A Nasserist Tone and a Leninist Nuance
Hazem Saghieh Al-Hayat

Observers did not miss that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah's last speech gave the Arab issue the lion's share. Hezbollah's Secretary General borrowed the Nasserist language of the 1960s in agitating against regimes and rulers, although he also showed a Leninist nuance.

When Lenin led the Bolsheviks to power in 1917, he was aware that an 'agricultural, Asian and backward Russia' was not the right country for a socialist experiment that would last. However, what would make the impossible possible would be the outbreak of socialist revolutions in advanced industrialized countries, especially Germany . Only at that point, according to this scenario, did the European working class begin helping revolutionary conditions in Russia .

Nevertheless, the German revolution was defeated, and its charismatic leader, Rosa Luxembourg, was killed. Moreover, no revolution broke out in the rest of advanced Europe, because its working classes had been lured to 'become bourgeoisie.' Therefore, there was nothing left for the Russian experiment but to 'rot' in the East, shedding its internationalism for 'socialism in one country', symbolized by Stalin and his reign of terror.

In this sense, it would be possible to define the Leninist nuance in Nasrallah's Nasserist tone as follows: either the Arabs begin to move to topple their regimes in support of the 'godly victory' in Lebanon, and in an attempt to imitate it; or this victory will be exposed to decay.

However, such a gamble will not lead to results. This assessment is not only due to the fact that the elements of the nation states in the Arab World can now compete with those of chaos (though they may not necessarily win). Likewise, this assessment is not only attributable to the fact that the current Arab anger is such that can be at once blown away and made use of by 'al-Jazeera'. In addition, there are others that radical forces in the Arab Mashreq do not want to see. Lebanon, small, weak and lacking consensus over its fundamental choices, is not like Egypt , which is big, strong and immeasurably apt to reach a larger consensus. Furthermore, what applies to Lebanon also applies to Syria, which, in turn, does not have the same characteristics as Egypt. As for Iran, many sensitivities would be aroused by its role in an environment that is supposed to be united in the face of a supposedly common enemy. With all these considerations in mind, we need not mention the fact that Nasserism was deeply connected with the Soviet influence during the Cold War, and that the Soviet Union, as well as the Cold war itself, has simply become history.

These assessments are not meant to imply that the current 'official' Arab situation is exemplary. Obviously, what is, and what will always be needed is that the Arab governments become more powerful in dealing with the US and, also, Iran, so that they can exert pressure for a just solution to the Middle East crisis. However, in order for the Arab governments to become so, it is necessary that stability and trust become stronger within the Arab world itself. Only then, a good deal of initiative-taking and positive dynamism can replace the current negative 'moderation' that can hardly keep up with developments of which the Arabs are not the author. On the other hand, the current radical attitude, embodied by Hezbollah and its allies, simply obstructs this path, makes it more complicated, and makes dormant fears greater than self-confidence.

Between these polarities, there is more and more degeneration. Countries and societies, starting with Lebanon, are menaced by what is taking place which is the caricature of the Nasserist tone and the Leninist nuance.