1.         The present report details progress made in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1595. In that resolution, adopted on 7 April 2005, the Security Council, condemning the 14 February 2005 terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and twenty two others, reiterating its call for the strict respect of Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity, and noting the conclusions reached by an earlier fact-finding mission (S/2005/203), decided to establish an international independent investigation Commission (hereafter called UNIIIC or the Commission) to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, in order to, among other things, help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.

2.         Prior to the adoption of resolution 1595, the Security Council had examined the report of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon on the same subject, submitted on 24 March 2005. The report reflected the outcome of a three-week enquiry, including a set of recommendations.  The fact-finding mission was of the opinion that, since the credibility of the Lebanese authorities conducting the investigation was questioned, an international independent investigation should be set up to establish the truth. For this purpose, a team with executive authority needed to be created, covering all the fields of expertise needed for such an investigation. Notwithstanding the limited time and manpower the fact finding mission was granted, its conclusions and recommendations have been of considerable value to the Commission.

3.         In a letter dated 29 March 2005 (S/2005/208), the Government of Lebanon expressed its approval of the Security Council’s decision to establish an international commission of inquiry as well as its readiness to cooperate with the commission within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and of its legal system.

4.         Following the adoption of resolution 1595, intensive consultations took place regarding the establishment of UNIIIC, its staffing and its logistical support. On 26 May 2005, a small advance team headed by Commissioner Detlev Mehlis arrived in Beirut. Mindful of the urgency of the matter, from a temporary headquarters, the team endeavored to create the support platform for its future work.

5.         On 13 June 2005, after extensive discussions with the Lebanese judicial authorities, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the Government of Lebanon and the Commission. The MOU detailed the modalities of cooperation between the two parties. Of particular importance to the Commission was the agreement that “the Government of Lebanon shall guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in the conduct of its investigation, and is provided with all necessary assistance to fulfill its mandate.”  The Commission was to determine its own procedures, collect evidence, both documentary and physical, meet and interview any civilians or/and officials it deemed necessary and have unrestricted access to all premises throughout the Lebanese territory, taking into account Lebanese law and judicial procedures. The Lebanese authorities, for their part, were to assist the Commission in its work by providing all documentary and material evidence in their possession and by locating witnesses as requested by the Commission.

6.         On 16 June 2005, the Secretary-General declared the Commission operational. On 17 June 2005, a press conference was held by the Commissioner to solicit publicly the assistance of the Lebanese authorities and to invite the Lebanese people to help the Commission by relaying any information which might be of interest to the investigation. Two hotlines were set up for this purpose, operated by the Lebanese authorities.

7.         Shortly after the signing of the MOU, the Lebanese authorities transmitted to the Commission an 8000 page case docket containing all the information and evidence collected since 14 February 2005.  Henceforth, the Commission conducted a thorough criminal and judicial investigation  in close cooperation with the relevant Lebanese judicial (State General Prosecutor of the Republic of Lebanon) and police (Internal Security Forces) authorities, in order to avoid duplication, overlapping or contradictory measures.

8.         The Commission established close links with the Lebanese security and judicial authorities. Regular discussions were held, particularly with the judicial authorities, to exchange updated information and files, share results and plan for the emerging phases of the investigation.  Most of the witnesses interviewed by the Commission were summoned through the Lebanese judicial and security authorities.  A case in point was the 30 August 2005 operation, in which Lebanese security forces and UNIIIC investigators closely coordinated the house raid and search of former senior security officials, prior to their transfer under close escort to the Commission’s Main Operating Base (MOB) for interviewing.   

9.         The Lebanese authorities were of great assistance in establishing the MOB, as well as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for the work of the Commission.  Lebanese security teams (police and military) worked hand in hand with the Commission’s security team to ensure the safety and security of the staff and premises.

10.       Although resolution 1595 gave the Commission executive authority, the Commission to a large extent was supported by the Lebanese judicial and security authorities during search and raid operations. Moreover, although the Commission was qualified to make proposals to the Lebanese authorities regarding the arrest of persons allegedly involved in the assassination, it remained the autonomous decision of the Lebanese authorities to proceed with such actions.

11.       From a two-track investigation, one Lebanese, one United Nations, has emerged a complementary and unified investigation carried forward in tandem by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese authorities have steadily shown the capacity to take increasing responsibility in pursuing the case. This was demonstrated by the fact that they took the initiative of arresting suspects, organizing raids and searches. 

12.       Given a deep mistrust that has prevailed among the Lebanese people towards their security and judicial authorities, UNIIIC has become a source of great expectation and hope for change, as well as an “interface” between the Lebanese people and their authorities. The two press conferences, particularly the first one, in addition to the interview of the first suspect, and the arrest of the former senior security officials at the Commission’s suggestion, had a catalytic effect. All of this was proof that in the eyes of the Commission, no one was above the law. This boosted Lebanese confidence. More witnesses came forward as the work of the Commission progressed. However, a number of people insisted that their identity not be disclosed to the Lebanese authorities.

