Lebanon and the Logic of Fighting
Abdullah Iskandar
 Al-Hayat - 28/01/07//

Lebanon has undergone a dangerous week that included all elements of civil strife. Many people considered it the beginning of another civil war: essential political disagreements, youth forced to the streets after they were incited that the war is a matter of life or death (death or victory), gunfire, victims, and official security forces trying to keep neutrality, but some places were out of their control and were reported to be bloody atrocities.

While all those concerned with the situation spoke about nipping the schism in the bud and the necessity of keeping away from entrapment and street or general fighting, the army undertook the security task. This help curbed the direct impact of the Beirut Arab University clashes, before which there were confrontations in the streets and districts last Tuesday.
After this bloody week, it may be said that the time for a Lebanese civil war has not come yet. This is not because the political players have instigated their youth, and that some of them are supported by the streets, but because they have to recognize an unconstitutional regulation, the curfew, which is part of the state of emergency. This measure requires a decision from the Cabinet under the President of the Republic. So long as it is an impossible session, in light of such circumstances, the measure was agreed on by everyone. This means that nobody considered this procedural (constitutional) part of the decision, perhaps for political calculations, and not for reluctance to get rid of opponents, even by force. All parties concerned found their interest in this measure, which if it had been taken in different circumstances, the situation would not have been cooled down, and clashes would not have stopped against the official bias. The parties have honestly been committed by the decision; otherwise, any separate patrol could be targeted, as fighting is in full swing. So far, Lebanon has not begun a civil war, but it entered into the logic of civil strife a long time ago, when all factors of clashing were available.

There was an internal and sectarian disagreement over the concept of an independent Lebanon and the role of the State and foreign policy. This division had been latent before the withdrawal of the Syrian forces. But the opposition to the Syrian presence had not had the tools of opposing. In the last parliamentary elections, these opponents won the majority and have become known as the March 14 Forces. This victory provided them with a constitutional tool, which they supposed to be sufficient for an essential peaceful change in Lebanon, especially regarding the nature of its relation with Syria.

However, the subsequent events have blocked this tool, hence the resignations from the government and the shifting of the debate over the treatment of these resignations and their causes away from the constitutional framework: Parliament. The opposition (the Shiite alliance with the Aoun movement) moved the battle to the street to force the government to comply with their demands, which, in the end, is trying to take Lebanon back to the pre-election point in time.

These moves would have been a kind of a political dynamism distinguishing the Lebanese constitutional system. But they came at a time when the constitutional institutions were blocked: the Presidency of the Republic, due to the majority's opposition to the extension of the president's tenure; the House of Representatives, because of the desire of its speaker (who belongs to the opposition) not to shift differences to Parliament where the resolution will be for the majority; and the Cabinet, whose legitimacy is doubted by the President of the Republic and the allied opposition.

Therefore, the constitutional tools were blocked to resolve political differences between parties. The matter would have been just a political and constitutional crisis, which has reoccurred in the history of independent Lebanon more than once. However, blocking the resolution of the crisis is linked to the presence of arms in the hands of non-security forces. That is to say, the State recognizes the presence of legitimate arms outside its bodies, and that the use of these arms is not contingent upon its decision.

The Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975, even though Lebanon entered into the logic of civil strife in 1969, when the arms of the Palestinian resistance in South Lebanon were recognized as legitimate, and when the legitimate armed forces were neutralized in the subsequent internal conflict. The Lebanese were divided over the reality of a State within the State. After that, demands for political participation, reforms, and urgent and social issues were added. Thus, the concept of the State and political authority mixed, leading to involving all the society elements in military fighting.

Today, the elements of civil strife, of which Lebanon has entered its circle, reoccurred when a contradiction surfaced over arms 'legitimatized' by the political hegemony and independent from the State, on the one hand, and the desire to restore the State's sovereignty, on the other. This was exactly what Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah expressed in his speeches, in which he spoke more than once about the negotiations that were held simultaneously with the July War until reaching the UN Resolution 1701, and then his accusations of conspiracy at the government. He exerted efforts to maintain the 'legitimacy' of his arms at a time when the State was trying to find a formula for the unjustifiable continuation of possessing these arms. Here the problem merges with demands for reform, participation, and issues concerning living conditions, thereby aggravating popular categorization, mobilization and incitement.