war is conducted by two bitterly contentious sides both of which are not properly framing the issues. A lot of the anti-war side is also repugnant, hostile to America, and basically repeating Arab nationalist and even Islamist arguments. And yet that does not make the advocates of the war—much less those who have conducted it so badly—right either.
My concern is that the Iraq affair has undermined the very important lessons deriving from Saddam’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait; the rejection of the peace process by Iran and Syria; the September 11 attacks; and the failures of the dictatorial regimes. There are many differences between Iraq and Vietnam, but one parallel is how both discredited important, correct ideas and policies. In Vietnam, these included the justice of the Free World’s cause, the need to fight the Cold War, tough strategic thinking, the need to be willing to use force when necessary, and anti-Communism.
But, of course, that is why the Middle East is so complicated. When I say that I was against the war, I also have to think about the Iraqis themselves who, as much as they were suffering now, were treated so terribly under Saddam Hussein.
One of the most brilliant French political analysts said to me at the war’s start that when mass graves were uncovered and people discovered how French policy had been a defender and apologist for such a brutal dictatorship, they would rebel against their government’s policy. Generally, the international effect was to make hatred of Bush and America the main issue; make people conclude that force never works; and discredit Arab liberals who backed the war.
Often, the history of the Middle East does seem one tragedy after another. Still, I remain optimistic in the Middle East rather than in the American sense of the word. American optimism is to believe in peace, prosperity, and people liking each other. Middle Eastern optimism is that the extremists will lose and things won’t get much worse.
FP: Thanks for being with us.
Rubin: As always, thanks.
FP: Barry Rubin, welcome to Frontpage Interview.
Rubin: Glad to be here.
FP: What inspired you to write this book?
Rubin: In dealing with the Middle East today, one often cannot escape a feeling akin to being Alice in Wonderland. Bitter partisan disputes turn any discussion of regional issues into something that has less to do with the Middle East than with domestic American politics. The academic field is plagued both with an abandonment of professional standards—even the most basic ones such as consistency, evidence, fairness—and tremendous power (one might say almost hegemonic control) by Arab nationalist ideology. Instant experts appear on the Middle East and Islam who make the most obvious and silly errors.
Syria is a good case study for what is real and what is ridiculous. Also, there has not been enough good work done on this country, at least in book form, and it is increasingly important. Just to recite the basic facts indicates that: Syria is sponsoring a terror war against Iraqi civilians and American forces in Iraq; it is subverting Lebanon, not even stopping at killing the most popular political leaders there; playing the leading role in being the patron of radical Palestinian forces against Israel; promoting anti-Americanism; formulating the new “resistance” strategy which combines radical Arab nationalism and Islamism; being Iran’s main Arab ally; and even being the main Arab state sponsor of revolutionary Islamism.
To begin with, to understand Syria—like other regional forces—one must first examine the nature of the regime and its real interests. The way to do this is not to cite the latest interview or op-eds by Syrian leaders or propagandists in the Western media or what one of them told some naïve Western “useful idiot” who traveled to Damascus but rather to look at what the Syrian rulers say among themselves, what they do, how they structure the regime and perceive of their interests.
Syria is not a radical regime because it has been mistreated by the West or Israel but because the regime needs radicalism to survive. It is a minority dictatorship of a small non-Muslim minority and it offers neither freedoms nor material benefit. It needs demagoguery, the scapegoats of America and Israel, massive loot taken from Lebanon, an Iraq which is either destabilized or a satellite, and so on.
Take the simple issue of the Golan Heights. It is commonplace to say that Syria wants back the Golan Heights. But one need merely ask the simple question: what happens if Syria gets it back? If Syria’s regime made peace with Israel it has no excuse for having a big military, a dictatorship, and a terrible economy. The day after the deal the Syrian people will start demanding change. The regime knows that.
Or economic reform. Again, many in the West take it for granted that the regime wants to take steps to improve the economy. But it would prefer to keep a tight hold on the economy rather than open it up and face enriched Sunni Muslim Arabs who hate the regime both due to their class status and their religious community.
The list goes on. Yet few of these points figure into the debate over Syria where statements like “engagement,” “a common interest in Iraq,” “getting Syria away from Iran,” “the benefits of peace with Israel,” and the reasonableness of Bashar al-Asad get repeated like mantras.
This problem is enhanced by the lack of memory. An example, on his first trip to Damascus, Secretary of State Colin Powell was lied to by Bashar—who made him look like a fool—when Powell repeated Bashar’s claim that he had closed the oil pipeline to Saddam Hussein. On his second trip, Powell told reporters that he understood what had happened and would not be fooled again. Yet within hours he was repeating Bashar’s claim that he had closed the terrorist offices in Damascus. A reporter merely called them and found they were open for business as usual. And today Powell—and former Secretary of State James Baker who suffered similar humiliations and failures—proclaim how well they did in negotiating with Bashar.