13.       There are other points worth highlighting.  First, a number of witnesses were fearful that they would be harmed if it were known publicly that they were cooperating with the Commission.  For this reason, the Commission took great care to ensure that witness interviews were conducted in a confidential manner.  Because the Commission credits the concern that these individuals have for their safety, this report will not reveal the identity of those interviewed.  Second, as is true in any investigation, witnesses often provide information beyond the scope of the investigation being conducted.  The Commission has and will continue to forward to Lebanese authorities all information related to any criminal matter beyond the scope of the Commission’s investigation.  Finally, the Commission interviewed people whose agenda was to point the Commission not in the direction to where the evidence would lead it, but in the direction the particular individual(s) wanted the Commission to go.  The Commission dealt with these individuals and situations by remaining focused on its single mission – to follow the evidence wherever it might lead and not to follow the agenda of any particular person or entity.

14.       Lebanese public opinion reflects a widespread view that, once UNIIIC has delivered its report and closed down, Lebanon will be “left alone”. A prevailing fear is that, in the aftermath of the completion of UNIIIC’s work, and sooner rather than later, the Syrian security and intelligence services will be back, orchestrating a “revenge campaign” in a society which remains “infiltrated” by pro-Syrian elements. Recent bombings, assassinations, and assassination attempts have been carried out with impunity; deliberate rumors and prophetic media analyses have sustained this state of mind and have deterred potential witnesses from contacting UNIIIC.

15.       Notwithstanding fears and reluctance to volunteer information as the Commission’s completion of its work seemed imminent (25 October), it is fair to say that the Lebanese people in general terms have been eager to come forward to help the Commission carry out its work.

16.       The Commission could not operate in a media vacuum, particularly in Lebanon.  It has been the Commission’s steadfast policy not to be drawn directly into a dialogue in the Lebanese media, avoiding any escalation and staying above any challenging or provocative statements. Both press conferences were aimed at countering such speculation and clarifying the status of the investigation. Inevitably, their effect was short-lived.

17.       To enhance transparency and broader cooperation, working with the judicial authorities entailed keeping the highest political authorities abreast of developments in the investigation, to the extent that such action did not call into question the independent nature of the Commission nor have a direct impact on the course of the investigation per se.  

18.       During the course of its investigation, the Commission had to face major logistical challenges. In this regard, the extensive support and assistance of sister organizations of the United Nations system and Interpol were invaluable in the daily work of the Commission.

19.       The international community, for its part, was always prompt, when asked, in coming forward with expertise. This assistance greatly facilitated the work of the Commission and gave added value to its work. However, although resolution 1595 called on all States to provide the Commission with any relevant information pertaining to the Hariri case, it is to be regretted that no Member State relayed useable information to the Commission.  A number of contacts led to mere exchanges of views and/or statements of facts. It is the Commission’s reading of the resolution that the pertinent information envisaged by the Security Council would have included among other things, intelligence information that could have been submitted without any prior request from the Commission.

20.       Despite the human, technical and financial capacities mobilized for the purpose of the investigation, and although considerable progress has been made and significant results achieved in the time allotted, the investigation of such a terrorist act with multi-faceted international dimensions and their ramifications normally needs months (if not years) to be completed so as to be able to establish firm ground for a potential trial of any accused individuals. It is of the utmost importance to continue to pursue the trail both within and outside Lebanon. The Commission’s work is only part of a broader process. Even as this report is being written a significant arrest was made just a few days ago; witness interviews are continuing and complex evidence continues to be reviewed.

21.       The Commission has established facts and identified suspects on the basis of evidence gathered or available to it. The Commission has checked and examined this evidence to the best of its knowledge. Until the investigation is completed, all new leads and evidence are fully analyzed, and an independent and impartial prosecution mechanism is set up, one cannot know the complete story of what happened, how it happened and who is responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the murder of 22 other innocent people. Therefore, the presumption of innocence stands.

22.       In producing this report the Commission has endeavored to ensure that nothing it does or says undermines the ongoing criminal investigation and any trials that may follow. The Commission, at this juncture cannot disclose all the detailed elements and facts it has in its possession, beyond sharing them with the Lebanese authorities. The Commission has tried to set forth the facts and to present the analysis of those facts in a way that most accurately explains what happened, how it happened and who is responsible.

II.      BACKGROUND

23.       Syria has long had a powerful influence in Lebanon.  During the Ottoman Empire, the area that became Lebanon was part of an overall administrative territory governed from Damascus.  When the countries were established in the aftermath of the First World War, Lebanon was created from what many Arab nationalists considered to be rightfully part of Syria.  Indeed, since the countries became independent, they have never had formal diplomatic relations. 