FP: What policy should the U.S. pursue toward Syria?
Rubin: It is amazing how much Syria gets away with this. A very brave Syrian dissident once asked me, “Why does the whole world seem so afraid of this country?”
A campaign to contain Syria requires aiding those neighbors menaced by it and its allies: the Lebanese majority that opposes Syrian-Hizballah hegemony, Israel, and the majority in Iraq angered by Syria’s role in murdering them. It also means working with Arab regimes like those in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan that stand against the Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas alliance due to their own interests. The United States and the West should show more regard for the interests of more moderate Arabs and Muslims rather than siding with the radicals against them. Likewise, Syrians must be shown that their leaders are failures and can offer neither lasting glory nor material gains. The regime must be contained until it crumbles or retreats. This can be a long process but it is ultimately a less costly one than the alternatives.
The starting point for an effective response is simply to understand the Syrian system on its own terms. The regime does not want to make peace, become moderate, or reform its economy. It wants to stay as it is and preferably to control Lebanon, continue the conflict with Israel forever, buy off the Islamists by supporting Hizballah and the Iraqi insurgency, and thus demagogically make its people cheer for Bashar as the great warrior of resistance.
Anwar al-Bunni, a Syrian democratic dissident, explained in 2003 that the only thing that held back the regime was fear of America. Only due to “the fright it gave our rulers, that we reformers stand a chance here."
But once U.S. members of Congress flocked to Damascus, offering words of praise and advocating détente, Bunni was proven right. A few weeks later, he was sentenced on trumped-up charges to five years’ imprisonment.
Being nice to Syria will lead nowhere because the regime thrives on conflict and its demands—including a recolonized Lebanon--are too much against Western interests to meet. U.S. policy should treat Syria’s regime as a determined adversary whose interests are diametrically opposed to those of America, no matter who sits in the White House.
In this book, I try to show how Syria works, how the regime has maneuvered so brilliantly--and so ruthlessly to survive--and how it has much too often gotten away with this strategy. If you want to know why the region continues to be so unstable and beset by radicals and dictators--as well as why Western policies have often been inadequate and Western analyses remarkably wrong--this book answers those questions.
FP: Is there any real hope that the Lebanese people can free themselves from Syrian-Hizballah hegemony? What must be done to help them in this effort?
Rubin: Yes. The majority Sunni, Christian, and Druze leadership—and most people in Lebanon want their country to be free of foreign control and from the Islamism of Hizballah. They see it as a civilizational and nationalist as well as communal struggle. But of course many Shias also don’t support Hizballah. There is a lot of hatred toward Syria and much resentment of the Palestinians. We hear all the time about the conflict with Israel, of course, but not these factors.
It is important to remember that every day the Lebanese majority leadership, especially politicians and journalists, are risking their lives every day. There have been at least 15 major assassination attacks, inspired by Syria, since the February 14, 2005, killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. It should also be remembered that this was the event which ended American diplomatic contacts with Syria, after strenuous efforts by the Bush administration during the four previous years.
At the center of events today is the effort to put together a tribunal on the Hariri murder. The investigation’s interim reports clearly indicate that the killing was planned at the highest level of the Syrian government. The Lebanese government has cooperated with the UN on trying to hold a joint tribunal. Hizballah, as a Syrian client, has made its highest priority to kill the tribunal. Note that this was the issue about which Hizballah walked out of the Lebanese cabinet.
Thus, the Lebanese government and majority deserve international support in terms of aid, diplomatic help, and moral support. Why is the aid money flowing to the radical, terrorist Palestinian forces rather than the democratic moderate Lebanese? Why should Lebanese risk their lives to combat radical Islamism and the growing power of Iran and Syria if the West won’t help them?
This means the pressure on Syria should continue—and that includes its isolation and economic sanctions—the tribunal should move forward, too. In addition, the Syrian government has repeatedly hinted that unless the UNIFIL forces--sent by the UN to preserve the truce with Israel--cave in and accept Hizballah’s rearmament and reoccupation of the south, they will face attack by mysterious “independent” terrorist forces. The West must show guts in defending UNIFIL.
FP: You refer to “more moderate Arabs and Muslims” that the U.S. should be supporting. Who exactly are they and why are we not already fully supporting them?
Rubin: There is a terrible truth most people don’t want to discuss. There are no good policies and no solutions in the Middle East. That is a long discussion, which I have dealt with in such previous books as The Tragedy of the Middle East and The Long War for Freedom. If a solution to the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts is decades off shouldn’t that fact be taken into account by policymakers? If liberal forces are too weak—no matter how virtuous—to triumph must not that be factored into the equation?
So here is the paradox: no good options, no perfect policies, and yet great dangers. How to cope with this situation? A starting point is five basic principles.
First, support for Israel. It has become a mantra often stripped of meaning but the fact is that Israel is the only reliable ally in the region and its relative power does remain strong.
Second, it is very useful to have a united front against radical Islamism even though to some extent this is a fiction. One should have no illusions about the nature or steadfastness of the allies in this situation. On one level, Iran, Syria, and the various radical Islamist and the remaining radical Arab nationalist groups are the main enemy and threat. The interests of other Arab states are contrary to this axis. Yet, of course, to give one example, the Saudis are a repressive, retrograde dictatorship who themselves bankroll radical Islamism. They will cut separate deals with the “enemy” and do things like broker the Hamas-Fatah deal for a Palestinian coalition government. One must have no illusions and not become apologist for allies. But this was also true of the Cold War, wasn’t it?
There are some relatively more moderate regimes—Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon—that is a reality, and courageous liberal forces. There are governments which face extremist threats like Algeria and Iraq. Consider Tunisia, arguably the most progressive Arab state in social and educational terms yet ruled by a nasty dictatorship, though far less murderous than those on the other side. How about Egypt, a dictatorship that takes U.S. aid with one hand and promotes anti-American propaganda with the other?
So let’s not romanticize this into a “good” and “bad” guy’s situation. Again, no illusions. One can work the most with the better elements, do what is necessary with the more ambiguous figures, and struggle against the extremists. And let’s remember those latter forces are not going to be talked into moderation. Beyond ideology, they have interests that set them directly against the West and that is not going to change. This is a conflict, not a failure of communications.
Third, the central problem of the Middle East is the dictatorial regimes and dogmatic ideology of radical nationalism and Islamism. Rather than deal with their social problems, build good institutions, expand freedom, move toward democracy, set economic reforms, and so on, they blame all their problems on Zionism and imperialism. Demagogic appeals mobilize the masses behind them. The answer is not reform, they say, but struggle. The struggle never ends. And the resulting victims are said to create the need and justification for still more struggle.
This paradox, then, is that the dictatorships are the problems, breeding radicalism intentionally and also through the frustration created by their bad policies. Yet the West needs to work with many of them. A balance must be struck adjusted to every specific state and situation, all of which are different.
Fourth, a liberal, democratic Middle East must be the long-term goal. The democrats are on the right path, not only because they are friendlier to the West but since they are the only ones with real solutions. Yet the real danger of destabilizing societies and bringing in radical Islamist regimes is a real one, as the liberals themselves recognize. So these groups must be helped to survive and to flourish but this is a complex and long-term task.
Finally, a large element of policy must be public relations. Of course, the United States has to show Europeans and Arabs and domestic critics that it is trying to reconcile hostile forces, make peace, and so on. But public relations should never be confused with strategic policy, which means real concessions should not be given to generate good publicity.
FP: What do you think of the state of the war in Iraq?
Rubin: I was never a big fan of the whole idea of invading Iraq. One of the ideas I presented in 2003 was that President George W. Bush go to the Europeans and UN and say that he really wanted to invade Iraq so what would they give him not to do it. This especially related to keeping up the sanctions on Saddam Hussein. I can tell you from first-hand knowledge that contrary to mythology, virtually nobody in Israel wanted this war and did not view it as beneficial to Israel’s interests. At one point, cabinet ministers were so opposed that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered them to shut up so as not to undermine the U.S. ally.
In briefings, I warned that the United States had a limited time in Iraq and should get out as soon as possible. It is certainly arguable that the United States must help ensure a stable regime in Iraq but this is an endless task. Both victory and defeat are impossible in Iraq, since the United States can neither defeat or be defeated by the insurgency. My view is that once the Iraqi regime—which in large part means the vast majority of the Shia and Kurds—has a strong communal basis. It will fight to preserve itself and not lose. But there is no good purpose for a continued U.S. presence, protecting an ultimately ungrateful regime.
The irony here is that the Bush administration could not depend on the Middle East experts, most of whom are at best indifferent to U.S. interests or the welfare of the region’s peoples. But it then generated its own very poor expertise which did not understand how the region worked either. Or to put it another way, I agree that dictatorship is the problem and democracy is the solution in theory, Practice is something else entirely.
The whole debate on the war is conducted by two bitterly contentious sides both of which are not properly framing the issues. A lot of the anti-war side is also repugnant, hostile to America, and basically repeating Arab nationalist and even Islamist arguments. And yet that does not make the advocates of the war—much less those who have conducted it so badly—right either.