24.       Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by Lebanese President Suleiman Franjieh in May 1976 in the early stages of the latter’s civil war. In the Taif Agreement, reached among members of the Lebanese parliament, that ended the civil war in 1989, inter alia, Lebanon thanked Syria for its assistance in deploying its forces in the Lebanon.  A provision of the agreement called for Lebanon and Syria to determine jointly the future redeployment of those forces.  A later agreement reached between the two countries in May of 1991 regarding cooperation, restated that provision.  Syrian forces withdrew in May 2005 in compliance with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). 

Relations between Mr. Hariri and Syria

25.       The Commission’s investigation has confirmed what many in Lebanon have long asserted, that senior Syrian intelligence officials had a powerful day-to-day and overall strategic influence on the governance of Lebanon.  The apparent growing conflict between Mr. Hariri and senior Syrian officials, including Syrian President Bashar Assad, was a central aspect of the information provided to the Commission through interviews and documents.  A meeting in Damascus between Mr. Hariri and President Assad on 26 August 2004 appeared to bring the conflict to a head.  In that meeting, which allegedly lasted for 10-15 minutes, President Assad informed Mr. Hariri, who was then Prime Minister, that President Assad intended that Lebanon would extend the term in office of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr. Hariri opposed. 

26.       Lebanese and Syrian witnesses, and the transcript of a meeting between Mr. Hariri and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moallem, provided the Commission with sharply differing versions of what was said in that meeting.  A number of Lebanese witnesses – including then former ministers Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Areedi, Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Joumblat, parliament member Bassem Sabaa, and Mr. Hariri’s son, Saad – reported that Mr. Hariri told them that President Assad brusquely informed him of the decision to extend President Lahoud’s term and threatened to “break Lebanon over your [Mr. Hariri’s] head and Walid Jumblat’s” if Mr. Hariri (and presumably Mr. Jumblat) did not agree to support the extension of President Lahoud’s term.  Syrian officials characterized the meeting differently.  Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa and General  Ghazali , head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, described the meeting in positive terms.   General Ghazali told the Commission that Mr. Hariri told him that President Assad referred to Mr. Hariri as a “friend,” and described a cordial, respectful meeting in which President Assad consulted Mr. Hariri on the matter.

27.       Following are excerpts of interviews conducted by the Commission regarding the 26 August 2005 meeting, relevant parts of a letter to the Commission from Mr. Sharaa, and a portion of the transcript of a taped conversation between Mr. Hariri and Mr. Al-Moallem:

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, letter to the Commission of  17 August 2005:

“A meeting took place between President Bashar Assad and late Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in Damascus on August 26^th, 2004 within the framework of the ongoing political consultation between the Syrian and Lebanese leaders. (…) A general review was made of the local and regional developments, including the possible extension of the mandate of Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon, in view of the troubled regional conditions and based on the mutual interest in maintaining stability in Lebanon. Mr. Al-Hariri requested that in case a consensus regarding the mandate extension is reached in the Council of Ministers, Syria should make endeavors to get President Lahoud to better

cooperate in the forthcoming period. The President requested Mr. Hariri to consult with his group and with whom he deems suitable and to take the appropriate position.”

Rustum Ghazali, undated written statement, submitted to the Commission by letter of 17 August 2005:

“I had two meetings at Anjar on that date (26 August 2004) with Prime Minister Hariri. The first was in the morning of August 26^th, 2004, on his way to Damascus to meet President Bashar Assad in Damascus, and the second was on his return trip from Damascus to Beirut after meeting with President Bashar Assad in Damascus. The latter meeting was also held in our office at Anjar.”

(…)

“We discussed his meeting with President Bashar Assad. He (Hariri) looked relaxed. Prime Minister Hariri said that his meeting with President Bashar Assad was cordial and brief. According to Prime Minister Hariri, President Assad told him: Abu Bahaa, we in Syria have always been dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Today, I am also dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Under the difficult circumstances currently witnessed by this region, with Lebanon in the midst, we are of the view that it is in the interest of Lebanon to maintain the continuity of the regime by extending the term of office of President Lahoud. As a friend, we would like you to clarify your position regarding this matter. We are in no hurry to know the answer, and you may wish to think about it at your convenience.”

Marwan Hamadeh, witness statement of 27 June 2005:

“On Wednesday 24 or 25 August, Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblat and Mr. Berri were all invited to go to Damascus in order to be informed about the decision to extend Mr. Lahoud’s mandate. Mr. Jumblat informed R. Ghazali that he would need to discuss it with President Assad. R. Ghazali insisted that the answer should be “yes” before setting up any appointment. He actually advised Mr. Jumblat to respond positively because this was a strategic matter for President Assad. Mr. Jumblat’s answer was negative. One hour later, Mr. Jumblat called me and told me that the Syrian Intelligence had cancelled his appointment.

In the evening, Mr. Jumblat and myself went to visit Mr. Hariri. He said that R. Ghazali insisted that as long as his answer was not positive, he would not confirm his appointment either. He was asked to go to Damascus, stay in his house (…) until further notice. The following day, he was called in for a short meeting.”

(…)

“The day Mr. Hariri met with President Assad, I was meeting at Mr. Jumblat’s residence in Beirut, with Bassem Sabaa and Ghazi Areedi. We saw that Mr. Hariri’s motorcade was back by 1 PM which meant that the meeting in Damascus was pretty short. We saw Mr. Hariri who looked tired. He was sweating. He told the four of us that President Lahoud was to be reelected or “he will have to pay a high price”. (…)He reported President Assad saying to him: I will break Lebanon on your head and Jumblat’s head.”

Ghazi Areedi, witness statement of 1 July 2005:

“Mr. Hariri reported to us that President Assad told him: “If Jacques Chirac puts me out of Lebanon, I will consider different options and will let you know. Either you are with us or against us. My choice is Emile Lahoud for President. I will make sure he is the President. I will wait for your answer. (…) Tell Walid Jumblat that if he has Druze people in Lebanon, I also have a Druze community in Syria. I am ready to do anything.”

Walid Joumblatt, witness statement of 28 June 2005:

“According to Mr. Hariri, Assad told him:”Lahoud is me. I want to renew his mandate. (…) If Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon. (…) During his visit to my house, Mr. Hariri was extremely tense and disappointed. He was in a very bad position.”

Jubran Tueni, witness statement of 25 June 2005:

“Later on, in 2004, when the issue of President Lahoud’s extension came up, Mr. Hariri also told me, that President Assad had threatened him directly and told him, that voting against the extension would be considered as being directed against Syria. According to Mr. Hariri, President Assad added that in that case they, the Syrians, would “blow him up” and any of his family members and that they would find them anywhere in the world.”

Bassem Sabaa, witness statement of 30 June 2005:

“When Mr. Hariri came back from his meeting with President Assad, I met him at Walid Jumblat’s house.”

(…)

“He reported to us President Assad’s words who has put it bluntly: “I am personally interested in this matter. It is not about Emile Lahoud but about Bashar Assad”.

We asked him if he had had a chance to discuss the matter with President Assad. He said that President Assad told him that the matter was not open for discussion, that it was bound to happen or else I will break Lebanon”(…). He was extremely aggravated. He told me that for the sake of Lebanon and its interests, he must think about what he will do, that we are dealing with a group of lunatics who could do anything.”  

Saad Hariri, witness statement of 9 July 2005:

“I discussed with my father, the late Rafik Hariri, the extension of President Lahoud’s term. He told me that President Bashar Assad threatened him telling him: “This is what I want. If you think that President Chirac and you are going to run Lebanon, you are mistaken. It is not going to happen. President Lahoud is me. Whatever I tell him, he follows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will break Lebanon over your head and Walid Jumblat’s. (…) So, you either do as you are told or we will get you and your family wherever you are.”

Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with Walid Al-Moallem on 1 February 2005:

“In connection with the extension episode, he (President Assad) sent for me and met me for 10 to 15 minutes.”

(…)

“He sent for me and told me: “ You always say that you are with Syria. Now the time has come for you to prove whether you meant what you said or otherwise.” (…) He did not ask my opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did not address me as Prime Minister or as Rafik or anything of that kind. He just said: “I have decided.” I was totally flustered, at a loss. That was the worst day of my life.”

(…)

“He did not tell me that he wished to extend Lahoud’s mandate. All he said was “I  have decided to do this, don’t answer me, think and come back to me.””

(…)

“I was not treated as a friend or an acquaintance. No. I was asked: “Are you with us or against us?” That was it. When I finished my meeting with him, I swear to you, my body guard looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”

28.       In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri complained that he believed that President Assad was being deliberately misinformed by the Syrian security services and Mr. Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri.  Translated excerpts of the meeting include the following statements by Mr. Hariri:

• “I cannot live under a security regime that is specialized in interfering with Hariri and spreading disinformation about Rafik Hariri and writing reports to Bashar Assad.”
• “But Lebanon will never be ruled from Syria.  This will no longer happen.”

29.       During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr. Hariri that “we and the [security] services here have put you into a corner.”  He continued, “Please do not take things lightly.”

30.       The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr. Al-Moallem’s witness interview of 20 September 2005 in which he falsely described the 1 February meeting as “friendly and constructive” and avoided giving direct answers to the questions put to him.

Syrian cooperation with the Commission

31.       The information set forth above, and the evidence collected by the Commission as described in the section below entitled Planning of the Assassination, point to the possibility that Syrian officials were involved in the assassination of Mr. Hariri.  When the Commission attempted to get the cooperation of the Syrian Government in pursuing these lines of the investigation, the Commission was met with cooperation in form, not substance.  

32.       The initial contact between the Commission and the Syrian authorities took place on 11 June 2005 when the Commissioner sent a letter to the Syrian Foreign Minister, requesting a meeting with representatives of the Syrian government.  Mr. Sharaa replied on 11 July, pledging the Syrian Government’s support for the investigation in general terms.  On 19 July, the Commission asked to interview several witnesses including the President of the Syrian Arab Republic.  On 26 August, at the request of the Syrian government, a meeting took place between the Commissioner and a representative of the Syrian Foreign Ministry, in Geneva, Switzerland.  At that meeting, the Commissioner was given a letter containing written statements of four witnesses.  It was indicated that President Assad would not be available for any interview.  The Commissioner repeated his request for direct witness interviews and was told that the request was under consideration but that President Assad would not be available to be interviewed.

33.       On 30 August the Commission sent another request to the Syrian Foreign Minister, requesting interviews of several additional witnesses and suspects in Syria.  The letter requested the support of the Syrian government to search the premises of the suspects.  On 7 September Foreign Minister Sharaa informed the Commission in writing that while the Commission’s evidence was based on false testimony, his Government agreed that the persons listed in the Commission’s requests of 19 July and 30 August, except for President Assad, could be interviewed.

34.       On 12 September details of the upcoming interviews were discussed between the Commission and a representative of the Syrian Foreign Ministry. The Commission expressed its wish that the interviews should be held in a third country, neither Lebanon nor Syria, which was refused. The Syrian authorities insisted that the interviews take place in Syria with the participation of Syrian officials.  The interviews took place between 20 and 23 September.  Each interview was conducted in the presence of the Legal Advisor to the Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry or another representative of the Foreign Ministry, one interpreter, two note takers, and at times, an additional person whose affiliation was not identified. At the end of the interview process, it was apparent that the interviewees had given uniform answers to questions.  Many of those answers were contradicted by the weight of evidence collected by the UNIIIC from a variety of other sources. The Commission has not had the opportunity to follow up on these interviews or pursue its investigation regarding a possible Syrian involvement in the crime.

35.       The Commission has concluded that the Government of Syria’s lack of substantive cooperation with the Commission has impeded the investigation and made it difficult to follow leads established by the evidence collected from a variety of sources.  If the investigation is to be completed, it is essential that the Government of Syria fully cooperate with the investigating authorities, including by allowing for interviews to be held outside Syria and for interviewees not to be accompanied by Syrian officials.

III.  THE CRIME

36 On  14 February 2005 at approximately 1250 hrs, the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri left the Nejmeh Square in Beirut going back to the Kuraytem Palace. He traveled in a motorcade comprising of 6 cars, together with his security detail and Member of Parliament, Bassel Fleyhan.

37.When the motorcade passed the St. George Hotel at Minae Al-Hosn Street a huge explosion occurred and resulted in the death of Mr. Hariri and others.

38.Shortly after the blast, the Director of Al-Jazeera TV in Beirut received a telephone call from a man who stated that the Nasra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria claimed responsibility for the assassination of Mr. Hariri.  This message was broadcast shortly thereafter.

IV.     THE LEBANESE INVESTIGATION

Initial Measures  

39. To resolve a crime of this magnitude requires strong management capacity, clear roles, coordination and access to sufficient competency, manpower, equipment and means of assistance. The following brief outline reviews measures undertaken by the Lebanese authorities in the period from the execution of the crime until UNIIIC was established.

Investigative Judge

40.       Primary Military Investigative Judge Rasheed Mezher was responsible for the crime investigation during the period from 14 to 21 February 2005.  On the latter date, a decision was taken by the Lebanese Government that the crime was a terrorist act targeting the Republic, which led to the case being transferred to a new competent court of jurisdiction, the highest Criminal Court in Lebanon, the Justice Council. A consequence of this decision was that a new investigative judge was appointed to lead the investigation, Judge Michel Abou Arraj, the representative of the Prosecutor General’s Office.

41.       Judge Mezher arrived at the crime scene less than an hour after the blast, accompanied by Judge Jean Fahd from the Prosecutor General’s Office.  He has described the situation at the crime scene as a chaos. His first decisions were to appoint the Assistant Chief of Beirut Police,  General Naji Mulaeb, as the person in charge of the scene and to assign him  the task of removing all dead bodies and wounded people from the scene, extinguish fires and, thereafter,  to withdraw all people from the scene and close it off ^{(witness statement)}.

42.       At 1700 hrs, Judge Mezher summoned a meeting with all the involved bodies, both from the Internal Security Forces and the Military, comprising in total 10 officers.  During the meeting Judge Mezher distributed tasks for the different bodies and gave further directions for the course of the investigation ^{(witness statement)}.

43.       The representatives from the Internal Security Forces during the meeting were: General Aouar as the acting Commander of the Judicial Police and Head of the Forensic Unit, General Mulaeb as acting Commander of the Beirut Police Force, General Salah Eid as the responsible person for the blast site and Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman in the capacity of the Head of the Information Division ^{(witness statement)}.

44.       After the meeting, at approximately 1900 hrs, Judge Mezher returned to the crime scene for a second time.  He was not satisfied with his observations at the crime scene, but hoped it should be better the next day since responsibilities had been distributed at the earlier meeting. The shortcomings consisted mainly of lack of equipment, means of assistance and experience. In addition, there was a lack of communication between the various bodies involved, the directions from the Investigative Judge were not followed and he did not receive proper feed-back concerning the progress in the investigation ^{(witness statement)}.

45.       During the period of his functions as Investigative Judge, Judge Mezher summoned approximately 10 people to his office for interrogations, comprising staff from the St. George Hotel, Mr. Hariri’s close protection officers, the father and mother of  Mr. Abu Adass and some eyewitnesses. He also, in consultation with Judge Jean Fahd, took the decision to request assistance from Switzerland regarding a forensic expert team to assist the Lebanese authorities in the investigation.  When Judge Mezher left the function of Investigative Judge, 21 February 2005, no sustainable results had been achieved in the investigation.

46.       The file was handed over to the new Investigative Judge, Judge Abou Arraj.  Judge Abou Arraj was Investigative Judge for the investigation from 22 February to 23 March 2005. He was appointed by First Judge Tanios Khoury, at the Supreme Council, and the file was registered at Abou Arraj’s office on 22 February 2005 ^{(witness statement)}.  His first opinions when reviewing the file, were that the crime had been a terrorist attack that would require a long period of time and extensive investigative measures to be undertaken, in addition to the application of substantial resources.  In his opinion, all the initial investigative measures had been performed in a professional and accurate way.  He was surprised at the removal of the motorcade cars.  He did not meet with Judge Mezher, but telephoned him whenever clarifications were needed ^{(witness statement)}.

47.       During the period of Judge Abou Arraj’s tenure as the Investigative Judge, the following measures were undertaken ^{(compiled notes case file)}.

48.       On 23 March 2005, Judge Abou Arraj stepped down from the post of Investigative Judge. The reason for this was the tense political atmosphere at this particular time: a lot of mistrust was being directed towards the Lebanese judiciary and criticism being leveled  at the manner of the investigation.  In addition, while in charge of the Hariri investigation, he also had to discharge his normal functions. The case was contaminated with political issues and during demonstrations in Beirut on 14 March 2005, he heard people mentioning his name in a critical manner  ^{(witness statement)}.

49.       At the time he left the post of Investigative Judge, the only achievement in the investigation was the  Mr. Abu Adass lead, despite attempts to focus on the modus operandi of the explosion and to get all experts involved to come up with one consensus opinion ^{(witness statement)}.

50.       Judge Abou Arraj was replaced by Investigative Judge Elias Eid, who as of October 2005, is still in charge of the investigation.

Internal Security Forces

51.       On 14 February 2005, General Ali Al-Hajj was the Head of the Internal Security Forces (ISF).  He was promoted to the post in November 2004, allegedly appointed by the Syrians, he stepped down from the post during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri.  According to his statement, he was at his office when he was alerted about the blast. He immediately went to the crime scene by car. During the ride he called General Shahid Al-Khoury, Chief of the Services and Operations Division within ISF, who told him that it was a huge blast.  General Al-Hajj then ordered Mr. Khoury to send all responsible units to the scene.  The units comprised the Forensic Unit under the command of General Hisham Aouar, the Explosives Unit under the command of General Abdel-Badie Al-Soussi and the Investigation Unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman. This was his only responsibility, to provide sufficient resources. After the arrival of the Investigative Judge, all ISF staff was under the command of the Judge and  General Ali Al-Hajj could not interfere in the investigation ^{(witness statement)}.

52.       In his opinion, the problems at the scene were related to the presence of too many different agencies, such as the Army, ISF, State Security and Public Security. 

53.       Later that afternoon,  General Al-Hajj joined a meeting with the Higher Defence Council at the Presidential Palace. The meeting was chaired by the President. Other participants were the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Economy, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Public works, the Governor of Beirut and Commanders from the various security agencies.  The meeting discussed the subject matter of the crime, its referral to the Judicial Council, and the ramifications of the crime.

54.       After the meeting  General Al-Hajj returned to his office: soon thereafter the Al-Jazeera TV channel broadcast a videotape, where Ahmad Abu Adass claimed responsibility for the blast and the killing of Mr. Hariri. From that time all available ISF resources, except those occupied with the crime scene work, were focused on the Abu Adass track.

Military Intelligence

55.       On 14 February 2005, General Raymond Azar was the Head of Military Intelligence. He was promoted to the post in December 1998 and stepped down during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his statement, he was alerted about the blast by Colonel Mohamed Fehmi, Head of the Military Security Branch.  He did not go to the crime scene, but followed the case in detail from his office, together with Colonel Albert Karam, the Chief of Beirut Intelligence Branch. He informed President Lahoud and General Ghazali about the blast at the time of its occurrence ^{(witness statement)}.

56.       Personnel from Military Intelligence (mainly specialists in the field of explosives) visited the crime scene and conducted their part of the examination. They confirmed that the type of explosives used were TNT and the estimated amount to be some 300 kilograms. All concrete evidence found on the site was handed over later to the ISF (General Hisham Aouar) and to  General Azar’s knowledge there were some metal fragments and a gun. His opinion was that basically ISF, but also the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Investigative Judge, had the overall responsibility for the crime investigation.

57.       In the afternoon of 14 February 2005,  General Azar attended the meeting at the Higher Defence Council.  At the meeting, a presentation was made about the assassination of Mr. Hariri, with all the details that were available at that time. Each participant presented his own point of view.

58.       At a later stage, his Directorate was assigned to focus on three elements:

• The videotape of Ahmad Abu Adass
• The cellular communications that took place in the area of the explosion
• The type and amount of explosives used.

Sûreté Générale

59.       On 14 February 2005, Brigadier General Jamil Al-Sayyed was the Head of the Sûreté Générale. He was promoted to the post in December 1998 and stepped down during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his statement, he was at his office when he heard the blast, but thought that the noise was a result of Israeli air fighters passing through the sound barrier. Somewhere between 1315 and 1330 hrs, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Al-Assir informed him of the blast and that Mr. Hariri’s motorcade had been the target. He stayed at his office and no one from the Sûreté Générale was sent to the scene. He called the President, the Minister of the Interior and General Ghazali.

60.       Later that afternoon, General Al-Sayyed attended the meeting at the Higher Defence Council. The meeting was focused on the consequences in the near future on the ground. The suggestions were submitted to the Government, which had a meeting later the same evening.

61.       On Tuesday morning, 15 February 2005, he got a phone call from a journalist from Al-Jazeera who told him nobody had yet picked-up the Abu Adass videotape. The tape was brought to him 16 February 2005. He made a copy and sent the original to the Investigative Judge Abou Arraj.

Crime Scene Investigation

ISF Report

62.       As with any similar criminal case, prompt examination of the crime scene and its surroundings is of paramount importance for the outcome of the investigation. The officer in charge of the crime scene, General Naji Mulaeb of the ISF, arrived at the scene at 1305 hrs on 14 February 2005.  He has issued a report dated 3 March 2005, on the crime scene examination conducted by the Lebanese authorities (General Directorate of Internal Security Forces, Beirut Police Unit, Ref. No.: 95) stating the following: 

“On implementation of investigation order issued by the first investigating judge of the military court in Beirut regarding the investigations and anything that can throw light on the enquiry into the explosion which caused the death of former Prime Minister Hariri and others.

Record:  Investigation order issued by the first investigating judge of the military court in Beirut No23/2005 dated 14 February 2005.

Order from the General Department of Referrals No 207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.

On 14 February 2005 at about 1250 hours, an explosion took place in Beirut which the operations room reported as being close to the St. George Hotel.  All patrols were ordered to go to the scene.  I proceeded there and arrived within a few minutes.  Cars on both sides of the road in the vicinity were ablaze and there was a lot of smoke.  Civil defense, fire brigade and Red Cross vehicles hastened to the area and took action to put out the fire, gather the corpses and take the wounded to hospital.  The scene was chaotic, and security and military personnel were mixed with civilians, firemen and first aid personnel and civilians, newspaper journalists and the media were all eager to get to the scene.  I ordered all the officers and police officers and patrols to do everything necessary to maintain security corridors and to take the requisite measures to safeguard the scene of the crime and keep away onlookers and made the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat responsible for implementation.  

The preliminary indications are that the explosion took place in the motorcade of Prime Minister Hariri but the outcome is not yet know.

Specialists in gathering evidence and explosives experts began their work. 

In addition to political and security officers, there came to the scene a Government commissioner from the Military Court with some support staff; and Rasheed Mezher, the first investigating judge from the Military Court in Beirut, who orally delegated me, in my capacity as officer in charge of the police during the absence from 12 February 2005 of the Police Commander on a mission abroad, or whoever I should see fit, to undertake the investigations and anything that could throw light on that explosion and to duly inform him.  The oral authorization would be followed up in writing. 

As soon as the General Director of Internal Security arrived at the scene, I informed him of all the above.

In accordance with the above-mentioned oral delegation of authority, I ordered Major Salah Eid to undertake the necessary investigative procedures in his capacity as the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat, within the remit of which the explosion took place, and to keep me informed. 

The work of retrieving the corpses and taking the wounded to hospital continued, as did the work of personnel from the Central Office of Accidents and the explosive experts.  A complete sweep was made of the scene and the surroundings.  A team of engineers from the Lebanese Army came and took samples from the scene in order to carry out tests thereupon.  An army detachment carried out a search of the site and buildings and assisted in imposing a security cordon. 

In view of the urgency of the investigation, we sent telegram No. 2065 dated 14 February 2005 to the leadership of the regional police unit and to police unit commanders in which we asked that all the necessary investigations should be carried out within the remit of each unit with respect to the corpses that had been taken to the hospitals in each area, in order to permit their relatives to identify them and duly inform me, thereby enabling me to gain the approval of the relevant authorities for the return to their relatives of those corpses.  Depositions were to be taken from the wounded and a copy deposited in the file of the overall investigation, through the Al- Burj squad.

Further to our telegram No. 2077 dated 14 February 2005, sent to unit departments regarding the isolation of the scene of the crime and establishment of a security cordon around it, we ordered the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat to use whatever personnel were necessary to perform those tasks and to place metal barricades and yellow tape around the scene and, in coordination with the commander of the traffic secretariat, to ensure the flow of traffic.

Major Eid kept me informed of the progress of the investigation and its outcome, and I duly informed the first investigating judge from the Military Court.  The corpses were handed over to their relatives in accordance with legal principles.

On the instructions of the first investigating judge of the Military Court, and with the approval of the General Director of Internal Security Forces, the cars from the Hariri motorcade were taken to the Helou barracks, once they had been photographed in situ and a video recording had been made in the presence of the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat, the commander of the second Beirut traffic squad, the commander of the Al-Burj detachment and a squad of criminal investigators, and using the lights provided by the civil defense, in accordance with report No. 144/302 dated 14 February 2005.  They were deposited in the Helou barracks.   

In our telegram No. 2122 dated 15 February addressed to the commander of the emergency services, we requested that they should be safeguarded and that no-one should be allowed to touch them. 

At 1500 hours on 15 February 2005, Major Omar Makkawi, the commander of the Beirut police unit, reported and assumed his command.  He informed me of all the procedures that had been taken and all incidents that had occurred, and we followed up the process of the investigation being undertaken by Major Salah Eid.  We then duly informed the first investigating judge of the Military Court of the same.

Pursuant to warrant No. 2F206/dated 17 February 2005, the unit commander transferred to us the written delegation of authority issued by the first investigating judge of the Military Court  Ref 23/2005 dated 14 February 2005 concerning the explosion, which was transmitted to us for implementation by the General Directorate as No. 2SH207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.

Similarly, the unit command gave us, pursuant to warrant No. 206/1735 dated 18 February 2005, written authorization from that party Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an order to keep the cars from the Hariri motorcade inside the barracks, cover them with tents and place them under guard, which was done.

In accordance with warrant No. 2F206/1736 dated 18 February 2005, The first investigating judge of the Military Court have us written authorization Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an order to contact the Governor of Beirut, who should supply us with the names of those recently working at a workshop at the site of the explosion. The aforementioned authority was carried out by means of a document of 14 pages which is attached.

Pursuant to the first delegation of authority referred to above; on the basis of the order to the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat to carry out the investigation; and as a result of the first report, No. 302/143 dated 14 February 2005 and all the investigations arranged by the units in the police unit and the regional police unit, we hereby submit the following:

Table No. 1 has been prepared concerning the corpses that have been returned to their relatives.

Table No. 2 has been prepared concerning the persons injured by this explosion.

Table No. 3 contains the depositions that were made concerning the explosion.

A table has been prepared showing the measures that were taken: an examination of the scene of the crime; articles impounded; damaged cars; the loss of one person at the site of the explosion and the failure to find him. 

All those procedures have been verified in report No. 302/1 dated 14 February 2005”.

Swiss Forensic Report

63.       The Lebanese experts involved in the crime scene examination, representing a variety of different agencies, came up with different opinions on the findings and results of the examination. As a result, they were summoned to a meeting at the Military Court in the presence of the Prosecutor General ^{(witness statement)}. The meeting led to a request from the Lebanese authorities for foreign assistance in examining the crime scene, which was directed to the Government of Switzerland. A Swiss forensic expert team visited Lebanon in March 2005 and conducted a forensic investigation.  The team’s final report stated (excerpt):

“Our conclusions about an explosion above or under ground are based upon the following examinations:

• Interpretations based on dispersion of fragments, size and shape of fragments
• Interpretations based on size and shape of crater
• Ballistic interpretations
• Interpretations of damages on buildings (structure, glass)

After interpretation and analysis of the dispersion of fragments, we can’t give clear evidence whether there was an explosion above or under ground.  Our analysis and research concerning the shape and form of the crater also gives no clear evidence whether there was an explosion above or under ground.

On the other hand, the form and shape of the crater gives some information about the possible amount of the charge (above or under ground):