My concern is that the Iraq affair has undermined the very important lessons deriving from Saddam’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait; the rejection of the peace process by Iran and Syria; the September 11 attacks; and the failures of the dictatorial regimes. There are many differences between Iraq and Vietnam, but one parallel is how both discredited important, correct ideas and policies. In Vietnam, these included the justice of the Free World’s cause, the need to fight the Cold War, tough strategic thinking, the need to be willing to use force when necessary, and anti-Communism.
But, of course, that is why the Middle East is so complicated. When I say that I was against the war, I also have to think about the Iraqis themselves who, as much as they were suffering now, were treated so terribly under Saddam Hussein.
One of the most brilliant French political analysts said to me at the war’s start that when mass graves were uncovered and people discovered how French policy had been a defender and apologist for such a brutal dictatorship, they would rebel against their government’s policy.
Generally, the international effect was to make hatred of Bush and America the main issue; make people conclude that force never works; and discredit Arab liberals who backed the war.
Often, the history of the Middle East does seem one tragedy after another. Still, I remain optimistic in the Middle East rather than in the American sense of the word. American optimism is to believe in peace, prosperity, and people liking each other. Middle Eastern optimism is that the extremists will lose and things won’t get much worse.
FP: Thanks for being with us.
Rubin: As always, thanks.

Text of Security Council Resolution 1757
Friday, June 01, 2007
"The Security Council,
"Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1595 (2005) of 7 April 2005, 1636 (2005) of 31 October 2005, 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005, 1664 (2006) of 29 March 2006 and 1748 (2007) of 27 March 2007,
"Reaffirming its strongest condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombings as well as other attacks in Lebanon since October 2004,
"Reiterating its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon,
"Recalling the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of 13 December 2005 (S/2005/783) requesting inter alia the establishment of a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are found responsible for this terrorist crime, and the request by this Council for the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Lebanon aimed at establishing such a Tribunal based on the highest international standards of criminal justice,
"Recalling further the report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon on 15 November 2006 (S/2006/893) reporting on the conclusion of negotiations and consultations that took place between January 2006 and September 2006 at United Nations Headquarters in New York, The Hague, and Beirut between the Legal Counsel of the United Nations and authorized representatives of the Government of Lebanon, and the letter of its President to the Secretary-General of 21 November 2006 (S/2006/911) reporting that the Members of the Security Council welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations and that they were satisfied with the Agreement annexed to the Report,
"Recalling that, as set out in its letter of 21 November 2006, should voluntary contributions be insufficient for the Tribunal to implement its mandate, the Secretary-General and the Security Council shall explore alternate means of financing the Tribunal,
"Recalling also that the Agreement between the United Nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon was signed by the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations respectively on 23 January and 6 February 2007,
"Referring to the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/2007/281), which recalled that the parliamentary majority has expressed its support for the Tribunal, and asked that his request that the Special Tribunal be put into effect be presented to the Council as a matter of urgency,
"Mindful of the demand of the Lebanese people that all those responsible for the terrorist bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others be identified and brought to justice,
"Commending the Secretary-General for his continuing efforts to proceed, together with the Government of Lebanon, with the final steps for the conclusion of the Agreement as requested in the letter of its President dated 21 November 2006 and referring in this regard to the briefing by the Legal Counsel on 2 May 2007, in which he noted that the establishment of the Tribunal through the Constitutional process is facing serious obstacles, but noting also that all parties concerned reaffirmed their agreement in principle to the establishment of the Tribunal,
"Commending also the recent efforts of parties in the region to overcome these obstacles,
"Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding all those involved in the terrorist attack accountable and reaffirming its determination to support Lebanon in its efforts to bring to justice perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of this and other assassinations,
"Reaffirming its determination that this terrorist act and its implications constitute a threat to international peace and security,
"1. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that:
(a) The provisions of the annexed document, including its attachment, on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon shall enter into force on 10 June 2007, unless the Government of Lebanon has provided notification under Article 19 (1) of the annexed document before that date;
(b) If the Secretary-General reports that the Headquarters Agreement has not been concluded as envisioned under Article 8 of the annexed document, the location of the seat of the Tribunal shall be determined in consultation with the Government of Lebanon and be subject to the conclusion of a Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the State that hosts the Tribunal;
(c) If the Secretary-General reports that contributions from the Government of Lebanon are not sufficient to bear the expenses described in Article 5 (b) of the annexed document, he may accept or use voluntary contributions from States to cover any shortfall;
"2. Notes that, pursuant to Article 19 (2) of the annexed document, the Special Tribunal shall commence functioning on a date to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, taking into account the progress of the work of the International Independent Investigation Commission;
"3. Requests the Secretary-General, in coordination, when appropriate, with the Government of Lebanon, to undertake the steps and measures necessary to establish the Special Tribunal in a timely manner and to report to the Council within 90 days and thereafter periodically on the implementation of this resolution;
"4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter."